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Abstract 
From review of historical projects, there is evidence that limitations in contemporary 
safety assurance approaches for software-dependent systems contribute to programmatic 
and certification difficulties, e.g. delays and risk retention. These difficulties arise 
particularly in relation to evaluating risk of systematic behavioural anomalies and 
evidence shortfalls or deficiencies. These findings question the effectiveness of current 
safety assurance approaches. Although these problems are general, this thesis is 
grounded in the context of Australian Defence Force aviation projects. 
Through analysing the purpose of safety assurance standards, this thesis establishes 
principles and guidelines for defining effective safety assurance frameworks for aviation 
systems. The principles and guidelines are used to define a novel integrated framework 
which is responsive to the specific challenges of military aviation systems acquisition. 
The framework qualifies knowledge of risks and uncertainty, focusing on product 
behaviour in the architectural context. It is based on evaluation of properties of 
architecture, including the prevention and tolerance of faults. Knowledge of product 
behaviours is informed by attributes of supporting evidence, and the tolerability of 
limitations in evidence. A key factor in the success of safety assurance standards, in an 
acquisition context, relates to their effectiveness for reducing uncertainty for supplier 
delivery of safety evidence across contracting processes. Thus this thesis also provides a 
method for contracting for the novel integrated framework. 
Evaluation of the principles, guidelines and framework has been conducted through peer 
review via workshop and survey questionnaire, analysis against real world aircraft 
architectures, analysis with respect to historical project data, a constructed example, 
anti-hypothesis analysis, and evaluation as an audit tool and contract evaluation aid on 
several projects. Evaluation on an actual project was not possible. A major factor 
identified in the effectiveness of safety assurance standards is how stakeholders are 
incentivised (or conversely discouraged) in decision making pertaining to product risk 
and evidence. This thesis shows that the novel integrated framework, through 
implementation of the principles and guidelines, could help to avoid the classes of 
project issues observed historically by enabling developers and assessors to focus on 
reasoning about the risks of behavioural properties of products, and in the production of 
evidence used to inform product behaviours. Further evaluation via application to actual 
projects is required to provide more definitive evidence of benefits and limitations. 
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1 Introduction 
Despite the application of contemporary safety and software assurance standards, there 
is evidence of limitations to these approaches contributing to programmatic and 
certification difficulties. This evidence of limitations is drawn from Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) certification activities of aircraft avionics systems and software for the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). Historic ADF projects reveal that contemporary 
approaches do not seem to routinely result in completion of aviation system 
developments within cost and schedule constraints, nor do they achieve difficulty-free 
certification by airworthiness regulators. Evidence supporting these observations exists 
in the form of: 
• failed project approvals due to concerns with limitations in evidence,  
• cost and schedule increases within projects due to emergence of safety issues, or  
• the retention of elevated safety risks by relevant authorities at release to service. 
1.1 Certification Challenges in Australian Defence Force 
Aircraft Avionics Acquisitions and Modifications 
The following sub-sections describe two examples from ADF experience where 
certification challenges have occurred due to evidence shortfalls or late emergence of 
safety risks. 
1.1.1 Flight Control System Example 
Several years ago, the ADF was forced to ground a fleet of their aircraft after a series of 
flight control events during test flying (Australian National Audit Office, 2009). At the 
centre of the problem was the aircraft’s Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS), 
which was intended to reduce the workload of the crew. The AFCS is a single channel 
design which is intended to provide stability augmentation and control of aircraft pitch 
attitude, roll attitude and heading, including autopilot. The AFCS was not intended for 
‘hands off’ operation because it only has limited control authority and the pilot should 
be able to overcome erroneous AFCS behaviours. 
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The ADF undertook an investigation to identify the causes of the flight control 
anomalies, which revealed the following: 
• Erroneous data from faulty air data sensors was being processed by the control 
law computations as valid information, the result being rapid changes to aircraft 
commanded motion. 
• Actuator position sensor or sensor wiring failures caused loss of closed loop 
control reference signals to the AFCS. The result could be control system 
runaway, leading to control actuators moving to their full permissible authority. 
• Limitations in fault tolerance resulted in non-benign responses to the 
aforementioned sources of failures. Further investigation revealed that other 
credible failure scenarios would result in similar non-benign AFCS responses. 
• Changes to the cockpit configuration resulted in anthropometric limitations to the 
range of control input movement, and thus limiting the available manual control 
authority in parts of the flight envelope. As a result, there are parts of the flight 
envelope where the crew may not have sufficient control authority to overcome 
erroneous AFCS commands. 
These factors prompted the ADF to undertake a broader investigation of design 
practices, system safety program and software assurance to seek understanding of how 
these vulnerabilities were introduced. The investigation revealed the following: 
• Aspects of the system safety program for the AFCS design had been conducted 
retrospective to design activities. Safety arguments sought to justify the 
established architectural design and implementation, rather than to influence 
design and architecture via safety design requirements. 
• The design solution was based on a digital computer rather than the analogue 
control system used in former designs to which the historical service history 
related safety arguments applied. 
• Although a simplex architecture, the design solution did not capitalise on 
opportunities for the implementation of additional fault prevention or tolerance. 
• Safety analysis lacked the fidelity and systematic completeness to properly draw 
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of the behaviours of the software under 
identified fault conditions. 
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• Safety evidence associated with external system components such as sensors and 
some actuators did not systematically identify credible failure modes of these 
components. 
• Software development had a process focus. There was limited product focus in 
safety arguments based on evidence produced from software development 
activities. 
• Verification evidence of safety-related behaviours of the system relied heavily on 
the wrong types of verification evidence. 
• The program had already suffered cost and schedule overruns, and thus there was 
commercial pressure to resolve the safety issues swiftly with minimum rework to 
the design. 
• The contract behaved more as an inhibitor to the resolution of safety issues than it 
did as an enabler for resolution. Contractual dispute featured often in discussions. 
• Many of these issues may have been visible, and potentially could have been 
averted either programmatically or technically, had pre-contract processes sought 
the delivery of appropriate evidence pre-contract signature and pre-design review 
milestones. Critical examination of safety arguments earlier in the lifecycle may 
have also revealed those arguments which were later revealed to be inferior. 
Clearly there were many contributing factors in these events. However, an inspection of 
them reveals that several notable themes do emerge. These themes are suitability of 
evidence, argument, architecture, and contractual mechanisms. Take note of these, as 
another example is considered. 
1.1.2 Flight Management System Example 
Recently, the ADF incurred a delay to the release to service of aircraft with an upgraded 
Flight Management Systems (FMS) due to the emergence of safety issues during flight 
test evaluation. These safety issues have emerged in an environment of on-going 
disputes between supplier and acquirer over limitations to the suitability of the evidence 
supporting safety arguments for flight systems for this aircraft. 
The upgrade primarily includes the introduction of the FMS, developed from an existing 
civil aircraft FMS, and modified to provide additional military capabilities and interface 
translation to the existing aircraft mission and flight systems. 
Investigation was undertaken into the safety issues (International Program Office, 
2010), which revealed the following: 
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• Waypoint and leg sequencing errors would potentially result in a deviation from 
flight routes and cause the aircraft to be commanded to fly routes where minimum 
safe altitude clearance may not be preserved.  
• Errors with vertical navigation cues could potentially cause the aircraft to descend 
below minimum safe altitudes during performance based navigation approaches. 
• Inconsistent menu layouts, including the operation of cancel and enter functions, 
between different operating modes and sub-systems, could cause confusion to 
operators when commanding critical flight functions. 
• Incorrect translation and display of flight parameters on other flight systems with 
which the flight management system communicates. 
• The flight management system would routinely degrade to a non-operational state. 
Many of these faults were correlated to safety assurance limitations, as follows: 
• Evidence of requirements analysis and decomposition had weaknesses. 
Requirements, including safety requirements, had not been refined and 
decomposed to abstractions that could be correlated to their implementation. 
Neither could they be verified or validated. 
• Evidence of consideration of sources of software faults lacked the fidelity and 
systematic completeness to properly draw conclusions regarding the 
appropriateness of the behaviours of the software under these fault conditions. 
• Fault handling strategies favoured failing the system to a non-operational state 
rather than provide some resilience against credibly routine sources of faults. The 
strategy for fault avoidance and fault tolerance was inconsistent with functional 
dependability objectives. 
• Software development had a process focus, with the software level assignment 
viewed as the mitigation to sources of software faults. There was minimal product 
focus in safety arguments based on evidence produced from software 
development activities. 
• The trustworthiness of some software evidence was undermined by limitations in 
review and inspection practices. 
• Verification evidence of safety-related behaviours of the system was 
predominantly an implicit bi-product of functional ground and flight testing. Clear 
traceability of evidence of safety verification and validation from software 
development through to flight test was not evident. 
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• The program had already suffered cost and schedule overruns, and thus there was 
commercial pressure to resolve the identified issues rather than re-questioning the 
safety argument and evidence across the design and implementation. 
• Contractual arrangements and software planning artefacts behaved more as 
inhibitors to the safety issues than as enablers for resolution. 
As with the flight control system example, an inspection of the factors relating to the 
flight management system example reveals consistency in the notable themes that 
emerge. Once again we see themes relating to suitability of evidence, argument, 
architecture, and contractual mechanisms. 
1.1.3 Other Examples 
A host of other ADF and international programs have revealed similar themes. This 
includes a range of different projects including unmanned systems, weapons, navigation 
system upgrades, mission system upgrades, etc. Analysis of a range of historical ADF 
programs and their evidence is undertaken within this thesis (refer Chapters 2, 3 and 10) 
to provide confirmation of the themes highlighted in the two aforementioned examples. 
As some of these programs are also cooperative with nations such as the United States 
of America, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and New Zealand; it is 
reasonable to speculate that these issues are not unique to the ADF. 
1.1.4 Identifying the Limitations and Challenges 
The themes that have emerged in the motivating examples relate to limitations in the 
suitability of evidence, argument, architecture, and contractual mechanisms. Elaborating 
these themes provides insight into the limitations from which they originate, and the 
motivations for the challenges to resolve them, as follows: 
• Evidence. Supplier capacity to produce evidence will always be limited because 
there is never unlimited time or money. Therefore it is important they provide 
evidence which materially contributes to assurance of safety. However, rationale 
on how evidence contributes to safety often differs between suppliers, acquirers 
and regulators. Supplier, acquirer, and regulator assessments of the suitability and 
sufficiency of evidence supporting safety arguments will also often differ. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial if there were approaches for achieving consensus 
regarding suitability and sufficiency of evidence. 
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• Argument. Operational authorities use safety arguments from safety cases to 
inform decisions about risk treatment or retention (Defence Aviation Safety 
Authority, 2011). Decisions about risk treatment or retention are product focused, 
and relate to hazard mitigations provided by design features, controls or guards, 
workarounds and operator intervention. But safety arguments relating to software 
intensive systems often have a greater process focus, rather than product focus. 
This makes operational decisions about risk treatments or retention difficult. 
While it is possible to make software safety arguments product focused, as shown 
by (Weaver, 2003), this approach is not routinely encountered in real project 
aviation system safety arguments outside of the UK. The argument also influences 
the production of evidence; hence an inferior argument can lead to inferior 
evidence production. 
• Architecture. Design mitigations to hazards are achieved from deliberately 
designed behaviours of a system, many of which emerge from architectural 
properties of a system. However when fault avoidance and fault tolerance 
architectural properties are overlooked, the systems in the motivating examples 
have become prone to hazardous behaviours. For more serious hazards, the 
motivating examples indicate that single defences were inadequate. Hence 
approaches are required for achieving consensus between suppliers, acquirers and 
regulators regarding the suitability of architecture in the presence of faults. 
• Contracts. For many military aviation system developments, the relationships 
between supplier, acquirer and regulator are articulated through a contract. 
However, the evidence suggests that contractual arrangements don’t seem to be 
helping with the resolution of safety issues; in fact the evidence is that it may be 
inhibiting effective resolution within cost and schedule constraints. Ambiguity 
and uncertainty seem to be significant factors. However, there are many 
opportunities within contractual establishment processes that could be exploited to 
improve this circumstance. 
1.1.5 Addressing the Limitations and Challenges 
Despite the on-going application of contemporary assurance standards, safety issues and 
limitations in safety evidence are still the causes of cost and schedule overruns for 
projects. Likewise they continue to contribute to difficulties in airworthiness regulators 
completing certification free from risk retention. It is these issues that have provided 
motivation for the research presented within this thesis. The thesis proposition provides 
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insight into how the author proposes to address the issues relating to evidence, 
argument, architecture and contracts in the context of military aviation systems. 
1.2 Defining the Key Concepts 
Great importance is placed upon the terminology used. Terms like evidence, argument 
and architecture have emerged, as have concepts of decisions on risk treatments and 
retention, safety cases, and assurance. Therefore in order to ensure consistent 
interpretation, it is important that the terminology and concepts are defined. It is also 
important to note that some of these concepts and terms may take on more specific 
meaning than those attributed under general English language interpretation. 
Furthermore, there is a proliferation of sometimes conflicting definitions for some of 
these terms throughout the safety community. Hence this section also serves the purpose 
of articulating which interpretation applies to the work described by this thesis. Every 
effort has been made to adopt terms defined by pre-existing and recognised literature, 
however where necessary this thesis provides a ‘local’ definition of terms. 
A goal of this thesis is to assist with the achievement of safety. 
Safety 
The expectation that a system does not, under defined conditions, lead to a state in 
which human life is endangered. 
Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 2 (Ministry of Defence, 1996) 
When safety is not achieved, accidents may occur. Hence a goal to achieve safety is a 
goal to prevent accidents or reduce their impact on human life. 
Accident 
An unintended event, or sequence of events, that causes harm. Where harm is defined as 
death, physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the 
environment. 
Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
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In contemporary practice the achievement of safety is articulated and justified through a 
safety case. 
Safety Case 
A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given 
operating environment.
1
 
Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
The Safety Case is a key artefact used for the certification of systems. 
Certification 
The end result, which is usually recorded in a certificate, of a process that formally 
examines and documents compliance of a product against pre-defined requirements to 
the satisfaction of the certifying authority. 
Local Definition adapted from (Wade, 2009) 
Core to the safety case is the concept of the safety argument. 
Safety Argument 
A logically stated and convincingly demonstrated reason why safety requirements are 
met. 
 Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
Arguments can be defined in more general terms. 
Argument 
An argument is a rationale in which the reason presents evidence in support of a claim 
made in the conclusion.  Its purpose is to provide a basis for believing the conclusion to 
be true. 
 (Mayes, 2013) 
Arguments are one of two kinds of rationale.  
                                                 
1 This definition implies that all safety cases are compelling, comprehensible and valid. This may not 
always be the case, but should be true of ‘acceptable’ safety cases. 
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Rationale 
Rationales are models used to reveal the logical relationships underlying our reasoning 
There are two types of rationale: argument and explanation. 
 (Mayes, 2013) 
In this thesis rationale is used where both argument and explanation are implied. 
Explanation 
An explanation is a rationale in which the reason presents a cause of some fact 
represented by the conclusion. Its purpose is to help us understand how or why that fact 
occurs. 
 (Mayes, 2013) 
Confidence is achieved through the concept of assurance. 
Assurance 
Adequate confidence and evidence, through due process, that safety requirements have 
been met. 
 Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
The other core aspect of the safety case is evidence which supports both the safety 
argument and the assurance of the safety argument. 
Evidence 
Information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid. 
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
A widely used strategy for arguing safety is to argue that all risks have been reduced to 
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  
Risk 
Combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm.  
  Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
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As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
A risk is ALARP when it has been demonstrated that the cost of any further Risk 
Reduction, where the cost includes the loss of Defence capability as well as financial or 
other resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that Risk 
Reduction. 
Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
Risks are reduced by treating either likelihood or severity, or both. It is common 
practice to use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assess risk, although further 
discussion on the merits and drawbacks of PRA are discussed later in this thesis. 
Systematic identification of risks implies a systematic identification of hazards from 
which risks emerge. 
Hazard 
A physical situation or state of a system, often following from some initiating event, that 
may lead to an accident. 
Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
The initiating event leading to a hazardous state is a failure. 
Failure 
An event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service. A service 
fails either because it does not comply with the functional specification, or because this 
specification did not adequately describe the system function. A service failure is a 
transition from correct service to incorrect service, i.e., to not implementing the system 
function. 
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) 
The deviation that causes the failure is called an error. 
Error 
A deviation of the external state of the system from the correct service state.  
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) 
The cause of an error is a fault. 
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Fault 
The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. Faults can be internal or external to a 
system. The prior presence of a vulnerability, i.e., an internal fault that enables an 
external fault to harm the system, is necessary for an external fault to cause an error 
and possibly subsequent failure(s). 
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) 
Succinctly, (Avizienis, et al., 2004) depicts the relationship between fault, error and 
failure as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Fault, Error and Failure relationships 
Since the development of the digital computer, software has played an increasingly 
important role in the control and operation of safety-related functions. 
Software 
Computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documentation and data 
pertaining to the operation of a computer system. 
IEEE 610.12 (IEEE, 1991) 
Faults can be characterized as either random or systematic. Faults in software are 
systematic (Weaver, 2003), and thus can’t be characterised by random process models.  
Systematic Fault 
Faults caused by design and implementation errors made by developers (i.e. humans or 
tools) during system design, development or manufacture, or by human error during 
operation or maintenance. 
Local Definition adapted from (Weaver, 2003) 
Hence assessing the likelihood of a systematic software fault cannot use probabilistic 
methods. Historically safety cases have argued the safety of software based on an appeal 
to the development processes. However (Weaver, 2003) and the examples at the start of 
this introduction showed why this may not be sufficient. 
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1.3 Thesis Proposition 
This thesis investigates the following proposition: 
It is feasible to establish principles for defining effective safety assurance 
frameworks. These principles enable frameworks to be developed to satisfy safety 
objectives for military aviation systems in typical acquisition contexts. 
This proposition is supported: 
• by showing that the principles are based on concepts that preserve the benefits and 
reduce the limitations of existing assurance paradigms for the military 
certification situation; 
• by examining the principles in the practical context of historical military aviation 
system projects; and 
• through the development and application of a novel integrated framework for 
assurance of aviation software systems, addressing identified deficiencies in 
existing assurance frameworks. 
1.4 Research Paradigm, Activities and Criterion 
The research presented within this thesis is based on a form of engaged scholarship 
defined by (Van de Ven, 2007) as Design and Evaluation Research. This form of 
research examines questions dealing with design and evaluation of models for solving 
practical problems. It includes an undertaking to provide a plausible explanation of the 
problem, as well as the collection and analysis of evidence-based knowledge of the 
feasibility and usefulness of the proposed approach to applied problems. While this 
approach differs to more traditional forms of basic science which are used to describe, 
explain or predict a phenomenon, it is necessary because the problems motivating this 
research are practical rather than theoretical problems.  
Contributions from theoretical research are amalgamated into this research, and are thus 
described by this thesis. However the focus is with respect to the practical problem and 
means of addressing the problem. This leads to an important assumption behind this 
work. The approach described by this thesis provides a framework focused at providing 
a pragmatic solution within the constraints imposed by stakeholders to the problem. To 
achieve this, the approach may make compromises of theoretical perspectives in 
exchange for pragmatism and practicality where there is benefit to either execution or 
outcome. Where deviations from theoretical perspective exist, this thesis identifies and 
provides rationale for them.  
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This research provides a practical contribution to knowledge by addressing the criterion 
and questions posed by the study activities of (Van de Ven, 2007) model for engaged 
scholarship, summarised as follows: 
• Relevance of the research is addressed by demonstrating that the problem 
formulation is based on historical experience of the industrial application of 
contemporary safety assurance paradigms by suppliers, acquirers and regulators. 
• Validity of the research is addressed by demonstrating that the general principles 
of the approach are based on deduction, induction or abduction of strengths and 
weaknesses of the practical application of contemporary safety assurance 
paradigms. 
• Truth (Verisimilitude) of the research is addressed by demonstrating that it is 
plausible that the approach proposed by this thesis provides a better result than 
contemporary safety assurance paradigms through examination of the approach 
against historical project evidence, a constructed example based on real system 
designs, survey review by stakeholders familiar with the problems, and 
application to a current project as an evaluation tool. This thesis doesn’t strive to 
show that the approach developed here is the mature end point for this research; 
instead it shows that the approach offers benefits over existing approaches. This is 
an acceptable research goal according to (Van de Ven, 2007)’s model. 
• Impact of the research is addressed by engaging stakeholders to interpret the 
feasibility and usefulness through communication, interpretation and negotiation 
of the findings through participative evaluation activities, such as surveys, and 
through the findings presented within this thesis.  
1.5 Thesis Scope 
Due to their holistic nature, the research question and thesis proposition posed in 
Sections 1.1.4, 1.1.5 and 1.3 could be potentially interpreted as a very encompassing, 
leading to a lack of bounds on the work. This is not the intent, and the research question 
and thesis proposition presented within this introduction are intended only to give 
readers a general introduction to the topic of research. In order to provide a more 
tangible and thus measureable body of work within this thesis, Chapter 2 uses the 
literature survey to provide a more extensive explanation of the limitations and 
challenges introduced in Section 1.1 and uses these to define a detailed research 
question and thesis proposition (refer Chapter 2). 
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1.6 Thesis Structure and Layout 
This thesis is structured into the following chapters: 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of literature on the certification of safety-related aviation 
systems and the associated contemporary approaches for safety assurance. Limitations 
with the current approaches are identified and explained, and potential treatments to the 
limitations are described and compared. Based on the limitations a detailed research 
question is stated and an elaborated thesis proposition presented. 
Chapter 3 establishes general principles for safety assurance frameworks that are used 
throughout the thesis for the development of assurance frameworks for architectural, 
claims and evidence assurance. These general principles are also used in the evaluation 
to evaluate the proposed assurance frameworks against motivating issues. A constructed 
example is introduced that is used throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis for 
explaining and evaluating the proposed assurance framework. 
Chapter 4 focuses on architectural assurance. The chapter summarises the concepts of 
fail-safe design, fault avoidance and tolerance. An examination of the architectures and 
fault avoidance/tolerance behaviours of real world aviation software systems is 
presented, and correlated to the principles of the fail safe design from the systematic 
failure perspective. Observations regarding the handling of systematic faults by the real 
world systems and the consideration of the fail-safe design criteria in this context lead 
to the development and explanation of meta-arguments for architectural assurance, and 
the definition of the Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) concept. 
Chapter 5 focuses on product behavioural knowledge. The chapter summarises the role 
of knowledge of product behaviours in safety arguments and examines contemporary 
approaches to providing assurance of safety arguments. Using principles derived from 
contemporary approaches for safety arguments and software assurance, meta-arguments 
for assurance of product behaviours are defined, and the Claims Safety Assurance Level 
(CSAL) is developed and explained. The relationship between ASALs and CSALs is 
also explained. 
Chapter 6 focuses on evidence assurance. The chapter describes a categorisation of 
evidence types and discusses the roles of differing evidence types. The chapter proposes 
the concept of ‘Tolerability of Limitations’ and defines the Evidence Safety Assurance 
Level (ESAL) based on this concept. The impact on evidence assurance is described 
with respect to properties of evidence including relevance, trustworthiness and results. 
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Chapter 7 describes the challenges of the certification environment of aviation systems 
in both the civil and military contexts. Unique circumstances of the military context are 
identified as challenges for achieving assurance objectives, most specifically being the 
need to articulate and enforce the assurance requirements via contract rather than 
legislation. Contracting paradigms are examined, as are acquisition paradigms. An 
approach is proposed for contracting for the assurance of military aviation systems, for 
which a specific instantiation for the ASAL/ESAL/CSAL frameworks is described. 
Guidance on the conduct of tender and contract execution processes is also provided. 
Chapter 8 details the historical problems of relating assurance to risk evaluation. The 
chapter examines alternatives to probabilities in risk matrices and re-defines risk based 
on a strength of defences paradigm.  
Chapter 9 recognises that there are a number of assumptions that may impact the 
feasibility of the proposed framework These include imperfect hazard analysis, the 
suitability of architectural factors, independence, managing change, and systems of 
systems.   
Chapter 10 describes how the proposed approaches have been evaluated. The 
evaluation of the work is based on peer and survey review, review of historical project 
evidence, anti-hypothesis analysis, application of the framework to a constructed 
example based on real system designs, application of the framework to a current project 
as an audit/evaluation tool. 
Chapter 11 presents the conclusions established from this body of research work. It 
describes the extent to which the work presented in the previous chapters supports the 
thesis proposition, and identifies topics for future work. 
The body of this thesis is supplemented with additional supporting material presented in 
several Appendixes, as follows: 
Appendix A presents the technical description of architectural fault avoidance and fault 
tolerance mechanisms of actual aviation systems including the flight control systems of 
the Boeing 777, Airbus A330, C-17A, and F/A-18A/B; and the flight management 
systems or mission computers of the Boeing 777, Airbus A330 / KC-30A, F/A-18A/B, 
and C-130J.  
Appendix B presents the taxonomy of attributes of software lifecycle products 
referenced by Chapter 5. 
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Appendix C provides an example Tender/Contract Statement of Requirement (SOR), 
Statement of Work (SOW), Data Requirements List (TDRL/CDRL) and the associated 
Data Item Descriptors (DIDs) for the contracting framework described in Chapter 7. 
Appendix D provides the survey evaluation forms and results 
Appendix E summarises the results of the review of historical projects. 
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2 Survey of Assurance of Evidence for Safety Cases 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the notion that contemporary approaches to safety assurance are 
not routinely resulting in completion of aviation system developments within cost and 
schedule constraints. Nor are they achieving difficulty-free certification by 
airworthiness regulators. Safety issues and limitations in safety evidence are often the 
causes of cost and schedule overruns for projects. Experience in military aviation 
systems suggests that these outcomes are the result of limitations in evidence, argument, 
and architecture; and the articulation of requirements for these in contracts between 
suppliers, acquirers and regulators.  
This chapter expands the introduction by presenting a survey and analysis of current 
standards, literature and applicable research on the safety assurance of aviation systems. 
The intent is to summarise the current approaches for the purposes of analysing and 
emphasising the benefits and limitations with these approaches. The chapter also 
provides the context for the contribution made by this research. Additional survey 
material is also introduced within later chapters as required to establish and 
contextualise the explanation of the author’s contributions.  
This chapter is divided is divided into the following sections: 
• Background on Certification for Safety-related Aviation Systems – The 
process by which regulators undertake safety certification of aviation systems, and 
the opportunities and constraints of these processes. 
• Communication and Enforcement of Certification Requirements using 
Contracts – Outlines the issues for contracts communicating certification 
requirements. 
• Current Approaches for Safety-related Aviation Systems – The current 
industrial approaches, including standards, for developing and evaluating safety-
related aviation systems. 
• Background on the Safety / Risk Case – The use of the safety case or risk case 
in certification evaluations and for informing decisions on operational risk 
treatment or retention. The structure of the safety case and the techniques for 
presenting safety arguments and reasoning about evidence. 
• A Discussion of Current Approaches for Safety-related Aviation Systems – A 
comparison of the benefits and limitations of the current industrial approaches. 
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• Potential Approaches to Addressing the Limitations with Current 
Approaches – Emphasises the focus for research that offers solutions to the 
problems with the current approaches. 
• Thesis Contribution – Based on the survey presented, the research questions and 
contribution of this thesis is described. 
2.2 Background on Certification of Safety-related Aviation 
Systems 
2.2.1 The Concept of Certification 
A local definition for certification was introduced in Section 1.2 which was adapted 
from (Wade, 2009). For aircraft designs this means that certification is the process that 
examines and documents compliance of the aircraft or aircraft modification (i.e. the 
product) against pre-defined ‘airworthiness’ requirements and standards to the 
satisfaction of the certifying authority.  
Similar interpretations of certification also exist for products within the domains of 
military equipment, railways, power generation, manufacturing and processing plants, 
and medical devices. Although it should be emphasised that the processes and 
certificates by which this is achieved, and the frameworks and regulations governing 
such activities may be notably different to aviation. There are also differences between 
civil and military aircraft certification approaches, but these shall be elaborated in 
forthcoming paragraphs. 
Other areas of the aviation sector (e.g. parts manufacturing and maintenance venues), 
and also entirely different domains (e.g.  quality assurance, insurance and finance) may 
also use a broader definition of certification that encompasses process and/or 
organisational compliance, perhaps in addition to product compliance. 
These product, process and organisational certification themes are reflected in the 
following definitions of certification identified from the literature: 
• “To attest by a certificate”,  where a certificate is “a writing on paper certifying 
to the truth of something”  (The Macquarie Library, 2002) 
• “An official document attesting a fact, in particular” (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 
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• “The process of assuring that a product or process has certain stated properties, 
which are then recorded in a certificate” (Committee on Certifiably Dependable 
Software Systems, 2007) 
• “The end result of a process that formally examines and documents compliance of 
a product, process or organisation against pre-defined requirements to the 
satisfaction of the certifying authority.” (Wade, 2009) 
• “Legal recognition by a certifying authority that a product, service or 
organisation complies with applicable requirements. Such certification comprises 
the activity of checking the product, service, organisation or person and the 
formal recognition of compliance with the applicable requirements by issue of 
certificate, license, approval or other document as required by national law or 
procedures. In particular, certification of a product involves: 
(a) the process of assuring the design of a product to ensure that it complies 
with a set of standards applicable to that type of product so as to 
demonstrate an acceptable level of safety, (acceptable risk); 
(b) the process of assessing an individual product to ensure that it conforms to 
the certified type design; 
(c) the issue of any certificate required by national laws to declare that 
compliance or conformity has been found with applicable standards in 
accordance with item(a). (Aviation Glossary, 2012) 
A number of important points should be made about these definitions.  
Firstly, while the emphasis in the dictionary definitions pertains to the issuance of a 
certificate, the industrial engineering definitions of certification emphasise it as a 
process of assessing compliance/achievement, not just the act of issuing the certificate. 
The act of recording the results in a certificate is simply the final step in the process.  
Secondly, certification involves at least two parties – an applicant and a certifying 
authority, and sometimes three if independent assessors are involved. The role of the 
certifying authority is to evaluate the evidence presented by the applicant against the 
pre-defined requirements and standards, and determine compliance/achievement. This 
differs somewhat from the concept of ‘self-certification’, which implies emphasis on 
attestation rather than on evaluation by an independent certifying authority. However, 
the certifying authority may require the applicant to self-certify their 
compliance/achievement as a component of the evidence that the certifying authority 
examines. 
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Thirdly, certification requires that pre-defined requirements and standards be specified 
as the benchmark for certification. The applicant and the certifying authority require a 
common benchmark against which evidence can be produced by the applicant, and the 
evidence evaluated by the certifying authority. The role of standards is discussed further 
in Section 2.2.2. 
Finally, certifications of products that can cause harm inevitably involve the 
determination of the level of risk. Hence safety is a fundamental element of certification 
for aviation systems. 
As this thesis is concerned with the product safety aspects (i.e. acceptable/tolerable 
safety risk) of aviation systems, discussion regarding process and organisational 
compliance will be limited to where they form part of existing standards, contemporary 
approaches or sources of evidence. The emphasis throughout this thesis will be product 
safety achievement. Hence, in the context of the product focus of the certification 
definitions provided, this thesis examines ways that the supplier and certifying authority 
relationship can effectively and practically achieve product safety with acceptable risk. 
2.2.2 Role of Standards in Certification 
Standards are fundamental to certification because they: 
• are often used as a tool for communicating certification requirements; 
• may also be used as a preferred means or guidance for demonstrating or assessing 
compliance for certification requirements; 
• provide a way of packaging requirements for a specific topic or technology; 
• reduce subjectivity of general principles they embody; 
• reduce variability of acceptable solutions to specific problems;  
• provide a way of providing re-use of certification benchmarks; and 
• are developed by a process of consensus amongst relevant stakeholders, which 
may include input from both applicant and certifying authority stakeholders. 
However, the effectiveness of standards achieving these fundamentals depends on the 
type of standard. The following sub-section examines the different types of standards, 
and how the type of standard may benefit or limit its effectiveness. 
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2.2.3 Types of Standards 
(McDermid & Rae, 2012) propose that there are different types of standards:  
• those that relate to technical aspects of products,  
• those that relate to whole products, and  
• those that relate to process.  
Standards for Technical Aspects of Products 
An example of a standard relating to technical aspects of a product is G88-05 “Standard 
Guide for Designing Systems for Oxygen Service” (ASTM International, 2005). This 
standard defines specific performance and safety requirements for oxygen systems 
including material selection, design methods, causal factors to fire risks, test methods, 
acceptability criteria, and approaches than minimise risk of a fire. The standard is 
flexible enough to permit design of oxygen systems for applications such as medical 
devices, aircraft oxygen systems, air separation plants, and spacecraft, while capturing 
the fundamental product features and safety devices that should be incorporated to 
produce an acceptably safe oxygen system design. Many other such standards exist 
covering technological aspects of aviation systems products including: 
• environmental requirements (temperature, humidity, dust, vibration, shock, etc.),  
• electromagnetic compatibility,  
• electronic circuit board design,  
• electrical wiring,  
• pneumatic systems,  
• hydraulic systems,  
• structural integrity, etc.  
Standards for Whole Products 
Somewhat more encompassing are those standards that relate to a whole product (e.g. 
complete aircraft, ship, railway; or whole system). Some examples are:  
• Aircraft certification standards such as Title 14 code of Federal Regulations Part 
25 Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes (National Archives 
and Records Administration, 2012) or the equivalent European standard. 
• Aircraft systems standards such as Technical Standard Order (TSO) TSO-C129a 
Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using GPS (FAA, 1996).  
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Standards for Processes 
Finally, there are the process standards. Some examples of these standards are: 
• System Safety Standards such as Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754 
(SAE Aerospace, 2010), Defence Standard 00-56 (Ministry of Defence, 2007), 
MIL-STD-882 (US DoD, 2000), and Def (Aust) 5679 (Australian Department of 
Defence, 2006). 
• Software Lifecycle Standards such as ISO/IEC 12207 (ISO/IEC, 2008) 
Additional Classifications of Standards 
Further to the product and process distinction identified in the paragraphs above, 
standards maybe classified as prescriptive or goal-based, although some standards may 
incorporate elements of both paradigms. Prescriptive standards are used by certifying 
authorities to tell applicants what to achieve (i.e. outcomes or objectives), and how to go 
about it (i.e. methods and techniques). Goal-based standards, on the other hand, set 
objectives saying what has to be achieved (i.e. outcomes or objectives), but don’t saying 
how to go about it (although supplemental guidance may provide examples of how to 
comply).  
There is substantial academic and industrial debate regarding the preference for 
prescriptive or goal-based standards. Table 1 provides a summarising model produced 
by the author of the benefits and limitations of prescriptive versus goal-based standards 
incorporating arguments made by: 
• (McDermid & Rae, 2012)  
• (Committee on Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007) 
• (Kelly, 2008) 
• (Kelly, et al., 2005)  
Table 1 highlights that there is both a symmetry (italicised) and asymmetry (underlined 
italicised) between the benefits and limitations of the approaches. The collective 
symmetric properties for each approach define the paradigm, and this influences 
perceptions regarding the utility of the approaches depending on the ‘world-view’ of the 
supplier and certifying authority (McDermid & Rae, 2012). This leads to the 
perspectives (variability and subjectivity) reflected in the asymmetric properties of each 
approach. The effects of these benefits and limitations will be examined in more detail 
in Section 2.3 as they apply to safety assurance standards. 
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 Goal-based Prescriptive 
B
en
ef
it
 
Flexible: Provides greater flexibility for 
suppliers’ solutions, encouraging 
novelty and technology innovation in 
solutions.  
Methodisible. Selection of techniques 
and methods can be based on a specific 
system, problem or design solution. 
Enduring: Standards do not require 
updating in response to changes in 
technology or knowledge of 
techniques/methods. 
Deductive: The intent of the standard 
will follow directly from the outcomes 
and objectives it specifies. 
 
Adjuring: Requires suppliers to do enough of 
the things (i.e. techniques, methods, solutions) 
the regulator views as right. 
Educating: Provides a means of educating 
potential suppliers on the right approaches. 
Uniformity: Minimises variation in approaches 
used to conform, and thus simplifies the 
regulator evaluation. 
Assessable-invariability: Strong prescriptions 
may reduce variability of assessor 
assessments. 
 
L
im
it
a
ti
o
n
s 
Abjuring: May not provide a clear 
benchmark of the things the regulator 
views as right. May provide too much 
flexibility for suppliers, leading to 
confusion. 
Non-educating: Does not provide a 
means of educating potential suppliers 
on the right approaches, only acceptable 
outcomes. 
Non-uniformity: May result in 
unnecessary variation in approaches 
used to conform, and thus may 
complicate the regulator evaluation. 
Assessable-subjectivity: Assessments of 
the extent to which achievement of goals 
is compelling may differ between 
assessors. 
Inflexible: Limits supplier choice, and thus 
potentially inhibits novelty and innovation in 
design.  
Non-methodisible: Selection of techniques and 
methods is based on prescriptions rather than 
being based on a specific system, problem or 
design solution. 
Non-enduring: Standards may require frequent 
updating in response to changes in technology 
or knowledge of techniques/methods, or the 
standards may end ‘out of date’. 
Inductive: The desired rationale for the 
prescriptions achieving the outcomes may not 
be compelling nor absolute. 
 
Table 1: Benefits/Limitations of Goal-based and Prescriptive Standards 
2.2.4 Empowerment of Certification Environments 
Another factor affecting certification and the usage of standards as certification 
requirements or benchmarks is the way the certification authority is empowered, and 
thus how enforcements of certification requirements is achieved. This is best illustrated 
by examining the differences between the civilian and military aviation certification 
environments. 
Civil Aviation Certification 
Consider the civil aviation certification environment. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), the civil aviation airworthiness regulator in the United States of 
America, issues certificates for new and modified aircraft and aircraft equipment. This 
certification is relied upon by the customers (owners and operators) who purchase and 
operate the aircraft. The FAA approach is also common to other civil aviation National 
 42  
Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs) around the world (e.g. Australia – Civil Aviation 
Safety Authority (CASA), UK – Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Europe – European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)).  
In this environment the roles of the developer, manufacturer, owner, operator and 
regulator are typically separated amongst different organisations or entities. This 
separation affords each of these entities some opportunity for independence in their 
function. For example, the owner and operator might be the same organisation (e.g. 
Qantas), whereas the supplier/developer/manufacturer might be an aircraft 
developer/manufacturer (e.g. Airbus or Boeing), and the regulator is a government 
agency (e.g. FAA, CAA, CASA, EASA). In addition, the prime developer and 
manufacturer are supported by a suite of sub-contractors that develop and manufacture 
aircraft systems and subcomponents. 
It is important to note that the civil regulator is supported by regulations that are 
indoctrinated in law, and are therefore legally enforceable by the regulator onto those to 
which they apply (developer and manufacturer). For example, in Australia the Air 
Navigation Act 1920 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1920), and the Civil Aviation Act 
1988 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1988) define ‘Australian’ aircraft, for which CASA 
are responsible for promulgating and enforcing Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 
(CASRs). The regulations effectively become an extension of the law. The CASRs then 
communicate the certification requirements and CASA performs compliance assurance 
against them.  A similar arrangement exists for the United States (United States of 
America, 2012) and UK/European environments. 
Because they are enforceable by law, then most civil aviation suppliers factor the costs 
of undertaking this certification into their underlying business model and project 
costing. Those that don’t, find themselves with a non-viable business model. The 
existence of consultancy businesses that specialise in guiding and recovering aircraft 
system developments with respect to civil certification requirements, is evidence of the 
seriousness with which developers are required to comply with certification 
requirements. Some examples of such business are listed at (Airsearch, 2008), with a 
specific example being (Certification Services, Inc., 2012)). However, it also suggests 
that naivety of certification requirements by prospective suppliers is also commonplace. 
While all new aircraft developments represent a business gamble by the developer, their 
gamble is with the airline market buying their product, not with the certification 
authority on the production of certification evidence and compliance with certification 
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requirements. The supplier is incentivised to comply with certification requirements; 
else they can’t sell their product when it is completed. After all, no airline would buy an 
aircraft or aircraft system which didn’t achieve certification in the civil context. 
Military Aviation Certification 
However, in the military aviation certification environment the regulator is not so 
overtly independent of the acquirer. Unlike civilian aviation arrangements, many 
militaries around the world are owners, operators and regulators; and to some extent 
developers and manufacturers. The militaries are their own regulators or airworthiness 
authorities because they require flexibility to do things civilian operators would never 
need, such as: low flying, combat, close proximity flying, special modifications, stores 
clearances, contingency maintenance, battle damage repair, and operational imperatives 
involving safety versus capability trade-offs; none of which are regulated by the civil 
authorities (Wade, 2009). This situation is reflected in the way militaries are empowered 
by laws to perform this regulation. For example laws pertaining to empowering the 
military (e.g. Defence acts, etc.), and workplace health and safety legislation (refer to 
Table 2) are the legal mechanisms used to delegate the responsibility for airworthiness. 
These military airworthiness authorities typically define regulations that govern the 
conduct of their activities, however unlike the civil regulations, these regulations are 
open to discretion by the military regulator/authority to allow trade-offs between 
providing capability and safety based on the current military climate (e.g. war 
operations, peace support, counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance, peacetime 
training, etc. (Royal Australian Air Force, 2007)). For example, in Australia the Air 
Navigation Act of 1920 (Commonwealth of Australia, 1920) defines ‘State’ aircraft and 
designates the Chief of the Air Force (CAF) as the Defence Aviation Authority for Air 
Force, Army and Navy aircraft. Through internal Defence Instructions (DI(G) OPS 2-2 
Defence Aviation Safety Program (Defence Aviation Safety Authority, 2011)), 
airworthiness management is separated into technical and operational responsibilities. 
The instruction also distinguishes the functions of the regulators (i.e. the entities that 
write the technical and operational regulations) versus the authorities (i.e. the entities 
that are responsible for interpreting the regulations and making the discretionary trade-
offs (via risk treatment or retention) between capability and safety). 
To illustrate this point, Table 2 identifies the military airworthiness laws, orders, 
regulations and publications applicable to airworthiness certification that were reviewed 
in the conduct of this survey for the ADF, United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence 
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(MoD), and United States Department of Defense (United States Air Force (USAF), 
United States Navy (USN), and United States Army). 
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Table 2: Military Airworthiness Certification Laws, Orders and Publications 
Unlike the civil airworthiness regulations, the military airworthiness regulations are 
typically described in military orders, instructions and publications which constitute 
lawful orders to those military and civilian government staff applying them (i.e. the 
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regulator, acquirer, and operator). However, they are not necessarily legally binding to 
those developers and manufactures (i.e. suppliers) supplying equipment to the military. 
Instead the contract between supplier and acquirer is the primary means by which 
requirements are set for suppliers and by which compliance and enforcement of these 
requirements is achieved. Military contracts typically achieve this by ensuring that 
relevant contract clauses between their suppliers and government reference the 
applicable regulations and safety standards. However the earlier discussion highlights 
that referencing regulations and safety standard may not be all that’s required by the 
contact, and that the contract may also need to establish the roles and relationships 
between supplier and certifying authority. 
Contracts are instruments which provide a legally binding agreement for the 
purchase/exchange of goods or services. A contract normally consists of terms and 
conditions, and is supported by technical annexes to define the requirements for 
goods/services and scope of work. For aviation systems, contracts are used for the 
acquisition and/or modification of these systems between the developer/manufacturer 
(i.e. supplier) and the owner or operator (i.e. acquirer). While there is a branch of legal 
studies associated with contract law, this law pertains to the lawful execution of 
contracts, and not the enforcement of certification requirements within contracts. 
Comparison of Military and Civil Certification Environments 
In the civil case, suppliers were incentivised by the laws and by a motivation to sell 
their product. They also desire to not become bankrupt in doing so. However in the 
military context, the role of the contract changes the sources of incentivisation. The 
laws and motivation to sell the product are no longer the key incentive; instead the 
incentive is contractual compliance while preserving profit margins. Motivation to sell 
their product is limited because the contract already guarantees payment if they achieve 
contractual compliance. The legal responsibility for airworthiness and safety mostly 
falls onto the acquirer because of the way the responsibilities are empowered by law. 
Health and safety laws do provide some incentive for suppliers to develop products with 
safety in mind; however because prosecution under these laws tends to only occur 
retrospective to an accident, they are not in isolation effective certification incentives.  
Hence it can be seen that the means for communicating, incentivising and enforcement 
of certification requirements differs between the civilian (i.e. laws and regulations) and 
military (i.e. contracts) aviation system cases. This variation occurs even though the role 
of regulators in these two domains is holistically similar, as are some of their practices 
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in the conduct of certification processes. Therefore, it is apparent that there are 
differences between the role of the civil airworthiness authorities, and some military 
regulators and airworthiness authorities. The differences are particularly notable with 
respect to the level of independence of the regulator from the other entities in the 
certification environment (owner, and operator), and the potential for incentives and 
legal enforcement of their requirements. 
Other Certification Environments 
Outside the scope of airworthiness, separate provisions apply to safety in society, as 
well as the regulation of technologies that are not aircraft. Parallels can be drawn with 
regards to the regulation of these other technologies (e.g. Ships, Vehicles, Weapons, 
etc.) and the aviation case.  
There are also other industries outside the aviation industry where the regulator plays a 
very much more passive role than in the aviation case. Consider consumer product 
safety. In this industry regulations and standards are empowered by consumer product, 
environmental and health and safety laws. However, the regulator is much more passive 
than in the aviation case. Responsibility for complying rests solely with the supplier for 
the demonstration and assessment of requirements and standard, including safety, with 
regulators focusing on recall of products and legal prosecution of suppliers who don’t 
comply. The ‘CE’ marking used on consumer products is an example of such suppler 
‘self-certification’. Such an environment changes significantly the behaviours of 
suppliers from those in the more active regulator environment. Instead decisions 
regarding safety and production of safety evidence will often be treated as commercial 
decisions based on trade-offs between benefits and business risk (Docker, 2011).  
The Contract is Important! 
The focus of this thesis is on military aviation systems, and as such the role of the 
contract in communicating and enforcing certification requirements is important. The 
contract must communicate certification requirements, provide incentives for suppliers 
to comply and provide mechanisms for enforcement when suppliers don’t comply. 
Section 2.3 will examine the way military contract authorities communicate and manage 
enforcement of certification requirements. 
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2.3 Communication and Enforcement of Certification 
Requirements using Contracts 
In Section 2.2 the importance of the contract was highlighted for the military 
airworthiness certification environment. To understand how certification requirements 
are communicated and enforced by the contract, it is important to understand the 
constraints on contracts for military programs. The following sub-sections describe the 
principal constraints, and provide background on why it is important that an assurance 
framework can work within these constraints. 
2.3.1 Government Preference for Fixed Price Contracts 
(Defense Contract Management Agency, 2012) summarises that there are numerous 
different contracting paradigms, which can be generally categorised as follows2: 
• fixed-price contracts (fixed price, fixed price with economic adjustment, fixed 
price incentive),  
• cost-plus contracts (cost plus award, cost plus fixed fee, cost plus incentive),  
• time and materials contracts,  
• performance or outcome based frameworks,  
• cost and schedule risk sharing arrangements such as accords, alliances, and 
cooperative agreements, etc.  
Contracts may also incorporate elements of several of these paradigms into one single 
contract. For example, the performance-based paradigm may apply to those elements of 
a contracting specifying service delivery requirements, whereas compliance with 
airworthiness requirements and product delivery is often achieved using fixed-price 
contract arrangements. 
Reasons for Fixed-price Contract Preference 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2012) defines a fixed-price contract as “a contract in 
which the price remains unchanged for the period of the contract except for agreed 
contract scope changes or variations in escalation and exchange rates if applicable.” 
The fixed-price contract relies on the premise that a supplier is able to estimate the cost 
of producing and supplying the goods or services with reasonable accuracy. 
                                                 
2 The differences often relate to how the acquirer wishes to incentivise the supplier’s behaviours or 
manage contract risk. 
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(Defense Contract Management Agency, 2012) states that fixed-price contracts are 
“preferred to all others because it encourages the contractor to contain costs.” The 
Australian Defence Material Organisation also prefers fixed-price contracts (Defence 
Materiel Organisation, 2010), (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012), as do the UK 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) (Think Defence, 2010). The preference by military 
acquisition organisations for fixed-price contracts exists due to the following factors: 
• Government funding approvals tend to favour firm costing estimates, due to the 
fixed periods of political budgeting. 
• Fixed-price contracts facilitate straightforward project budgeting arrangements 
and cost management due to their cost certainty. 
• Fixed-price contracts transfer perceived cost and schedule management 
responsibility to the contractor.  
• Fixed-price contracts appear to reduce the opportunity for scope creep on the 
supplier and acquirer sides, offering Governments greater assurance that budgets 
are being used appropriately. 
Difficulties of Fixed-price Contracts 
Despite the benefits of fixed-price contracts, this type of contract is not without its 
difficulties. When it comes to the acquisition of largely non-developmental aircraft or 
aircraft systems, where reasonable costs can be established at the outset, fixed-price 
contracts are generally suitable. Highly developmental systems are less cost effective to 
contract for under fixed priced arrangements, as the unknowns affecting the 
developmental aspects usually translate into significant cost and schedule risk margins 
appearing in supplier cost estimates. Open competition and fixed price bidding also 
encourage supplier under-bidding (Think Defence, 2010). When a contact is under-bid, 
cost and time overruns are common, and delivery is only achieved by de-specifying, 
delaying and reducing quantities; all of which undermine the intended capability 
outcome. From the safety perspective, the result may be that the responsible authority 
has to retain undesirable risks, because they can’t be treated within the resources 
available. 
In cases where these problems are prevalent, cost plus, risk sharing arrangements such 
as accords or alliances, or just a really well managed time and materials contract can be 
more cost effective in the long run. However, there are still numerous examples of 
developmental systems being acquired under fixed price arrangements for the ADF, US 
DoD and UK MoD.  
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Working Within the Fixed-price Paradigm 
A value for money and on-time/on-budget fixed price contract will only be possible 
when both the acquirer’s and supplier’s expectations resulting from their ‘world views’ 
are aligned. This in turn implies that they undertake a series of actions to align their 
expectations of the product and evidence requirements prior to contract signature. The 
better the supplier understands the requirements before contract signature, and the better 
they understand how shortfalls in product and evidence are to be resolved within the 
contract, the better the likelihood of a favourable contractual outcome. A favourable 
contractual outcome is generally a pre-requisite for a favourable capability and safety 
outcome also. 
In the literature referenced in Section 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6, the constraints of fixed-priced 
contracting arrangements on achieving safety assurance for military systems have 
largely been ignored. Hence, many of the limitations of contemporary practices for 
safety assurance discussed in Section 2.6 may be a bi-product of the lack of recognition 
of the role the contracting paradigm. 
For the purposes of relevance to the Australian Defence acquisition environment and the 
types of contracts preferred, this thesis focuses on fixed price contract arrangements. 
There may also be read across to other contract paradigms. 
2.3.2 Evidence Delivery or Access 
Evidence produced by suppliers under a contract can typically be classified as either 
deliverable or non-deliverable. Deliverable evidence is supplied to the acquirer by the 
supplier, whereas non-deliverable evidence will tend to be held at the supplier facility, 
or their sub-contractors. Contracts provide acquirers the ability to assess evidence in one 
of two ways, depending on if the evidence is deliverable or non-deliverable. Delivery 
versus access to evidence is usually dictated by intellectual property considerations. 
Deliverable Evidence 
Access for assessors to deliverable evidence is usually straightforward, as is typically 
stipulated through the Statement of Requirement (SOR), Statement of Work (SOW) and 
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) which references applicable Data Item 
Descriptors (DIDs) for each piece of evidence the acquirer and certifying authority 
require to conduct acceptance and certification. 
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Non-deliverable Evidence 
For non-deliverable evidence, assessor access may be achieved through on-site access 
provisions. If an element of non-deliverable evidence is not stipulated through the 
contract, or through a supplier plan for which acquirer approval is required under the 
contract, then it is unlikely that the supplier will make this evidence available. In the 
event that there are evidence shortfalls, and the contract does not cater for this 
circumstance, the acquirer may be forced to seek an amendment to the contract, which 
will usually incur an associated cost and schedule impact. 
Limitations with Data Item Descriptors 
For deliverable evidence, although DIDs define the structural content requirements for 
evidence, they do not necessarily define the quality of the information that underlies the 
required content (e.g. forms of argument, defensibility of the argument, quality of 
evidence, etc.). An acquirer review and acceptance cycle is usually the means of 
assuring the quality of the content of artefacts delivered against DIDs. The acceptance 
and rejection criteria are often constrained by the activities described in acquirer 
approved plans from earlier in the lifecycle. This illustrates that it is vital that the 
supplier plans are meaningful to the goals for safety assurance, and also that the 
appropriate assessors to review the deliverables. Both are difficult propositions for 
projects (Docker, 2011), (Kinnersly, 2011), if they are not properly coordinated with the 
certifying authority.  
On this basis, it is possible to infer that contract DIDs need to be accompanied by 
material on the quality of argument and evidence required to comply with software 
system safety assurance objectives. This thesis also examines the requirements for 
integration between assurance requirements and contracting mechanisms for evidence 
delivery to determine criteria for assurance paradigms to enable successful integration 
with contracts. 
2.4 Current Approaches for Safety-related Systems 
Let’s now examine the certification of safety-related systems including the standards 
employed across the civil and military aviation domains and draw comparisons between 
them. Table 3 proves a summarised list of the standards related to software and safety-
critical systems. Note that the columns used to group the standard do not necessarily 
imply that all listed standards are applied to a development in that domain.  
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 Military Civil Aviation Other 
US DoD UK MoD Other 
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MIL-STD-
882C/D 
DEF STAN 
00-56 
DEF (AUST) 
5679 
AC/AMC 25.1309 
SAE ARP 4754/A 
SAE ARP 4761 
IEC61508 Part 1 (Funct. 
Safety EEPE) 
ISO 26262 (Road 
Vehicles) 
EN 50126 (Rail) 
ISO15026 (IT) 
S
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S
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ty
 
JSSSC SSSH 
(Guidebook) 
DEF STAN 
00-58 
(Obsolete) 
DEF STAN 
00-56 
SSEI-TR-
00000413 
DEF (AUST) 
5679 
H ProgSäkE 
(Handbook) 
CAP670 SW01 (Air 
Traffic Control) 
IEEE 1228 
IEC61508 Parts 3 and 7 
(Functional Safety 
EEPE) 
NASA-STD-8719.13 
(Space) 
S
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re
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 No dedicated 
standard4 
DEF STAN 
00-55 
(Obsolete)5 
SSEI-TR-
0000041 
DEF (AUST) 
56796 
H ProgSäkE 
(Handbook) 
RTCA/DO-178B/C 
DO-248B/C 
DO-278A 
(CNS/ATM)  
FAA Order 8110.49 
Job Aid 
IEC61508 Parts 3 & 7 
(Funct. Safety EEPE) 
ISO 26262 (Road 
Vehicles) 
ISO15026 (IT) 
EN50128 (Rail) 
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
DoD-Std-
2167A 
MIL-STD-
498 
No dedicated 
standard 
No dedicated 
standard 
DO-330 (Tools) 
DO-331 
(Modelling) 
DO-332 (Object 
Oriented), DO-333 
(Formal Methods) 
J-STD-016 
IEEE12207 (Software 
Life Cycle 
IEEE829 (Test Docs) 
IEEE830 (Req Specs) 
IEEE1012 (V&V) 
IEEE1028 (Reviews) 
IEEE1042 (CM) 
IEEE1044 (SPRs) 
Table 3: Standards Pertaining to Safety and Software Assurance 
The approaches adopted by these standards can be broadly classified as one of three 
approaches: 
• The Assurance Level Approach (prescriptive) 
• The Evidence Assurance Level Approach (semi-prescriptive) 
• The Safety Argument Approach (goal-based) 
The following sub-sections discuss each of these approaches. 
                                                 
3 The Software Systems Engineering Initiative (SSEI) developed a technical report on Software Safety 
Evidence Selection and Assurance for guidance for compliance with Defence Standard 00-56. 
4 MIL-HDBK-516B references RTCA/DO-178B, but is often not used by suppliers to the US military. 
5 Defence Standard 00-55 was made obsolete by the issue of Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4. Defence 
Standard 00-55 is currently undergoing redevelopment. 
6 DEF (AUST) 5679 is predominantly used by the Royal Australian Navy. The Royal Australian Air 
Force tends to use the civil aviation standards where possible. 
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2.4.1 The Assurance Level Approach 
The assurance level approach has historically been the most widespread way of 
providing assurance of software for safety-related systems. The term assurance level is a 
generic label for those standards employing a predominantly development process 
based assurance level framework. Examples of their specific labels and the standards 
from which they are derived are shown in Table 4.  
Software Level Levels
#%
 Source 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL)7 
(0) 1-4 IEC61508 Edition 1 (IEC, 1998) 
IEC561508 Edition 2 (IEC, 2010) 
Defence Standard 00-55 Issue 2 (Ministry of Defence, 
1997) 
ISO15026 (ISO/IEC, 1998) 
EN50128 (CENELEC, 2001) 
Automotive SIL 
(ASIL) 
A-D ISO26262 (ISO, 2011) 
Design Assurance 
Level (DAL)8 
(E) D-A RTCA/DO-178B (RTCA Inc., 1992) 
RTCA/DO-178C (RTCA Inc., 2011) 
Safety Assurance 
Level (SAL) 
(S0) S1-S6 Def (Aust) 5679 Issue 2
9 (Australian Department of 
Defence, 2006) 
Software Hazard 
Risk Index (SHRI) 
5-1 MIL-STD-882C (US DoD, 1993) 
# Levels shown in brackets indicates the lowest level for which the standard defines no requirements. 
% Levels are presented from least assurance to most assurance. 
Table 4: Examples of Software Level Approaches 
The following sub-sections consider the assignment and application of assurance levels. 
Assignment of  an Assurance Level 
There are two factors that must be considered in the assignment of an assurance level: 
• what the assurance level is being assigned to,  and 
• how the assignment is performed.  
Depending on the specific standard, assurance levels may be assigned to either a safety 
function (or the safety requirements associated with a safety function), or to a 
configuration item. The former allows the assurance level to be fully contextualized by 
                                                 
7 Note that the SILs used in Defence Standard 00-55, IEC 61508 and ISO 15026 are not equivalent. 
8 ARP4754A introduces the concept of the Functional DAL (FDAL) and Item DAL (IDAL), although 
strictly speaking, assurance is only applied to IDALs in the way it was formerly applied to DALs under 
ARP4754, with FDALs used to model DAL assignment/reduction for functions and architecture. 
9 Note that SALs were previously defined as Safety Integrity Levels SILs in Def (Aust) 5679 Issue 1 with 
levels S1-S6 
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the importance of the safety function or safety requirement for a specific system. The 
latter allows visibility of the safety importance of the specific configuration item for 
achieving its allocated functions. The latter also suggests easier portability and re-use of 
assurance evidence as the evidence is traceable to a specific configuration item, and not 
a safety function contextualized by a specific system implementation. However system 
specific context is often unavoidable and thus portability is rarely straightforward. 
Because faults in software are systematic (Weaver, 2003), and thus can’t be 
characterised directly by random process models, assurance level assignment can’t be 
based on probability. Thus the traditional dimensions of risk (i.e. consequence and 
probability) can’t be used directly for assignment of an assurance level. Most standards 
recognise this, and thus have developed alternative ways for assigning assurance levels 
that don’t involve establishing probabilities directly. It should also be observed that 
development of software to an assurance level does not imply the assignment of a 
failure rate for that software. Thus, assurance levels or reliability targets based on 
assurance levels cannot be used by the system safety process as hardware failure rates 
are (RTCA Inc., 1992). 
There are two most dominant approaches for assigning assurance levels. The most 
widely used is to assign the assurance level proportional to the severity or consequence 
of the failure condition, hazard or accident of either the physical item or of the function 
it implements. A related approach is to assign the level based upon the acceptable 
probability of failure of the function. In this second case, it should be noted that the 
acceptable probability of failure of the function is established proportionally to the 
severity or consequence of the failure of that function, and thus in many respects it 
mirrors the severity proportional approach.  
One less widely used approach (ISO/IEC, 1998) proposes that the assurance level 
should be proportional to risk, being a function of both consequence and frequency. 
However no guidance is provided on how the frequency of software failure is 
determined, noting the limitations with this approach discussed earlier. A further 
variation on this approach is to assign the assurance level based on the proportional 
combination of the severity/consequence and a control category established from the 
degree of autonomous control the software has over the hardware function (US DoD, 
1993).  
Some standards permit a reduction of the assurance level (usually only one level) based 
on architectural mitigations or mitigation external to the system.  Others limit the 
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claimed assurance level based on architectural configuration. Table 5 summarises the 
approaches adopted by the different standards. 
Standard Level 
Assigned to 
Assignment 
Methodology 
Level Reduction / 
Claim Limits 
IEC61508 Safety 
Function 
Average Probability 
of Failure (Functional 
Failure) 
Architectural (Claim 
Limit – Safe Failure 
Fraction and Hardware 
Fault Tolerance) 
Def Stan 00-55 Iss 2 Configuration 
Item 
Severity Proportional 
(Accident) 
Architectural 
ISO15026 Configuration 
Item 
Risk Proportional 
(Threat) 
Architectural 
EN50128 Safety 
Function 
Tolerable Hazard Rate Architectural 
ISO 26262 Safety 
Function / 
Hazard 
Severity, 
Controllability, 
Exposure Time 
Proportional 
Architectural 
RTCA/DO-178B/C Configuration 
Item 
Severity Proportional 
(Functional Failure) 
Architectural 
Def (Aust) 5679 
Issue 1 & 2 
Safety 
Requirement 
Severity Proportional 
(Accident) 
External Accident 
Mitigation 
MIL-STD-882C Configuration 
Item 
Severity (Hazard) and 
Control Category 
Proportional 
Control Category 
Table 5: Assurance Level Assignment Approaches  
Application of Assurance Levels 
Based on the assigned assurance level most of the standards present in tabular form, or 
equivalent, mandated or recommended lists of activities, processes and 
methods/techniques that should be applied at an applicable phase of the development 
lifecycle or process. Some standards also include architectural design feature 
prescriptions (e.g. IEC 61508 (IEC, 2010)). The more rigorous the assurance level, the 
greater the number or more thorough the prescription of activities, processes and 
methods/techniques. Some standards also allow for flexibility by accepting alternative 
techniques or methods provided there is justification that they are as effective as those 
they are replacing.  
A variation on this approach involves the prescription of objectives of the software 
lifecycle (e.g. RTCA/DO-178B (RTCA Inc., 1992), rather than activity, technique or 
method prescriptions. This approach offers greater flexibility to the developer on 
selection of activities, processes and methods/techniques, but they are still bound by 
certification authority approval and the software lifecycle processes to which the 
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objectives apply. (Kelly, 2008) argues that this approach is still synonymous to the 
activity, technique and method prescriptions which characterise the prescriptive 
approach because supporting the objectives are descriptions of activities and design 
considerations for achieving those objectives and descriptions of the evidence that 
indicates objective satisfaction. (McDermid & Rae, 2012) emphasise though that only 
two of the objectives in (RTCA Inc., 1992) stray into direct prescription, and that the 
perception of it being a process standard may be because there are so many objectives. 
At the level of techniques, activities and methods there are some commonalities 
between the standards, but also some significant differences. For example, Defence 
Standard 00-55 (Ministry of Defence, 1997) and Def(Aust) 5679 (Australian 
Department of Defence, 2006) place significant emphasis on formal methods in the 
demonstration that requirements are consistent with each other, and that the 
requirements translate correctly to implementation. In addition, Defence Standard 00-55 
(Ministry of Defence, 1997) placed significant emphasis on static code analysis. 
IEC61508 (IEC, 2010), on the other hand, identifies a very large range of techniques 
and methods, to almost encyclopaedic proportions, including formal methods. In 
significant contrast, RTCA/DO178B (RTCA Inc., 1992) implicitly stresses human 
centric reviews and rigorous testing to assure that requirements are adequately specified 
and that they translate correctly into implementation (McDermid & Kelly, 2006), 
(McDermid, 2001). Note though, that RTCA/DO-178C (RTCA Inc., 2011) has now 
been supplemented with RTCA/DO-333 (RTCA Inc., 2011) which provides guidance 
on the application of formal methods within aviation software developments. 
(McDermid, 2001) points out that the rationale for recommending or prescribing 
development processes and methods is complex, but is based upon two key 
assumptions: 
• the processes for higher assurance levels produce apparently “better” software; 
and 
• the processes for the higher assurance levels are more expensive, hence it is 
inappropriate to use them unless the consequences of failure are severe. 
The inductive argument (and presumption) is that the more rigorous the activities, 
processes and methods/techniques, the greater the assurance that the software does not 
contain errors, and can be relied on to function safely within its operating context. 
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Benefits of the Assurance Level Approach 
The assurance level approach is widely used, and thus there must be perceived benefits. 
A review of relevant literature and examination of industrial practice reveals the 
following benefits: 
• Track Record. Despite a relatively small number of high-profile accidents being 
attributed to software, software developed using this approach has a remarkably 
good track record (McDermid & Pumfrey, 2001). Albeit, it is not possible to 
conclude that the good track record resulted from the assurance level approach, or 
was achieved due to other factors.  
• Process to Product Paradigm. There are circumstances under which the 
assurance level approach could be considered to satisfy the core requirements of a 
product-based approach, provided it can be shown that the requirements subject to 
such prescriptions include all safety requirements (Kelly, 2008).  
• Minimal Subjectivity and Variability. The prescription of processes sets clear 
expectations for the supplier’s scope of work and evidence delivery (Kelly, 2008), 
leading to consistent understanding between suppliers and acquirers. The 
prescription of processes sets expectations for a minimum baseline which should 
deter those suppliers who don’t have the requisite organisation, people and 
processes and tools (Kelly, 2008). The use of a defined process reduces 
variability; thus also improving planning and costing estimates for both suppliers 
and assessors (Kelly, 2008). 
• Trustworthy Evidence. They provide guidance on how to develop and 
implement requirements in a trustworthy manner (Kelly, 2008). 
• Certifying Authority Compatible. Certification authorities have developed 
entire certification frameworks and the associated environments around standards 
adopting the assurance level approach, including whole of product standards 
(refer Section 2.2.4), related standards, assessor delegations and authorisations, 
assessor guidance and training material. 
Common themes that emerge are with respect to the reduction in subjectivity and 
variability between suppliers, acquirers and certifying authorities; and the confidence 
established from trustworthy evidence. Both of these benefits are relevant to the military 
certification environment. Therefore, it is desirable that improvements in safety 
assurance frameworks strive to preserve such benefits. This is examined further in 
Section 2.7. 
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Limitations of the Assurance Level Approach 
However despite the benefits listed above, there are a significant number of criticisms of 
the process-based assurance approaches that use assurance levels. These are as follows: 
• Realised Risks. Avoidable software failures have occurred where the assurance 
level approaches have been applied, leading to loss of life and for major economic 
losses (Committee on Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007), (Marks, 
2008). The good track record is often disputed by the difficulty of attributing 
accident causal factors to software (McDermid & Pumfrey, 2001). 
• Process isn’t Product. The assurance level approaches have concentrated on the 
process aspects, and product aspects are mostly implicit (Lindsay & McDermid, 
1997). This has led to the certification of software systems using the assurance 
level approach to rely more on assessments of the process used to develop the 
system rather than on the properties of the system itself (Committee on Certifiably 
Dependable Software Systems, 2007). There is a lack of evidence that adherence 
to the prescribed process leads to a specific level of integrity (Lindsay & 
McDermid, 1997), (Redmill, 2000). There is also a lack of evidence that software 
of differing levels does have failure rates of “integrity level order” (McDermid, 
2001), due in part to poor correlation between the techniques and methods 
prescribed and the failure rate implicitly defined by the assurance level (Kelly, 
2008). The assurance level is also often wrongly interpreted as achieving the 
target rate of dangerous failures of the product (Redmill, 2000). Finally, the 
product argument inherent behind the assurance level approach is not explicit. 
• Questionable Level Definition. Specific assumptions underlying assurance level 
definition are questionable (McDermid, 2001). Assurance level definitions differ 
between standards and are derived in different ways; thus making it difficult to 
transfer assurance levels from one standard domain to another (Redmill, 2000). 
Some methods for assigning assurance levels (e.g. using control categories) 
assume the risk of software faults leading to an accident is decreased by giving the 
human more control; but this is incompatible with the (US DoD, 1993) design 
order of precedence (Lindsay & McDermid, 1997). 
• Differences in Methods. Some standards overemphasise testing and human 
reviews as verification methods (Kelly, 2008). Other standards prescribe formal 
methods, which may be ineffective for some safety-critical control systems, where 
it is necessary to assess control stability, jitter, timing, etc. of discrete 
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approximations to continuous control problems (McDermid & Rae, 2012). 
Compliance is not easily portable from one domain to another due to differences 
in the requirements (methods, techniques, processed, documentation) between 
standards (Redmill, 2000), (Kelly, 2008). 
• Questionable Value for Money. Some prescribed methods do not provide a 
material contribution to safety in certain circumstances, and thus maybe wasteful 
in terms of cost and schedule for projects (McDermid & Pumfrey, 2001). 
• Inflexible. The prescription of processes can hinder the adoption of new process 
approaches that could improve flexibility and predictability of software 
development (Redmill, 2000), (Kelly, 2008). The prescription inhibits freedom to 
choose arguments and evidence that address the specific circumstances of the 
software safety requirements (Kelly, 2008). 
• Used Out of Context. The assurance level is contextualised by the safety 
assessment that assigned it, and the safety requirements applicable to the specific 
system. The assurance aspects of these approaches are sometimes applied 
independent of the system safety approaches to which they are dependent, leading 
to confusion of the term (Redmill, 2000). 
While the list of criticisms is certainty long, several key themes are evident. Most 
significant is the limitations in an explicit product behavioural focus with respect to 
safety. Of similar importance also are the somewhat arbitrary prescription of techniques 
and methods that do not have clear rationale for their risk reducing role. In terms of 
practical implementation in the military certification environment, assurance level 
approaches do not include a means for assessing the impact on safety risk when there is 
a shortfall in evidence against one of the requirements of the standard. While the civil 
certification frameworks tend to take a black and white compliance/non-compliance 
view, and this somewhat avoids the problem, military programs and their associated 
cost, schedule and capability constraints mean that establishing the risk in such cases is 
vital. However the assurance level approach is a target and does not address the 
implications for shortfalls with respect to risk. Therefore, it is desirable that 
improvements in assurance frameworks strive to avoid such limitations. This is 
examined further in Section 2.7. 
2.4.2 The Evidence Assurance Level Approach 
In recent years several standards and literature have emerged that are based on the 
concept of evidence assurance rather than assurance levels. The evidence assurance 
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level approach sets benchmarks for the suitability and sufficiency of evidence used to 
achieve compliance with safety requirements or safety goals. The term evidence 
assurance level is a generic label for those approaches employing this concept. 
Examples of their specific labels and the standards from which they are derived are 
shown in Table 6. 
Evidence 
Assurance Level 
Levels
#%
 Source 
Assurance 
Evidence Level 
(AEL) 
1-5 CAP670 (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003) 
Evaluation 
Assurance Level 
(EAL) 
1-7 ISO/IEC 15408 (ISO/IEC, 2009) 
Safety Evidence 
Assurance Level 
(SEAL)10 
1-4 (Fenn & Jepson, 2005) 
# Levels shown in brackets indicates the lowest level for which the standard defines no requirements. 
% Levels are presented from least assurance to most assurance. 
Table 6: Examples of Evidence Assurance Level Approaches 
The following sub-sections consider both the assignment of evidence assurance levels 
and the application of the evidence assurance levels. 
Assignment of the Evidence Assurance Level 
As for the assurance level, there are two factors that must be considered in the 
assignment of a evidence assurance level: 
• what the evidence assurance level is being assigned to,  and 
• how the assignment is performed. 
Depending on the specific example, evidence assurance levels can either be assigned to 
safety objectives or configuration items. The former allows the evidence assurance level 
to be fully contextualized by the importance of the safety objectives or safety 
requirement it pertains to for a specific system. In the latter case, this implies that the 
evidence assurance level applies to the collective set of the safety requirements 
applicable to the configuration item. As in the assurance level case, the latter also 
suggests easier portability and re-use of assurance evidence as the evidence is traceable 
                                                 
10 Note that the SEAL referred to here is not the implementation of the SEAL for the F-35 JSF Program 
(Eccles, 2007), where, despite intent, the SEAL is more akin to the software level assurance paradigm, 
rather than the evidence assurance paradigm. 
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to a specific configuration item, and not a safety objective contextualized by a specific 
system implementation. However since the evidence is with respect to safety objectives 
of the configuration item, portability of assigned levels is rarely straightforward. 
However the evidence assurance level approach does offer the advantage that the 
evidence may be portable for assessment against differing safety objectives in another 
system context. 
There are two most dominant approaches for assigning evidence assurance levels. There 
is a severity proportional method similar to that used for assigning assurance levels, and 
there is a combined severity proportional and failure probability of mitigating factors 
approach. The only difference is that the latter permits consideration of mitigating 
factors outside the context of the specific safety objective. Where assurance levels are 
assigned to low level safety objectives (or claims if applied in conjunction with an 
argument structure – refer Section 2.4.3) then some approaches suggest refactoring 
methods for reducing evidence assurance levels based on the way safety sub-objectives 
combine to achieve the overall safety objective. 
Some approaches permit a reduction of the evidence assurance level based on the 
number and strength of defensive layers or other architectural mitigations external to the 
system. Table 7 summarised the different approaches. 
Source Level 
Assigned to 
Assignment 
Methodology 
Level Reduction / 
Claim Limits 
CAP670 Configuration 
Item 
Severity Proportional Number and strength of 
defensive layers 
ISO/IEC 15408 
(Security) 
Configuration 
Item 
Severity Proportional Nil 
SEAL Each Safety 
Objective (or 
Goals if 
applied to a 
Safety 
Argument) 
Top Goal: Severity 
and Failure 
Probability of 
Mitigating Factors 
Proportional 
Sub-goals: Relevance, 
Coverage and 
Trustworthiness 
Proportional 
Layered Protection or 
Defence In Depth 
Table 7: Evidence Assurance Level Assignment Approaches  
Application of the Evidence Assurance Level 
Based on the assigned evidence assurance level most of these approaches present in 
tabular form, or equivalent, mandated or recommended lists of evidence types that 
should be provided in support of the safety objective. The philosophy is that the 
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developer should not be required to follow any particular process or use any particular 
method or technology, provided evidence is produced in support of the safety objective 
and the production of evidence is sufficiently rigorous. Evidence assurance level 
approaches are sometimes proposed to be used in conjunction with the safety argument 
approach which will be summarised in Section 2.4.3. 
Evidence assurance level approaches typically present categories of evidence 
contextualised by attributes of the product that they relate to. For example, CAP670 
(Civil Aviation Authority, 2003) identifies three general evidence types: analytic 
evidence, test evidence and field experience across attributes of the product including 
functional properties, timing properties, robustness, reliability, accuracy, resource usage 
and overload tolerance. Other approaches vary the degree of formality in the production 
of evidence types (ISO/IEC, 2009). The more onerous the evidence assurance level, the 
more diversity and formality required in the provision of evidence. 
Benefits and Limitations of the Evidence Assurance Level Approaches 
The application of evidence assurance level approaches is not yet widespread, and is 
constrained to several limited domains, as illustrated by Section 2.4.2. Therefore, there 
is limited literature discussing the specific benefits and limitations of such approaches. 
Evidence assurance level approaches appear to have been developed to bring some of 
the benefits from the assurance level approach into the product-focused assurance 
paradigm. The approach provides a more explicit product focus than the assurance level 
approach by setting product safety requirements and providing a framework for 
determining evidence to support the safety requirements. The focus moves away from 
development lifecycles, and specific techniques and methods. However, in practice the 
application of evidence assurance levels has been found to be difficult (Weaver, 2003). 
This is predominantly due to: 
• Evidence assurance levels tend to apply to configuration items, or at best specific 
requirements assigned to configuration items. The measures of evidence set by the 
evidence assurance level approach are not based upon the type of requirement and 
the failure modes or hazards to which it relates (Weaver, 2003).  
• The focus is on setting rules for the types of evidence that should be provided, but 
not on how the evidence is combined. Limited elaboration is provided by these 
methods for how the evidence combines to provide a strong case for safety 
(Weaver, 2003).  
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• Limitations in the guidance for the selection of evidence to overcome the 
aforementioned limitations (Weaver, 2003).  
• Software components assume the more rigorous evidence assurance level 
equivalent to the highest level of the individual software safety requirements 
implemented in the software component. This can lead to depth of evidence and 
evidence types being recommended at a component level without adequate 
consideration of the specific software hazardous failure modes that the 
requirements address.  
The key themes evident with respect to evidence assurance levels are that evidence 
needs to be appropriate to the requirements and failure modes to which it relates, and 
that the properties established from the way differing evidence combines is more 
important than simply the type of evidence presented. Therefore, it is desirable that 
improvements in assurance frameworks strive to incorporate such factors relating to 
evidence. This is examined further in Section 2.7. 
2.4.3 The Safety Argument and Evidence Approach 
Most contemporary of the approaches summarised within this thesis is the safety 
argument and evidence approach to software safety assurance. The approach has come 
to provenance as a means of addressing some of the limitations with the assurance level 
approach (Weaver, 2003). The safety argument and evidence approach adopts a 
product-centric perspective for assurance (Kelly, 2008). In this paradigm, arguments are 
required to: 
• justify the determination and adequacy of product behavioural safety objectives 
derived from hazard analysis; 
• present the case for the satisfaction of the product behavioural safety objectives 
based on relevant and trustworthy evidence; 
• justify the selection of evidence used for specific claims within the case;  
• justify why the presence of counter evidence does not undermine the case for 
safety; and 
• state why the case supports an acceptable level of safety in the identified usage 
context. 
The argument and evidence required to justify safety collectively form the safety case, 
which is often summarised in a safety case report (Kelly, 1998).  
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Safety case arguments are rarely provable deductive arguments (Kelly, 2008). Because 
they essentially catalogue a set of beliefs about the evidence, by their nature, they are 
often subjective. The arguments are mostly inductive and carry with them a degree of 
uncertainty as to their truth. On this basis, (Kelly, 2008) indicates that the objective of 
safety case development is not only the presentation of the subjective case, but also the 
process of obtaining mutual agreement between the supplier and certifying authority of 
the validity of the subjective case. The acceptance of the case is a social process 
(Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010). 
There are several different types of arguments that are commonly included within safety 
arguments (Kelly, 1998). Central to the thrust of the safety arguments and evidence 
approach is the product safety argument, sometimes referred to as the direct argument. 
This argument should focus on product behaviours and the validity and satisfaction of 
safety objectives. Supporting the direct argument should be backing arguments, which 
provide additional information that informs confidence about the direct argument and 
the evidence used to support the direct argument. 
The safety argument and evidence approach is generic, and thus can be applied to all 
elements of a system, including software. Software is best dealt with within this 
paradigm by ensuring that the focus of the software-related arguments (direct claims) is 
on demonstrating the product safety resulting from software product behaviours, rather 
than demonstrating the development of the software to any specific process. The safety 
argument and evidence should address both normal operating and failure circumstances 
of the software and the system, and their mutual behavioural interactions. Arguments 
and evidence about the development process are still important, but they have a 
different role in the safety argument. They are used in supporting subordinate and 
backing claims about the trustworthiness of evidence used for supporting product 
arguments. 
Software Product Arguments 
(University of York, 2004) summarises several historic safety case patterns for software 
aspects. Some example patterns include arguments over: 
• product and process, 
• hazards and safety requirements, 
• functional versus non-functional properties. 
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However, there are problems with these approaches. The main problem stems from 
these arguments creating a discontinuity in the safety case (Weaver, 2003). This is 
because the safety argument has a product focus, and the software argument historically 
had a process focus. In many respects, this is unsurprising because historic arguments 
originated from the principles underlying the assurance level approaches described in 
Section 2.4.1. Furthermore, software cannot be safe or unsafe, and the safety of software 
can only be judged in the system context (Leveson, 1995). Hence the software safety 
argument cannot be disjoint of the system safety argument. Because of this problem, 
more product oriented patterns have emerged for dealing with software arguments in the 
safety case, such as those described by (Weaver, 2003) and those inferred by (Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2003). 
Examining (Weaver, 2003)’s patterns provides a good illustration of the principles 
important to safety arguments for software. (Weaver, 2003) proposes arguments for 
showing that causes of hazardous software failure mode are either absent or are detected 
and handled. Absence arguments are relevant to the software component under 
consideration whereas detection and handling arguments may be relevant to both the 
software component under consideration and other elements of the system. The 
framework is based upon (Pumfrey, 1999)’s taxonomy of software failures, which is 
based around the provision of services.  
Service 
The communication of a piece of information, with a specific value, at a particular time. 
(Pumfrey, 1999) 
There are five categories of software failure in (Pumfrey, 1999)’s taxonomy, as follows: 
• Omission: the service is never delivered; 
• Commission: the service is provided when it is not required; 
• Early: the service occurs earlier than intended (either absolute real time, or 
relative to some other action); 
• Late: the service occurs later than intended (either absolute real time, or relative to 
some other action); and 
• Value: the information (data) delivered has the wrong value. 
(Pumfrey, 1999)’s classification was chosen by (Weaver, 2003) over other 
classifications, as it addresses some of the discrepancies between other such 
classifications (i.e. those defined by (Ezhilchelvan & Shrivastava, 1989) and 
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(Bondavalli & Simoncini, 1990)). It is also consistent with (Avizienis, et al., 2004)’s 
taxonomy of service failure modes, and the definitions therein provide some consensus 
on the topic. 
(Weaver, 2003) (and also (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003)) identify that the three 
principal types of evidence needed within the safety argument for hazard directed 
requirements are as follows:  
• Requirements Validation: Evidence that the behaviour specified by the 
requirement is complete and accurate (e.g. real world operation, simulation or 
analytic evidence that confirms the appropriateness of the behaviour under 
relevant operating and failure conditions). 
• Requirements Satisfaction: Evidence that the behaviour specified by the 
requirement is achieved by the system and software implementation (e.g. a 
combination of analytic and test based verification evidence, potentially 
supplemented with field service experience). 
• Requirements Traceability: Evidence that the hazard directed safety requirement 
has been decomposed or refined through the system design into the system and 
software implementation (e.g. using matrices or methods as described by (Palmer, 
1997) or (Praxis Critical Systems, 2001)). 
(Weaver, 2003) also defines a categorisation of evidence at the system requirements 
level, software requirements level, and software functional unit level to assure that 
evidence is appropriately contextualised. The reader is directed to (Weaver, 2003) for 
further information on the framework. 
Safety Argument Assurance 
Because it is possible to build both strong and weak safety arguments, including those 
for software, approaches to safety argument assurance have been proposed by both 
(Weaver, et al., 2003) and (Fenn & Jepson, 2005). Both these approaches define 
qualitative levels of argument assurance and means for factoring the levels across the 
argument. (Weaver, et al., 2003) reasons that by expressing the assurance of an 
argument it is possible to identify what confidence can be placed in that argument. The 
safety argument assurance is intended to assist in development of the safety case and in 
assessor review by making explicit the confidence in the safety argument and the 
evidence presented.  
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(Weaver, et al., 2003) proposes a qualitative approach defining Safety Assurance Levels 
(SAL) and states that the SAL is “the level of confidence that a safety argument element 
(GSN goal or solution) meets its objective”. There are four SALs in the framework 
(SAL 1 lowest confidence – SAL 4 highest confidence). (Weaver, 2003) describes a top 
level process for applying SALs as follows: 
• Determine the top level SAL to set the target assurance of the argument. 
• Analyse the decomposition of the argument and re-factor the argument as 
necessary to fit a single support pattern, linked support pattern or convergent 
support pattern. 
• Determine SAL decomposition across child elements using the SAL 
decomposition tables relevant to the support pattern type: 
o Single Support – direct assignment, 
o Linked Support – assignment based on relevance, 
o Convergent Support – assignment based on independence. 
• Determine SALs for evidence. 
(Fenn & Jepson, 2005) propose an alternative approach using SEALs, for which the 
evidence assurance aspects were introduced in Section 2.4.2. SEALs attempt to 
overcome the difficulties in practice of decomposing safety arguments into the support 
patters described by (Weaver, et al., 2003). The SEAL is “a qualitative statement of 
requirement for a degree of confidence in the evidence that a specific safety goal has 
been achieved” (Fenn & Jepson, 2005). As for (Weaver, et al., 2003)’s SALs, SEALs 
are decomposed from the top level goal across child elements, although the rules 
proposed for decomposition differ somewhat from SALs. Decomposition strategies are 
suggested based on the adequacy of evidence (inadequate, adequate, more than 
adequate) and taking into account apportionment strategies, independence and claims 
related to direct versus backing evidence (Fenn & Jepson, 2005). 
Separation of the Safety and Confidence Arguments 
(Kelly, 2008) and (Hawkins, et al., 2011) both identify that failure to recognise the 
differences in role between the product-based elements and the process assurance-based 
elements of the safety argument can lead to safety arguments being difficult to interpret. 
In practice, this failure also leads to safety cases that lack sufficient product focus and 
that are not compelling to assessors. To address this, (Hawkins, et al., 2011) introduces 
the concept of assured safety arguments. An assured safety argument provides a 
structure for arguing safety in which the product safety argument is accompanied by a 
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confidence argument that documents “the confidence in the structure and bases of the 
product safety argument.” 
(Hawkins, et al., 2011) propose that any product safety argument includes assertions 
related to the sufficiency and appropriateness of the inferences declared in the 
argument, the context and assumptions used, and the evidence cited. Therefore, to be 
compelling the safety argument should justify the confidence in the assertions made, 
and the degree of uncertainty in the truth. 
(Hawkins, et al., 2011) describes that the confidence arguments should be tied to three 
types of Assurance Claim Points (ACP), which correspond to the three different types 
of assertions in safety arguments, as follows: 
• Asserted Inferences – the link between the parent claim and its strategy or sub-
claims; the confidence argument should document why the assessor should 
believe that the premises are sufficient to establish the probable truth of the 
conclusion. 
• Asserted Context – the link between contextual information (represented by 
context or assumption elements) and the argument elements to which it applies; 
the confidence argument should document why the assessor should believe that 
the asserted context is appropriate and trustworthy. 
• Asserted Solution – the link between a solution and the argument; the confidence 
argument should document why the assessor should believe that the evidence is 
appropriate to support the claim, and the evidence is trustworthy. 
Each confidence argument should propose that the probable truth of the assertion is 
believable, residual uncertainties in the assertion have been identified, and residual 
uncertainties in the assertion are insufficient to undermine the probable truth (Hawkins, 
et al., 2011). 
(Hawkins, et al., 2011) also propose that the individual fragments of confidence 
arguments applicable to each assertion across the product safety argument, should also 
be assembled together into an overall confidence argument. The proposal is that the 
overall confidence argument requires that all assertions of the safety argument have an 
accompanying confidence sub-argument that argues confidence for all inferences, all 
context and all evidence used in the safety argument (Hawkins, et al., 2011). (Hawkins, 
et al., 2011) also identify some concerns in relation to the overall confidence argument. 
Arguing the sufficiency of the overall confidence in the safety argument is probably 
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more complex than the simple composition of arguments of sufficient confidence for 
each argument assertion. This is because it is necessary to examine whether the multiple 
branches of argument in the safety argument share common underlying shortfalls in 
confidence or believability.  
(Hawkins, et al., 2011) claim that by exercising discipline over the permissible claims 
and evidence of the safety argument, and encouraging a systematic approach to the 
construction of a confidence argument, the suitability and sufficiency of the arguments 
can begin to be addressed. 
Benefits of the Safety Argument and Evidence Approach 
The safety argument and evidence approach is the most contemporary of the approaches 
examined. It has emerged primarily in response to the limitations of the assurance level 
approaches. A review of relevant literature and examination of industrial practice 
reveals the following anticipated benefits: 
• Product Focussed. The approach emphasises the product-based assurance 
aspects, and thus is conceptually more straight-forward to relate to product safety 
risk than the process-based approaches. 
• Flexible Rationale and Evidence. The approach permits evidence to be chosen 
that is specifically relevant to the safety arguments being made (Kelly, 1998). 
This inherently provides flexibility for selection and methods based on specific 
system, problem or design solution (Kelly, 2008). 
• Standards Endure. Standards do not require updating in response to changes in 
the rapid progression of software and related technologies or the establishment of 
new techniques/methods (McDermid & Rae, 2012). 
• Pattern Reuse. Patterns provide guidance on acceptable types of arguments and 
evidence for software aspects of systems (Weaver, 2003). Likewise anti-patterns 
have also been proposed to describe unsuitable approaches (Kelly, 1998). 
It is important to note that these benefits may be realised for the safety argument and 
evidence approach, irrespective of the specific situation. The key theme that is evident 
from the benefits of the safety argument and evidence approach is the product focus and 
opportunity to reason about product behavioural properties with respect to safety and 
risk. The concept of patterns is useful because it provides a means to reduce the inherent 
variability of this approach. Therefore, it is desirable that improvements in assurance 
frameworks strive to utilise such benefits. This is examined further in Section 2.7. 
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Limitations of the Safety Argument and Evidence Approach 
However, despite the benefits, a review of the literature indicates that there are a 
number of criticisms of the safety argument based approaches. These are as follows: 
• Compromised Objectivity. Safety arguments tend to converge on the answer the 
supplier wants (i.e. the “system is acceptable safe”) and thus tend to be self-
fulfilling prophesises (Kinnersly, 2011). Such safety cases don’t truthfully 
represent counter evidence because the counter evidence doesn’t support the 
positive claims being made. Further, the safety arguments within safety cases are 
rarely challenged by the assessment process (Kinnersly, 2011). There are issues of 
how such challenges and rebuttals are accommodated within the safety case 
(Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010). Conventional contracting processes related to 
supplier delivery of safety case documents (milestone drafts, and final), and 
acquirer review of the safety case don’t encourage safety arguments to be 
challenged, or assessors to search for counter evidence (Kinnersly, 2011). 
• Incomprehensible. Compelling arguments may be difficult to construct for non-
experts (Hawkins, et al., 2011). Conversely weaknesses of the argument are often 
not evident and so are easily overlooked by assessors. Arguments are often 
indirect and unfocused, and the link between elements of the argument and risk is 
often lost. This causes safety arguments tend to become large and 
incomprehensible; there is too much information in the argument, leading to lead 
to “voluminous, rambling, ad infinitum arguments” (Hawkins, et al., 2011). 
Arguments often suffer from the following: 
o Necessary elements of the argument are sometimes omitted, because the 
need for the specific elements is lost in the volume of the argument 
(Hawkins, et al., 2011).  
o Necessary evidence is sometimes omitted, because the need for the specific 
evidence is lost in the obscurity of the argument.  
• Blurring of Product Focus. Both the safety argument and the confidence 
argument tend to be poorly prepared, because the lack of distinction between the 
two makes it more difficult to spot incompleteness or poor structure in either 
(Hawkins, et al., 2011). While separation of the product argument and the 
confidence argument helps, for large safety arguments it may simply not be 
practical to provide arguments of confidence for every assertion in the safety 
argument (Hawkins, et al., 2011). 
 70  
• Avoid Acknowledging Real Risk. The approach of arguing that the “system is 
acceptably safe” fails to adequately inform acquirer decisions regarding risk 
treatment or retention. In turn this fails to adequately inform supplier decisions 
regarding necessary changes to their design and additional evidence generation. 
The emphasis on arguments contributes to a culture of arguing away inadequacies 
in system design and shortfalls in the evidence of safety, rather than supporting 
the adequate determination of system design treatments and provision of evidence 
of safety. Further, safety arguments often give equal attention to hazards 
regardless of their severity, and thus failing to emphasise where the greatest risks 
in the system lie (Kinnersly, 2011). 
• Subjectivity Complicates Acceptance. The subjectivity of arguments in safety 
cases makes achieving mutual acceptance between suppliers and certifying 
authorities difficult (Kelly, 2008). 
• Trustworthiness Undermined. Uncertainty in the provenance of evidence in 
safety arguments can undermine trustworthiness in the evidence and in the safety 
arguments (Habli & Kelly, 2007). 
• Difficult to Interpret. Decomposing the abstract objectives set forth within the 
standards to practice can be difficult for some suppliers (Kelly, 2008). The 
additional guidance required to help suppliers understand acceptable means of 
compliance had lagged release of the standards significantly. 
• Flexibility Not Exercised. In practice top level safety arguments tend to follow 
the same repetitive, mechanical format (Kinnersly, 2011), leading to doubt that 
substantial flexibility is required in this part of the safety case. 
• Difficult Maintenance. Despite intentions that safety cases are ‘living’ 
documents (Kelly, 1998), and methods having been suggested for safety case 
maintenance (Kelly, 2008), most safety cases languish on shelves after their initial 
development (Kinnersly, 2011). 
Many of the above problems with current practice in the application of safety cases 
were highlighted by (Haddon-Cave, 2009). It is important to note though that these 
limitations might not all apply to each specific safety cases because the circumstances 
of each safety case are different. The key themes evident from the limitations of the 
safety argument and evidence approach centre around subjectivity and the impacts on 
supplier, acquirers and certifying authorities in resolving this subjectivity and managing 
variability. Subjectivity and variability will complicate the enforcement of certification 
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requirements within contracts used for military system. Further, the approach needs to 
ensure that systems that present intolerable risks are clearly identified as requiring 
treatment. It should not only be feasible to build a compelling safety argument and 
evidence for a good design, it is necessary to identify unsafe designs as non-compliant 
against the safety objectives, either because of inferior product argument or evidence. 
Therefore, it is desirable that improvements in assurance frameworks strive to reduce 
the impact of such limitations. This is examined further in Section 2.7 
2.4.4 Presenting Safety Arguments 
Because knowledge will be assumed in later chapters of this thesis, it is relevant to 
review methods of presenting safety arguments. There are numerous means of 
presenting a safety argument within a safety case. For example, (Department of 
Computer Science, 2004) describes safety arguments in the following forms: 
• Textual Narrative 
• Tabular Format / Traceability Matrices 
• Argument Notations: 
o Claim Structures,  
o Toulmin Structures (Toulmin, 1958),  
o Adelard’s Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) notation (Adelard, 2008),  
o Bayesian Belief Networks (Littlewood, et al., 1998), and  
o Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (Kelly, 1998), (Origin Consulting 
Limited, 2011).  
Additionally, (Object Management Group, Inc., 2012) proposes a Structured Assurance 
Case Meta-model (SACM), which is comprised of two specifications:   
• Argumentation Meta-model (ARM) (Object Management Group, Inc., 2010), and  
• Software Assurance Evidence Meta-model (SAEM).   (Object Management 
Group, Inc., 2010) 
The effectiveness, however, of communicating the safety argument varies depending on 
the means of expression. For example (Ankrum & Kromholz, 2005) identifies that the 
existing frameworks for constructing (e.g. textual / tabular forms) and evaluating (e.g. 
human narrative review) assurance cases often provide excruciating detail about the 
final table of contents but offer little about how to identify, collect, merge, and analyse 
technical evidence. Some “generate large volumes of data without offering guidance 
for navigation and analysis” (Ankrum & Kromholz, 2005). Deriving a single judgment 
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of safety or risk from this is often an informal process of “expert judgment”, which may 
be unreliable and is difficult to analyse and verify (Littlewood, et al., 1998). The 
development of argument notations for the safety domain has provided a means to 
improve the level of expression and clarity in presenting the safety argument over 
textual methods. Although representing an argument graphically clearly disambiguates 
the structure and elements of the argument, it cannot ensure that the argument itself is 
‘good’, or sufficient for its purpose (Hawkins, et al., 2011). While methods such as 
BBNs offer a formal mathematical language for providing quantitative analysis and 
reasoning in uncertain situations (Littlewood, et al., 1998), the underlying quantitative 
values are nothing more than an encoding of confidence. Therefore such notations do 
not in themselves assure a compelling argument. 
2.5 Background on the Safety / Risk Case 
Section 1.2 described that within contemporary practice the achievement of safety is 
articulated and justified through a safety case. Section 1.2 provided a definition for a 
safety case. This is reinforced by (Kelly, 1998) who states that a safety case 
“communicates a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is 
acceptably safe to operate in a particular context”. 
2.5.1 Structure of the Safety Case 
A safety case normally consists of two elements: 
• Safety Argument which presents the principles on which the safety is based and 
identifies the safety objectives and requirements (Department of Computer 
Science, 2004). The safety argument is “a logically stated and convincingly 
demonstrated reason why safety requirements are met” (Ministry of Defence, 
2007). It “communicates the relationship between the evidence and objectives” 
(Kelly, 1998).  
• Evidence supporting the safety argument. 
(Department of Computer Science, 2004) makes an important distinction between the 
safety case and safety case report. The safety case is the totality of the safety 
justification and all of the supporting material. Supporting material might include 
testing reports, validation reports, relevant design information, modelling, simulation, 
analysis, etc. The safety case report is the document that presents all of the key 
components of the safety case and references all supporting documentation (Department 
of Computer Science, 2004). 
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While these definitions are broadly reflective of contemporary practice, there are 
variations on the approach to documenting and communicating the safety case and 
variations to the principle inclusions to a safety case. Table 8 summarises the 
approaches used for documenting and communicating the safety justification by several 
military and civil airworthiness authorities. 
Authority Achievement of Safety articulated and 
justified by: 
Source 
ADF Safety Case Report:  
MIL-STD-882C programs: the Safety Case Report is a 
summary report consisting of  the Task 301 Safety 
Assessment, Task 401 Safety Verification and Task 
402 Safety Compliance Assessment 
ARP4754 programs: the Safety Case Report is a 
summary report summarising the results of the 
Aircraft and Systems Functional Hazard Assessment, 
System Safety Assessment, Common Cause Analysis 
and Health Hazard Assessment.  
DI (G) OPS 2-2 (Defence 
Aviation Safety Authority, 
2011) 
AAP7001.053 (Directorate 
General Technical 
Airworthiness, 2010) 
AAP7001.054 (Directorate 
General Technical 
Airworthiness, 2010) Sect 2 
Chap 1 
UK MoD Safety Case Report: a report that summarises the 
arguments and evidence of the safety case, and 
documents progress against the safety 
programme. 
Defence Standard 00-56 
(Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
USAF, 
USN,  
US Army 
DI-SAFT-80102 Safety Assessment Report 
DI-SAFT-81300 Mishap Risk Assessment Report 
MIL-STD-882C (US DoD, 
1993) 
MIL-STD-882D (US DoD, 
2000) 
FAA, 
EASA, 
CAA, 
CASA 
Reports summarising the results from Aircraft 
and Systems Functional Hazard Assessment, 
System Safety Assessment, and Common Cause 
Analysis. 
ARP5754 (SAE International, 
1996) 
Table 8: Safety Justification Artefacts of Airworthiness Authorities 
Despite the differences in report types and contributing assessments, the various reports 
provide the justification as to why the system is acceptably safe or why the risk is 
acceptable or tolerable. This thesis will primarily assume the domain of the safety case 
and the associated arguments and evidence, although it will be evident that the ideas 
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developed within this thesis have read across to the other approaches used to justify 
safety. 
2.5.2 The Emergence of the Risk Case 
In the report into the loss of the RAF Nimrod in 2006 (Haddon-Cave, 2009), Haddon-
Cave recommended that safety cases be renamed and be made more focused, 
proportionate, and relevant. The official recommendation is as follows:  
Recommendation 21.E.1: The Regulator shall set the requirements for a single, concise, 
through-life “Risk Case” for each platform in a format which stimulates effective 
analysis, encourages focus on key risks and can easily be assimilated and understood 
by the intended user. 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009) 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009) proposes a simple definition of risk case as “reasonable 
confirmation that risks are managed to ALARP.”. (Haddon-Cave, 2009) is not the only 
source to criticise the safety case approach. Criticisms of safety cases are: 
• They shouldn’t argue that the system is safe; they should argue why the risks are 
controlled and indicate those areas where remedial action is needed to achieve an 
acceptable level of safety. 
• The focus should be on decision-making: for both decisions as to the acceptance 
of risk and decisions as to the deployment of resources to reduce risk. 
• They should not be a ‘snapshot’ report or an ‘archaeological’ collection of 
documents; they should be actively informing decisions on risk treatment or 
retention. 
• The definition of safety case in (Ministry of Defence, 2007), tends to encourage a 
laborious, discursive, document-heavy ‘argument’ aimed at justifying a self-
fulfilling prophesy (Haddon-Cave, 2009). 
• They suffer from factors outlined by (Kelly, 2008) including: the apologetic safety 
case, the documents-centric view, the approximation to the truth, prescriptive 
safety cases, safety case shelf-ware, imbalance of skills, and the illusion of 
pictures. 
Based on these criticisms Haddon-Cave proposes a “paradigm shift is required away 
from the current verbose, voluminous and unwieldy collections of text, documents and 
GSN diagrams to risk cases which comprise succinct, focused and meaningful hazard 
analysis which stimulate thought and action.” 
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To some extent the concept of the risk case is already evident in the safety case 
approaches of the ADF and US military. For example the Mishap Risk Assessment 
Report often used in US programs focuses on risk, although these reports are not 
immune from the criticisms of (Haddon-Cave, 2009) either. While it is yet to be clear if 
the risk case recommendation will be fully adopted by stakeholders, the evidence 
supporting the criticisms of the use of safety cases is largely indisputable, and should 
prompt further examination into the role and usage of safety cases. In the context of this 
thesis, it is important to understand the impacts of these criticisms on certification of 
aviation systems. Section 2.6 will discuss this further. 
2.5.3 Software Safety Cases 
So far this section has discussed safety cases in general, and so it is worthwhile 
clarifying the term software safety case. A software safety case is the element of a 
safety case that argues the safety of the software component of the system. The software 
safety case should recognise that the software does not exist in isolation to the 
remainder of the system and that the software’s interaction with the hardware and other 
elements of the system are crucial. The software safety case records the software 
viewpoint in terms of the safety case. Views are very common in engineering and 
computer science (Clements, et al., 2010). 
2.6 A Discussion of Current Approaches 
Section 2.4 provided an overview of the contemporary approaches used for assurance of 
safety-related software systems. From these overviews it is evident that the practice of 
safety assurance varies substantially between the assurance level, evidence assurance 
level, and safety argument and evidence approaches. There is also variation between 
domains (i.e. between military and civil aviation, rail, etc.), and there is variation 
between the specific requirements of standards. Because there is variation, it follows 
that there will also be variation in the benefits and limitation of using these approaches.  
The specific benefits and limitations of each approach were also analysed, key themes 
which should be factored into the application of safety assurance frameworks identified. 
Section 2.7 will look at how these themes can be used to derive general principles for an 
assurance framework in this context. However, before doing so, it is worthwhile to 
examine the literature that provides holistic analysis of these approaches and sets a 
broader direction for principles for an assurance framework. 
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2.6.1 Disputing the Assurance Level Approach 
The assurance level approach is in widespread use, and may be viewed as the accepted 
norm, at least in some domains (McDermid, 2001). Even the most recent revisions to 
standards of this type (e.g. (RTCA Inc., 2011), (IEC, 2010)) have continued to use the 
assurance level approach.  
However, despite the benefits, the assurance level approach is heavily criticised. Taken 
individually, none of the difficulties are sufficient to suggest that the current approaches 
should be abandoned, but taken together they suggest a more systematic and defensible 
approach is needed (Lindsay & McDermid, 1997). (Committee on Certifiably 
Dependable Software Systems, 2007) notes that in part the problems are due to 
inadequate oversight, inconsistent application of the standards, and processes 
established without regards for principles of standards. However this is not the whole 
answer, and the answers lie in the lack of product focus and relevance to risk 
assessments. 
2.6.2 The Assurance Level Approach Has Value 
Despite the criticisms, (McDermid, 2001) stresses that the assurance level approaches 
have value, and the criticisms and need for change should not be interpreted as a ‘free 
for all’ in development. The assurance level based standards do contain a lot of sensible 
requirements, advice and guidance on development. Their emphasis on requirements 
traceability also assists with ensuring requirements satisfaction is achieved. However, 
the approach doesn’t focus on providing information about the properties of the system 
that contributes to safety. What is needed is more focus on the product and the validity 
of the safety requirements for that product. Therefore this thesis asks if it possible to 
give the assurance level approaches a greater product focus while still preserving their 
benefits. Likewise is it possible to impart some of the assurance level’s benefits into the 
safety argument and evidence paradigm. If principles to this effect can be established, 
they might make the existing approaches more complementary. 
2.6.3 The Need for Product and Evidence-based Approaches 
The emergence of safety argument and evidence assurance based approaches is 
indicative of a growing concern about validity of the previously accepted wisdom. 
There is widespread support within the literature that the approach should be to seek 
explicit evidence of safety, rather than making a general appeal to the development 
processes (Committee on Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007).  
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2.6.4 Safety Argumentation Needs Enhancement 
The safety argument and evidence approach can provide a more product-assurance 
focused framework that provides an opportunity for addressing the recommendations 
for explicit claims and evidence. However a problem is that it gets misused because of 
its permissive subjectivity leading to unconstrained variation in judgements. The 
prominent reasons for this are the relative immaturity of safety argument methods, and 
the lack of experience in using product evidence as the main thrust of safety assurance. 
(Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010) suggest that contemporary safety argumentation and 
associated methods need to be enhanced to achieve this. Recent research literature also 
reflects a disproportionate focus on questions of argument, rather than questions of 
evidence, and thus more research is required regarding the problems of evidence 
sufficiency. A system should be regarded as dependable only if sufficient evidence of its 
explicitly-articulated properties is presented to substantiate the dependability objectives 
(Committee on Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007). (Committee on 
Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007) suggests that in practice, certification 
will be based on inspection, analysis and challenging of the dependability claim and the 
evidence offered in its support. Where over-sight by regulators is less prevalent, the 
approaches should provide more transparency, so that users can make informed 
judgements about dependability.  
However, as illustrated by Section 2.2, the approach adopted has to be complementary 
to the context of the specific regulatory environment and overall approaches to safety in 
that domain (Bloomfield & Bishop, 2010). This is a significant weakness in the 
literature pertaining to safety assurance. This thesis is one of the few works which 
addresses the contextual issue of the certification environment and the application of a 
product based approach. 
2.6.5 Never Enough Evidence 
There will never be unlimited evidence, because there is never unlimited time and 
money. So there will always be limitations in evidence, and it is important that an 
assurance framework recognises this. (Littlewood, 2007) contests that “it still remains 
impossible to show, before using it, that a system will be extremely dependable in 
operation”, on the basis of what (Littlewood, 2007) describes as the “unforgiving law 
about the extensiveness of evidence needed to make very strong dependability claims”. 
However despite these reservations, the world’s demand for systems will prevent any 
halt on the supply of such systems. The burden on those supplying and certifying these 
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systems is to establish ‘reasonability’ in the eyes of the public. Therefore, it is important 
that in addressing the problems with the current approaches, some consensus on 
benchmarks is sought on how much evidence, and what sort, is required to make 
‘reasonable’ claims about dependability and safety? 
2.6.6 Informing Risk in Real Time 
Safety (assurance) cases should be living documents, to reflect changes to the system 
and operational context over time (Kelly, 1998). Hence the case should not be 
constrained to initial development, and should evolve and continue to inform risk 
assessments throughout the life of the system. For example, (Ankrum & Kromholz, 
2005) states that “assurance case frameworks address new software development but 
rarely consider the larger lifecycle, including how to maintain confidence as the 
software evolves”. Section 2.4.3 has also identified that many safety cases become large 
and incomprehensible, which make them difficult to maintain. This is important because 
certifying authorities and operators need to continually identify, analyse and evaluate 
risks during operation. Thus the assurance framework needs to be useable during 
operation. It should help users make on-going risk treatment decisions. 
2.6.7 Understanding the Lack of Consensus 
Safety assurance is only effective if it is not only possible to produce a compelling 
safety case, but it is probable. Approaches that don’t result in probable production of a 
compelling safety case are potentially not effective. For any approach (new or existing) 
to be effective, it must be possible to not only identify examples where the approach is 
successful, but also ensure counter-examples don't indicate ineffectiveness. Where there 
is ineffectiveness, it must be possible to provide explanation for the ineffectiveness. 
As can been seen from the presentation of benefits and limitations, the variation in the 
approaches is indicative of differing philosophies of safety assurance standards between 
domains and regulatory contexts. The variation reflects the extent to which prescriptive 
and goal-based approaches are favoured, and thus the commensurate emphasis on 
process-assurance and product-assurance. The variation is also indicative of a lack of 
consensus in practice. What can be concluded from this lack of consensus is that current 
approaches to providing safety assurance have limitations. Thus, as neither paradigm is 
without its limitations in this context, it is possible that the more effective approach may 
be a compromise between both paradigms. Certainly, the symmetry between 
prescriptive and goal-based approaches identified in Section 2.2.3 suggests this.  
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This should be investigated because the context of suppliers, acquirers and certifying 
authorities is something that has been largely absent from literature criticising assurance 
frameworks. While this does not invalidate the criticisms it does mean that there has 
been an assumed context to the criticisms which warrant better understanding. 
2.7 Providing an Approach for Addressing the Limitations with 
Current Approaches 
This chapter has examined the certification of safety-related aviation systems and 
summarised the current and contemporary approaches. Section 2.4 has examined the 
benefits and limitation of these approaches, and identified themes amongst the benefits 
and limitations that should be addressed if better approaches are to emerge. For the 
assurance level approach the themes are summarised as follows: 
• Reducing variability in presentation of evidence is beneficial for relationships 
between suppliers, acquirers and certifying authorities. 
• Consensus on benchmarks for trustworthy evidence has benefits for suppliers, 
acquirers and certifying authorities 
• Aspects of the prescriptive approach are beneficial where contracts are used to 
enforce certification requirements relating to safety assurance. 
• Limitations in explicit product behavioural focus complicate the assessment of 
risk and the achievement of safety objectives.  
• Lack of clear rationale for prescription of techniques and methods with respect 
their risk reducing role leads to confusion.  
• Absence of a means for assessing the impact on safety risk when there is a 
shortfall in evidence against requirements complicates usage. 
For the safety argument and evidence-based approaches, the themes are as follows: 
• Evidence needs to be appropriate to the requirements and failure modes to which 
it relates, and the properties established from the way differing evidence combines 
are more important than simply the type of evidence presented. 
• Product focus and opportunity to reason about product behavioural properties with 
respect to safety and risk is beneficial.  
• The concept of patterns is useful because it provides a means to reduce the 
inherent variability. 
• The major drawbacks are subjectivity and the impacts on supplier, acquirers and 
certifying authorities in resolving this subjectivity and managing variability.  
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• Subjectivity and variability complicate the enforcement of certification 
requirements within contracts used for military system.  
• Intolerable risks are clearly identified as requiring treatment. It should not only be 
feasible to build a compelling safety argument and evidence for a good design, it 
is necessary to identify unsafe designs as non-compliant against the safety 
objectives, either because of inferior argument or evidence. 
In the military certification environment the contract is important and integration 
between the contract and assurance is vital if approaches are to be successful. 
This thesis discusses how these themes can be used to derive general principles for an 
assurance framework. The intent is to find the appropriate balance between goal-based 
and prescriptive elements. It will also provide a way to understand how the limitations 
of the current approaches may be resolved without introducing further limitations. 
There are benefits if the assurance framework can accurately disclose the risk, in the 
presence of an evidence set that has been benchmarked against benchmarks established 
by consensus of regulators and industry. For this goal, it will be important to be able to: 
• reason about the impact on risk of limitations, 
• make informed decisions before entering into contract, and 
• have clear expectation regarding resolving safety shortfalls and evidence shortfalls 
within the scope of the contract (in a fixed price paradigm). 
If these things can be achieved more programs should be completed within cost and 
schedule constraints. 
2.8 Thesis Contribution 
2.8.1 Research Questions  
The review of literature has motivated the following research questions: 
• General Principles. Is it possible to establish general criteria for safety assurance 
based on compromise between benefits and limitations of the contemporary 
approaches surveyed?  
• Informing Risk Decisions. Is it possible to identify criteria for safety assurance to 
enable stakeholders to make informed judgements about risk?  
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• Consensus on Argument and Evidence. Is it possible to identify criteria for 
safety assurance that assist with achieving consensus between suppliers and 
certifying authorities regarding suitability of argument and evidence?  
• Contractual Enforcement. Is it possible to identify criteria for contracts to permit 
communication and enforcement of safety assurance through contracts between 
suppliers and assessors in the military domain?  
• Architectural Properties. Is it possible to use the properties of aviation systems 
(e.g. aircraft flight control systems, flight instruments, navigation systems) to 
identify additional criteria for safety assurance? 
• Practice. Is it possible to develop a practical safety assurance framework that 
adheres to these criteria? 
2.8.2 Thesis Proposition 
From these research questions, the author presents the following thesis hypothesis: 
This thesis demonstrates that it is feasible to establish principles and usability criteria 
for defining effective safety assurance frameworks for aviation systems in typical 
acquisition contexts. This thesis provides meta-arguments that can be used as the 
basis for defining a novel integrated framework for the assurance of aviation systems. 
The thesis demonstrates how this approach can be used to address the identified 
limitations and challenges of the certification of aviation systems. Further, by 
reducing uncertainty for supplier delivery of safety evidence across contracting 
processes, the framework is intended to help limit emergence of safety evidence 
issues, the resultant cost and schedule implications, and reduce the likelihood of 
retaining intolerable safety risks. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the current approaches for assurance of safety related 
systems, with an emphasis on the treatment of systematic failures. The certification 
environment and contractual instruments with which these approaches are used was also 
reviewed. The chapter has identified that approaches can be categorised as prescriptive 
or goal-based, albeit some approaches inherit properties from both. Neither approach is 
without limitations; however notably the limitations differ between approaches. Both 
approaches also have benefits for safety assurance and for the relevant certification 
frameworks. The review identified that there is a lack of consensus on which approach 
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or which combination of approaches is more effective. There was also a lack of 
consensus on the purpose of safety assurance, and how this differs from the existence of 
a safety argument as part of a safety case. There was, however, general consensus that a 
greater product focus is required and that improvements are needed achieve this. 
Research questions and a thesis proposition have been defined. 
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3 Establishing General Principles for Safety 
Assurance Frameworks 
Safety assurance frameworks are only effective if it is not only possible to produce a 
compelling safety case, but it is probable. To establish which properties from 
prescriptive and goal-based approaches are most beneficial to safety assurance, this 
chapter establishes general principles and usability criteria for effective safety assurance 
frameworks. These general principles and usability criteria form the basis for the 
definition of a specific framework. The intent of the framework is to demonstrate that it 
is feasible to inherit properties from both the prescriptive and goal-based approaches to 
achieve a product focus and compatibility with certification environments and 
contracting methods. 
3.1 Clarifying the Terminology 
Substantial importance is placed on the terminology used within this thesis. Section 1.2 
provided definitions for key terms that are inherited from existing standards and 
literature. Relationships between terminologies are also important. In order to ensure 
consistent understanding, this section clarifies terminology to be used, and defines 
meta-models based on relationships between terminology. 
3.1.1 Parts of the System 
In any complex system, it is important to be able to refer to parts of the system 
accurately. In this thesis the following parts hierarchy is used (refer Figure 2). This 
hierarchy has been derived from terminology used in (SAE International, 1996) and 
(SAE Aerospace, 2010).  
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Figure 2: Hierarchy of Parts and Systems 
3.1.2 Evidence, Behaviours, Hazards, and Consequences 
The terms evidence, hazards and consequences are widely used in the safety assurance 
literature, as is evident from Chapter 2. The definitions of these terms (from Section 
1.2) imply certain relationships which are important for defining safety assurance. 
Figure 3 summarises these relationships, such that the purpose of safety assurance can 
be further developed. This meta-model will be assumed vocabulary. 
3.1.3 Behaviours 
In defining the relationships within Figure 3, it has been necessary to introduce 
terminology pertaining to systems producing hazards. This thesis supposes that systems 
exhibit behaviours, and that these behaviours may be desirable or undesirable with 
respect to safety. Those behaviours which are undesirable may produce hazards. For 
example, consider an aircraft flight control system which can produce a hard-over under 
certain conditions, which unrecovered would result in loss of continued safe flight and 
landing (i.e. a crash). Such behaviour is both undesirable and of catastrophic 
consequences. Clearly a goal of safety assurance is to provide confidence that the 
designers have prevented these consequences, by controlling hard-over related hazards, 
by constraining behaviours of the system that could produce such hazards. 
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Figure 3: Evidence, Behaviours, Hazards and Consequences 
3.1.4 Constraining Behaviours with ‘Constraints’ 
Figure 3 annotates the concept of Product ‘Constraints’.  
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Constraint 
A requirement on the system to constrain one or more of the systems behaviours, such 
that the behaviours exhibited by the system are desirable with respect to safety. 
Constraint of behaviours may be by means such as prevention or tolerance. 
Working Definition 
The concept of a ‘Constraint’ will be elaborated further in Chapter 5. However, 
notionally, the ‘Constraint’ is, for example, intended to be consistent with (Weaver, 
2003)’s usage of (Pumfrey, 1999)’s classification of software functional failures modes 
(Omission, Commission, Early, Late, Value), and the requirements (Weaver, 2003) 
identified on the system and its evidence for treating them (Absence or 
Detection/Handling). The ‘Constraint’ is a more generic representation of this concept 
that can be applied at the system perspective, and not just for software. The reader is 
referred to (Weaver, 2003) for a description of these concepts. 
To illustrate this concept, consider the following. A constraint which uses prevention 
(or absence) to constrain undesirable behaviours implies there are evidence 
requirements to demonstrate the prevention. Whereas a constraint which uses tolerance, 
may need to define both product behavioural requirements, such as a detection/handling 
capability and the evidence to show that these are correctly implemented. Such 
implications are important for safety assurance.  
3.2 Purpose of Safety Assurance 
A purist might argue that the only concern of safety assurance is achieving safety 
through minimising risks to a level for which there is societal consensus. However even 
the most cursory inspection of any number of safety assurance standards reveals that 
these standards seem to concern themselves with a much greater range of factors than 
just safety. Consider the following description of the purpose of safety assurance 
standards by (McDermid & Rae, 2012), which states that at least one view of the 
purpose of safety assurance is to: 
• require a minimum standard of safety to be achieved and demonstrated; 
• where further safety can be achieved above the minimum, require safety 
improvement to be balanced with the cost of safety improvement; and 
• minimise the cost required to achieve and demonstrate safety. 
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While it is clear that the purpose includes safety, there are additional factors and 
relationships expressed, as follows: 
• standard of safety achieved which is about the safety of the product, 
• demonstration of safety which is about the way the safety is shown, and 
• cost of safety which relates to the cost of both achievement and demonstration. 
Relationships are also expressed between these factors, as follows: 
• safety / cost relationship – achieve the minimum standard of safety while 
minimising cost of achievement, 
• demonstration / cost relationship – demonstrate the minimum standard of safety 
while minimising cost of demonstration, and 
• balanced safety / cost improvement – balance further improvement of safety with 
the cost of safety improvements. 
Of note, the cost factor is prominent in each of these relationships, revealing a practical 
element of safety assurance. The following sub-section examines this further. 
3.2.1 Role of Cost of Achievement and Demonstration 
The cost factor and its relationships are prominent in (McDermid & Rae, 2012)’s 
purpose statement. The notion of cost is important because it emphasises a practical 
‘real-world’ aspect of the achievement and demonstration of safety. It recognises that 
doing these things takes resources, time and money; and how well they are done is 
inseparable from the cost of doing them. Minimising cost is intuitively sensible as it is 
credible commercial goal to inspire efficiency improvement in the achievement and 
demonstration of safety. However from the very outset it emphasises there will always 
be limitations to achievement and demonstration based on cost drivers. Hence it implies 
that a significant aspect of safety assurance is actually the measurement and 
management of these cost relationships, both for achievement and demonstration.  
The contemporary approaches (refer Section 2.4) implicitly acknowledge the role of the 
cost factor, but have typically excluded, avoided or struggled to comprehend how to 
express these relationships. Some make assumptions about the cost of safety, and this 
becomes implicitly encoded in their requirements; while others ignore it and struggle 
with relevance to practicality. Therefore, it is important to have a clear understanding 
about the cost relationships for both achievement and demonstration to ensure standards 
appropriately express safety assurance. 
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3.2.2 Understanding Achievement and Demonstration 
Achievement and demonstration are different concepts, but they are not independent. If 
achievement of safety is about minimising accidents and reducing their severity through 
treating risks (refer to definitions of safety, accidents and risk from Section 1.2), then 
informing the design and operation of these systems to treat or manage those risks also 
forms part of the evidence used in the demonstration of safety achievement. It implies 
that sufficient (minimal) information is necessary to understand the risks and make 
well-informed judgements about the costs and benefits of design options and 
operational risk treatments used for achievement. Because of this information 
dependency, achievement is inseparable from enabling elements of demonstration. 
Therefore, an additional qualifier to the purpose of safety assurance is the relationship 
between achievement and demonstration to enable cost minimisation. The purpose 
should recognise that certain minimum information associated with the demonstration is 
required to adequately inform achievement. The following paragraphs examine specific 
measures of achievement and demonstration that will further assist with defining this. 
Measures of Achievement 
When it comes to the cost of achievement of the minimum standard of safety, there are 
several well established measures governing this. For example some approaches qualify 
acceptable, tolerable (or acceptable with higher authority approval) and unacceptable 
levels of risk. Concepts such as ALARP11 are then also applied to provide a measure of 
adequacy of risk reduction (and thus safety achievement) versus cost obligations.  
However, because of the information dependency between achievement and 
demonstration outlined above, there are problems when the ‘traditional’ interpretation 
of ALARP assumes that this information is without cost (McDermid, 2012). In other 
words, the only cost considered in ALARP is that of taking action to mitigate risk, not 
of the work required to establish the risks, determine potential action options, and the 
potential cost and benefit of such action. In situations where the cost of information is 
high, such as for aviation systems, this becomes a significant problem. In practice this 
leads to the intent of ALARP being undermined by the cost of getting the information 
needed to make ALARP decisions. Hence an additional purpose of safety assurance is 
                                                 
11 As described by references such as (United Kingdom Goverment, 1974), (UK Health and Safety 
Executive, 2013) and (Ministry of Defence, 2007) 
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to set a minimum standard for the information required to inform risks and risk 
reduction decisions. This information includes the identification, analysis and 
evaluation of risks, and the identification and analysis of possible treatment options. 
Measures of Demonstration 
However, for the cost of demonstration, the measures are less clear than for 
achievement. This is due to the lack of consensus on exactly what should be shown to 
demonstrate achievement of safety. Some ‘traditional’ approaches try to avoid this 
problem by simply prescribing evidence and/or argument for demonstration, but often 
without any explicit rationale. They effectively make an assumption about what 
demonstration should be, rather than making explicit the rationale for it.  
Other approaches emphasise the concept of confidence. For example, (McDermid, 
2008) has proposed the concept of As Confident as Reasonably Practicable (ACARP). 
ACARP proposes that there is, in effect, a scale of confidence in the evidence and 
argument available to demonstrate safety, and that this scale of confidence can be 
treated similarly to the way risk is considered under ALARP. Thus for each limitation in 
confidence, treatment options should be identified, and decisions made regarding which 
treatment options provide justifiable benefits to confidence. However, ACARP is little 
more than a concept at this point, and there aren’t any frameworks which formalise this 
concept as yet. Because of this, there is also limited literature as to whether it actually 
resolves the demonstration issue. At first glance, it seems to have a comparable 
limitation to ALARP in that it doesn’t acknowledge the minimum information 
requirement to inform demonstration treatment options. However, there is benefit to 
having a classification of criteria for measuring when confidence is sufficient. 
Demonstration of safety, in essence, is a measure of what knowledge there is of risks, 
and what opportunity there is for this knowledge to be undermined by uncertainty. Only 
when the knowledge of risks outweighs the impact of potential uncertainty of risks, can 
it be possible to reason that demonstration is achieved. Otherwise, there remains the 
opportunity for the knowledge to be fundamentally undermined by uncertainty. 
To articulate this, Figure 4 revises Figure 3 to also show the concept of establishing 
knowledge and uncertainty of risks.  
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Figure 4: Knowledge and Uncertainty in Safety Assurance 
Figure 4 represents that there will always be gaps in knowledge of risks, and thus it is 
important to be able to determine when knowledge sufficiently outweighs uncertainty 
when measuring demonstration of safety. It will be important to characterise to what 
extent the overall risk is based on the following: 
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• Known Knowns12: known product behaviours which result in risks, 
• Known Unknowns: known limitations in the extensiveness of the evidence and 
unknowns about product behaviours; 
• Unknown Unknowns: unknown product behaviours because of limitations in the 
evidence, and thus limitations in knowledge. 
In Figure 4, uncertainty of risks is represented by a dashed box to illustrate uncertainty 
is not directly measureable. Instead the goal is to examine how knowledge might be 
undermined by uncertainty and reduce such uncertainty until it is tolerable. 
With respect to demonstration, there is also a notable exclusion in (McDermid & Rae, 
2012)’s purpose statement.  While the purpose mentions a minimum standard of safety 
(achieved), and thus implies that the minimum cost of achieving safety is limited by 
achievement of the minimum standard of safety, there is no equivalent statement for a 
minimum standard of demonstration of safety. Thus it is not possible to automatically 
imply a minimum cost of demonstration, and it is not explicit within the purpose 
statement. Hence an additional purpose of safety assurance is to also set a minimum 
standard for the demonstration. 
3.2.3 An Improved Purpose of Safety Assurance 
In sub-section 3.2.2 additional factors and relationships have been established that 
require inclusion within the purpose of safety assurance. These relate to minimum 
information required to inform achievement and the minimum standard of 
demonstration. Restating the purpose of safety assurance results in the following 
purpose statement (with enhancements shown in italics): 
• require a minimum standard of safety to be achieved and demonstrated; 
• require the achievement of a minimum standard of safety to be informed by a 
minimum set of information 
• require a minimum standard of demonstration; 
• where further safety can be achieved or demonstrated above the minimum, 
require improvement to be balanced with the cost of improvement; and 
• minimise the cost required to achieve and demonstrate safety. 
                                                 
12 There is a fourth category of Unknown Knowns; however in this context, the notion of communicating 
the knowledge and proposing an evaluation of the risk effectively shifts any knowledge from this 
category into the Known Knowns. 
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Safety assurance is thus inclusive of these factors and the relationships they imply. It 
should be unsurprising then that safety assurance frameworks have to find a way to 
express and measure these relationships. However, how to do that in a way that ensures 
the purpose of safety assurance remains explicit is something the current approaches 
struggle with because of the difficulties of addressing the cost of demonstration aspects. 
3.3 Purpose of Assurance Standards 
Standards typically have a wider role than just achieving the purpose of safety 
assurance. The following subsections describe what assurance standards are used for. 
3.3.1 Standardisation of Acceptable Practice 
One important role for standards is to standardise acceptable practice. The word 
‘standard’ in general English language definition can imply the following: 
• “anything taken by general consent as a basis of comparison” (The Macquarie 
Library, 2002) 
• “a level of quality which is regarded as normal, adequate, or acceptable” (The 
Macquarie Library, 2002) 
• “a level of quality or attainment” (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
The key points here are: 
• the basis of comparison (usually expressed as a set of criteria)  
• against a measure of acceptability or attainment (i.e. the pass-mark)  
Interpreting these key points for a safety assurance standard implies that a safety 
assurance standard should provide a basis of comparison between a product and its 
evidence, and the desired outcomes of the standard. In the case of a safety assurance 
standard the goal is achievement and demonstration of safety. Posing the question 
rhetorically, what are the structured set of properties of the product and its evidence that 
permits a conclusion to be established that the product’s behaviours are appropriate with 
respect to safety? To answer this question it is necessary to have criteria for measuring 
how evidence informs product behaviours and product behaviours inform knowledge of 
risks, risk assessment and safety. 
(Weaver, 2003) describes a two properties of evidence that are useful for establishing 
criteria for suitability of evidence. These are as follows: 
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Relevance 
The extent to which an item of evidence entails
13
 the requirements for evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
Trustworthiness 
The perceived ability to rely on the character, ability, strength or truth of the evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
Unfortunately many of the frameworks (refer Section 2.4.1) underpinning ‘traditional’ 
assurance standards confuse premises for conclusions or outcomes. Thus they prescribe 
a ‘basis of comparison’ focussed around the methods of development or assessment, 
rather than about the suitability (relevance and trustworthiness) of the behaviours and 
evidence with respect to safety. In general, this thesis doesn’t raise objection to the 
many valid premises that underpin these standards, and to which (Weaver, 2003) refers 
to as ‘best practice’ or ‘good practice’. However the inference that they lead to the right 
conclusions is usually implicit, if not missing altogether. There are also some instances 
where it is questionable that a standard’s premises even link to an appropriate 
conclusion, or are there for other reasons otherwise not made explicit. While, this is 
certainly a limitation to existing frameworks, the developers of these frameworks were 
not entirely at fault for this circumstance. 
When acceptable practice is established based on premises (things practitioners become 
familiar with through practical experience), then the acceptable practice will focus on 
the methods (e.g. what test method should be used, how should requirements be written, 
etc.). This may be acceptable where premises lead directly to conclusions. However for 
safety assurance standards involving technologies whose failures are dominated by 
systematic failures, rarely does a premise lead directly to a conclusion. Rarely does a 
claim from one single piece of evidence relate directly to satisfying a safety objective. 
This is because the product safety objectives are abstracted from the methods of 
evidence generation. Furthermore, because of the technologies involved, the plethora of 
techniques and methods, architectural options and implementation possibilities, there 
are numerous approaches to any one design problem. This creates a challenging 
conundrum. Should the assurance standard define the preferred combination of the 
                                                 
13 To involve, or logically necessitate. 
 94  
methods (or those premises with which practitioners are most familiar)? or should the 
assurance standard focus on how the premises link to inferred premises and 
conclusions? This thesis proposes that the focus should be on the latter14, rather than the 
former; although the role of the former should be explicitly recognised. To achieve this 
focus, examine the chain of definitions from Section 1.2 and Figure 3: 
• safety is defined in terms of risk,  
• risk is defined in terms of product behaviour contributions, 
• product behaviours are defined in terms of information provided by evidence. 
It emphasises that these things are the measures of safety. Hence it can be inferred that: 
safety assurance should set outcomes and a basis for comparison for those things 
most important to safety: risk, product behaviours, rationale, and evidence. The 
principles and usability criteria developed in this chapter will use these factors as the 
basis for defining safety assurance.  
3.3.2 Contractual or Regulatory Compliance 
A related role of standards which is applicable to safety assurance standards is 
providing consistent benchmarks for contractual or regulatory compliance. This is 
because these standards often form part of commercial and/or legally binding 
relationships between suppliers, acquirers, and regulators. When a standard is part of 
such a relationship, it must be possible for the stakeholders to consistently distinguish 
compliance from non-compliance. 
While the concept of benchmarks is relatively straightforward, which benchmarks are 
suitable, and how best to articulate them, is a substantially more challenging question. 
The purpose statement from Section 3.2.3 has provided three minimum benchmarks that 
require articulation:  
• the minimum standard of safety achievement,  
• the minimum standard of demonstration, and  
• the minimum information required to inform achievement.  
Hence, a safety assurance standard should concern itself with how to measure these 
from a compliance perspective. This implies a level of prescription, as necessary to 
measure the benchmarks identified by the purpose statement. It is also important to note 
                                                 
14 Because only the latter provides the explicit product argument for safety, whereas the former leaves it 
implicit. There are other pros and cons though, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
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that there are practical constraints on assessors. The benefits and limitations discussed 
in Section 2.6 indicate that variability and subjectivity hinder the basis of comparison. 
Thus minimisation of unnecessary variability and subjectivity is also a goal. 
Hence it can be inferred that: it must be possible to distinguish compliance / non-
compliance or acceptable/unacceptable; and that reducing variability and subjectivity 
may assist this. The principles and usability criteria developed in this chapter will use 
these factors as the basis for defining safety assurance. 
3.3.3 Compliance Assurance and Managing Risk 
Inevitably the compliance assurance programs of regulators will eventually find non-
compliances with respect to the criteria of any standard, and the same will apply for 
safety assurance standards. Suppliers are driven by commercial motivators, and despite 
good intentions things do get missed or avoided. For safety assurance standards, the 
important thing is that the meaning in terms of safety achievement can be determined 
from such non-compliances. For product standards, the meaning is usually fairly 
straightforward – i.e. the product poses a risk because it doesn’t have a particular 
property or safety feature that would normally be expected for this product. However, 
for safety assurance standards, the impact of the non-compliance might be less certain, 
particularly when it pertains to shortfalls in demonstration, or the minimum information 
necessary to inform decisions fundamental to achievement. 
The definition of requirements, objectives and outcomes in an assurance standard 
should be explicit in product meaning, so the safety impact of any non-compliance can 
be determined. This provides the regulator with a basis for managing the tolerability of 
any risk associated with non-compliance, rather than being uncertain as to the specific 
risk. There are also benefits to this approach if shortfalls are learned about 
retrospectively, and the regulator is faced with reassessing risk and promulgating 
interim risk treatments until the non-compliance can be properly resolved. 
Hence it can be inferred that: the impact in terms of risk of limitations in safety 
assurance on the outcomes of safety assurance should be explainable. The principles 
and usability criteria developed in this chapter will use these factors as the basis for 
defining safety assurance. 
3.4 Key Principles for Safety Assurance 
Having established the purposes of safety assurance based on both the intentions of 
safety assurance and how it is applied in practice, it is possible to establish principles 
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and usability criteria that the safety assurance frameworks should adhere to. This 
section proposes a set of general principles for safety assurance frameworks based on 
the purpose of safety assurance established within this chapter. The intent of these 
principles is to guide the development of safety assurance frameworks within a specific 
domain or context. These principles will be used through the remainder of this thesis to 
develop a safety assurance framework for the specific context of military aviation 
systems and their associated certification environment. 
Section 3.3.1 identified that risk, product behaviours, rationale and evidence are 
important. Thus a model on which principles are based must define the goals of each of 
these elements and the relationships between them. The relationships between them 
must address both the rationale for the relationship, as well as how any limitations in 
one element affect other elements higher in the hierarchy. Figure 5 provides a model of 
the relationship between these entities.  
 
Figure 5: Principles and Guidelines of Safety Assurance 
The following sub-sections describe the principles/guidelines and their instantiation in 
the context of this model. 
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3.4.1 Principles of Entities of Risk, Behaviours and Evidence 
Principle A – Safety assurance should inform risk treatment and retention 
decisions 
Description: The primary purpose of safety assurance is to inform risk decisions by 
identifying, analysing and proposing evaluations15 of risks to establish if risks are 
acceptable, tolerable or unacceptable in a given context. This permits duty holders to 
make informed decisions pertaining to risk treatment or retention. It also informs duty 
holders of their operational obligations pertaining to management of risk. 
Rationale: The authorities responsible for risk treatment decisions should be informed 
as to when the minimum standard of safety has been achieved and when additional risk 
treatment is necessary. 
Related Purpose Statement: This principle relates to the purpose require a minimum 
standard of safety to be achieved. 
Principle B – Safety assurance should prompt stakeholders to treat risks ALARP  
Description: Through the systematic identification and analysis of treatment options by 
relevant stakeholders, the act of undertaking safety assurance should prompt 
stakeholders to continue to treat risks when the minimum standard of safety hasn’t yet 
been achieved, and where further safety is economic to achieve. 
Rationale: Only through risk treatment is it possible to achieve the minimum standard 
of safety required in a given context. Unacceptable and intolerable risks should be 
clearly identified as requiring treatment. Where further safety can be achieved above the 
minimum, safety improvement should be balanced with the cost of safety improvement.  
Related Purpose Statement: This principle relates to the purposes: 
• require a minimum standard of safety to be achieved, and 
• where further safety can be achieved above the minimum, require safety 
improvement to be balanced with the cost of safety improvement. 
Principle C – Knowledge of behaviours should be established. 
Description: Knowledge of behaviours of the system under normal operating and 
failure circumstances should be established for use in the assessment of risk. 
                                                 
15 Risk steps (identify, analyse, evaluate) taken from ISO 31000:2009 (ISO, 2009) 
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Rationale: The behaviours of a product under normal operating and failure 
circumstances dictate its suitability as a system from both functional and safety 
perspectives. Although the knowledge of product behaviours will never be absolute, 
because there is never unlimited time or money to identify and analyse them, by 
identifying the product behaviours systematically under both normal operating and 
failure circumstances it is possible to reason about their suitability. 
Related Purpose Statement: This principle relates to the purposes: 
• require the achievement of a minimum standard of safety to be informed by a 
minimum set of information 
• require a minimum standard of demonstration; 
Principle D – Evidence should be relevant to the rationale for its purpose. 
Description: Evidence (both product and process) should be used where it is 
appropriate, and it should be obvious when evidence is being misused, and this impact 
on the demonstration captured as a limitation. 
Rationale: The role of each piece of evidence should be relevant to its use for providing 
knowledge of the product behaviours. For example, evidence from white box unit 
testing has very limited relevance to a claim about requirements validity. Product 
evidence that is not relevant to its role (in the rationale) results in: 
• a limitation in evidence if the role is not fulfilled by another piece of evidence, or 
• is counter evidence for process assurance as it indicates that this specific evidence 
has been used for the wrong purposes, and this may lead to uncertainty regarding 
the use and role of other evidence. 
The set of evidence is never infinite (because there isn’t infinite time or money). The 
way the evidence combines is important for characterising the trustworthiness of 
product evidence and the product behaviours deduced from it. Misused evidence costs 
money to produce, and is probably not contributing materially to safety. Costs will only 
be minimised when unnecessary activities are avoided. 
Related Purpose Statement: This principle relates to the purposes: 
• require the achievement of a minimum standard of safety to be informed by a 
minimum set of information; 
• require a minimum standard of demonstration; 
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• where further safety can be achieved or demonstrated above the minimum, 
require safety improvement to be balanced with the cost of safety improvement; 
and 
• minimise the cost required to achieve and demonstrate safety. 
3.4.2 Principles Relating to Relational Associations 
Linking each entity of evidence, product behaviours and risk in Figure 5 are relational 
associations. These relational associations need to articulate two types of information, 
as described by the following two relational principles. Note alternative labelling (X, Y) 
are used for these principles to distinguish them from the entity principles described 
above. 
Principle X – The rationale should be explained. 
Description: The rationale that relates the one entity to another entity should be 
explained so that achievement of goals of the higher entity can be assessed. The 
rationale is in effect the underlying argument specific to the relationship between the 
particular entities. The rationale allows the chain of argument and evidence to continue 
from evidence, to product behaviours through to risk. 
Rationale: The explanation of the rationale between one entity and another entity 
communicates the achievement relationship, and is fundamental to providing and 
reasoning about the demonstration. When there are limitations in the rationale, then 
higher entities may be impacted. 
Principle Y – The impact of limitations should be explained 
Description: The impact of limitations of one entity on another should be determined 
and explained in relation to the rationale. 
Rationale: No entity is ever without its limitations, either because of physical 
limitations or because practical cost (resources, time, money) constraints. Knowledge is 
thus always coupled with uncertainty. Understanding these limitations informs 
achievement and the confidence in the demonstration. Counter evidence is a powerful 
indicator of non-achievement. Understanding the impact informs overall achievement 
and the confidence in the demonstration. 
3.4.3 Establishing Usability Guidelines 
The purposes of assurance standards identified in Section 3.2 suggest that there are 
usability guidelines that support the application of principles. This is because humans 
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are required to comprehend and communicate many aspects of safety assurance (i.e. 
safety assurance had a large human component, no matter how much modelling or how 
many tools we apply to it). As such safety assurance must have a human factors element 
to its definition. Section 3.3 provides further confirmation that usability is an important 
aspect of archiving the purposes for which standards are used. Thus the implementation 
of the aforementioned principles with respect to the entities of Figure 5 in certification 
frameworks must be guided by usability guidelines if they are to be practical. There is 
also evidence that where such usability guidelines do not exist, then many of the 
limitations identified by Section 2.6 may result. The guidelines will be used to make 
trade-offs between theory and application in the development of the framework 
described by this thesis (refer to Chapters 4 through 6). The usability guidelines are 
defined as follows. 
Guideline 1 – Minimise variability 
Rationale: Variability of communications of risk, rationale and limitations can lead to 
difficulties in comprehension. This is because the variability leads to variability of 
interpretation and potentially inconsistent decision making. Therefore variability should 
be reserved for circumstances where explicit comprehension of a difference, limitation, 
decision or action is required. 
Guideline 2 – Minimise subjectivity 
Rationale: Subjectivity of risk assessment, rationale and limitation information can lead 
to limitations in the extent to which the information is compelling, or the ease with 
which agreement can be reached over that information. Therefore subjectivity of 
information should be minimised by either eliminating subjectivity, or by providing a 
means within the certification framework for resolving it. 
Guideline 3 – Straightforward
16
 for {assessor} to distinguish acceptable / 
unacceptable achievement/demonstration of {outcome} 
Rationale: The implementation of the aforementioned principles should permit a 
‘reasonable’ assessor within the domain to establish that the outcome is acceptable or 
                                                 
16 Straightforward does not imply the absence of judgement. It implies that routine judgements, which fall 
within established airworthiness practice (i.e. the majority of design decisions in airworthiness 
certifications), are easy to identify. Time spent making judgements should be reserved for genuinely 
novel solutions or problems. 
 101  
unacceptable in a manner that is suitable for repeated application and efficiency of 
resources. Decisions by assessors regarding acceptable/unacceptable outcomes should 
be consistent amongst average assessors. 
Guideline 4 – Straightforward for {decision maker} to determine {action} 
Rationale: The implementation of the aforementioned principles should permit a 
typical ‘reasonable’ decision maker to determine an appropriate action. While the 
decision will always be the responsibility of the decision maker, all decisions imply 
there are options, and thus ensuring that a suitable range of options are presented to the 
decision maker is important. 
3.5 The Role of Argumentation for Rationale 
In the principles defined by Section 3.4 rationale forms a key part of relating evidence 
to product behaviours and product behaviours to risk. Contemporary approaches suggest 
that argument (Kelly, 1998) is a widely used tool for expressing rationale. Argument is 
evident in many aspects of human society, with argument most prominent in disciplines 
such as: 
• legal processes of the judicial system, for which arguments are expressed by the 
defendant and accuser/prosecutor to relate evidence to each party’s respective 
version of the truth for evaluation by an independent judge and jury17;  
• philosophy, for which some branches utilise argument for expressing relationships 
between truths and knowledge, beliefs, and theories of justification and reason 
(Nuttall, 2002); and 
• scientific method, for which principles of reasoning are applied to evidence for 
investigating phenomena, formulating new knowledge, or revising and correcting 
existing knowledge (Nola & Sankey, 2007). 
Perhaps less prominent as a discipline or profession, but one to which most people can 
relate is the ‘debate’ commonly practiced in high school education. Debating is also 
used during political campaigning as a method of contrasting political policies between 
differing party representatives. A debate includes affirmative and negative arguments 
and rebuttals, and is adjudicated by an independent panel (Murphy, et al., 2003). 
                                                 
17 A jury is only present when a determination of guilt is required. There are legal processes such as a 
tribunal where a jury is not typically involved (Harris, 2006). 
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Argument has also come to prominence in safety assurance, with literature such as 
(Kelly, 1998) and (Hawkins, et al., 2011) developing methods for the development, 
presentation, maintenance and reuse of safety arguments. However, closer examination 
of the usage of argument in the prominent disciplines mentioned above and the usage of 
argument in safety assurance reveals noteworthy differences. 
3.5.1 Argument in Legal Process 
In legal process, both the defendant and accuser present their respective arguments to 
the court. While there are some legal forums where the defendant and accuser may not 
be so explicit, such as in a court of inquiry, there is still debate of the affirmative and 
negative to capture a range of perspectives on the argument (Harris, 2006). This implies 
there are essentially two arguments, an argument for and an argument against. These 
arguments are then subjected to challenging by the opposite party through cross 
examination, counter argument and rebuttal. This process of challenging the arguments 
is aimed to establish the relative truth of the respective arguments for deliberation by 
judge and jury. Hence the role of the argument is not simply the development and 
presentation of the two arguments, but also the process of challenging the arguments for 
the visibility of the decision makers. 
3.5.2 Argument in Philosophy and Scientific Method 
This concept of challenging of arguments also exists in philosophy and scientific 
method. In philosophy supposed truths and knowledge are often expressed as rhetorical 
arguments when they are proposed (Nuttall, 2002). In general the nature of philosophy 
is then that supposed truths only become ‘nearer truths’ when their falsifiability has 
resisted enquiring counter-argument by other philosophers. A similar concept applies 
also to scientific method where all scientific knowledge is the subject of scientific 
enquiry and the revising and correcting of existing knowledge is prompted wherever 
evidence of falsification can be reasoned to invalidate previous scientific theory (Nola 
& Sankey, 2007). Theories that stand up to scientific enquiry by the scientific 
community will persist and may eventually become acknowledged as scientific laws. 
Whether it is legal processes, philosophy or scientific method, a key aspect of assurance 
of decisions or knowledge is based on the concept of challenging arguments. 
3.5.3 Why is Argument in Safety Assurance Different? 
However, the same cannot be said for the present usage of arguments in the domain of 
safety assurance. Literature on safety cases has mostly focussed on the development and 
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presentation of arguments by the developer (e.g. (Kelly, 1998), (Habli & Kelly, 2007), 
(Weaver, 2003)). There is very limited literature examining the parallels with legal, 
philosophical and scientific domains for methods for challenging the safety arguments. 
To some extent is has been expected of assessors in reviewing safety arguments (Kelly, 
2007), but with limited guidance and authority. While (Kelly, 1998) identified the 
concept of anti-patterns as a basis for challenging safety cases, and some further 
patterns have been developed in (Weaver, 2003), further research of this topic has been 
limited. The recent literature that has suggested the concept of challenging the safety 
argument (e.g. (Kinnersly, 2011), (Haddon-Cave, 2009), (Graydon, et al., 2010)), hasn’t 
yet suggested a context in which the challenging should take place that permits it to be 
effective and efficient in typical certification environments.  
(Hawkins, et al., 2011) has proposed that confidence arguments can be used to express 
confidence in the product argument (refer Section 2.4.4). However, in practice can it be 
expected to achieve any more than simply to convey a self-fulfilling opinion of high 
confidence? Other domains suggest that it is the challenging of the opinion that 
contributes greatly to decision making on outcomes. If the concept of challenging the 
argument and adjudicating this process is so important to other societal usages of 
arguments, then does this also imply that safety arguments should be subject to a similar 
challenging? Further, does an unchallenged safety argument have any basis for being 
societally compelling? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider ways in which the challenging of 
a safety argument can occur. There appears to be a choice of two general ways to 
achieve the challenging of the argument: 
• have a product development, acquisition and certification process that permits a 
systematic challenging of the argument on a case by case basis, or 
• pre-constrain the argument by challenging the arguments in the process of 
developing the standards that express those arguments, and require suppliers to 
conform to those arguments. 
The following sub-sections examine these two approaches. 
3.5.4 Case by Case Challenging of Safety Arguments 
The case-by-case challenging of safety arguments approach is broadly akin to the goal-
based approach, but for which methods for challenging of arguments haven’t yet been 
widely addressed beyond those defined by (Kelly, 2007). The legal process, philosophy 
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and scientific methods all offer approaches that provide a means for challenging 
arguments, but are any of these suitable for the safety argument context? 
Is the Legal Challenging Model Feasible? 
If the challenging of safety arguments was to adopt a legal process analogy, then there 
are several interpretations on how the legal process roles could be achieved for a safety 
argument. One might be that the supplier provides the affirmative argument for 
achievement and demonstration of safety, an acquirer representative provides the 
rebuttal argument against safety, and the regulator provides mediation and adjudication. 
While this interpretation captures the distinct roles of the legal process, it does 
potentially suffer from conflict of interest that the legal process model does not. For 
example the acquirer wants or needs the product for some reason, and thus the strength 
of their challenge may vary dependent on this pressure. (Australian National Audit 
Office, 2009) and (Haddon-Cave, 2009) suggest that commercial pressures strongly 
dominate decision making processes. 
An alternative that would address this drawback would be to have an independent safety 
assessor (or similar role) perform the rebuttal argument against safety. The independent 
safety assessor might be empowered by the acquirer to work with their supplier, subject 
to agreement by the regulator on their competence to perform the role. In essence the 
acquirer would pay for two arguments to be developed, with the intent being that both 
arguments have the opportunity to include counter arguments of the other argument. 
This would imply a degree of iteration in the development of such arguments that could 
be perhaps controlled through systems engineering milestone reviews or other such 
milestones in the project. On the surface, this approach appears to be feasible, but there 
is a cost impost on the acquirer in that they are paying for two safety arguments to be 
developed and iterated in their projects. This would seem to work against the purpose of 
safety assurance that suggests minimising the cost of achievement and demonstration. 
Is the Philosophical or Scientific Challenging Model Feasible? 
If on the other hand, challenging of safety arguments was to adopt a philosophical or 
scientific method analogy, then this proposes that safety arguments must be published in 
the domain of system and safety professionals such that they can be subject to wide 
scrutiny and challenge by stakeholders and other practitioners. There are several 
difficulties with this approach. Firstly safety arguments often contain supplier 
proprietary information and thus suppliers won’t typically authorise wide release. 
Secondly the process of assembling and collating the open criticisms of the safety 
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arguments may be difficult to control for the regulator because of the number of 
prospective stakeholders involved. Thirdly there are timeliness goals for the fielding of 
systems, and thus suppliers will seek assurances that the challenge process can be 
completed within a bounded period of time. Philosophy and scientific endeavour are not 
bound by these same timeliness aspirations as is the fielding of systems. 
Of the two analogies the legal process analogy seems more feasible as a means of 
challenging safety arguments. However there are cost implications which work against 
the cost minimisation goals of the purpose statement. 
3.5.5 The Pre-constrained Argument 
In some respects pre-constraining the argument is what the traditional prescriptive 
standards tried to do. However, because of the focus on methods and techniques, they 
were often unclear about rationale, and thus equally unclear on whether this rationale 
was being challenged in the process of achieving consensus on the standard.  
There have also been attempts to document the rationale behind standards (e.g. RTCA 
SC-205 SG2 (RTCA Inc., 2012) efforts to document rationale behind DO-178B 
objectives for the DO-178C revision, (Holloway, 2012)). However, these approaches 
often reiterate the goals, objectives or sub-objectives of the standard, and don’t explain 
why (or the rationale for why) these goals or objectives relate to safety.  
Presuming though that appropriate arguments could be expressed in standards, and that 
the process of achieving consensus between stakeholders in development and review of 
standards effectively constitutes a challenging of the arguments, then it seems feasible 
to pre-constrain parts of arguments. Stakeholders typically represent suppliers, acquirers 
and regulators; and so to draw a legal process analogy, this provides a means for both 
defendants, accuser, judge and jury to witness the challenging of the arguments 
intended for capturing in the standard. The open circulation of drafts proposals of 
arguments for review, comment and refuting by stakeholders is also analogous to the 
philosophical and scientific uses of arguments, albeit constrained in time. 
Such a process would avoid the requirement for the arguments (at least the holistic 
ones) to be subjected to further challenging on a case by case basis, except perhaps 
periodically when the community suggests the standard requires review because societal 
or scientific acceptance of those arguments has changed. Whilst the goals of novelty and 
flexibility for supplier solutions will prevent the entire argument being pre-constrained, 
specific elements of the argument could be constrained and yet still permit appropriate 
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flexibility in design solutions. Only in the case of entirely novel systems and 
technologies would pre-constraining the argument not be feasible. This is because there 
wouldn’t yet be the basis of experience from which to form a standards committee. 
This pre-constraining approach has the benefit that regulators do not have to spend time 
challenging core philosophical arguments about how safety can be achieved and 
demonstrated, and can focus on other aspects of compliance, such as examining the 
evidence and specific product behavioural attributes. This approach may also be 
beneficial in domains where regulation is more reactive rather than proactive because it 
means that suppliers aren’t at risk of proposing arguments that have not been subjected 
to challenge already and that thus would remain unchallenged. 
3.5.6 To Pre-constrain Arguments or to Assess Case-by-Case 
The more effective approach will depend on several factors. In domains where there are 
large numbers of certifications involving essentially the same argument pattern for 
familiar problems and solutions, then to pre-constrain key parts of the arguments by the 
standards process is probably a more effective method of assuring safety for their 
domain. This is the vast majority of safety certifications undertaken. Where there are 
very large numbers of participant suppliers and assessors, the pre-constrained parts of 
the argument may also offer benefits of reducing variability and subjectivity in 
arguments. Pre-constraining parts of the argument is also relevant where regulators are 
reactive or have very limited resources, because the opportunity to review or challenge 
the argument may be limited. The pre-constrained argument also promises greater cost 
minimisation from a compliance evaluation perspective than the fully case-by-case 
assessment, and this may be favourable to regulators and acquirers. 
On the other hand, for systems where pre-constraining appropriate elements of the 
argument isn’t practical, because too much of the argument is specific to a novel 
problem or solution rather than general, then the case-by-case assessment is probably 
better (e.g. entirely new fields of problem or solution).  
This relationship between problems, solutions, novelty and consistency in arguments 
has been previously articulated by the McDermid Square (Ministry of Defence, 2007). 
However the existing McDermid Square expresses that the variable is the amount of 
argument (i.e. minimal, focussed or extensive). Considering the McDermid Square in 
the context of this discussion reveals that what should be variable is not the 
completeness of the rationale or argument, but instead the way in which it is expressed. 
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Adapting the McDermid Square to reflect pre-constrained arguments versus case-by-
case arguments results the Modified McDermid Square shown in Figure 6. 
Based on this discussion, this thesis will investigate the feasibility of pre-constraining 
elements of the argument in order to achieve the challenging of safety arguments. 
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Figure 6: The Modified McDermid Square 
3.6 Applying Safety Assurance to Software 
Discussion thus far has been predominantly related to safety assurance. It is also 
necessary to consider the purpose of software safety assurance, and how it may be 
achieved. Section 3.4 has established principles and guidelines for achieving safety 
assurance. To consider if the principles and guidelines require any further refinement 
when applied to the context of assurance of software systems will require an 
understanding of how software might impact the meta-models defined so far.  
To do this, it is important to understand how software might contribute to risks. 
(McDermid, 2001) identifies that software failures arise most often from: 
• discrepancies between documented requirements specifications and the 
behaviours needed for correct and safe functioning of the system; and 
• misunderstandings by software developers about the software's behavioural 
interface with the rest of the system. 
Software-related incidents and accidents have still occurred when the software satisfied 
its specification and when the operational reliability of the software was perceived to be 
very high (McDermid, 2001). This is due to: 
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• requirements that specify behaviour that is not appropriate from a system 
perspective; 
• requirements that do not specify some particular safety behaviour and therefore 
the developers have made invalid assumptions or omissions about those particular 
behaviours; or 
• software that has unintended (and unsafe) behaviour beyond that which is 
specified in requirements. 
The primary themes that emerge are the suitability of the behaviours of the software, 
and the knowledge of behaviours. Software events and failures are systematic, and thus 
the behaviours of any system resulting from behaviours of its software will also be 
systematic. Inspection of both Figure 3 and Figure 5 reveals that the behavioural 
properties are identified as a specific aspect of characterising a system. Thus it follows 
that characterising the behavioural properties of the software is part of characterising the 
overall system behaviours. Such an observation is consistent with established practice 
that software itself is not safe or unsafe, but it is the system in which the software 
resides whose behaviours may be desirable or otherwise. 
Because software behaviours are systematic, the rationale relating evidence, product 
behaviours and risks should also adopt a systematic viewpoint. Hence, a systematic 
approach of establishing and measuring these properties is sought. 
3.7 Conceptual Framework 
In this section a framework is outlined which is intended to provide an instantiation of 
the principles and guidelines outlined within this chapter. The intent of this framework 
is not to prescribe the specific techniques and evidence that must be used to provide 
assurance of safety. Instead, the framework identifies the underlying rationale for 
establishing knowledge and uncertainty of risks, the role of evidence, and gives 
guidance on how to establish the suitability of evidence. The framework described in 
this section is conceptual and independent of existing standards and frameworks. The 
framework is presented diagrammatically in Figure 7, and is summarised by the 
following sub-sections. Figure 7 also provides references to the chapters and sections 
within this thesis where specific topics are elaborated. 
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Figure 7: Conceptual Framework Architecture 
3.7.1 Risk Assessment 
Operational authorities and duty holders (here-after referred to as the ‘authority’) are 
required to make decisions regarding treatment and retention of risks during 
development and in-service operation of systems. The authority must establish that they 
are confident in their knowledge of risks in order to make effective risk decisions. 
 110  
Confidence in knowledge of risks is a function of the extent to which knowledge of 
risks outweighs uncertainty of risks. For an assurance framework, evidence must be 
presented that shows that knowledge and uncertainty of risks have been characterised.  
Taking a systematic perspective on risks means that risks are a function of both their 
severity of consequences, as well as the technological and operational defences (i.e. 
strength of defences) that are in place to prevent their manifestation. The stronger the 
defences against a particular risk, the lower the risk. Evidence should be presented that 
risk estimates have been informed by characterisation of knowledge and uncertainty. 
3.7.2 Architectural Assurance 
Defences are a means of constraining the behaviour of a system. They are preventative 
(fault prevention) or based on tolerance (fault/event tolerance). The suitability of 
individual defences, and the way multiple defences combine, affects the overall strength 
of defences. Evidence must be presented that the strength of defences for undesirable 
behaviours are commensurate with the severity of consequences.  
As the designer has numerous options for embodying both preventative and tolerance 
based defences within the system architecture, evidence must be presented that the 
architecture implements defences (individually and collectively) in an appropriate way. 
3.7.3 Claims Assurance 
A defence provides a ‘constraint’ on the behaviour of the system and its software. The 
requirement on the system for the defence is a ‘constraint’. The translation of a 
‘constraint’ into implementation is characterisable by lifecycle products that capture the 
refinement from requirements, through design, to implementation and the verification 
and validation thereof. The extent to which the chain of evidence is preserved affects 
the extent to which knowledge of the ‘constraint’ is achieved and demonstrated. 
In addition to establishing the existence of a lifecycle product, evidence can be grouped 
around the specification, verification and validation of a lifecycle product. Within each 
group, attributes provide knowledge of the lifecycle product itself (i.e. self attributes), or 
of the relationships between lifecycle products (i.e. relational attributes). Collective 
knowledge of these attributes forms the overall chain of evidence. 
3.7.4 Evidence Assurance 
Suitability of evidence is characterisable by its ‘relevance’ to how it is being used, and 
the ‘trustworthiness’ of its origins (Weaver, 2003). The results contained within the 
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evidence may also be a source of counter evidence.  Therefore, in characterising any 
specific attribute of a lifecycle product, the relevance, trustworthiness and results18 of 
the evidence must be characterised. Where there are limitations in evidence, then the 
tolerability of those limitations is dependent on how they relate to overall knowledge 
and uncertainty of product behaviours and resulting risks. 
3.7.5 Contracting for Safety Assurance 
For a safety assurance framework to be useful in practice, it must be compatible with 
the contractual arrangements used for acquiring such systems. This thesis examines the 
topic of military aviation systems, but factors governing usefulness have relevance to 
other domains also. Enabling the application of the framework and the criteria for 
ensuring its usefulness are important for real world implementation. A key element of 
evaluation is establishing that the framework is feasible and useful in practice. 
3.8 Introducing the Example - A-DHC-4 Advanced Caribou 
To aid the reader in understanding the framework a partially worked example is 
provided alongside the explanation. The A-DHC-4 Advanced Caribou is a fictional 
upgrade to the retired Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) DHC-4 Caribou tactical 
transport aircraft (Figure 8). The Caribou is a twin-engine high-wing monoplane with 
full-span double-slotted flaps and reversible propellers, which allow it to achieve steep 
approaches and short take-offs and landings. 
 
Figure 8: Royal Australian Air Force DHC-4 Caribou (photo by the author) 
                                                 
18 ‘Results’ encompasses the outcome, meaning, interpretation and/or consequences of the evidence. 
 112  
This example focuses upon the upgraded digital avionics systems, with specific 
emphasis on the digital fly-by-wire Flight Control System (FCS). Figure 9 identifies the 
flight control surfaces which are to be controlled by the FCS. 
 
Figure 9: A-DHC-4 Flight Control Surfaces 
This example focusses on the FCS. The FCS is an embedded computer system which 
controls the pitch, roll and yaw. The remaining chapters of this thesis develop this 
example further to aid in understanding the framework. 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has developed principles and usability criteria pertaining to the 
achievement and demonstration of safety assurance. This chapter has also introduced a 
conceptual framework for implementing the principles and usability criteria. The 
framework has been developed from a knowledge and uncertainty of risk perspective, 
whereby knowledge and uncertainty are characterised from architectural, claims and 
evidence viewpoints. The aim of this framework is not to prescribe techniques and 
evidence to be used. Instead, the framework identifies the role of evidence in providing 
safety assurance, and gives guidance on how to establish the suitability of evidence 
based on its role in establishing knowledge of product behaviours and risk. The 
framework provides an evidence-based approach to the risk assessment of a system and 
its operation.  
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4 Assuring Against Systematic Failures Using 
Architecture 
Architecture is widely recognised as an important aspect of achieving systems with 
predictably dependable behaviours. Such dependable behaviours are an essential pre-
requisite for controlling risks and thus achieving safety. In Chapter 3, a model 
containing principles and guidelines was established (refer Figure 5). Chapter 4 
examines how architectural properties can be used by an assurance framework to satisfy 
the principles and guidelines pertaining to product behavioural elements of this model 
(shown in bold italics within Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Implementing Key Principles of Safety Assurance Using Architecture 
Sections 4.1 through 4.6 of this chapter examine the properties of architecture that relate 
to fail safe design and thus contribute to providing deterministic knowledge of product 
behaviours. These properties illustrate how architecture can be used to satisfy Principle 
C. Through examining these properties, the rationale of how architectural properties 
contribute to knowledge of product behaviours is documented using meta-arguments, 
thus providing a means to satisfy Principle X. Finally, the rationale for satisfying these 
principles is explained in Section 4.7, through the definition of an architectural 
assurance framework, such that it is feasible to adhere to Guidelines 1, 2 and 3.  
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4.1 Exploring the Role of Architecture 
Architecture is an encompassing term for the elements of a system and their 
interconnections. It is an abstract concept and is dependent on viewpoint and notation. 
The elements and interactions of a system will lead to a set of behaviours at the 
architectural level which are more elaborate than simply the collective set of behaviours 
of the individual elements. It is these additional behaviours (sometimes referred to as 
emergent behaviours) resulting from the interactions of elements, which give 
architecture the opportunity to control divergent or unintended behaviours of individual 
elements. If it is assumed that safety risk is dependent in part on the suitability of 
behaviours under normal operating and failure circumstances, then architecture can 
provide a degree of control over the suitability of behaviours, and thus knowledge of 
architecture is useful for identifying and analysing risks. 
Given the opportunity for architecture to control behaviours of a system, then how can 
architecture be used for providing knowledge of behaviours of a system, and controlling 
those behaviours with respect to risks? To answer this question, it is necessary to 
examine how and where architecture is already used in aviation system certification. 
4.2 Safety Outcomes of Architecture 
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) identifies that faults, errors and failures are threats to the 
achievement of safety (refer to Section 1.2 for definitions). In this context errors and 
failures may be the result of both internal faults (e.g. a fault in a software component) as 
well as external events (e.g. sensors experience a set of conditions that may not be 
anticipated). Therefore it follows that safety is only achieved when faults, errors and 
failures are appropriately controlled. This implies that an important property of a system 
is the suitability of its behaviours in the presence of faults, errors and failures, and their 
associated propagation and transformation. 
This concept is not novel, as existing aviation system design requirements recognise this 
(e.g. the fail-safe design concept (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988)). 
4.2.1 The Concept of Fail Safe Design 
The concept of fail-safe design exists within several prominent system safety standards. 
The two most prominent examples are from the civil aviation certification requirements 
and the United States Department of Defense safety standards. 
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Fail-Safe Design in Civil Aviation 
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988) defines 
the fail safe design concept as follows: 
“In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component, or 
connection during any one flight (brake release through ground deceleration to stop) 
should be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures should not prevent 
continued safe flight and landing, or significantly reduce the capability of the airplane 
or the ability of the crew to cope with the resulting failure condition.” 
“Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and 
combinations thereof, should also be assumed, unless their joint probability with the 
first failure is shown to be extremely improbable.” 
The definition emphasises two key concepts: 
• no single failure should prevent safety being achieved, not matter how unlikely 
the failure is presumed to be, and 
• combinations or sequences of failures should also not prevent safety being 
achieved unless the likelihood of the combinations can be shown to be so 
incredible that it is virtually impossible. 
A similar definition is also shown in the European Acceptable Means of Compliance for 
the Certification Specifications (CS) 25.1309 rule (EASA, 2011). The consistency of 
these definitions is indicative of consensus on this concept in the civil aviation domain. 
Both the (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988) and (EASA, 2011) state that the fail 
safe design concept implies the application of fault tolerant design approaches 
including: 
• Designed Integrity and Quality 
• Redundancy or Backup Systems, Monitors 
• Isolation of Systems, Components, and Elements 
• Failure Warning or Indication 
• Flight Crew Procedures 
• Check-ability 
• Designed Failure Effect Limits 
• Designed Failure Path 
• Margins or Factors of Safety 
• Fault and Error Tolerance 
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Interestingly, almost all of these suggested approaches have a bearing on architecture. 
For example, the design approaches either deal with a property of an element of the 
system, or a property of the interactions between elements of the system. Hence the fail-
safe design concept is in many respects an implementation of the concept of using 
architecture to control the behaviour of a system in the presence of faults, errors or 
failures. This concept is not unique to civil aviation systems. 
Fail Safe Design for Military Systems 
Inspecting the US military safety standards reveals that (US DoD, 2000)19 defines fail-
safe design as: 
“A design feature that ensures the system remains safe, or in the event of a failure, 
causes the system to revert to a state that will not cause a mishap.” 
(US DoD, 2000) suggests achievement of the fail-safe design through the inclusion of a 
set of unacceptable and acceptable  conditions within the solicitation specification or as 
contract requirements for the system design. The suggested requirement within (US 
DoD, 2000) is that “positive action and verified implementation is required to reduce 
the mishap risk associated with these situations to a level acceptable to the program 
manager.” Examples of unacceptable conditions pertaining to failures are provided as 
follows: 
• “Single component failure, common mode failure, human error, or a design 
feature that could cause a mishap of Catastrophic or Critical mishap severity” 
• “Dual independent component failures, dual independent human errors, or a 
combination of a component failure and a human error involving safety critical 
command and control functions, which could cause a mishap of Catastrophic or 
Critical mishap severity” 
Examples of acceptable conditions pertaining to command and control functions are 
provided as follows: 
                                                 
19 Note that the fail-safe concepts of (US DoD, 2000) are present in earlier versions of this standard also 
(US DoD, 1993). The most recent revision (US DoD, 2011), which has yet to see widespread use on 
projects, has removed this text, although it has been retained within the (G-48 Technical Committee, 
2008) document. 
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• “For non-safety critical command and control functions: a system design that 
requires two or more independent human errors, or that requires two or more 
independent failures, or a combination of independent failure and human error.” 
• “For safety critical command and control functions: a system design that requires 
at least three independent failures, or three independent human errors, or a 
combination of three independent failures and human errors.” 
(US DoD, 2000) does not limit its suggested unacceptable conditions to those pertaining 
to failures (as quoted above), but recommends additional classes of acceptable and 
unacceptable conditions. These additional conditions reflect an instantiation of the 
‘system safety design order of precedence’, another concept of the United States 
military system safety standards. For completeness of understanding, the system safety 
design order of precedence for mitigating identified hazards is: 
a. “Eliminate hazards through design selection. If unable to eliminate an identified 
hazard, reduce the associated mishap risk to an acceptable level through design.” 
b. “Incorporate safety devices. If unable to eliminate the hazard through design 
selection, reduce the mishap risk to an acceptable level using protective safety 
features or devices.” 
c. “Provide warning devices. If safety devices do not adequately lower the mishap 
risk of the hazard, include a detection and warning system to alert personnel to 
the particular hazard.” 
d. “Develop procedures and training. Where it is impractical to eliminate hazards 
through design selection or to reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level 
with safety and warning devices, incorporate special procedures and training. 
Procedures may include the use of personal protective equipment. For hazards 
assigned Catastrophic or Critical mishap severity categories, avoid using 
warning, caution, or other written advisory as the only risk reduction method.” 
On the other hand, inspection of UK Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 (Ministry of 
Defence, 2007) reveals that it does not contain such explicit fail safe design criteria, 
either as requirements or guidance. This is a notable difference between the US and UK 
military paradigms. While its absence from requirements from (Ministry of Defence, 
2007) may be a symptom of the more holistic flexibility sought from the application of 
goal-based concepts by UK Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4, this does not explain its 
absence from the guidance within Part 2 of Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4. The 
application of the ALARP principle and the consideration of counter evidence may 
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implicitly prompt fail safe design, but it is not explicit. Through the author’s 
involvement with several UK based military projects, there is also anecdotal evidence 
that the application of ALARP has not meant the application of fail-safe design. 
From inspection, the MIL-STD-882 fail-safe design criteria are broadly equivalent to 
their civil 25.1309 counterpart. Both are explicit in requirements for controlling single 
failures in circumstances when safety is impacted, and for subsequent or combinations 
of failures in certain serious circumstances. These themes are important and are 
suggestive of some more general principles that can be examined in the context of 
aviation software systems. 
4.2.2 Controlling Hazards Caused by Faults, Errors and Failures 
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) identifies the means of achieving safety and dependable 
systems as follows: 
• Fault prevention – to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults. 
• Fault tolerance – to avoid service failures in the presence of faults. 
• Fault removal – to reduce the number and severity of faults. 
• Fault forecasting – to estimate the present number, the future incidence, and the 
likely consequences of faults. 
(Avizienis, et al., 2004) distinguishes that fault prevention and fault tolerance aim to 
provide the ability to deliver a service that is dependable and that achieves safety. 
Whereas fault removal and fault forecasting aim to provide confidence by justifying that 
the behaviour specifications are adequate and that the system is likely to meet them. As 
such, this chapter focusses on fault prevention and fault tolerance.  
Fault Prevention 
Achievement of fault prevention, and thus each specific fault condition being absent, is 
shown through the provision of evidence of prevention of the introduction of faults (i.e. 
show that faults weren’t introduced, and therefore they are absent). Examples of such 
evidence include reviews, inspections and proofs of the correctness of specification of 
requirements, design and implementation. The main thrust of fault prevention is that 
there is an absence of faults because development errors were prevented, or detected 
and removed, and thus failures won’t occur. Traditional assurance standards use the 
concept of putting controls on the development process for requirements, design and 
implementation to limit the occurrence or introduction of faults/errors, and thus prevent 
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faults. Figure 11 describes a model for fault prevention using the definitions for 
concepts provided previously in Figure 1 and Figure 3.  
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Figure 11: Fault Prevention Defence 
In Figure 11, failures are only prevented and undesirable product behaviours 
constrained when faults and errors are absent. Therefore, a requirement on an assurance 
framework to address fault prevention should be to reason about fault prevention by an 
assertion of absence of faults/errors, and the provision of suitable evidence to support 
the assertion this assertion. This requirement is expressed in GSN as per Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Fault Prevention by Assertion of Absence 
The child claim G_Absence_Assertion is developed further in Chapter 5. Fault 
prevention is dependent on knowledge of sources of error, and the failures that might 
occur in the presence of those errors. If there are limitations in knowledge in this regard, 
then fault prevention may not in isolation be sufficient to achieve safety. In these cases 
it may be supplemented with fault tolerance. 
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Fault Tolerance 
Achievement of fault tolerance focuses on showing that system level failures are 
avoided in the presence of faults. Fault tolerance is the ability for a system to detect an 
error, fault or failure condition and then undertake a level of reconfiguration/handling to 
prevent the fault or localised failure propagating to a failure at the sub-system boundary, 
or a system hazard at the system level. Figure 13 describes a model for fault tolerance 
using the definitions for concepts provided previously in Figure 1 and Figure 3. 
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Figure 13: Fault Tolerance Defence 
In Figure 13, failures are only prevented and undesirable product behaviours 
constrained when errors caused by faults and events are detected and handled. 
Therefore, a requirement on an assurance framework should be to reason about fault 
tolerance by detection and handling of errors caused by faults/events, and the provision 
of suitable evidence to support the claim. This requirement is expressed in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Fault or Event Tolerance by Detection and Handling 
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The child claim G_Detection_Handling is developed further in Chapter 5. 
Defence 
In both Figure 11 and Figure 13 the concept of a ‘Defence’ has been annotated, either to 
label the fault prevention or fault/event tolerance defence. The term ‘Defence’ will be 
used widely through this thesis, and is defined as follows: 
Defence 
A design feature or action intended to prevent faults/events and errors propagating to 
failures, such that they cannot cause undesirable product behaviours with respect to 
safety. A defence may be a fault prevention defence, or a fault tolerance defence.  
Working Definition 
As the ‘Defence’ refers to the applicable instantiation of fault prevention (Figure 12) or 
fault/event tolerance (Figure 14), in assuring a claim about the suitability of a defence, it 
is necessary to present evidence based on the type of defence in each specific instance, 
as shown in Figure 1520. 
 
Figure 15: Defence pattern 
  
                                                 
20 Faults and Events are shown as separate goals to capture their difference in origin. In practice, they can 
be reasoned about in a similar way, as will be shown by the further development of these goals later in 
this thesis. 
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Where Fault Prevent and Fault Tolerance is Performed 
Because fault prevention and fault tolerance implies a consideration of preventing faults 
propagating to system level behaviours, the means (of the process and system) to 
achieve this are important. The developer has important choices to make regarding how 
and where these defences are provided. Figure 16 illustrates the places where defences 
may be used. 
 
Figure 16: Provision of Defences 
Figure 16 suggests that where the ‘Defence’ is implemented is categorised per Table 9. 
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 Category Outcome Perspective Action Example 
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Fault 
Prevention 
Defence 
Freedom 
from fault 
because the 
fault isn’t 
activated 
Development 
activities – 
non-activation 
Prevent the 
fault at its 
source 
modelling and simulation  
competency from training and 
experience 
Error 
Prevention 
Defence 
Freedom 
from error 
because the 
error doesn’t 
propagate 
Development 
activities – 
non-
propagation 
Prevent the 
error at its 
source 
reviews, inspections, proofs 
a proof that set of possible results 
does not product/contribute to a 
causal chain to a hazard 
F
a
u
lt
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o
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Direct 
Defence 
Prevent the 
originating 
fault/error 
propagating 
to an item 
failure 
Fault 
perspective – 
what fault has 
occurred? 
Detection 
and handling 
at the source 
of the 
fault/error 
a reasonability check of inputs or 
outputs within the controller 
a reversal check (analytic 
redundancy) algorithm within the 
controller for pre-checking 
computed outputs 
Intra-
system 
Defence 
Prevent the 
item failure 
propagating 
to a system 
failure 
System 
perspective – 
what item has 
failed? 
Use another 
sub-system 
to detect and 
handle the 
item’s sub-
system fault 
a monitor channel within a 
command/monitor architecture 
LRU with disengagement 
capability in the event of a fault 
bit fault reporting and pilot fault 
management procedures 
Extra-
system 
Defence 
Prevent the 
system 
failure 
propagating 
to a platform 
level failure 
Functional 
Perspective – 
what should 
the system do 
or not do? 
Use another 
system to 
detect and 
handle the 
item’s sub-
system fault 
an analogue backup for a digital 
flight control computer  
advisory, caution and warning 
system and pilot fault management 
procedures 
External 
Defence 
Prevent the 
platform 
failure 
propagating 
to an 
accident 
Platform 
accident 
prevention 
perspective – 
how can the 
accident be 
prevented? 
Use external 
measures to 
prevent the 
accident 
air traffic advisory information 
regarding en-route and terminal 
area weather 
air traffic controller commands 
aircraft handling procedures for 
ground crew to prevent ground 
crew being injured in prop/turbine 
line 
Platform 
Severity 
Reduction 
Defence 
Reduce the 
severity of 
the platform 
failure 
Accident 
severity  – 
how can the 
severity of the 
accident be 
reduced by the 
platform? 
Use 
platform-
level 
measures to 
reduce the 
severity of 
the accident 
zonal design features on aircraft 
belly designed to prevent 
flammable liquid related fire during 
a wheels up landing 
16G seats with seat belt airbags to 
reduce injury severity 
External 
Severity 
Reduction 
Defence 
Reduce the 
severity of 
the accident 
Accident 
prevention – 
how can the 
severity of the 
accident be 
reduced by 
external 
measures 
Use external 
measures to 
reduce the 
severity of 
the accident 
arrestor cable on airfield to ensure 
aircraft stops within defined space 
fire crews in proximity to site at 
airfield 
Table 9: Defence Categorisation 
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From Figure 16 and Table 9, it is evident that architecture is often used to provide 
detection and handing mechanisms to achieve fault tolerance. For aviation systems, 
fault tolerance mechanisms may also be classified as the following: 
• system level fault tolerance – mechanisms usually provided at a system or line 
replaceable unit (LRU) level to provide tolerance to sub-system faults (noting that 
the sub-system fault may be caused by factors internal or external to the system); 
• hardware implemented fault tolerance – implementation of system level fault 
tolerance mechanisms by hardware; 
• software implemented fault tolerance – implementation of system fault tolerance 
mechanisms by software; and 
• software fault tolerance – mechanisms provided at software level for containing 
or mediating software errors, faults and failures. 
To provide examples of these mechanisms, Table 10 summarises commonly used fault 
tolerance mechanisms. These are sourced from (Hammett, 2001) and (Hitt & Mulcare, 
2001). Section 4.3 undertakes an examination of actual aviation systems, in which many 
of these are also evident. 
Fault tolerance is dependent on knowledge of forecast faults/events and failures that 
might occur in order to establish strategies for detection and handling. If there are 
limitations in knowledge in this regard, then fault tolerance may not be totally effective 
in achieving safety in the presence of unanticipated faults/events. 
To provide practical understanding of how the aforementioned fault tolerance 
mechanisms are used within actual aviation systems, the following section examines a 
number of real world aviation systems. 
4.3 Examination of Actual Aviation Systems 
Fault tolerance mechanisms are remarkably prevalent in critical aircraft systems, 
suggesting that the architectural benefits of including them in system designs are widely 
recognised. To illustrate the prevalence of fault tolerance, this thesis examines a number 
of actual aviation systems, with specific focus on Automatic Flight Control Systems 
(AFCS) and Flight Management Systems (FMS). The rationale for selecting these types 
of systems is that they are representative of aircraft systems with moderate to severe 
failure consequences. Specific attention will also be afforded to those fault tolerance 
mechanisms that detect or handle systematic faults, as this will be relevant to 
determining criteria for such mechanisms in later parts of this chapter. 
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System Level Fault 
Tolerance 
Hardware-
Implemented Fault 
Tolerance 
Software Implemented 
Fault Tolerance 
Software Fault 
Tolerance 
• Simplex, no fault 
tolerance  
• Simplex, with 
disengagement 
features 
• Dual standby 
• Self-checking pair 
(single or dual) 
• Self-checking pair 
with simplex fault 
down 
• Triple modular 
redundancy  
o fault down to self-
checking pair or 
fault down to 
simplex 
• Redundancy 
• Dissimilar Hardware 
• Distinct Hardware 
• Command / 
• Monitors 
• Voter Comparators 
o Average 
o Middle Value 
Selection 
o 2/3 Majority Vote 
• Watchdog Timers 
• Error Detection – 
recognition of the 
incidence of a fault 
o Replication Checks 
o Timing Checks 
o Reversal Check 
(Analytical 
Redundancy) 
o Coding Checks 
o Reasonableness 
Checks 
o Structural Checks 
o Diagnostic Check 
• Damage Confinement 
/ Fault Containment – 
restriction of the 
scope of effects of a 
fault 
• Damage Assessment 
– diagnosis of the 
locus of a fault 
• Error Recovery – 
restoration of a 
restartable service 
• Service Continuation 
– sustained delivery 
of system services 
• Fault Treatment – 
repair of a fault 
• Distributed Fault 
Tolerance 
• Multi-version 
software  
o N-version program 
o Cranfield 
Algorithm for 
Fault Tolerance 
(CRAFT) 
o Distinct and 
Dissimilar 
software 
• Recovery Blocks 
o Deadline 
mechanism 
o Dissimilar Backup 
Software 
• Exception Handlers 
o Hardened Kernels 
o Robust Data 
Structures and 
Audit Routines 
o Run-Time 
Assertions 
• Hybrid Multi-version 
Software and 
Recovery Block 
Techniques 
o Tandem 
o Consensus 
Recovery Block 
Table 10: Examples of Fault Tolerance Mechanisms 
4.3.1 Automatic Flight Control Systems 
The AFCS have been examined for the following aircraft types: 
• Boeing 777 – Civil Transport Category 
• Airbus A330 / Airbus Military KC-30A – Civil / Derivative Transport Category  
• Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) C-17 – Military Strategic Air Lift  
• Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) F/A-18A/B – Military Air Combat 
Appendix A provides a tabulated summary of the architectures of AFCS for these 
aircraft, and identifies those design features that provide fault tolerance. The 
information has been obtained from the public domain. Where this has been 
insufficient, then additional behaviours and treatments have been inferred using flight 
manuals, pilot briefing notes and maintenance publications. Table 11 identifies the main 
sources of information used. 
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Aircraft Flight Control System Information Sources 
Boeing 777 (Buus, et al., 1995) 
(Hornish, 1994) 
(Yea, 1996) 
(Yea, 2001) 
(Bartley, 2001) 
Airbus A330 / Airbus Military KC-30A (Airbus, 1999) 
(Briere & Traverse, 1993) 
(Briere, et al., 2001) 
Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) C-17 (Kowal, et al., 1992) 
(Pop & Kahler, 1992) 
Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) F/A-18A/B (Girard & Sharpe, 1999) 
(Royal Australian Air Force, 2008) 
(Royal Australian Air Force, 2012) 
Table 11: Flight Control System Information 
4.3.2 Flight Management, Navigation 
The FMS and navigation systems have been examined for the following aircraft types: 
• Boeing 777 – Civil Transport Category 
• Airbus A330 / Airbus Military KC-30A – Civil / Derivative Transport Category 
• Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 – Military Strategic and Tactical Air Lift 
• Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) F/A-18A/B – Military Air Combat 
Appendix A provides a tabulated summary of the architectures of FMS for these aircraft 
with the purpose of identifying those design features that might provide fault tolerance. 
The information has been obtained from the public domain. Where this has been 
insufficient, then additional behaviours and treatments have been inferred using flight 
manuals, pilot briefing notes and maintenance publications. Table 12 identifies the 
sources of information used. 
Aircraft Flight Control System Information Sources 
Boeing 777 (Driscoll & Hoyme, 1992) 
(Morgan, 2001) 
(Uczekaj, 1995) 
(Witwer, 1995) 
Airbus A330 / Airbus Military KC-30A (Airbus, 1999) 
(Potocki de Montalk, 2001) 
Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 (Royal Australian Air Force, 2005) 
Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) F/A-18A/B (Royal Australian Air Force, 2008) 
(Royal Australian Air Force, 2012) 
Table 12: Flight Management Systems Information 
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4.4 Observations of Fault Tolerance in Actual Aviation 
Systems 
Analysing the properties of the actual aviation systems leads to observations about the 
inclusion of fault tolerance within these systems. The following sub-sections describe 
these observations. 
4.4.1 Fault Tolerance for Random and Systematic Faults 
There is evidence from the examples of Section 4.3 that fault tolerance exists in these 
systems for both random and systematic sources of faults. Some types of fault tolerance 
have been used to provide protection against random and systematic sources of faults, 
while others only provided protection against a specific type of threat. Hence fault 
tolerance is relevant to both random and systematic sources of faults, and that software 
faults can be treated using fault tolerance in addition to fault prevention. 
4.4.2 Layered Fault Tolerance 
Some sources of fault tolerance have a high degree of fidelity at detection of and 
handling of faults, while others have a much lower degree of fidelity. There was also 
evidence that fault tolerance mechanisms may be implemented at item, intra-system and 
extra-system levels, and that more serious sources of faults were protected against using 
several fault tolerance mechanisms in a way that resembles layers of defences. This is 
an important observation, as it provides some confirmation that fail-safe design requires 
defences against occurrences of combinations of faults. Figure 17 provides a 
diagrammatic representation of the layers of defences observed. It illustrates the 
different perspectives each defence type has, as well as the concepts of coverage of 
propagation paths and defence in depth. Note also the each defence can cause its own 
faults (as per Figure 13), and this is illustrated in Figure 17 by the alternative fault 
propagation paths shown. 
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Figure 17: Layered Fault Tolerance Defences and Defence in Depth 
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In Figure 17, the overall strength of defences is characterised by the defence in depth for 
each propagation path between the initiating events or faults and the respective hazard 
and accidents. This property can be expressed as meta-claim as per Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Strength of Defences by Defence in Depth 
This meta-claim is developed further in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
4.4.3 Fault Tolerance from Fail-Safe Design 
Based on the architectural reasoning and justification provided within the information 
sources examined for these systems, the most likely source of the systematic fault 
tolerance present in aviation systems is from the application of the fail-safe design. The 
application of the system safety or design assurance standards would seem to be less 
prevalent in achieving this outcome. Whilst this observation is limited because the study 
did not have full insight into development, these observations favour the prominence of 
the fail-safe design criteria. A possible way to reason about this observation is to ask: do 
developments that apply design or safety assurance, but not the fail-safe design criteria, 
include equivalent levels of fault tolerance? Those examples provided in Sections 1.1.1 
and 1.1.2 suggests that they may not.  
This is interesting, since fault tolerance seems to be a compelling goal for design and 
safety assurance, and yet it isn’t prominent within the assurance frameworks, and it 
doesn’t seem to be achieved in isolation of the fail-safe design criteria. This prompts the 
question: can the fail-safe design criteria be integrated within design and safety 
assurance frameworks to assure that an equivalent degree of fault tolerance is achieved? 
The following sections examine this further. Fault tolerance is also fundamentally 
dependent on knowledge of forecast faults and failures that might occur in order to 
establish strategies for detecting and handling these faults. If there are limitations in 
knowledge in this regard, then fault tolerance may not be entirely effective in achieving 
safety in the presence of unanticipated faults. Therefore, it is important to establish 
ways of predicting the overall adequacy of the fault tolerance mechanisms within a 
system’s architecture. 
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4.5 Interpreting the Fail Safe Criteria for Systematic Faults 
Since the observations of actual systems suggest that fault tolerance for systematic 
sources of faults is prompted by the fail-safe design criteria, it is worthwhile to 
understand how the fail-safe design criteria is interpreted, and whether is requires any 
refinement to properly address systematic faults and failures. This is a valid question to 
ask because the fail-safe design criteria from the civil aviation domain includes some 
probabilistic criteria, which Section 1.2 proposed to be inappropriate for systematic 
faults and failures. Such consideration is also necessary because the military fail-safe 
design proposes cardinal quantities of failure combinations, but without rationale as to 
how these were established, and why? 
For the purposes of clarity throughout this discussion, it is assumed that systematic 
faults can be classified according to (Pumfrey, 1999)’s taxonomy (refer Section 2.4.3), 
and that treatment strategies include approaches such as those articulated by (Weaver, 
2003) (i.e. fault prevention – absence, fault tolerance – detection and handling). 
The following sub-sections examine the above questions in detail. 
4.5.1 No Single Failure Criterion 
The fail-safe design criteria for civil aviation and military systems state the following 
regarding single failures: 
• Civil Aviation – “In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, 
component, or connection during any one flight (brake release through ground 
deceleration to stop) should be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single 
failures should not prevent continued safe flight and landing, or significantly 
reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with the 
resulting failure condition.” 
• Military Systems (US) – “Single component failure, common mode failure, 
human error, or a design feature that could cause a mishap of Catastrophic or 
Critical mishap severity categories” is an “unacceptable condition”. 
The criteria effectively state that no single failure of a software or hardware component 
or item should lead to any of the more serious failure circumstances (e.g. Major, 
Hazardous or Catastrophic using (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988) terminology 
or Catastrophic or Critical using (US DoD, 2000) terminology).  
Therefore when dealing with the presence of systematic faults it must be assumed that: 
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• any given fault prevention (absence) assertion might be invalidated (due to 
unknown faults, irrespective of how well assured it might be), or  
• any given fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism might also be 
invalidated (due to unknown faults in the detection and handing mechanism, 
irrespective of how well assured it might be). 
It also implies that each of these requires a means to avoid these circumstances 
preventing the achievement of safety. In essence it implies that there must be additional 
fault tolerance within the system architecture (elements and interactions) to mitigate 
these sources of faults. The following paragraphs examine each of these in turn. 
Invalidating Fault Prevention (Absence) Assertions 
If a fault prevention (absence) assertion is invalidated then only a fault tolerance 
(detection and handling) mechanism can address the invalidation. This is because once 
the fault prevention (absence) assertion is invalidated the failure has now occurred and 
is no longer absent. While the appropriate system architecture might mask that fault at 
higher levels of abstraction thus making it (or its effects) absent, the system will employ 
fault tolerance (detection and handling) to achieving this masking. 
In typical aviation system architectures, there are several choices available as to where 
such a subsequent fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism might be 
implemented. These are: 
• direct defence – downstream in the control and data flow of the same component 
or item, provided this subsequent detection and handling mechanism isn’t violated 
due to a common mode failure; 
• intra-system defence – at the typical avionics assembly level or Line Replaceable 
Unit (LRU) level (hardware and/or software implemented); or  
• extra-system defence – at the system/platform architecture level, which 
predominantly concerns itself with the requirements for additional systems, 
elements or interactions between systems. 
Which choice is most appropriate depends on where the fault is best able to be detected 
(which depends on the type of fault), and also where the fault is best able to be handled. 
The designer will also have to make architectural choices about how fault tolerance 
mechanisms can be integrated and combined to provide an architecture with a consistent 
and yet effective strategy for detecting and handling the totality of all faults, and not just 
each fault in isolation. 
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Invalidating Fault Tolerance (Detection and Handling) Mechanisms 
If a fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism is invalidated then only an 
additional higher abstraction fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism can 
address the invalidation. The choices for treatment available to the designer are the 
same as identified above. Because it is implied that any fault tolerance mechanisms 
could be invalidated, including those that treat the invalidation of other fault prevention 
assertions or other fault tolerance mechanisms, regardless of whether they have in fact 
been invalided, then even the no single failure criterion suggests that layers of fault 
tolerance may be required. The requirement for layers will become more evident when 
the combinations of failure criterion is examined. 
It is also important to note that it only takes either the detection OR the handling 
mechanism to be invalidated to invalidate the effectiveness of the whole detection and 
handling mechanism. Detection may be at a different level of abstraction to the handling 
– although most often handling is at the same or higher level than the detection feature. 
Impact of the No Single Failure Criterion 
The no single failure criterion therefore places constraints on the structure of the 
rationale for treatment of the more serious failure circumstance (i.e. Major through to 
Catastrophic failures). Table 13 identifies the effect of these constraints on the fault 
prevention and fault tolerance strategies typically necessary for any given failure mode. 
It also suggests which level of architectural abstraction is typically used to treat the 
failure mode. Note that the previous paragraphs have focussed on the more serious 
failure circumstance (i.e. Major, Hazardous and Catastrophic failure conditions). 
Implicitly the no single failure criterion also implies that a single failure can acceptably 
lead to a Minor or No Safety Effect failure condition. Thus it is also possible to 
represent these failure conditions in Table 13. The Item columns in Table 13 (columns 
B21 and D) both refer to the same configuration item. This is because it is possible to 
provide an initial fault prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanism (column B) and then provide the subsequent fault tolerance 
(detection and handling) capability at a later point in the functional flow, or 
architecturally (column D). The second Item column (column D) should be interpreted 
                                                 
21 Column identifiers are alphabetic values starting at Column A for the Severity Column. 
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as a separate configuration item, perhaps resident in a monitor for example. This is 
considered at the intra-system (LRU) level. 
Severity Direct 
(Item
%
) 
 Direct 
(Item) 
 Intra-
System 
(LRU) 
 Extra-
System 
Catastrophic, 
Hazardous / 
Major 
Absence 
(Primary, 
Secondary, 
and Control) 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling* 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
Detection* AND Handling OR Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
Detection 
AND 
Handling 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling# 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
Detection# AND Handling OR Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
Minor, No 
Safety Effect 
Absence 
(Primary, 
Secondary, 
and Control) 
OR - - Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
Detection  
AND 
Handling 
OR - - Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
% - initiating fault invalidates this assertion under no single failure criterion 
* - provided invalidating the fault prevention (absence) assertion doesn’t also lead to invalidation of its 
detection and handling by the item 
# - provided invalidating the original fault tolerance (detection and handling mechanism) doesn’t also 
lead in invalidation of its detection and handling by the item 
Logical conventions: Logical operators and conditions within the same cell assume parenthesis  
Italics – evaluate the logical operator first – assume parenthesis encapsulates the cells either side  
Bold – evaluate the logical operator last (after italics and normal type face operators) 
Table 13: No single failure criterion implications for fault prevention and fault tolerance 
To illustrate the intent of Table 13, a simple example will be considered. Consider a 
system with a catastrophic failure condition. Table 13 implies that there are two 
approaches the system designer could use to address the no single point of failure 
criterion. The first is to assure both the absence (Table 13 row 222, column B) or 
direct/immediate detection and handling (Table 13 row 3, column B) of the initiating 
fault and provide a supplemental detection and handling mechanism at a downstream 
direct (column D), intra-system (column F) or extra-system level (column H). Thus at 
least two failures are required to realise the catastrophic failure condition. 
However, this is only the first criterion we need to examine, the next section considers 
further constraints on these identified effects, and will likely further constrain Table 13. 
                                                 
22 Row identifiers are positive integer values starting at Row 1 for the Heading row of Table 2. 
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4.5.2 Combinations of Failure Criterion 
The fail-safe design criteria for civil aviation and military systems state the following 
regarding combinations of failures: 
• Civil Aviation – “Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or 
latent, and combinations thereof, should also be assumed, unless their joint 
probability with the first failure is shown to be extremely improbable.” 
• Military Systems (US) – Unacceptable conditions are defined as follows: 
o “Dual independent component failures, dual independent human errors, or 
a combination of a component failure and a human error involving safety 
critical command and control functions, which could cause a mishap of 
Catastrophic or Critical mishap severity categories”   
o “For non-safety critical command and control functions: a system design 
that requires two or more independent human errors, or that requires two 
or more independent failures, or a combination of independent failure and 
human error.” 
o “For safety critical command and control functions: a system design that 
requires at least three independent failures, or three independent human 
errors, or a combination of three independent failures and human errors.” 
Both criteria effectively state that credible combinations of failure of a software or 
hardware item shouldn’t lead to any of the more serious failure circumstances. 
However, the means for establishing how many combinations are necessary differs. The 
civil aviation approach uses the threshold that the joint probability is Extremely 
Improbable, whereas the military systems approach specifies ordinal numbers directly. 
Do these two different measures imply the same thing, or do are they different? 
Extremely Improbable can never be defensibly argued for any single component. 
Instead Extremely Improbable is reasoned by combining sequences of event likelihoods 
which are in isolation more likely than Extremely Improbable. For example, using 
terminology from (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988), the following combinations 
of failure likelihoods are often used:  
• Extremely Remote AND Remote,  
• Extremely Remote AND Probable,  
• Remote AND Remote, or 
• Probable AND Probable AND Probable.  
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All these statements are based on the presumption of independence between elements of 
the design. It is this criterion that leads to triple redundancy in civil aviation systems 
with catastrophic failure conditions and dual redundancy in most civil aviation systems 
with hazardous or major failure conditions (as is apparent in the aviation systems 
examined in Section 4.3, and observations made by (Edwards, et al., 2010)). However 
for items with systematic failure modes (e.g. software, complex electronic hardware), 
probability and likelihoods have traditionally had little relevant meaning (refer to 
Section 1.2). Therefore it is necessary to resolve an equivalent interpretation that 
doesn’t use probabilities. 
One way is to speculate that the joint likelihood of no two combinations of systematic 
failures can ever be demonstrated to be commensurate with extremely improbable. This 
hypothesis, based on examination of actual systems, is that the burden of demonstrating 
this level of knowledge of the system or the stochastic model would generally be 
unattainable. Section 4.6 provides further discussion on knowledge and uncertainty. 
Therefore, no two systematic failures should lead to a catastrophic failure condition. 
Interestingly, this is equivalent to the military systems (US) approach from (US DoD, 
2000), which reasons that dual failure combinations are insufficient for the catastrophic 
case. 
This implies that there is at least sufficiently independent fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) of the initiating failure mode within the item itself, and at the intra-system 
level or extra-system architecture level for catastrophic failure conditions. For Major 
and Hazardous failure conditions, two independent failures may be tolerable (because 
the consequences would require another event to realise a catastrophic failure 
condition). The independence is most practically achieved by detecting and handling the 
faults/events at a level outside the item. Overall, the outcome is broadly comparable to 
the outcome for probabilistic hardware failure assessments. It is also supported by the 
observations made on the examination of the aviation systems discussed in Section 4.3, 
and observations made by (Edwards, et al., 2010). 
For combinations of three systematic failure modes, it may be possible to reason that 
they are Extremely Improbable, provided there is fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) of item failure modes outside of the item in question (i.e. at either the LRU 
level or system architecture level). With each layer of fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanisms, the burden of demonstrating this level of knowledge of the 
system or the stochastic model is more attainable. This is because the opportunity to 
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generalise the detection and handling of classes of faults becomes more tractable. Again 
the outcome is broadly comparable to the outcome for hardware failures, and is 
supported by the examination of the aviation systems discussed in Section 4.3, and 
observations made by (Edwards, et al., 2010). Section 4.6 examines the effects of 
layered fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanisms on uncertainty in the 
stochastic model in more detail. The following paragraphs consider the implications of 
combinations of failure in more detail. 
Invalidating the Fault Prevention (Absence) Assertion and the Fault Tolerance 
(Detection and Handling) Mechanism – Catastrophic Only 
In this case we invalidate the fault prevention (absence) assertion, but also the fault 
tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism that provides the treatment to the 
invalidation of the absence assertion. This leads to it being necessary to detect and 
handle the failure mode outside of the item – either at the intra-system (LRU) level (e.g. 
through a monitor) and/or by the extra-system architecture level (e.g. through 
combinations of redundancy, analogue backup, diverse system components, etc.), or 
both. These circumstances are supported by observations from the examination of the 
aviation systems in Section 4.3. 
Impact on Argument of Combinations of Failure Criterion 
The combinations of failures criterion therefore places further constraints on the 
structure of the argument for serious failure circumstance (i.e. Major, Hazardous and 
Catastrophic failure conditions). Table 14 identifies the effect of these constraints on the 
number of treatments required for any given failure mode – and at what level within the 
system the failure mode is typically mitigated, as determined from the aviation systems 
considered in Section 4.3 and observations made by (Edwards, et al., 2010). Note that 
severity is the accident effect if the intra-system (LRU) level and extra-system level 
mechanisms were absent or the item fault was permitted to propagate without 
intervention at the intra-system or extra-system levels. 
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Severity Direct 
(Item
%
) 
Direct 
(Partitioned Item) 
Intra-
System 
(LRU) 
 Extra-
System 
Catastrophic Absence 
(Primary, 
Secondary, 
and Control) 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling&* 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
Detection 
AND 
Handling&* 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
Detection 
AND 
Handling 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling&# 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
Detection 
AND 
Handling&# 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling& 
Hazardous, 
Major 
Absence 
(Primary, 
Secondary, 
and Control) 
AND Detection 
AND 
Handling&* 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
Detection 
AND 
Handling 
AND Detection
&# AND Handling OR Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
Minor, No 
Safety 
Effect 
Absence 
(Primary, 
Secondary, 
and Control) 
OR - - Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR - - Detection 
AND 
Handling 
OR Detection 
AND 
Handling 
- - Detection AND Handling 
% - initiating fault invalidates this argument under no single failure criterion 
& - additional faults may invalidate these arguments under combinations of failure criterion 
* - provided invalidating the absence argument doesn’t also lead to invalidation of its detection and 
handling in software 
# - provided invalidating the original detection and handling argument doesn’t also lead in invalidation of 
its detection and handling in software 
Logical conventions: Logical operators and conditions within the same cell assume parenthesis 
Italics – evaluate the logical operator first – assume parenthesis encapsulates the cells either side 
Bold – evaluate the logical operator last (after italics and normal type face operators) 
Table 14: Combinations of failure criterion implications for fault prevention and fault tolerance 
Specific Circumstances for Fault Prevention (Absence) Assertions 
Absence assertions (for omission, commission, early, late and value) should never be 
valid for input data (i.e. data originating outside the item of the LRU, e.g. from a sensor) 
to the item within an LRU. This is because the item has no control over the validity of 
this information. These types of faults are better detected and handled at the input to the 
item, as is evident in many aviation systems; or by ensuring that the fault propagates to 
a detectable fault at a higher system level. Detection will usually need to be more 
extensive than simply checking the valid flag provided with the data from the sensor 
because this doesn’t provide detection of timing or omission related failures, and 
because the valid flags coverage of credible value failures is often very limited. There 
are instances (e.g. Qantas QF72 07 Oct 2008 (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
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2008)) where a sensor doesn’t only ‘lie’ about the value it is providing, but it also ‘lies’ 
about the validity of that value with its valid flag. Typically a combination of range, 
rate, physical world model checks, or comparison to redundant or diverse sources is 
required. 
While the fault tolerance (detection and handling) of this class of faults may be deferred 
until later in the system functional flow, this is rarely suitable. For example, in Flight 
Control Systems, there are minimal benefits to processing control laws based on invalid 
input data and then attempting to trap the failure at the system’s output or control 
actuator. Flight control systems that have adopted this strategy have shown it to be 
problematic. This is because the vast majority of input data failures are not easily 
discernible at this point in the system. The only times it might be suitable is if through 
physical limiting (e.g. mechanical limiting) the Flight Control System’s authority is 
limited to a worse credible failure severity of minor, which is clearly not applicable to 
full authority systems, or systems where limited authority cannot be guaranteed across 
the flight envelope. 
4.6 Using Architectural Fault Tolerance to Bound Uncertainty 
The rationale for proposing the layering of fault tolerance (detection and handling) 
mechanisms at different levels of abstraction in a system (e.g. direct (item) level, direct 
(partitioned item level), intra-system (LRU) level, and extra-system level) is that it 
permits the uncertainty associated with detecting and then providing a suitable handling 
response to the fault to be bounded to an amount that is useful for reasoning about 
knowledge and the safety of the system. This section examines how architecture is used 
to bound uncertainty. 
4.6.1 Using Architecture to Bound Uncertainty 
To examine the effect of architecture on uncertainty, consider a series of cascading 
faults in a system with fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanisms at the direct 
item (software/hardware), inter-system (LRU) and extra-system levels.  
Examining the 1
st
 Fault 
At the occurrence of the 1st fault at the item level (i.e. invalidation of the 1st fault 
prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism), 
the knowledge is a function of the following: 
• the understanding of types of failure that might occur (i.e. to what extent is an 
appropriate mechanism provided to achieve coverage of all classes of the 
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taxonomy of potential item failure modes, noting that the lower the level faults are 
examined at, the greater the fidelity of faults to be considered); and 
• the appropriateness of fault prevention (absence) or fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanisms given the specific fault under consideration. 
Conversely, the uncertainty is a function of the following: 
• the extent to which the taxonomy of potential item failures modes is incomplete 
for the specific failures that could occur in the system (i.e. are there sources of 
failure that haven’t been understood?); 
• the effect of failure sources that haven’t been understood (i.e. is the effect 
something that has been left unanticipated, even in a generalised sense?); and 
• the suitability of the extant fault prevention (absence) or fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) mechanisms for these unknown sources of failure (i.e. will it do 
something undesirable in the presence of an unknown fault?). 
Therefore, for the 1st fault with no additional fault tolerance (detection and handling) 
mechanisms, uncertainty is difficult to bound. Even if a fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanism is employed, the ratio of uncertainty to knowledge may be large 
depending on the extent of the fault coverage by the mechanism. This poses problems 
for failures with severe consequences, but may be suitable for failures with minor 
consequences. For minor consequences, the requirement for evidence showing the 
prevention or tolerance of such faults/errors should be such that occurrences of these 
consequences does not undermine the system dealing with more serious consequences. 
Therefore a single defence will usually be suitable, as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Single Defence 
G_Single_Defence
No single defence can guarantee it will 
prevent an initiating event or fault 
propagating , and so a single defence 
is only suitable for minor 
consequences.
J
J_Single_Defence
The 2X.1309 fail safe design criteria 
implies that no single component, 
item, or sub-system can ever be 
guaranteed to not experience a fault 
or unintended event.
S_Single_Defence
Argument about the 
relevant defence.
G_Defence
A defence prevents an event/
fault/error propagating to failure 
and thus causing undesirable 
system behaviours.
Defence
(Figure 15)
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For more severe consequences, additional propagation of faults needs to be examined. 
Examining the 2
nd
 Fault 
At the occurrence of the 2nd fault, this time at the intra-system (LRU) level (i.e. failure 
of the 2nd fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism), the knowledge is a 
function of the following: 
• the extent to which the taxonomy of failures should resolve the failures of the 1st 
mechanism, which should be finite at this level (the existence of the detection and 
handling mechanism is explicitly having to detect the consequences of the failure 
of the 1st mechanism); 
• the degree to which it is possible for the 2nd detection and handling mechanism to 
be activated from the cascading fault condition; 
• the coverage of intended coupling paths between software and LRU level 
mechanisms; and 
• the appropriateness of the detection and handling mechanisms at the LRU given 
the specific known fault class that has occurred (i.e. is the behaviour of the 
mechanism valid at this level of abstraction). 
The uncertainty is a function of the following: 
• the extent to which the cascading faults don’t resolve to the taxonomy of faults 
handled at this layer; 
• the suitability (or unsuitability) of detection and handling mechanisms for 
unknown sources of failure, and its effects; and 
• the extent to which unintended independence violators might be active (but should 
be limited by the degree of physical partitioning). 
With two (2) layers of protection, uncertainty may be significant, but it is likely to be 
much less and may be much easier to bound depending on the extent to which the 
classes of cascading faults resolve to the taxonomy at the second layer. Therefore a 
system with two layers of protection may be reasoned as suitable for any system except 
for those with the most severe failure modes, provided suitable protections are 
employed at each layer. This can be expressed as shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Dual Defence 
For the most severe consequences, another fault occurrence needs to be examined. 
Examining the 3
rd
 Fault 
At the occurrence of the 3rd fault, this time at the extra-system level (i.e. failure of the 
3rd fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanism), the knowledge and uncertainty 
parallel the observations listed above for the 2nd mechanism, with the following key 
difference: 
• the extent to which the taxonomy of failures at this level resolves the failures of 
the 2nd mechanism should be better than at the 2nd level as the number of classes 
of failures the cascading faults need to resolve to should be decreasing (with 
ultimate convergence at two general classes of failures modes – i.e. loss of the 
function and malfunction of the function). 
With three (3) layers of protections, uncertainty may exist, but it is likely to be 
manageably reduced and bounded depending on the extent to which the cascading faults 
resolve to the taxonomy at the second and third layers. Therefore a system with three 
layers of protection may be suitable for any system, even those with severe failure 
modes, provided suitable mechanisms are employed at each layer. This can be 
expressed as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Triple Defence 
Diversity of Layers 
In essence, what the 2nd and 3rd layers of defence at differing perspective are providing 
is a way for defences to combine to reduce uncertainty regarding propagation of the 
fault/error condition to the system boundary. This can be expressed as meta-claims as 
per Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Diversity of Layers 
There is still the need to address the suitability of each individual defence, which is 
further addressed in Chapter 5. In addition to examining each individual defence, the 
adequacy of the totality of defences is also important for informing risk assessments. 
While the above paragraphs have addressed the defence in depth aspect, coverage of the 
propagation paths is also relevant. 
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Coverage of Propagation Paths 
Figure 17 illustrates that a network of potential propagation paths may exist within any 
system architecture. Therefore, to establish the adequacy of the knowledge of 
propagations paths, analysis is required on the extent to which there is: 
• knowledge of possible propagation paths, 
• the suitability of each individual defence based on its location in the propagation 
path, and 
• the defence in depth for each propagation path. 
The rationale for these concepts is presented in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: Strength of Defences and Coverage of Propagation Paths 
The ways knowledge of defence in depth and coverage of propagation paths are used in 
risk assessment is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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Inferences about Knowledge and Uncertainty 
From this rationale it is possible to see that ultimately each additional fault tolerance 
(detection and handling) mechanism layer bounds the uncertainty of the extent to which 
the cascading faults from the lower level resolve to the taxonomy of faults handled at 
the current layer.  
Relating the layers of defences, through the characteristic of bounding uncertainty, 
provides a means by which to measure the overall strength of defences. This 
relationship is expressed in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24: Layers of Defence to Bound Uncertainty 
Summarising the effects of bounding uncertainty, from what was observed with actual 
aviation systems (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) and the analytic perspective provided in Section 
4.5, results in the following: 
• With no fault prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanisms, uncertainty is difficult to bound. This type of architecture 
should only be employed when there is no safety effect. 
• With one (1) fault prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) mechanism, uncertainty may still be large depending on the extent of 
the fault coverage. Therefore, a system with only one layer of protection must not 
have severe failure modes. 
• With two (2) layers of protection, uncertainty may exist, but it is likely to be 
reduced and bounded depending on the extent to which the classes of cascading 
faults resolve to the taxonomy at the second layer. Therefore a system with two 
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layers of protection is suitable for any system except for those with the most 
severe failure modes, provided suitable protections are employed at each layer. 
• With three (3) layers of protections, uncertainty may exist, but it is likely to be 
manageably reduced and bounded depending on the extent to which the cascading 
faults resolve to the taxonomy at the second and third layers. Therefore a system 
with three layers of protection may be suitable for any system, even those with 
severe failure modes, provided suitable mechanisms are employed at each layer. 
• Additional layers of protection may bound the uncertainty further, provided they 
continue to enforce the resolution of fault classes to those analysed and treatable 
at the subsequent layers of protection. However, observations from the review of 
actual aviation systems suggest that they don’t occur in practice due to 
cost/benefit. 
Therefore, the bounding of uncertainty provides conceptually a compelling case for 
structuring specific layers of fault prevention (absence) and fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) for treating systematic faults. Combining these concepts with the 
observations from aviation system has permitted architectural assurance requirements to 
be developed and expressed as GSN meta-claims. Section 4.7 examines one possible 
approach to implementing these meta-claims, and also uses the usability criteria from 
Chapter 3. 
4.7 Assurance of Architecture 
This section proposes a framework for assurance of architecture of aviation systems. 
The framework provides a set of architectural assurance requirements based on a 
specific instantiation of the meta-claims presented in the previous sections of this 
chapter. The framework is also intended to address the principles of safety assurance 
pertaining to knowledge and uncertainty of product behaviours. Practicality is also 
emphasised through addressing usability criteria. 
4.7.1 An Assurance Framework Based on Assurance Levels 
Section 2.6.2 established the benefits of using assurance levels, and particularly how 
assurance levels assist with managing variability, subjectivity and compliance 
assessment. Assurance levels therefore provide a means for adhering to the usability 
guidelines specified in Figure 10. However, Section 2.6.1 also discussed numerous 
limitations with the assurance level approach which should be heeded in proposing an 
assurance framework based on an assurance level concept. Specifically Section 2.6 
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identified that the primary limitations with existing assurance standards is with the 
direct provision of evidence that the behaviours of the system are acceptable with 
respect to safety. This limitation exists because: 
• the assurance levels used in existing standards don’t have explicit product 
meaning; and 
• the objectives (where used) are all expressed as outcomes of the development 
process, rather than in terms of their contribution to assuring behaviours of the 
product with respect to safety. 
Therefore it is important that any safety assurance framework used ensures that the 
relevance of the rationale and evidence to the assurance of behaviours of the software 
with respect to safety remains explicit. The assurance framework should also be explicit 
in how much (and what strength) of evidence is necessary to make the rationale 
compelling and bound uncertainty. Hence it is important to establish guidelines for 
assurance level definitions for the assurance framework defined in this thesis to ensure 
that the limitations don’t undermine the framework. 
4.7.2 Guidelines for Safety Assurance Level Definitions 
Using the benefits and limitations of assurance levels from Section 2.6, it is possible to 
propose some guidelines for the use of assurance levels for addressing usability criteria. 
This thesis proposes the following guidelines for assurance level definitions: 
Guideline A – Safety assurance levels should have or be relatable to a product 
meaning. 
Rationale: Safety assurance levels should either directly specify some physical 
property of the product and its behaviours, or be relatable to something that does. Non-
satisfaction of the assurance level should be inferable to uncertainty of specific product 
behaviours or a product behavioural difference. 
Guideline B – Safety assurance levels should focus on outcomes rather than 
activities. 
Rationale: Safety assurance levels should not concern themselves with prescribing 
specific techniques or methods as this limits flexibility and novelty for supplier 
solutions. They should instead set objective benchmarks for properties of the product, 
rationale and its evidence that should be established. 
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Guideline C – Safety assurance levels should be explicit in their rationale relating 
evidence to product behaviours. 
The relevance of the claims underpinning the assurance level definition should be made 
explicit i.e. the generic argument pattern to which the assurance framework conforms 
should be made explicit so that it is obvious when the pattern is not relevant to a 
specific problem or solution. 
Guideline D – Safety assurance levels should provide suppliers a means to establish 
the suitability of supplier proposed methods and techniques. 
Rationale: The framework incorporating the assurance levels should include a 
mechanism for inferring the relationship between any supplier proposed technique and 
method, and the outcomes or objectives they satisfy by ensuring that the 
factors/properties underpinning each objective are explicit. From this it should make 
transparent any limitations in supplier proposed methods and techniques, and any 
related evidence shortfalls. 
Guideline E – Safety assurance levels should balance prescription and goal setting 
based on the principles and usability criteria. 
Rationale: The assurance framework should be goal setting in terms of outcomes and 
objectives of the framework, and only as prescriptive as necessary to ensure explicit 
benchmarking for compliance with respect to product related behaviours. To achieve 
this, the framework should balance the implementation of principles based on 
theoretical aspiration with the usability criteria to ensure effectiveness in practice. 
The framework proposed in this thesis is intended to satisfy the identified principles and 
usability guidelines. 
4.7.3 Defining the Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) Concept 
This thesis proposes an Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) concept. The 
ASAL provides an outcome based benchmark or measurement of the extent to which 
the system’s architecture is tolerant to sources of systematic faults based on the concept 
of fail-safe design and defence in depth through layers of defences. The degree of fault 
tolerance can be directly associated with the aircraft failure condition severities 
categories defined by standards such as (SAE Aerospace, 2010) or (SAE International, 
1996). Note that throughout this thesis, the failure conditions severities have been used 
based on the civil aviation paradigm, although alternative categories could be used from 
either the UK or US military paradigms. Four ASAL levels are proposed in Table 15. 
 148  
Failure 
Condition 
Severity
1
 
Architectural 
Safety Assurance 
Level (ASAL) 
Required Systematic Fault Tolerance in 
Fault/Event Propagation Paths 
Catastrophic ASAL 3 At least three (3) diverse2 systematic faults are necessary for 
the aircraft failure condition to be realised 
Hazardous / 
Major 
ASAL 2 At least two (2) diverse2 systematic faults are necessary for 
the aircraft failure condition to be realised 
Minor ASAL 1 At least one (1) systematic fault is necessary for the aircraft 
failure condition to be realised 
No Safety 
Effect 
ASAL 0 Systematic fault tolerance is not required from a safety 
perspective, however the designer may choose to incorporate 
fault tolerance to provide assurance of system availability and 
reliability 
1. The worst credible failure condition severity of loss of and malfunction of the aircraft function with 
which the system and its software is associated. 
2. For a systematic fault to be diverse of another systematic fault, it must be shown that the activation of 
one fault does not automatically lead to the activation of another systematic fault. In practice this is 
achieved by ensuring that the faults must occur in independent components and/or at differing layers of 
abstraction (e.g. direct, intra-system, extra-system) where the correct functioning of the subsequent 
detection and handling mechanisms can be shown to be independent of the initiating fault condition or the 
detectable class of fault at the next layer is distinct of the initiating class of fault. 
Table 15: Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) Definitions 
4.7.4 ASAL Assignment Methodology 
Section 2.4 identified that there are two factors that must be considered in the 
assignment of an assurance level, regardless of how it is defined. These are: 
• what the software level is being assigned to,  and 
• how the assignment is performed.  
Section 2.4 also identified that there are established instances (e.g. standards) where 
assurance levels are assigned to safety functions, configuration items, safety 
requirements or safety objectives. 
The ASAL is intended to be assigned to the overall system. However, unlike the 
practices of many other assurance levels, an overall system may have multiple ASALs 
assigned to it. This is because ASALs are assigned based on the tuple of the: 
• system (aircraft) failure mode (failure condition) (e.g. loss of roll control, 
malfunction of pitch control, erroneous display of altitude data); 
• the established severity of this failure mode (failure condition) (i.e. Catastrophic, 
Hazardous, Major, Minor, or No Safety Effect); and 
• the overall system as a configuration item. 
In essence the ASAL relates to the severity of the consequences at the end of each 
identified propagation path from fault/event through the hazard. ASALs are not 
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intended to be assigned to subordinate configuration items, because they relate to 
properties of the overall system. Discussion on how sub-ordinate configuration items 
are addressed is provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
ASAL assignment should be performed by doing the following: 
1. Identify the aircraft system using one or more existing system description 
methodologies, such as architectural notations, descriptive languages, etc. 
2. Determine potential aircraft system failure modes systematically using one or 
more existing methods such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), System 
Hazard Analysis (SHA), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), etc. 
3. Determine the severity of the aircraft system failure modes using established 
severity assignment methodologies, such as those in (SAE Aerospace, 2010) or 
(US DoD, 2000). 
4. Perform ASAL assignment using Table 15, as follows: 
a. For each identified aircraft system failure mode (failure condition) and 
associated severity, identify the relevant row from column A of Table 15. 
b. Assign an ASAL per column B of Table 15 based on the relevant row. 
c. Establish a safety objective for the aircraft system based on column C of 
Table 15 and the relevant row for the respective aircraft system failure. 
One of the advantages of assigning ASALs in this way is that the ASAL and respective 
safety objective are contextualised by the relevant failure mode and its severity. As most 
systems typically perform multiple functions, and the failure modes associated with 
these functions will often differ in severity, then the ASAL approach ensures that the 
safety objectives are commensurate with the seriousness of each specific failure mode. 
This is advantageous as it ensures the protection measures employed by a system are 
applied where they are needed most. It also overcomes some of the criticism of existing 
assurance level approaches that assign a level to an entire configuration irrespective of 
the differing severities of the failure modes of that configuration item. 
While there are similarities to FDAL/IDAL assignment of ARP4754A, there are 
important differences. ASALs are assigned based on the top level aircraft system failure 
mode, and are not reducible. They set a benchmark for the defence in depth of 
architectural defences, and the knowledge needed of each defence and the collective 
defences. FDALs (and IDALs where functions are assigned to systems) are assigned at 
the top level, but then can be reduced based on the architectural mitigations of 
functional and item independence. While FDAL/IDAL reductions have to be justified, 
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including those made to architectural elements, architecture levels typically can't be 
reduced under ARP5754A. However, every time a DAL is reduced on an element that 
provides a defence in the failure propagation path, the body of evidence is reduced on 
the behaviours of that element providing the defence. While there are limits to how 
many times an FDAL/IDAL may be reduced, a reduction in DAL reduces the evidence 
of the architectural mitigation with respect to the severity of the aircraft system failure 
mode. This differs from using architecture to bound uncertainty from Section 4.6. 
4.7.5 Specifying Requirements for Fault Tolerance Mechanisms 
A key factor in providing for diverse systematic faults identified in Table 15 is 
providing fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanisms at differing layers of 
abstraction of a system. The differing layers of abstraction provide an opportunity for 
independence in implementation of these mechanisms. They also provide an 
opportunity for differing fault detection perspective and to bound the uncertainty of 
fault coverage of subordinate fault tolerance mechanisms. 
Using the taxonomy of layers of detection and handling mechanisms identified in 
Section 4.4.2, the proposed ASAL framework uses the following identified layers of 
fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanisms23: 
• Direct – at the typical software or hardware item level, and includes fault 
prevention features, fault tolerance features and software/hardware implemented 
fault tolerance features. 
• Intra-System – at the typical avionics equipment level (e.g. Line Replaceable Unit 
(LRU)) within an aircraft, and includes fault tolerant features such as: 
o command/monitors24, 
o voting planes, 
o output wraparounds25, 
o hardware BIT, etc. 
• Extra-System – at the typical system architecture level within an aircraft and may 
include redundancy26, analogue backup, diverse system components, etc. 
                                                 
23 Layers were refined from software, LRU, and system level as a result of evaluation feedback. 
24 Note that additional software/hardware in the monitor is considered at the intra-system (LRU) level, 
although the safety argument for that monitor would also consider its effects at the component level. 
25 Although the feedback is usually hardware implemented, the comparison is usually in software. 
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Relating the layers of fault prevention (absence) assertions and fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) mechanisms to the ASAL concept results in Table 16. 
ASAL 1
st
 Layer of Defence 
Fault Prevention 
(Absence) or Fault 
Tolerance (Detection 
and Handling) 
2
nd
 Layer of Defence 
Fault Tolerance 
(Detection and 
Handling) 
3
rd
 Layer of Defence 
Fault Tolerance 
(Detection and 
Handling) 
ASAL3 Direct Partitioned Direct# or 
Intra-System* 
Intra-System* or Extra-
System 
ASAL2 Direct Partitioned Direct# or 
Intra-System or Extra-
System 
Not Required 
ASAL1 Direct OR Intra-System 
OR Extra-System 
Not Required Not Required 
# must be independent of the initiating failure and the 1st Absence / Detection and Handling mechanism 
(i.e. through a partitioning mechanism) 
* Must be independent of the proceeding detection/handling mechanism 
Table 16: ASAL Architecturally Layered Fault Tolerance 
4.7.6 Using Architecturally Layered Fault Tolerance 
While Table 15 sets outcomes for the safety performance of the system, Table 16 is 
intended to be a source for design requirements for the system. Table 16 was established 
by analysing how the fail-safe design criteria applies to systematic faults, and 
examining actual aviation systems to validate how this is achieved in practice. Table 16 
does not prescribe specific fault prevention or fault tolerance measures, but is intended 
to set benchmarks for where the system architecture should exhibit these for aviation 
systems. On this basis, Table 16 is intended to be the default requirement for layers of 
defence (protection) against faults, but deviation is permitted provided it is justified and 
approved via consultation with the relevant certifying authority. 
Table 16 should be used by: 
1. For each tuple of (system, system failure mode, failure mode severity), and the 
allocated ASAL, establish potential initiating faults and fault propagation paths 
within the system using existing methods such as SHARD (Pumfrey, 1999), Fault 
Propagation and Transformation Notation (Fenelon & McDermid, 1994), etc. 
                                                                                                                                               
26 Note that redundant components running the same software configuration only provides protection 
against hardware related failures, or failures of independent input sensors. It provides no protection 
against systematic failures of the software. The emphasis here is on system level architectural features 
that provide protections against systematic failures by detection and handling of faults. 
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2. Propose, via design analysis, fault prevention and fault tolerance strategies that: 
a. conform to the layers of defences specified by Table 16, and 
b. achieve the safety objectives for the assigned ASAL per Table 15. 
3. Revise the design with specific implementations of the proposed fault prevention 
and fault tolerance strategies. 
4. Reanalyse and iterate these steps as necessary until the safety objectives of Table 
15 are achieved for each tuple of (system, system failure, failure mode severity). 
4.7.7 Potential Benefits of the ASAL Concept 
The ASAL concept potentially provides the following perceived benefits to assurance 
frameworks: 
• The ASAL concept explicitly integrates requirements for fault prevention and 
fault tolerance to systematic faults, through architectural treatments, into the 
traditional assurance approach, and it doesn’t conflict with the existing safety 
analysis of civil and military standards. 
• The ASAL concept provides a multi-dimensional (better than binary) perspective 
on the fault prevention (absence) assertions and fault tolerance (detection and 
handling) of systematic faults commensurate with the worst credible failure 
condition. This is an improvement over existing software safety assurance 
paradigms as it more accurately reflects the achievement of fail-safe design. 
• The ASAL concept quantifies (in the product context) the degree of fault 
tolerance for each system’s contribution to aircraft level failure conditions. 
Therefore, the ASAL as a level inherently has a product meaning. 
• The ASAL concept is simple, and therefore doesn’t burden assurance frameworks 
with complex, non-objective prescriptions. The rationale has been encoded within 
the meta-claims presented in earlier sections of this chapter. 
• The ASAL concept doesn’t prescribe specific architectures, although it does 
imply an aviation system context. It is therefore inherently flexible and doesn’t 
constrain designer’s choices on the specific fault prevention or fault tolerance 
mechanisms they believe are best. It focuses on the treatment of systematic faults 
by the architecture. 
• The ASAL concept encourages fault tolerant architectures for the systems whose 
functions most need fault tolerance (i.e. those with severe hazards or failure 
conditions). 
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• The ASAL concept is compatible with observations of systematic fault tolerance 
management in actual aviation systems from Section 4.3, and those observations 
made by (Edwards, et al., 2010). 
The validity of these benefits is evaluated in Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
4.7.8 Potential Limitations of the ASAL Concept 
The ASAL concept introduces or highlights the following potential limitations: 
• The ASAL concept sets no benchmarks for the level of evidence required to 
demonstrate that numbers of diverse systematic faults do not contribute to 
identified failure modes. The ASAL concept does not address ‘how much is 
enough?’ for design assurance evidence. Chapters 5 and 6 will examine this in 
further detail. 
• The ASAL concept relies on bounding uncertainty, of which a fundamental factor 
is the extent to which faults at one layer of abstraction resolve to a detectable set 
in the perspective of the next layer of abstraction. However, the ASAL concept 
doesn’t provide an explicit measure of the specific contextual claims about fault 
prevention (absence) and fault tolerance (detection and handling) of systematic 
faults as they propagate to high levels of system abstraction. Thus it doesn’t 
support inferences about the suitability of the specific proposed detection and 
handling capabilities of the system architecture. Chapters 5 and 8 examine this 
aspect further. 
The impact of these limitations is evaluated in Chapters 9 and  10. 
4.7.9 Additional Factors Effecting Assurance Level Assignment 
Section 2.4 also identified factors that are used to reduce or refine the assigned 
assurance levels in existing frameworks. The following paragraphs provide discussion 
of the relevance of these concepts to the ASAL approach. 
Conceptual and Mechanistic Independence 
Conceptual and mechanistic independence have been suggested by (Weaver, 2003) as 
playing an important factor in assurance of arguments constructed around (Pumfrey, 
1999)’s software failure taxonomy. How does conceptual and mechanistic independence 
relate to the ASAL concept defined?  
The definitions within the ASAL concept specify several diverse faults. This implies 
that there is conceptual independence between the initiating direct, the intra-system 
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level and extra-system level detection and handling mechanisms (where relevant). 
Systems sharing common software and/or hardware may be prone to common mode 
failure conditions and are not considered to be diverse. Unless mechanistic 
independence delivers conceptually different architectures during the design process, it 
does not play a role in the ASAL concept directly. The role of mechanistic 
independence will be considered in Chapter 6. 
On-demand versus Continuous-demand Systems 
The concept of on-demand versus continuous-demand systems has most prominence 
within the IEC61508 standard (IEC, 2010). However, some conceptual consideration of 
the potential impact on the ASAL concept is beneficial because it reveals how the 
approach deals with established concepts.  
The ASAL concept was largely derived in the context of actual aviation systems that are 
inherently continuous demand systems, although specific functions provided by 
individual safety functions maybe also classified as on-demand. But, how does the 
ASAL concept apply for on-demand systems versus continuous demand systems? 
On-demand systems (usually used for protection systems) are usually associated with an 
availability requirement (which is continuous demand) on a related aviation system 
associated with the protection mechanism. Therefore in most cases there is little 
practical difference between an on-demand system and continuous demand system with 
respect to the ASAL concept. Actually, this insight is useful, because it also provides 
evidence that on-demand versus continuous demand is not a useful distinguisher when 
taking a perspective of systematic faults and fault tolerance. 
4.8 Defining a Process for Applying the ASAL Concept 
Having defined architectural assurance requirements in both Table 15 and Table 16, it is 
necessary to define an overall lifecycle process for using these concepts. Figure 25 
provides an overview of the process, which incorporates those sub-processes defined in 
Sections 4.7.4 and 4.7.6. Figure 25 has been developed to be consistent with the typical 
systems engineering ‘V’ model, such as described by (Leveson, 1995), (Storey, 1996) 
and (Kossiakoff, et al., 2011). 
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Figure 25: ASAL Process Overview 
The following provides elaboration of each of the ASAL process steps. Each step is 
illustrated by use of the A-DHC-4 fictitious example from Section 3.8. 
4.8.1 Step 1 – Conceptual Design Proposal 
a. Propose a conceptual system architectural design based on the allocated 
requirements and derived requirements, including safety requirements using a 
process such as described by (SAE Aerospace, 2010). 
 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Figure 26 details the conceptual architecture of the flight control system based on a 
standard functional hazard assessment and associated processes. This example focusses 
on the functional failure of ‘Malfunction of Roll Control’ which has been assessed to be 
Catastrophic using Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). 
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Figure 26: Conceptual Flight Control System Architecture 
The A-DHC-4 incorporates a total of five Flight Control Computers (FCC) – three 
Primary Flight Control Computers, and two Secondary Flight Control Computers. The 
five flight control computers are integrated with two Autopilot Flight Management and 
Guidance Computers. The flight control system has three modes of operation: 
• Managed Guidance from the Flight and Data Management System – Normal and 
Degraded modes 
• Selected Guidance by the pilot (input speed, heading, altitude, vertical 
speed/flight path angle) entered via the Flight Control Panel – Normal and 
Degraded modes 
• Direct Control – Normal, Degraded and Direct modes 
Figure 27 shows the FCCs used to control the actuators for each control surface, and the 
associated hydraulic supplies. 
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Figure 27: Conceptual Flight Control Architecture (Computers, Control Surfaces, Hydraulics) 
The A-DHC-4 incorporates three independent hydraulic systems (labelled H1, H2 and 
H3) for actuation of aircraft control surfaces. There are no mechanical backups to the 
digital flight control system. In the event of complete failure of the automated system, 
the aircraft can be flown using the electric rudder trim and horizontal stabiliser trim 
controls. The analysis will assume that this property is established via aerodynamic 
analysis, simulation and prior flight testing. 
b. Propose a conceptual hardware architectural design based on the requirements 
allocated to hardware, and additional derived requirements, including safety 
requirements. 
 
Example – A-DHC-4 
As shown in Figure 28, each primary FCC consists of a command channel and a 
monitor channel. The command channel processes the control laws, whereas the 
monitor channel is responsible for monitoring the inputs, processing and outputs of the 
command channel. 
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Figure 28: Conceptual Primary Flight Control Computer Hardware Architecture 
Each channel is implemented using identical digital microprocessors. The primary flight 
control computer contains a two software packages (Primary Command Channel, 
Primary Monitor Channel). This example will focus specifically on the Primary 
Command Channel, although the Monitor Channel, Secondary Flight Control 
Computers, and other features of the architecture will be used to show the handling of 
failure modes not handled by the Primary Flight Control Computer. 
c. Propose the conceptual software architectural design based on the requirements 
allocated to software, and additional derived requirements, including safety 
requirements. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The conceptual software architectural of the Primary Command Channel design is 
summarised in Figure 29. The figure uses MASCOT notation, as defined by (Joint 
IECCA and MUF Committee on MASCOT, 1987), (Simpson, 1986), (Simpson & 
Jackson, 1979) and uses the Real Time Network protocols of (Simpson, 1996), and 
(Simpson, 1994). The reader is referred to these references for more information. 
In this example we focus on the sensor_data input to the Signal Data Conditioning 
element. The sensor_data communication is derived from sensor data read from the 
flight control databus. 
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Figure 29: Software Architecture for Primary Command Channel – MASCOT representation 
 
epsilon_gs
gamma_VOR
gamma_loc
sensor_fault status_reports
BIT_fault
fault_events
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4.8.2 Step 2 – Analyse Conceptual Design 
a. Undertake a HAZOP, SHARD (refer to (Pumfrey, 1999)) or equivalent analysis of 
the conceptual hardware and software architectural design to identify relevant 
hardware and software failure conditions and to prompt design resolution 
consideration. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Table 17 shows an extract from a SHARD analysis (refer (Pumfrey, 1999)) for the value 
failure of the sensor_data attitude source #1 communication. The SHARD analysis 
identifies one type of value failure for the sensor_data attitude source #1 communication 
and examines the effects and the proposal of detection/protection mechanisms. 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Cause Effect Detection / Protection 
Value Attitude 
source #1 
has failed 
fixed at 
+10deg roll 
attitude 
Hardware 
failure of 
attitude 
sensor 
Attitude reference is 
calculated from average of 
Attitude source #1 and 
Attitude source #2. A 
erroneously fixed attitude 
will cause the calculated 
attitude reference to be 
both erroneous and lag in 
dynamic response. 
At an aircraft level, this 
would mean the flight 
control system would 
exhibit incorrect roll 
attitude command and 
would lag in dynamic 
response. 
PFCC monitor channel employs 
attitude source divergence 
monitoring to detect inappropriate 
input attitudes. If an inappropriate 
attitude is detected, then the 
PFCC mode is set to degraded 
and the monitor sets the 
applicable attitude to invalid. 
SFCC uses turn rate detection to 
detect inappropriate command 
response during turns. SFCC 
reverts FCS to Secondary ‘direct’ 
mode and the pilot must establish 
the correct attitude from the 
displays, including standby 
sources. 
… … … … … 
Table 17: SHARD for sensor_data Communication ‘Value’ Failure 
b. Undertake relevant system safety analysis of the system architectural design to 
identify relevant fault propagation paths for identified hardware and software 
failure conditions from the software/system interfaces to the system boundary (at 
which hazards and risks can be identified). 
Example – A-DHC-4 
One way of understanding the fault propagation paths applicable to the aforementioned 
value failure of sensor_data is to produce a diagrammatic representation using Fault 
Propagation Transformation Notation (FPTN), as defined by (Fenelon & McDermid, 
1994). Alternatively, the notation and methods of time triggered architecture could be 
used, as defined by (Kopetz & Bauer, 2003). Figure 30 presents a simplified FPTN that 
focusses on the propagation of the sensor_data.attitude#1 value failure. It shows the 
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propagation of the fault through the Primary FCC command channel software, monitor 
and Secondary FCC. The proposed detection and handling mechanisms are shown as 
defences at intra-system and extra-system layers. 
 
Figure 30: FPTN Representation of Fault Propagation Path and Preliminary Defences 
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
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4.8.3 Step 3 – Propose Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance Strategies 
Identify and analyse potential fault prevention and fault tolerance strategies for each 
software failure condition and propagation path such that they satisfy the requirements 
of Table 15 (protection against total number of faults) and Table 16 (architectural 
location of fault prevention and fault tolerance). 
Example – A-DHC-4 
As the ‘Malfunction of Roll Control’ is catastrophic, Table 15 prescribes that the 
architecture must be assured to ASAL 3, implying that at least three diverse systematic 
faults are required to leading to the catastrophic outcome. Table 16 therefore states that 
fault prevention and/or fault tolerance is required at all perspective layers (Direct, Intra-
System, and Extra-System) layers. 
Inspection of Figure 30 reveals that the conceptual design proposal only includes 
protection at the intra-system and extra-system layers. Therefore an additional 
protection is required at the direct layer. It isn’t possible to achieve fault prevention for 
a sensor fault, and so fault tolerance is required at the direct layer. 
Figure 31 proposes an additional defence at the Direct layer. The defence is detection by 
a reasonability check of attitude data sources, and marking of invalid of any attitude 
source that does not meet the reasonability criteria. For the purposes of this example, it 
is assumed that the reasonability check can detect a frozen attitude based on integration 
over time based checks and real time inputs from other sources of information. 
4.8.4 Step 4 – Revise Design (e.g. Conceptual to Preliminary Design) 
a. Revise system architectural design based on the results of Step 3. 
b. Revise software and hardware architectural design based on the results of Step 3. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
As the additional defence is within the software, the signal conditioning function within 
Figure 29 should be updated to reference the additional reasonability check specified 
above. The system and hardware architectures do not require any further updating based 
on the analysis of this fault propagation path. It is possible, however, that analysis of 
other faults may require difference changes to the system, hardware and software 
architectures. As each fault and propagation path is analysed, these will be identified 
and the architecture refined. 
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Figure 31: FPTN including Fault Prevention / Tolerance 
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4.8.5 Step 5 – Re-Analyse Design 
a. Revise SHARD (or equivalent analysis) for the preliminary software/hardware 
architectural design to include results of Step 3 and 4. Identify any additional 
software/hardware failure conditions and to prompt design resolution 
consideration if necessary (in which case return to Step 3 as required). 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The SHARD from Table 17 would be updated to include the additional 
detection/protection mechanism. 
b. Revise relevant system safety analysis of the system architectural design to 
include results of Step 3 and 4. Identify any new or revised fault propagation 
paths for new or revised software/hardware failure conditions from the 
software/hardware/system interfaces to the system boundary (at which hazards 
and risks can be identified), and return to Step 3 if required. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Figure 31 shows the revised FPTN showing the inclusion of the additional Defence. For 
each additional fault and fault propagation path, the process is iterated and the 
architectures refined. For the purposes of simplicity within this thesis, the analysis of 
additional faults is not shown. 
4.8.6 Step 6 – Implement Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance 
Implement fault prevention and fault tolerance in the system, LRU and 
software/hardware designs.  
Example – A-DHC-4 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 example on 
implementing fault prevention and fault tolerance defences, and how to provide 
assurance of these activities. 
4.8.7 Step 7 – Verify Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance 
a. Undertake verification of each fault prevention assertion or fault tolerance 
mechanism to establish that they satisfy the requirements for protection against 
the relevant classes of systematic faults, and that they satisfy Table 16. Chapters 5 
and 6 provide some guidance on providing assurance of these activities. 
b. Undertake verification of each fault propagation path to establish appropriate 
interactions between fault prevention assertions and fault tolerance mechanisms, 
and that they satisfy Table 15. 
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c. Resolve verification shortfalls by returning to Step 6. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Verification of defences will usually be through one or more of design refinement 
analysis, implementation analysis, low level software testing, software integration 
testing, software hardware integration testing, systems integration laboratory testing, rig 
testing, ground and flight testing. Chapters 5 and 6 provide guidance and continuation 
of the A-DHC-4 example on verifying fault prevention and fault tolerance defences, and 
how this evidence relates to provide assurance of these activities. 
4.8.8 Step 8 – Validate Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance 
a. Undertake validation of each fault prevention assertion or fault tolerance 
mechanism to establish that the system and software behaviour under these 
conditions is consistent with the achievement of safety. 
b. Undertake validation of each fault propagation path to establish that the 
interactions between fault prevention assertions and fault tolerance mechanisms 
are consistent with the achievement of safety. 
c. Resolve validation shortfalls by returning to Step 3. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Validation of defences will usually be through one or more of requirements analysis, 
systems design analysis, systems integration laboratory testing, rig testing, ground and 
flight testing. Chapters 5 and 6 provide guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 
example on validating fault prevention and fault tolerance defences, and how this 
evidence relates to provide assurance of these activities. 
4.8.9 Step 9 – Use Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance to Inform Risk 
Assessment 
Inform the risk assessment using the knowledge of fault prevention and fault tolerance – 
refer to Chapter 8. If risks are not adequately resolved (refer Chapter 8), then return to 
Step 3. 
4.8.10 Step 10 – Release to Service and commence operating the system. 
Once the risk of operating the system has been assessed as tolerable, then the system 
may achieve release to service, and operation commenced. Faults and failures in-
service should be treated using the fail-safe design and layers of defences. 
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4.8.11 Step 11 – Monitor System Operation 
a. Monitor for counter evidence to verification and validation of fault prevention 
and fault tolerance. 
b. If counter evidence indicates that compliance with Table 15 or Table 16 is 
threatened, then return to Step 3. 
If in-service monitoring detects instances where there are inadequacies in fault/event or 
failure identification, knowledge of propagation paths, suitability of defences or defence 
in depth, then there may be a change to the risk of operating the system. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The monitoring reveals that the PFCC misses certain sub-classes of the value failure 
during sensor failure events. This failure case is re-analysed using the earlier steps in 
this process. 
4.8.12 Step 12 – Revise Risk Assessment based on counter evidence. 
a. If risks are intolerable, then enter a state of operational pause or suspended 
operation until additional risk treatments can be implemented. 
b. If further risk reduction is no longer practical or cost effective, then it may be 
necessary to recommend retiring the system. 
c. If the risks are tolerable, then return to Step 11. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The investigation reveals that the checks carried out by the PFCC miss certain sub-
classes of the value failure. Chapter 8 provides guidance and continuation of the 
A-DHC-4 example on revising risk assessments based on counter evidence. 
4.8.13 Step 13 – Implement Risk Treatment 
Implement design and /or operational treatments. Treatments may be interim or 
permanent depending on the operational imperative. Interim operational treatments 
may be implemented until such a stage as permanent design treatments are 
implemented.  
Example – A-DHC-4 
If counter evidence was identified regarding the sensor_data.attitude#1 value failure, 
then an example of an interim treatment may be to enter a state of operational pause (i.e. 
ground the aircraft) until such a stage as the investigation is carried out. If for example 
the investigation reveals that the checks carried out by the PFCC miss certain sub-
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classes of the value failure, then the interim treatment may be amended to return to 
flying based on additional serviceability checks of sensors against the specific type of 
failure to reduce opportunity of the defence to miss this type of failure. The permanent 
design treatment may be a design change to the monitor software to accommodate 
handling of the additional fault. 
4.8.14 Step 14 – Retire System  
Retire system when operation of the system is no longer required, or when risk 
reduction is no longer practical or cost effective. 
While retirement of aviation systems, particularly military aviation systems is political 
rather than a safety decision, impractical risk reduction or prolonged risk exposure are  
two factors influencing decisions to retire aviation systems. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has explored the role of architecture for achieving fail safe design and thus 
providing knowledge of product behaviours. Specifically, properties of architecture 
have been identified in relation to protecting against systematic faults and failures 
through layers of defences. Architectures and treatments of systematic faults and 
failures in a number of actual aviation systems have been examined. The results of this 
examination have been contrasted with the fail safe design criteria, and general 
properties of the treatment of systematic faults and failures identified. 
The general properties of architecture that contribute to knowledge of product 
behaviours have identified and categorised, thus satisfying Principle C of Figure 10 for 
behaviours that emerge from architecture. Meta-arguments have been used to document 
the rationale of how architectural properties contribute to knowledge of product 
behaviours (thus also satisfying Principle X from Figure 10).  
Using the identified properties, and examining how these factors contribute to bounding 
the uncertainty of the effects of systematic behaviours, the ASAL framework has been 
proposed. The assurance framework provides a measure of the system’s fault tolerance 
against systematic faults and failures, and thus infers the system’s suitability for use in 
the presence of aircraft level failure conditions of differing severities. An example was 
used to illustrate the process of applying the ASAL framework. 
The ASAL framework has been developed to adhere to the usability guidelines 
identified in Figure 10. The ASAL framework minimises variability (adhering to 
Guideline 1) by specifying deterministic requirements for layers of defence, defence in 
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depth, and coverage of propagation paths. These requirements are derived from general 
principles, and have been validated by benchmarking against a study of actual systems. 
The ASAL framework minimises subjectivity (adhering to Guideline 2) with respect to 
architectural assessment by ensuring that the ASAL requirements are numerically 
measurable based on the existence of defences and their role in providing defence in 
depth. This measurability to minimise subjectivity also permits adherence to 
Guideline 3 as assessors can distinguish acceptable from non-acceptable. 
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5 Assurance of Product Behavioural Knowledge 
This chapter is concerned with achieving knowledge of product behaviours in relation 
to the defences of Chapter 4. The term product behaviour is used to mean the 
behaviours the realised product actually has. Product behaviours differ from 
requirements in that a requirement is an aspirational behaviour for the product 
established by the requirements and development processes, whereas the product 
behaviour is the actual behaviour the product exhibits. In practice, developers strive for 
these to be consistent, but there are factors that cause inconsistencies. Requirements 
satisfaction is the term applied to assuring consistency between requirements and 
product behaviours. 
From the outset, it should be acknowledged that the knowledge of product behaviours 
of a defence will never be absolute. This is because the knowledge of product 
behaviours is dependent on factors such as: 
• the extent to which sources of behavioural influence for the product are examined 
(i.e. where to look), and 
• how systematically each source of behavioural influence for software is examined 
(i.e. how hard to look). 
Where to examine and how hard to examine are influenced not only by the strategy 
employed, but also the cost and resources available to do so (refer Chapters 2 and 3). 
However absolute completeness of knowledge of product behaviours is not necessary to 
achieve safety. Not all behaviours have a bearing on safety, and some behaviours matter 
more than others. Thus, the goal for knowledge of product behaviours that is less than 
complete or absolute knowledge, and the emphasis is ‘enough’ knowledge of 
behaviours that impact safety. Determining the rationale for ‘enough’ knowledge about 
each defence is the topic of this chapter. 
The factors of “where to look” and “how hard to look” are important, but are not in 
themselves outcomes. The outcomes are the extent of the knowledge of product 
behaviours, and the uncertainty that that knowledge is valid. This implies that any 
knowledge is always caveated by the uncertainty of its validity, and the bearing this 
uncertainty has on the conclusions established about product behaviours. Hence it is 
important that the uncertainty in knowledge of product behaviours remains explicit. 
This may be achieved through the concept of assurance, which provides a way of 
dealing with uncertainty and its inverse, confidence. 
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In Section 1.2 the concept of assurance was introduced and defined as adequate 
confidence and evidence that safety requirements have been met. The concept of 
assurance can be used to provide confidence that the knowledge of product behaviours 
of a defence is sufficient to reason about their suitability for informing the knowledge of 
risks. This chapter will examine how assurance of product behavioural knowledge can 
be achieved. In Chapter 3, a model containing principles and usability criteria was 
established. This chapter explores the assurance of product behavioural knowledge for 
defences. This chapter focusses on the principles shown in bold italics in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32: Key Principles/Usability Criteria of Safety Assurance for Product Behavioural Knowledge 
Sections 5.1 through 5.3 of this chapter examine how knowledge of behaviours of 
products can be obtained through examination of a product and its lifecycle products (to 
satisfy Principle C). The role of lifecycle products is examined and a categorisation and 
hierarchy of lifecycle products is defined. A set of attributes of lifecycle products is also 
established (to satisfy Principle D). The rationale for how lifecycle products contribute 
to knowledge of product behaviours is described using meta-arguments (to satisfy 
Principle X). The effect on knowledge of limitations is also examined (to satisfy 
Principle Y). Finally, the rationale for satisfying these principles is instantiated in 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5, through the definition of an product behavioural assurance 
framework (to satisfy Guidelines 1, 2 and 3).  
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5.1 The Rationale for Knowledge of Product Behaviours 
Deciding on what claims to make about a product and its evidence is a challenge. 
Established practice also reveals that there is a lack of consistency in ways to do this, 
each with differing benefits and limitations (refer to (Weaver, 2003)). In Section 3.5 the 
role of argumentation for demonstration of rationale was discussed. Specifically, the 
motivation to pre-constrain parts of the argument capturing rationale was identified. 
Based on this aspiration to constrain relevant aspects of the argument is it possible to: 
• establish a set of behavioural attributes of a product defence, and associated 
evidence requirements for them?, and  
• qualify the extent of knowledge of product behaviours with respect to the 
defence? 
5.1.1 What Should Product Behavioural Claims be About? 
Chapter 4 has established that knowledge of product behaviours is required to answer 
questions about architectural fault prevention and fault tolerance which in turn are used 
to inform risk assessments. Chapter 4 also provides a means for establishing the 
collective adequacy of fault prevention and fault tolerance mechanisms, presuming 
there is knowledge of them. Chapter 4 asserts that layers of fault prevention (absence) 
assertions and/or fault tolerance (detection and handling) mechanisms can be used to 
provide assurance that systematic faults do not lead to unacceptable failure conditions.  
Thus for each defence it is necessary to examine the product and its evidence to 
determine if the defence achieves its role in architectural assurance. This chapter 
examines a means of examining the knowledge of the product behaviours of defences.  
5.1.2 The Concept of a Constraint 
Whether the specific architectural defence uses fault prevention or tolerance is 
dependent on the specific fault, its propagation path and the architecture of the overall 
system. The layered treatment requires that for a given fault, the behaviour of the 
system will be constrained to either prevent or tolerate the fault.  
Using this pattern, each fault prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) mechanisms can be transposed to a specified ‘constraint’ requirement on 
the behaviour of the system and its software. This transposition of meaning is expressed 
in GSN in Figure 33.  
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Figure 33: Constraints on Behaviours 
In general terms, any requirement is a ‘constraint’ on the behaviour of the system. The 
focus here is on constraints to do with fault prevention or tolerance. 
5.2 Knowledge from Lifecycle Products 
There are at least two possible ways to establish knowledge of the behaviours of an 
engineered product, such as software, electronic hardware or mechanical systems. One 
is to directly examine (analytically or empirically) the product itself. For example: 
• for software: the source code or executable object code, 
• for electronic hardware: the physical electrical circuit, and  
• for mechanical systems: the interactions between gears, linkages, etc.  
However, designers realise that determining the acceptability of behaviours of an 
engineering product solely on the basis of an examination of the product is difficult. For 
complex technologies (e.g. software and complex electronic hardware), it remains 
difficult even with the advent of specialist tools. This is because the behaviours of the 
product will not be evident without additional information to guide the examination. 
Because of these difficulties, most contemporary assurance approaches for complex 
technologies don’t try to reverse engineer a product’s behaviours, albeit there are 
exceptions27. Instead they rely on an examination of a product and its lifecycle 
                                                 
27 Exceptions include the US Nuclear Code, which examines of source code and object code, and UK 
MoD initial acceptance of C-130J Mission Computer Software, which was subject to static code analysis. 
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evidence, herein referred to as lifecycle products. The following sub-sections examine 
how product behaviours can be elicited from lifecycle products and their evidence.  
5.2.1 Categorisation of Lifecycle Products 
If the typical lifecycle products are examined, such as for real project evidence (refer 
Chapter 10), it is evident that the typical lifecycle products include: 
• requirements, 
• refined and detailed design requirements28, 
• human readable logical implementation (e.g. source code) / model29,  
• machine readable logical implementation code (executable object code / binary 
code), 
• physical implementation / product, 
• verification results of product with respect to: 
o logical implementation / model, 
o refined and design requirements, and 
o requirements, 
• validation results of: 
o product, 
o logical implementation / model, 
o refined and design requirements, and 
o requirements. 
Note that it doesn’t matter whether the systems engineering development lifecycle is 
grand design, waterfall, spiral, or certain instantiations of the agile paradigm, because: 
• despite good intentions, in practice some lifecycle evidence always lags the 
product due to project resourcing and scheduling, irrespective of lifecycle model; 
• in real world projects there are typically two phases of evidence production: the 
prototyping phase, and after ‘measurement’ commences; the identified lifecycle 
products usually exist once measurement commences as a way of packaging 
evidence for certification authorities; 
                                                 
28 at one or more levels of refinement or abstraction; maybe also referred to as technical requirements 
29 e.g. source code in one or more languages, or an abstract implementation language/model such as those 
used in model based engineering 
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• the order of production of the lifecycle products is not important to defining 
attributes of them; and 
• holistically, the individual lifecycle products are broadly consistent to these 
categories irrespective of the paradigm under which they were developed. 
There is sentiment, as evidenced by (RTCA Inc., 2012), that methods such as model-
based engineering undermine categories based on lifecycles in the way they undermined 
standards that are based on a specific lifecycle. In these cases, model-based engineering 
simply changes the sources of evidence for lifecycle products from human centric 
processes to tools. The evidence should still exist; it just takes a different form 
depending on the construct of the tool.  
Each of the above mentioned lifecycle products are uniquely definable in terms of 
expected content. While there is evidence of variations in document sets and structures 
across projects (examined in Chapter 10), it is possible to identify data pertaining to 
each above mentioned category of lifecycle products irrespective of which physical 
document it exists in. 
Consider a software development, for example: 
• System Requirements Data is often documented in a System Specification (SS), 
• Sub-System Requirements Data is often documented in a Sub-System 
Specification (SSS), 
• Software Requirements Data (SRD) is often documented in a Software 
Requirements Specification (SRS), 
• refined requirements and design description are often documented in subordinate 
parts of the SRS, and/or in a Software Design Description (SDD) and/or Interface 
Design Document (IDD); 
• low level requirements and detailed design are often documented in the SDD or as 
annotations to code functions; 
• source code is usually stored in source code files; and 
• software verification and validation (V&V) procedures, cases and results are often 
documented in: 
o the Software Verification Plan (SVP) or Software Test Plan (STP),  
o Software Verification Description (SVD) or Software Test Description 
(STD), and  
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o Software Verification Report (SVR) or Software Test Report (STR) 
respectively; 
• Sub-system and system verification and validation produces, cases and results are 
often documented in: 
o V&V plans, or test plans, 
o V&V descriptions or test descriptions, 
o V&V reports. 
The proliferation of developments adhering to the legacy DoD-STD-2167A (United 
States Department of Defense, 1988), the superseding MIL-STD-498 (US DoD, 1994), 
or J-STD-016 (IEEE Computer Society, 1995) and ISO/IEC12207 (ISO/IEC, 2008)) 
results in reasonable consistency between developments, even across different nations. 
While there is also variation in the names and structures of these documents, there is 
consistency in content as illustrated by Section 11 of (RTCA Inc., 1992) which may be 
exploited in establishing knowledge of product behaviours from lifecycle products. 
Figure 34 graphically illustrates the hierarchy of lifecycle products. At the top-most 
level the behaviour is related to a Product Defence and ‘constraint’ to continue the line 
of reasoning from Chapter 4 and Section 5.1. Lifecycle product evidence may either 
pertain to a lifecycle product directly (e.g. analysis evidence of detailed design 
requirements), or pertain to the relationship between lifecycle products (e.g. verification 
of the software product against detailed design requirements). 
5.2.2 Understanding the Relationship between Knowledge and the Chain 
of Evidence 
From a safety assurance perspective it is important to establish the relationship between 
the extent to which the hierarchy of evidence preserves the chain of evidence, as this 
influences the knowledge and uncertainty that may be inferred. 
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Figure 34: Lifecycle Products and their Hierarchical Relationships 
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Logically it follows that for cases where limitations in the knowledge of behaviours of 
the product are intolerable, then limitations or discontinuities in the chain of evidence 
between specified constraint level requirements, and the physical and logical 
implementation of the constraint can’t be tolerated. In these cases it is necessary to 
present evidence for each lifecycle product and relationship in the hierarchy. This 
rationale is represented by the left hand branch of Figure 35. 
However, for cases where limitations in the knowledge of the behaviours can be 
tolerated, then there are additional considerations. In cases where limitations in the level 
of knowledge sought should be constrained such that they don’t undermine the chain of 
evidence, then limitations in the hierarchy of lifecycle products may be tolerated 
provided they don’t introduce a discontinuity into the chain of evidence. In these cases, 
it is necessary to present evidence for a minimum set of lifecycle products such that 
discontinuities in the traceability of the chain of evidence are avoided. This rationale is 
represented by the central branch of Figure 35. 
For example, if evidence was presented with the exception that no evidence is presented 
for any refined or abstract requirements. In this case there would also be no evidence of 
V&V of the logical and physical implementation of refined abstraction requirements, 
and there would be no verification of low-level requirements against refined or abstract 
requirements. Therefore in order to avoid a discontinuity in the chain of evidence, then 
verification of low level requirements would be required with respect specified 
constraint level requirements to preserve the chain of evidence. The key factor is that 
the chain of evidence does not become discontinuous. 
Finally, in cases where limitations in the level of knowledge can be tolerated because 
the safety impact is not severe, then limitations in the hierarchy of lifecycle products 
may be tolerated. In these cases, it is necessary to at least present evidence that the 
constraint and implementation exists, else there is no product defence. This rationale is 
represented by the right hand branch of Figure 35. 
In essences Figure 35 suggests that there are three categories of assurance: those where 
limitations are intolerable, those where the limitations are constrained and those where 
they are tolerable. This concept will be used as the basis for a product behavioural 
assurance framework which is described in Section 5.4. 
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Figure 35: Knowledge from Lifecycle Product Hierarchy 
5.3 Establishing the Attributes of a Lifecycle Products 
Section 5.2 requires that evidence be presented about lifecycle products, but what 
evidence should be presented, how should it be organised, and what should it show? 
This section examines how attributes of lifecycle products are defined to address this. 
5.3.1 Defining Categories of Attributes of Lifecycle Products 
Section 2.4 established the concepts of requirements validity, requirements satisfaction 
and requirements traceability as the core concepts of assurance of safety. While these 
concepts feature the word requirements, in terms of lifecycle products, they are relevant 
to all lifecycle products. This is because for lifecycle products not directly about 
requirements they will provide evidence of the satisfaction or traceability of 
requirements. Herein, satisfaction means not only the verification of the requirement, 
but also the means by which the lifecycle product specifies the satisfying behaviour. 
These concepts can be used to define categories of attributes about lifecycle products. 
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Figure 36 presents a set of general attributes for lifecycle products. The attributes are 
grouped as follows: 
• Existence: attributes that characterise the existence of the lifecycle product; 
• Specification: attributes that characterise the specification of the behaviour of 
lifecycle product and how that behaviour related to both high level and low level 
abstraction of the behaviour; 
• Verification: attributes that characterise the verification of the behaviour of 
lifecycle product with respect to higher level abstractions of the behaviour; and  
• Validation:  attributes that characterise the validity of the behaviour both in terms 
of safety objectives and other behaviours of the system. 
Independent of the grouping of the attributes, there is an extra-group attribute which is 
relevant to each attribute in each group. In Figure 36 it appears as ‘Inadequacies 
Resolved’. Establishment of the other attributes may reveal inadequacies in this 
lifecycle product, and unless these are resolved, the articulation of the relevant 
behaviour by this lifecycle product will be incorrect. As development is not an 
instantaneous activity, there will always be inadequacies to resolve for at least some 
lifecycle products. This attribute pertains to evidence that the inadequacies in evidence 
of other attributes has been resolved to the extent necessary to avoid a gap or 
discontinuity in evidence if one cannot be tolerated. 
The attribute groups of each lifecycle product contain two types of attributes: self and 
inter-relational. Self attributes are attributes which deal with internal properties of the 
relevant lifecycle product. Inter-relational attributes deal with the relationships within 
the hierarchy of lifecycle products and are predominantly concerned with traceability, 
and technical agreement (compliance and robustness) between lifecycle products. 
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Figure 36: Lifecycle Product – Attributes 
Evidence must be presented for each attribute group. Because there are dependencies 
between attribute groups and lifecycle products, then if evidence is missing there may 
be a break in the chain of evidence in the hierarchy. This rationale is described by 
Figure 37, which specifies that evidence is required for each attribute group. 
 
Figure 37: Attribute Groups of Lifecycle Products 
The following sub-sections examine each of these attribute groups in greater detail. 
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5.3.2 Existence Attribute Group 
There are four attributes within the existence attribute group, all of which are ‘self-
attributes’: developed, defined, produced and integrated. The attributes are defined as 
follows: 
• Defined: evidence of the definition of the constraint within the lifecycle product; 
• Developed: evidence that derived or refined behaviours have been developed 
appropriate to the abstraction of the lifecycle product; 
• Produced: evidence of the implementation of the constraint; and 
• Integrated: evidence that the lifecycle product has been integrated into the 
physical implementation to form part of the product. 
Evidence should be presented for each of these attributes as shown in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38: Attributes of Existence 
5.3.3 Specification Attribute Group 
The specification attribute group is used for presenting evidence of how well the 
behaviours are specified for the constraint at the level of abstraction of the lifecycle 
product. The specification attribute group contains both self-attributes as well as inter-
relational attributes, as shown by Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Attributes of Specification 
Self Attributes 
There are seven self attributes within the specification attribute group, as follows: 
• Accurate: evidence of the degree of closeness of specification of the constraint at 
this level of abstraction to the actual constraint; 
• Precise: evidence of the degree of closeness of the representation to physical 
values at this level of abstraction;  
• Unambiguous: evidence of avoidance of misinterpretation due to ambiguity in the 
specification; 
• Complete: evidence that the behavioural specification is not missing part of its 
specification for this level of abstraction; 
• Consistent: evidence that the behavioural specification is internally consistent, 
such that elements of the specification can be interpreted and evaluated 
consistently; 
• Verifiable: evidence that it is possible to verify the behaviour at this level of 
abstraction against higher levels of abstraction – if the behaviour can’t be verified, 
then requirements satisfaction cannot be achieved; and 
• Validatable: evidence that the behaviour is validated at this level of abstraction 
against safety objectives and with respect to other behaviours of the system. 
Evidence should be presented for each of these attributes as shown in Figure 40. 
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Figure 40: Self Attributes of Specification 
Up Attributes 
There is one upwards inter-relational attribute within the specification attribute group: 
• Traceable to ‘Higher’ Abstractions: evidence that the specification is traceable to 
the relevant specification of next higher abstraction of lifecycle product to 
continue the chain of evidence. 
Evidence should be presented for this attribute as shown in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: Up Attributes of Specification 
Specification 
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Down Attributes 
There are two downwards inter-relational attributes within the specification attribute 
group: 
• Traceable to ‘Lower’ Abstractions: evidence that the specification is traceable to 
the relevant specification of the next lower abstraction of lifecycle product to 
continue the chain of evidence; and 
• Compatible with Target: evidence that the specification is compatible with the 
intended logical and physical implementation, and that any behaviours introduced 
at this level that are inherited from logical or physical implementation are 
captured as a dependency for low level abstractions. 
Evidence should be presented for these attributes as shown in Figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42: Down Attributes of Specification 
5.3.4 Verification Attribute Group 
The verification attribute group is used for presenting evidence as to how well the 
behaviours specified for the constraint have been verified with respect to high level 
abstractions. The verification attribute group contains both self-attributes as well as 
inter-relational attributes, as shown by Figure 43. 
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Figure 43: Attributes of Verification 
Self Attributes 
There is one self attribute within the verification attribute group:  
• Coverage of ‘Self’: evidence of verification coverage of the behaviours.  
Evidence should be presented for this attribute as shown in Figure 44. 
 
Figure 44: Self Attributes of Verification 
Up Attributes 
There are three upwards inter-relational attributes within the verification attribute group, 
as follows: 
• Compliant with ‘Higher’ Abstractions: evidence that the constraint at this level 
of abstraction is in technical agreement with the relevant behaviours at higher 
abstractions (positive perspective – when faults are absent from input data); 
S_LPA_Verification
Argument over self and 
relational attributes for 
verification.
M_LP_Attrib_Verif
Refer to Figure 36 
(Lifecycle Product 
Attributes)
G_LPA_Ver_Self
Self attributes associated with 
verification of lifecycle product 
{A} provides knowledge of 
constraint {X}
G_LPA_Ver_Up
Upwards relational attributes of 
verification of lifecycle product {A} 
provide knowledge of continuation of 
lifecycle product hierarchy for 
constraint {X}
G_LPA_Verification
Verification evidence of 
lifecycle product {A} 
provides knowledge of 
constraint {X}
Attribute Groups 
(Figure 37)
 186  
• Robust with ‘Higher’ Abstractions: evidence that the constraint at this level of 
abstraction is in technical agreement with the relevant behaviours at higher 
abstractions (negative perspective – when faults are present in input data); and 
• Coverage of ‘Higher’ Abstraction: evidence of verification coverage of the 
traceable higher abstractions of the constraint by verification in this lifecycle 
product. 
Evidence should be presented for these attributes as shown in Figure 45. 
 
Figure 45: Up Attributes of Verification 
5.3.5 Validation Attribute Group 
The validation attribute group is used for presenting evidence of the validity of the 
behaviours specified for the constraint at the applicable level of abstraction of the 
lifecycle product with respect to both safety objectives and other constraints and 
behaviours of the system. The validation attribute group contains attributes, as shown 
by Figure 46. 
• Consistent with Safety Objectives: evidence that the behaviours specified in 
relation to the constraint at the level of abstraction of this lifecycle product are 
consistent with the safety objectives for the overall system and the behaviours 
necessary for the system to achieve those safety objectives; 
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• Consistent with Constraints: evidence that the behaviours specified in relation to 
the constraint are consistent with other constraints placed on the system by 
architectural assurances (refer Figure 47); and 
• Non-Interference with Other: evidence that the behaviours specified in relation 
to the constraint do not interfere with other constraints placed on the system 
through physical or logical partitioning, or acceptable interactions (refer Figure 
48). 
 
Figure 46: Attributes of Validation 
 
Figure 47: Consistency with Constraints 
 
Figure 48: Non-interference with Constraints 
In (Weaver, 2003)’s argument patterns, non-interference was addressed by including 
elements of the argument that address failures of other software components which 
could lead to the specific software failure mode. Effectively (Weaver, 2003) was 
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identifying a category of evidence showing other software components didn’t cause the 
failure in question. 
If the concept of the constraint used in this chapter is considered, the mechanisms that 
provide non-interference between constraints and other aspects of the system can also 
be labelled as constraints and knowledge of them provided as per the lifecycle product 
hierarchy and attributes discussed above. For example these non-interference 
‘constraints’ may be defined to address non-interference of intended and unintended 
coupling paths between components.  
Defining ‘constraints’ for intended coupling paths to show they do not lead to a 
violation of the initiating constraint will usually involve addressing all intended 
coupling paths such as control and data flows, intentionally shared resources, etc.  
Defining ‘constraints’ for unintended coupling paths to show they also do not lead to a 
violation of the initiating constraint will usually involve addressing all feasible spatial 
and temporal coupling paths. For example ‘constraints’ can be defined that use 
containment and/or mediation mechanisms for spatial interference paths. Such 
‘constraints’ for software for example might include such mechanisms as the 
application of protected modes, virtual machines, memory management units, data 
wrappers, cache management, and software instruction run time evaluation. 
‘Constraints’ for software based mediation mechanisms of temporal interference paths 
might include execution time monitors, and real time scheduling mechanisms (earliest 
deadline first, rate monotonic, cyclic executive with interrupts, etc.). 
This sub-section has described the attributes that have been defined for lifecycle 
products. In Section 5.4, these shall be used as the basis for the definition of an 
assurance framework for product behaviours associated with constraints. However, it is 
firstly important to examine several observations about the attribute set. 
5.3.6 Asymmetry in Inter-relational Attributes 
Although it might seem that compliant/robust/coverage should be symmetrical to both 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ abstractions, it would be incorrect to treat them as similar. A lower 
level abstraction typically includes refined information with implementation specifics. 
Therefore, while a ‘lower’ abstraction should always remain compliant and robust with 
a ‘higher’ abstraction, a ‘higher’ abstraction may not be in technical agreement 
(compliant or robust) with a ‘lower’ abstraction. When it comes to verification, this 
same factor governs the relationship between verification evidence of lower abstractions 
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with higher abstractions, and thus prevents verification of higher abstractions with 
lower abstractions. Hence there is no need for attributes relating to compliance, 
robustness or coverage in the downwards abstraction direction. 
5.3.7 Attributes - Binary versus Qualitative  
The attributes defined in this Section can be characterised as either binary or qualitative. 
Binary attributes are those for which the evidence shows a clearly distinguishable 
outcome. The following are examples of binary attributes: 
• Existence attributes – defined, developed, produced, integrated; 
• Traceability attributes 
The assessment of all other attributes may not be clearly distinguishable and involves 
qualitative factors. In these cases it is necessary to reason about the suitability and 
limitations in evidence where the attribute is not clearly established. 
Identification of these differences between attributes is useful as it permits guidelines 
for reasoning about evidence to be tailored based on attribute type. Section 5.4 
examines why this is useful. 
5.3.8 Completeness of the Attribute Set 
The set of attributes describe above is complete because the set of attributes was 
determined by ensuring that each potential source of violation for lifecycle product has 
attributes that provide coverage of requirements validity, requirements satisfaction, and 
requirements traceability, as shown in Table 18. 
Comparison to Software Systems Engineering Initiative Model 
There are similarities of the lifecycle product hierarchy and attribute set to elements of 
the GSN patterns proposed by (Menon, et al., 2009). These patterns provide a 
framework for reasoning about evidence at differing level of abstractions, and are 
relevant to many of the underlying principles of proposing a framework based on 
attributes and the evidence assurance describe in Chapter 6. However this thesis differs 
from (Menon, et al., 2009) in that it identifies properties of the lifecycle hierarchy and 
the attribute set that can be exploited for setting qualitative benchmarks for reasoning 
about evidence. This is an enhancement to the (Menon, et al., 2009) work which only 
provided a categorisation of argument for reasoning about evidence at each level of 
abstraction. 
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Attribute Requirements Validity Requirements 
Satisfaction 
Requirements 
Traceability 
Existence    
Defined A A A 
Developed A A A 
Produced A A A 
Integrated A A A 
Specification    
Accurate    
Precise  B  
Unambiguous  B  
Complete    
Consistent    
Verifiable    
Validatable    
Traceable to Higher 
Abstractions 
 C  
Traceable to Lower 
Abstractions 
 C  
Compatible with Target    
Verification    
Coverage of Self    
Compliant    
Robust    
Coverage    
Validation    
Consistent with Safety 
Objectives 
 D  
Consistent with Other  D  
Non-interference with 
Other 
 D  
Inadequacies Resolved    
Key: 
A: Permits this to be possible. 
B: Addresses potential for errors to be introduced into lower level lifecycle products. 
C: Traceability is necessary in order to relate verification evidence. 
D: Satisfaction is only possible when consistency and non-interference are assured. 
Table 18: Completeness of Attribute Set 
Comparison to RTCA/DO-178B 
There are similarities between the some attributes and objectives of RTCA/DO- 178B/C 
(RTCA Inc., 2011). While some attributes have been labelled consistently with 
established DO-178B/C terminology, the key differences are as follows: 
• in this framework they are referred to as attributes of lifecycle products – which 
differs in interpretation from DO-178B/C objectives; 
• each of the defined attributes is with respect to the specific behaviour under 
consideration (e.g. the ‘constraint’) being considered – in DO-178B/C the 
objectives relate to the entirety of the software product; 
• each of the attributes is organised in a set with respect to a lifecycle product (i.e. 
with respect to product evidence) – in DO-178B/C the objectives are organised 
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around software lifecycle phases and integral processes, not with respect to the 
type of evidence; 
• each of the attributes is focussed on behaviours of the product with respect to the 
‘constraint’ – DO-178B/C has additional objectives related entirely to process, 
such as the planning objectives and certification liaison; and 
• additional attributes have been developed to address behavioural interferences (or 
non-interference as should be the goal) between constraints. 
In many respects the attribute set described within this chapter is far more general than 
DO-178B/C usage of objectives. The lifecycle product hierarchy described herein  
pertains to any product be it software, electronic hardware or mechanical systems, and 
the attribute sets are general in that they do not imply a specific lifecycle process to 
generate the evidence. The attributes of the lifecycle products have also been specified 
so they focus on the general self and relational properties of lifecycle products rather 
than specific properties of any specific lifecycle product. 
5.4 Assurance of Product Behaviours 
This section proposes a framework for assurance of product behaviours. The framework 
provides a set of product behavioural assurance requirements based on a specific 
instantiation of the meta-claims presented in the previous sections of this chapter. The 
framework is also intended to address the principles  and usability criteria of safety 
assurance pertaining to knowledge of product behaviours. 
In Section 4.7.1 the benefits of assurance levels were discussed with respect to adhering 
to the usability guidelines presented in Figure 32. Additional guidelines were identified 
in Section 4.7.2 to avoid the limitations of assurance levels and the framework proposed 
by this section has been developed in response to these guidelines. 
5.4.1 Defining the Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) Concept 
This thesis proposes a Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) concept. The CSAL 
qualifies the level of product behavioural knowledge about validity, satisfaction and 
traceability of each specified ‘constraint’ level requirement (refer to Section 5.1.2). In 
essence, the CSAL sets a benchmark for the tolerability of gaps or discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy (refer Section 5.2) and associated attributes (refer Section 
5.3) based on the strength of knowledge required given the severity of failure of the 
product defence established from Chapter 4. The CSALs are defined based on the meta-
argument (Figure 35) that distinguishes options for tolerability of limitations in the 
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chain of evidence across the hierarchy of lifecycle products. Five CSAL levels are 
proposed in Table 19, although CSAL4 sets an upper limit for reference only and is not 
used in practice.  
CSAL Category Intended Outcome – 
Qualitative 
Sources of Knowledge from 
Lifecycle Product Hierarchy and 
Attributes
30
 
CSAL 4 
(not used) 
Absolute 
Assurance 
Intended and unintended 
behaviours of the absence or 
detection and handling constraint 
are absolutely assured with 
respect to safety, such that there is 
no uncertainty in behaviour 
Not practicable (or affordable) to 
provide evidence of absolute assurance 
– Near Absolute Assurance provides 
sufficient control of the uncertainty 
CSAL 3 Near 
Absolute 
Assurance 
All reasonably practical and 
effective steps have been taken to 
systematically account for the 
intended and unintended 
behaviours of the absence or 
detection and handling constraint 
with respect to safety, such that 
the remaining uncertainty would 
unlikely lead to a violation of the 
constraint under any credible or 
foreseeable circumstances. 
Limitations and discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy are 
intolerable:  
• Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement 
• Refined Abstract Level Design 
Requirements (as necessary to avoid 
discontinuities) 
• Low Level / Detailed Design 
Requirements 
• Logical Implementation (“Human 
Readable”) 
• Logical Implementation (“Machine 
Readable”) 
• Physical Implementation 
Limitations in evidence of attributes are 
intolerable. 
CSAL 2 Nominal 
Assurance 
Steps have been taken to 
systematically account for the 
intended functional behaviours of 
the absence or detection and 
handling constraint with respect to 
safety, such that the remaining 
uncertainty would only lead to a 
violation of the constraint under 
extremely improbable 
circumstances 
Limitations and discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy are tolerable 
provided they are constrained such that 
they don’t introduce a discontinuity in 
the chain of evidence:  
• Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement 
• Refined Abstract Level Design 
Requirements (as necessary to avoid 
discontinuities) 
• Low Level / Detailed Design 
Requirements 
• Logical Implementation (“Human 
Readable”) 
• Logical Implementation (“Machine 
Readable”) 
• Physical Implementation 
Limitations in evidence of attributes are 
tolerable, provided they don’t introduce 
a discontinuity in the chain of evidence. 
                                                 
30 Note that the expression of this column was refined based on the evaluation (Chapter 10), when 
compared to earlier work, to better express the relationship to limitations and discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy. 
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CSAL Category Intended Outcome – 
Qualitative 
Sources of Knowledge from 
Lifecycle Product Hierarchy and 
Attributes
30
 
CSAL 1 Limited 
Assurance 
Claims broadly account for the 
intended functional behaviours of 
the absence or detection and 
handling constraint with respect to 
safety, such that the remaining 
uncertainty could lead to a 
violation of the constraint, but this 
would not be expected under 
probably operating conditions that 
would exercise the constraint 
Limitations and discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy are tolerable 
provided  a constraint and 
implementation exists:  
• Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement 
• Refined Abstract Level Design 
Requirements (optional) 
• Low Level / Detailed Design 
Requirements (optional) 
• Logical Implementation (“Human 
Readable”) 
• Logical Implementation (“Machine 
Readable”) 
• Physical Implementation 
Limitations in evidence of attributes are 
tolerable, provided there is evidence of 
the constraint and implementation. 
CSAL 0 No 
Assurance 
No evidence exists to assure the 
absence or detection and handling 
constraint with respect to safety 
Limitations and discontinuities in the 
lifecycle product hierarchy are 
tolerable. 
Limitations in evidence of attributes are 
tolerable. 
Table 19: Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) Definition 
5.4.2 Relating ASALs and CSALs 
For each ‘constraint’ it is necessary to establish the degree to which the ‘constraint’ 
should be assured, and also what the degree of assurance means with respect to the 
product defence. The ASAL concept (refer Chapter 4), uses layers of defences (absence 
assertions or detection/handling mechanisms) to provide assurance that systematic faults 
do not lead to unacceptable failure circumstances. Each ‘constraint’ will be associated 
with a specific layer of fault prevention (absence) assertion or fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) mechanisms in the context of the system architecture. Therefore, the 
degree of claims assurance, as expressed by the CSAL is related to the role of the 
constraint in the architecture, as expressed by the ASAL. Implicitly therefore, CSAL is 
also related to the severity of failures associated with the system through the ASAL 
definition. 
Determining the CSAL Assignment Approach 
The simplest approach that could be taken is to assign the CSAL commensurate to the 
severity of the failure of the system and the ASAL, noting that the ASAL is already 
defined in terms of the severity of failures of the system. Therefore, the stronger the 
architectural necessity for the system to resolve systematic faults, the stronger the 
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motivation for claims assurance and evidence. This is the approach that has been chosen 
within this thesis however it is acknowledged that it could be performed differently.  
One alternative approach would be to assign the CSAL proportionally to the remaining 
defence in depth for the given fault propagation path, in addition to the severity of the 
failure of the system. Thus the greater the defence in depth, the lesser the CSAL could 
be31. In essence, the CSAL could be potentially reduced for one defence in response to 
an increase in CSAL for another defence. In this scenario, the argument is that claims 
assurance might also be used to provide additional strength for one layer of mechanism 
to reduce a higher CSAL for one or more requisite layers. While this seems intuitive, 
and an attractive approach for a number of practical reasons, there is a factor to this 
approach which violates a key concept outlined in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 4 examined the fail safe design criteria and looked at the effect of single and 
multiple failures on the system. If the CSALs are reduced based on re-proportioning of 
CSALs for other defences, then potentially the fail safe design concept is impacted 
regarding our knowledge of behaviours of defences. Claims assurance is about 
knowledge of behaviours and not necessarily about the likelihood of failure. The 
architectural benefits of resolving faults at differing layers of abstraction and the impact 
of this on bounding uncertainty are an important facet of this framework, which should 
be supported by the knowledge obtained from claims assurance, and not overridden by 
it. For this reason, the re-proportioning approaches to CSAL assignment have been 
avoided in this thesis. 
The relationship between ASAL and CSALs is described by Table 20. 
Dealing with Additional Layers of Defence 
Recognising that some systems might include additional layers of defence (over and 
beyond the requisite layers defined by Chapter 4); Table 20 also defines the CSAL 
associated with additional layers. The key factor in specifying the CSAL for additional 
layers is the extent to which the additional layer might potentially interfere with the 
required layers, and its effect on the propagation path. Careful consideration is required 
when assigning layers of defences as either the primary layer, or additional layers. 
Depending on the layer’s role in the architectural hierarchy of defences, some defences 
                                                 
31 This is essentially what ARP4754A does through the FDAL and IDAL assignment requirements. 
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might be more suitable to be defined as primary layers (and subject to non-reduced 
claims assurance) rather than additional layers due to their potential for interference. 
ASAL 
1
st
 Layer of 
Defence 
Fault Prevention 
(Absence) or 
Fault Tolerance 
(Detection and 
Handling) 
2
nd
 Layer of Defence 
Fault Tolerance 
(Detection/Handling) 
3
rd
 Layer of Defence  
Fault Tolerance 
(Detection/Handling) 
Additional 
Layers of Defence 
Potentially 
Interfere1 
Can’t 
Interfere2 
ASAL3 Direct CSAL3 Partitioned 
Direct# or 
Intra-
System* 
CSAL3 Intra-
System* 
or Extra-
System 
Level 
CSAL3 CSAL2$ CSAL0 
ASAL2 Direct CSAL2 Partitioned 
Direct# or 
Intra-
System or 
Extra-
System 
CSAL2 Not Required CSAL2$ CSAL0 
ASAL1 Direct 
OR 
Intra-
System 
OR 
Extra-
System 
CSAL1 Not Required CSAL1 CSAL0 
Notes: 
1 Potentially interfere with subsequent detection and handling 
2 Can’t Interfere with subsequent detection and handling 
# must be independent of the initiating failure and the 1st Absence / Detection and Handling mechanism (i.e. through 
a partitioning mechanism 
* must be independent of the preceding detection/handling mechanism 
$ additional mechanisms behaviour must be assured to reason that it won’t interfere with the main mechanisms 
Table 20: Relating ASALs and CSALs 
5.4.3 CSAL Assignment Methodology 
Section 2.4 identified that there are two factors that must be considered in the 
assignment of an assurance level, regardless of how it is defined. These are: 
• what the software level is being assigned to,  and 
• how the assignment is performed.  
The CSAL is intended to be assigned to a specific behavioural ‘constraint’ used to 
provide fault prevention or fault tolerance. In some respects this is equivalent to the 
assigning of assurance levels to safety functions or safety requirements as performed by 
existing assurance approaches. Each constraint will have an assigned CSAL, and the 
CSAL assignment may differ across differing ‘constraints’ within the same product.  
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CSAL assignment should be performed by the following steps: 
1. Identify the applicable fault prevention (absence assertion) or fault tolerance 
(detection and handling mechanism), as determined from the architectural 
assurance activities (refer chapter 4). 
2. Determine the ‘constraint’ on the behaviour of the product necessary to achieve 
fault prevention or fault tolerance. 
3. Perform CSAL assignment for the ‘constraint’ using Table 20, as follows: 
a. For the applicable ASAL assigned to the system, identify the relevant row 
from column 1 of Table 20. 
b. For the applicable ‘constraint’ layer, identify the relevant major column 
from columns 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Table 20. 
c. Provided the ‘constraint’ meets the criteria from the first sub-column for the 
relevant major column of Table 20, assign the CSAL per the second sub-
column for the relevant major column of Table 20 based on the relevant 
ASAL row. 
With the CSAL assigned, the next step is to establish how the CSAL will be achieved. 
5.4.4 Specifying the Attributes of Software Lifecycle Products 
Having determined the CSAL, it is necessary to specify the measures for evidence based 
on the level of knowledge required of lifecycle product chain of evidence and the 
attributes of these lifecycle products. Appendix B presents the complete list of attributes 
versus CSAL level for each lifecycle product category based on the requirements of 
Table 1932. Appendix B provides: 
• a table for each lifecycle product in the hierarchy. 
• each of the attributes as it pertains for the specific lifecycle product,  
• details the impact of the attribute not being satisfied with evidence for that 
lifecycle product, including how this breaks down the evidence chain, and  
• the relationship to the CSAL by indicating if it is intolerable, constrained 
tolerability, or tolerable to have a limitation in evidence for the specified attribute. 
                                                 
32 The Appendix B tables were refined from earlier works based on the evaluation (Chapter 10) with 
respect to the grouping and attribute definition to better align with the lifecycle product hierarchy and 
attribute relationships. 
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Each attribute is annotated for each lifecycle product as intolerable, constrained or 
tolerable based on: 
• the role of the lifecycle product in the chain of evidence, which sets the reference 
point for the columnar transition between intolerable (CSAL3), constrained 
(CSAL2) and tolerable (CSAL1); 
• the extent to which the specific attribute can introduce a discontinuity into the 
chain of evidence, which is shown as adjustments to columnar divisions between 
intolerable and constrained (CSAL3→CSAL2 or CSAL2→CSAL1), and 
constrained and tolerable (CSAL2→CSAL1 or CSAL1→CSAL0) based on the 
lifecycle product; and 
• determination as to whether the attribute is binary or qualitative as per Section 
5.3.7, which is shown at direct transitions from intolerable to tolerable for binary 
attributes and intolerable to constrained to tolerable for qualitative attributes. 
In essence, this provides an explanation for the differences in assurance level 
requirements. Appendix B is intended to provide a practical instantiation of the rationale 
described in earlier sections of this chapter. Having set the tolerability of limitations in 
evidence for each attribute, Chapter 6 addresses how evidence should be assessed based 
on the level of knowledge sought for each attribute. 
5.4.5 Potential Benefits of the CSAL concept 
The CSAL concept provides the following perceived benefits to assurance frameworks: 
• The ‘constraint’ and associated CSAL are contextualised by the applicable ASAL 
objectives, and thus the relevant product failure modes and severity – this 
provides the CSAL traceability to a product meaning.  
• The ASAL/CSAL integrated approach ensures that the search for knowledge of 
product behaviours is commensurate with the seriousness of each specific failure 
modes and product behaviour – this is advantageous as it ensures the evidence 
examined is that evidence that is most relevant to safety and risk.  
• The CSAL concept overcomes criticism of existing assurance level approaches 
that assign a level to an entire configuration irrespective of the differing severities 
of the failure modes of that configuration item. 
• The CSAL approach is an instantiation of a set of general principles pertaining to 
the chain of evidence in the hierarchy of lifecycle products and their attribute set. 
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Therefore, while specific instantiations might vary, the general principles have 
been reasoned about to provide the foundation for the framework. 
• The CSAL concept provides inherent consistency in safety cases without unduly 
limiting or constraining the product.  
• The CSAL concept places emphasis on generic properties of a product’s evidence 
without burdening the developer with the difficultly of architecting holistically 
unique top level arguments for safety cases for each development. 
• It should be possible to reuse evidence from developments (e.g. RTCA/DO-178B) 
with the CSAL concept. 
The validity of these benefits is evaluated in Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
5.4.6 Potential Limitations of the CSAL concept 
The CSAL concept has the following potential limitations: 
• There are options for the ways CSALs are assigned (refer Section 5.4.2). The 
approach chosen in this thesis is a simple relationship, which may not cater for 
every possible architectural trade-off in practice. Further practical validation is 
necessary to establish the most suitable relationships between ASAL and CSALs. 
• The CSAL concept has set benchmarks for the type of evidence required to 
support attributes of lifecycle products which are necessary to assure the chain of 
evidence between constraint and implementation, based on the level of knowledge 
sought. The CSAL concept does not address how evidence should be reasoned 
about based on the level of knowledge sought for each attribute. Chapter 6 will 
examine this in further detail. 
The impact of these limitations is evaluated in Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
5.5 Defining a Process for Applying the CSAL Concept 
With the necessary fault prevention (absence) assertions or fault tolerance (detection 
and handling) mechanisms identified from architectural assurance activities, it is 
necessary to define an overall lifecycle process for applying claims assurance to each 
constraint and associated fault prevention assertion or fault tolerance mechanism. Figure 
49 provides an overview of the process, which incorporates those sub-processes defined 
in Section 5.4.3. 
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Figure 49: CSAL Process Overview 
The following provides elaboration of each of the CSAL process steps. Each step is 
illustrated by use of the A-DHC-4 fictitious example from Section 3.8. 
5.5.1 Step 1 – Identify the Fault Prevention Assertion or Fault Tolerance 
Mechanism 
a. Identify the fault prevention assertion or fault prevention mechanism to which 
claims assurance is to be applied. 
b. Identify the components within the system on which fault prevention or fault 
tolerance is to be implemented. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
This example considers the fault tolerance mechanism in the 
SENSOR_DATA_CONDITIONING functional unit of the Primary Command Channel 
of the Primary Flight Control Computer (refer Figure 31). This mechanism provides a 
defence against a value failure of sensor_data.attitude#1. 
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5.5.2 Step 2 – Determine the ‘Constraint’ to Achieve Fault Prevention or 
Tolerance 
a. Define a specified ‘constraint’ level requirement for achieving the fault 
prevention assertion or fault tolerance mechanisms on the relevant system 
components. For ‘constraints’ to be implemented in software, the ‘constraint’ will 
be a high level software requirement. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The constraint to achieve the aforementioned defence is “Value failures of type fixed of 
sensor_data.attitude#1 shall be detected using reasonability checking against expected 
attitude data based on sensor_data.attitude#2, aircraft_motion and lateral_mode. 
Handling shall set the sensor_data.attitude#1.valid flag to invalid.” 
This specified constraint level requirement is allocated to the Primary Command 
Channel software. 
5.5.3 Step 3 – Assign a CSAL to the ‘Constraint’ 
a. Assign a CSAL to the ‘constraint’ using the process defined in Section 5.4.3 and 
using Table 20. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Section 4.8.3 detailed that the architecture must be assured to ASAL3. Based on this 
ASAL assignment, the aforementioned ‘constraint’ associated with the direct defence 
should be assured to CSAL3 (in accordance with Table 20). 
5.5.4 Step 4 – Establish the Conformance of Software Lifecycle Products 
to Appendix B 
a. As the lifecycle products generated by the developer may not exactly correspond 
to the categories of lifecycle products defined by Appendix B, establish a mapping 
between the categories of Appendix B and the actual lifecycle products being 
used. 
b. Where one or more abstractions of Refined Abstract Level Requirements are 
employed, identify the abstractions to which the Refined Abstract Level 
Requirements will be applied. Ensure these abstractions are distinct from the 
Specified ‘Constraint’ Level Requirements and the Low Level Requirements. 
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Example – A-DHC-4 
The following summarised mapping is established between the developer lifecycle 
product documentation and the lifecycle product hierarchy from Appendix B: 
• Specified Constraint Level Requirements are documented in the PFCC SSS and 
SRS, which are stored in the Requirements Management Database. Traceability 
between the SRS and SSS is documented as links between sub-system level 
requirements (prefix PFCC) and software requirements (prefix PFCC.PCC). 
• One level of Refined Abstract Level Requirements is documented in the Model-
Based Development Tool in the form of a functional and implementation model 
defined by an abstract definition language. Traceability between model elements 
and software requirements is documented in the Requirements Database. 
• Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements are documented in a Software Design 
Description, which is an export of the model definition from the Model-Based 
Development Tool supplemented with additional low level requirements 
pertaining to software architecture and other infrastructure related behaviours such 
as fault and error management and built in test. 
• Logical Implementation (“Human Readable”) exists as source code which has 
been generated from the Model-Based Development Tool. The code has been 
manually integrated with additional hand coded units necessary to add a subset of 
SPARK annotations and integrate the source code with the board support and 
executive/scheduling source code. The Logical Implementation was subject to 
code reviews (walkthrough and peer reviews), has been checked using the 
SPARK Examiner, as documented in the Software Test Description.  
• Logical Implementation (“Machine Readable”) exists as executable object code 
which has been compiled from the source code using an Ada compiler, including 
appropriate compile time checking, and integrated with the minimal Ada run time 
machine. The executable object code was tested on a target based software test 
bench with simulated and emulated inputs, as documented in the Software Test 
Description. 
• Physical Implementation exists as single board computer hosted on the backplane 
within the PFCC. The PFCC underwent testing on a target based software test 
bench as well as system in the systems integration laboratory and ‘iron bird’ test 
rig as documented in the Sub-System Test Description and System Test 
Description. 
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5.5.5 Step 5 – Determine the Tolerability Benchmarks  
a. Using Appendix B and the assigned CSAL, identify the tolerability benchmark for 
each attribute for each software lifecycle product. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
For CSAL 3 the tolerability benchmark for attributes is Intolerable as per Appendix B. 
For the sake of brevity of this example, the focus is on the Low Level / Detailed Design 
Requirements Lifecycle Product only. 
5.5.6 Step 6 – Apply the ESAL Framework to the Attributes 
a. For each attribute of each lifecycle product, assign an ESAL based on the 
tolerability benchmark determined at Step 5. 
b. Apply the ESAL framework as per Chapter 6. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Consider the following attributes of requirements applicable to the aforementioned 
constraint in the Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements lifecycle product: 
• Specification Group: Accuracy, and 
• Verification Group: Robust with Higher Abstraction. 
The evidence presented in support of each of these attributes is described in Table 21. 
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Attribute Evidence Provided 
Specification Group: 
Accuracy 
• Software Design Description 
• Model-Based Development Analysis 
• Inspections by Peer Review 
• Configuration Management Records for SDD 
Verification Group: 
Robust with Higher 
Abstraction 
• Requirements Management Database containing 
Software Requirements and Traceability Data 
• Software Design Description 
• Software Test Description 
• Software Test Procedures and Cases 
• Software Test Results 
• Configuration Management Records 
 Table 21: Examples of Initial Evidence Supporting Attributes 
Chapter 6 provides guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 example on providing 
evidence assurance, using the evidence articles identified above. 
5.5.7 Step 7 – Identify Limitations in Attribute Satisfaction 
a. For each argument of tolerability for each attribute of each software lifecycle 
product, identify limitations in evidence. 
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Example – A-DHC-4 
Chapter 6 provides guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 example on providing 
evidence assurance. As an example, assume that Chapter 6 identifies the following two 
untreated limitations in evidence: 
• There are limitations in trustworthiness of the evidence supporting the Accuracy 
attribute because of limitations in independence in the inspection of requirements 
data and also a lack of conformity review by quality assurance of the processes 
pertaining to inspections and inspection record management. 
• There are limitations in relevance to purpose of the evidence supporting the 
Robust with Higher Abstraction attribute because of limitations in the 
comprehensives of robustness test cases. Limitations in executing certain 
robustness cases on the target hardware means that evidence from host based 
testing and analysis is required to overcome these limitations. 
5.5.8 Step 8 – Determine if the Limitations in Attribute Satisfaction are 
Tolerable 
a. For each argument of tolerability for each attribute of each software lifecycle 
product, identify if the limitations in attribute satisfaction are tolerable or 
intolerable. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The aforementioned limitations are assessed to be intolerable based on the level of 
knowledge sought and reasoning about evidence assurance described in Chapter 6. 
5.5.9 Step 9 – Generate Additional Evidence to Address Limitations 
a. Generate additional evidence to resolve the limitations in attribute satisfaction. 
b. Revise the arguments established in Step 6 to take into account the additional 
evidence. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The revised evidence presented in support of each of these attributes is described in 
Table 21. Additional evidence is shown in italics. 
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Attribute Evidence Provided 
Specification Group: 
Accuracy 
• Software Design Description 
• Model-Based Development Analysis 
• Inspections by Walkthrough and Peer Review 
• Quality Assurance Records for Inspections 
• Configuration Management Records for SDD and 
Inspection Records 
Verification Group: 
Robust with Higher 
Abstraction 
• Requirements Management Database containing 
Software Requirements and Traceability Data 
• Model-Based Development Tool analysis results 
• Software Design Description 
• Software Test Description 
• Software Test Procedures and Cases 
• Software Test Results 
• Configuration Management Records 
• SPARK Analyser Results 
Table 22: Examples of Revised Evidence Supporting Attributes 
Chapter 6 provides guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 example on providing 
evidence assurance given the revised evidence. For the purposes of this chapter, assume 
that the additional evidence resolves the evidence shortfall and that the limitation in 
evidence with respect to attributes is now tolerable. 
5.5.10 Step 10 – Determine the Risk of Intolerable Attribute Satisfaction 
Limitations 
a. Determine the impact of intolerable attribute satisfaction limitations for 
communication to higher level product risk assessments, which will include 
consideration of: 
i. the attribute against which the evidence shortfalls exists, 
ii. the applicable ‘constraint’ to which it relates and the corresponding CSAL 
assignment for that ‘constraint’, and 
iii. the other fault prevention or fault tolerance mechanisms employed by the 
architecture to treat the source of fault. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Assume that an evidence shortfall has also been identified against the Traceable to 
Higher Abstraction attribute for the Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements 
Lifecycle Product. Chapter 8 provides guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 
example on revising risk assessments based on counter evidence. 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined how knowledge of behaviours of products can be obtained 
through examination of a product and its lifecycle products with respect to constraints 
associated with defences defined in Chapter 4. Specifically the role of lifecycle products 
has been examined and a categorisation and hierarchy of lifecycle products has been 
defined. A set of attributes of lifecycle products has also been established to determine 
evidence requirements for product defences. 
A means of defining the knowledge of behaviours of products has been described that 
examines a product and its lifecycle products, thus providing a means to satisfy 
Principle C of Figure 32. A set of attributes of lifecycle products was established to 
determine evidence requirements for product defences, providing a means to satisfy 
Principle D of Figure 32. Through examining the properties of the categorisation, 
hierarchy and attribute set of lifecycle products; the rational for how lifecycle products 
contribute to knowledge of product behaviours have been documented using meta-
arguments, thus providing a means to satisfy Principle X of Figure 32. The effect on 
knowledge of limitations in the evidence supporting attributes and the lifecycle product 
hierarchy has also been examined and expressed within the meta-arguments, thus 
providing a means to satisfy Principle Y of Figure 32.  
Using the identified categorisation, hierarchy and attributes of lifecycle products, the 
CSAL framework provides assurance of product behavioural knowledge with respect to 
constraints for product defences. The assurance framework qualifies the knowledge 
obtained from evidence based on the tolerability of limitations in knowledge. An 
example was used to illustrate the process of applying the CSAL framework. 
The CSAL framework has been developed to also adhere to the usability guidelines 
identified in Figure 32. The CSAL framework minimises variability (adhering to 
Guideline 1) by specifying deterministic requirements for presenting evidence for 
lifecycle products and attributes thereof. These requirements are derived from general 
properties of lifecycle products and their hierarchical relationships. The CSAL 
framework minimises subjectivity (adhering to Guideline 2) with respect to product 
behavioural assessment by ensuring that the CSAL requirements are explicitly defined 
based on a mutually exclusive and measurable attribute set. This measurability to 
minimise subjectivity also permits adherence to Guideline 3 as assessors can distinguish 
acceptable from non-acceptable. Chapter 6 provides more detail on reasoning about the 
adequacy of evidence for each attribute.  
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6 Assurance of Evidence  
Evidence is the foundation of numerous safety assurance frameworks, and there is 
growing consensus that an evidence-based approach to safety assurance should be 
advocated (Committee on Certifiably Dependable Software Systems, 2007). In generic 
terms, evidence is information that can be used to substantiate whether a belief or 
proposition may be true or false (Oxford University Press, 2010). For safety assurance, 
evidence is the information that should be used to substantiate the claims about 
knowledge of product behaviours, and the suitability of those behaviours with respect to 
safety. In Chapter 5, a set of attributes of lifecycle products was established as a means 
of structuring claims about behaviours of products and the chain of evidence between 
behaviour and implementation. Chapter 5 also introduced the concept of tolerability of 
the attribute not being satisfied based on the lifecycle products role in the chain of 
evidence. This chapter will examine how assurance of evidence for attributes of 
lifecycle products may be achieved. 
In Chapter 3, a model containing principles and usability guidelines was established. 
This chapter explores the assurance of evidence with respect to attributes. Hence, this 
chapter focusses on addressing the principles shown in bold italics within Figure 50. 
 
Figure 50: Implementing Key Principles/Usability Criteria for Assurance of Evidence 
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6.1 Exploring the Role of Evidence 
Chapter 2 illustrated that evidence plays a prominent role in safety assurance, 
irrespective of whether the approach involves tasks, objectives, design assurance levels, 
safety integrity levels, evidence assurance levels or safety arguments. All of these 
approaches rely on provision of evidence; with a major source of criticism of some 
frameworks being the type of evidence required and the role of this evidence. For 
example, design assurance levels and safety integrity levels have been criticised for 
favouring process evidence over product evidence (McDermid, 2001). However, despite 
the criticisms, these approaches still involve the generation of evidence, much of which 
is relevant to making claims relevant to safety objectives. Safety argument 
methodologies also imply the provision of evidence categorised based on the claims 
being made, as do evidence assurance levels. The important point that this reveals is to 
understand the role of different types of evidence. To do this, it is necessary to 
understand how evidence can be categorised.  
6.1.1 Categorisation of Evidence Types 
Evidence may be generated from different types of activities, and exists in different 
forms and formats. Evidence may come from previous products and their development 
lifecycles, from operation of systems and from the development of systems. However 
despite its apparently eclectic nature, evidence can be categorised in ways that help in 
understanding the role of the evidence, and the claims that can be made from it.  
(Toulmin, 1958) has suggested that evidence may be considered as Direct or Backing 
evidence, which is based on the degree of directness by which the evidence supports the 
arguments being made. (Weaver, 2003) has refined this categorisation based on the 
evidence’s role in supporting requirements validation, requirements satisfaction and 
requirements traceability. At a more detailed level, (Weaver, 2003) also categorised 
evidence as pertaining to absence arguments or handling arguments in relation to failure 
modes. In essence, (Weaver, 2003) categorises evidence by the structure of the 
argument patterns being defined. 
At the lowest level, (Weaver, 2003) categorises for the suitability of evidence based on 
Relevance, Trustworthiness and Independence, which are defined as follows: 
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Relevance 
The extent to which an item of evidence entails
33
 the requirements for evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
 
Trustworthiness 
The perceived ability to rely on the character, ability, strength or truth of the evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
 
Independence 
The extent to which complementary items of evidence follow diverse approaches in 
fulfilling the requirement for evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
6.1.2 Relevance 
Relevance has two properties (Directness and Coverage) which support the relationship 
between the evidence and the requirement for evidence. These are defined as follows: 
Directness 
The extent to which an item of evidence directly fulfils the requirement for evidence. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
Coverage 
The proportion of the requirement for evidence which the evidence addresses. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
Coverage suggests that more than one piece of evidence may be required for a given 
claim, and this it will be necessary to establish how evidence combines or is 
complementary. Therefore, ways of measuring coverage are required to establish if 
coverage is achieved, and what any gaps in coverage means in terms of safety impact. 
                                                 
33 To involve, or logically necessitate. 
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At an evidence level, Relevance can be argued distinctly from Trustworthiness. This is 
because Relevance is to do with the strength of the result of the method/s with respect to 
an associated attribute (and ultimately the claim being made) of the lifecycle product, 
whereas Trustworthiness is the extent to which the results of the evidence are correct.  
6.1.3 Trustworthiness 
(Weaver, 2003) suggests that Trustworthiness may be affected by factors such as: 
• “buggy-ness” – how many faults there are in the evidence; 
• level of review; 
• for tool derived evidence: tool qualification and assurance evidence; and 
• experience and competence of the personnel. 
In more generic terms, Trustworthiness is concerned with understanding the role of: 
• competency: a function of qualifications, training and experience; 
• scope and level of review/inspection; 
• the method or approach used to generate the evidence; and 
• the level of independence in generating the evidence or reviewing the evidence. 
6.1.4 Independence 
(Weaver, 2003)’s final category of suitability of evidence is Independence.  In defining 
Independence, (Weaver, 2003) introduced the concept that Mechanistic Independence 
or Conceptual Independence could be used to improve the assurance of a claim. These 
concepts are defined as follows: 
Mechanistic Independence 
Mechanistic Independence is achieved through applying the same underlying principles 
in different ways. For example, the same testing technique performed by two different 
testing teams is mechanistically independent. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
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Conceptual Independence 
Conceptual Independence is achieved through applying different approaches based on 
difference underlying principles. For example, (dynamic) testing and static analysis are 
conceptually different approaches as testing involves executing the program whereas 
static analysis does not. 
(Weaver, 2003) 
From their definition, it is evident that Mechanistic and Conceptual Independence affect 
Relevance and Trustworthiness. Therefore, despite being identified as a distinct 
category of evidence by (Weaver, 2003), Independence is actually a property of 
evidence used to support specific claims about the Relevance and Trustworthiness of 
evidence to a claim. This is revealed by examining the potential origins of evidence and 
the types of claims that can be made based on that context. Hence, Independence should 
be considered a subordinate property of evidence, and not a distinct category as 
suggested by (Weaver, 2003). 
6.1.5 An Alternative Perspective on Evidence Categorisation 
In Chapter 3 (Figure 3), the concept of product behaviours being informed by evidence 
was introduced. In essence, the ‘direct’ evident is the evidence that informs product 
behaviours, and thus there is a category of evidence in this context that informs 
knowledge about product behaviours. In Chapter 3, a set of principles and usability 
guidelines was also established that distinguishes evidence that directly informs 
knowledge of product behaviour from other types of evidence that inform knowledge 
about the product evidence (i.e. the backing evidence). Based on this distinction 
evidence can also be classified as: 
• product evidence34, which can be used to provide knowledge of product 
behaviours – i.e. the evidence says something directly about the product, e.g. the 
result of a test case that provides information on the behaviour of the system 
under the specified test conditions; and 
• process evidence35, which can be used to provide knowledge of the 
trustworthiness or confidence of knowledge of product behaviours – i.e. the 
evidence says something about the rigour behind another piece of evidence 
                                                 
34 Product evidence is the safety assurance instantiation of the generic concept of Direct Evidence. 
35 Process evidence is the safety assurance instantiation of the generic concept of Backing Evidence. 
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(usually product evidence), e.g. evidence of review and inspection of the test 
procedures and cases used to show that the test procedure and test case was 
appropriate. 
The following sub-sections elaborate product and process evidence. 
6.1.6 Product Evidence 
Examining product evidence further reveals that product evidence can be categorised 
based on what knowledge the evidence contributes about product behaviours. Product 
evidence may exist as: 
• product defining information, which presents information about the product 
behaviour (i.e. what is the product behaviour?), examples of which are: 
o specification information, such as requirements and detailed design; 
o implementation information, such as source code and other implementation 
language code; 
o verification of specification information, such as analysis outcomes or test 
cases and results; and 
o verification of implementation information, such as analysis outcomes or 
test cases and results; 
• rationale for product behaviour, which provides information about the rationale 
for the product behaviour (i.e. why does the product have this behaviour), 
examples of which are: 
o analysis / modelling / simulation of specification information; 
o analysis / modelling / simulation of implementation information; 
o analysis of verification information; 
o validation (analytical or empirical) of specification information; and 
o validation (analytical or empirical) of implementation information 
For example, worst case execution time analysis / testing are product defining 
information because they provide information as to ‘what’ the timing behaviour of 
software is. Whereas the analysis / modelling / simulation that establishes the bounds on 
what are acceptable worst case execution times because of hard real time deadlines and 
temporal partition is rationale for product behaviour. This example emphasises two 
points: what the evidence is trying to show and what the method used to produce the 
evidence is. 
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6.1.7 Process Evidence 
Process evidence also lends itself to further categorisation based on what the evidence 
contributes to knowledge about trustworthiness or confidence. Process evidence may be 
categorised as shown in Table 23 and elaborated below: 
 Product Evidence 
Generation 
Review/Inspection of Product 
Evidence 
Competency Domain, Method Domain, Method 
Method Suitability, Rigour Suitability, Rigour 
Independence Complementary Review/Inspection, Complementary 
Table 23: Process Evidence Categories 
• competency: 
o for product evidence generation: 
 competency in product domain provides information on the domain 
competency of the staff involved in the production of the evidence 
(e.g. for flight control system development the evidence that staff 
understand the flight control systems domain, as measured by 
recognised competency frameworks based on qualifications, training 
and experience); 
 competency with method provides information on the 
development/verification method competency of the staff involved in 
the production of the product evidence using that method (e.g. the 
evidence that the staff understand the method used, as measured by 
evidence of training and experience using that method); 
o for review/inspection of product evidence: 
 competency in product domain, as for product generation evidence; 
 competency with method, as for product generation evidence but with 
respect to review/inspection method; 
• method: 
o for product evidence generation: 
 suitability of method provides information on the suitability of the 
method of evidence generation with respect to the role of the product 
evidence (e.g. a UML class diagram is not suitable for providing 
information on behaviours pertaining to data flow, whereas a 
MASCOT model is suitable for providing information on data flow 
between functional units); 
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 coverage of application of method, which provides information on the 
coverage of the method for product evidence generation (e.g. a 
MASCOT model which only models data flows associated with the 
call tree between selected function units is not as rigorous as a 
MASCOT model which models all data flows, including those related 
to call tree, shared resources, and external dependencies); 
o for review/inspection of product evidence: 
 suitability of method, which provides information on the suitability of 
the approach used for review/inspection of product evidence (e.g. a 
walkthrough style inspection may be suitable for assessing the 
accuracy of textual requirements but less suitable for assessing the 
accuracy of executable object code, and proofs against hypothesis is 
more suitable for checking the accuracy of a formal model, than for 
checking the correctness of test procedures and test cases);  
 rigour of application of method, which provides information on the 
degree to which the review/inspection was systematic or adhoc (e.g. a 
formal inspection, is more rigorous than a walkthrough, than a guided 
desktop review, than unguided peer review); 
• independence: 
o for product evidence generation: 
 complementary product evidence generation, which provides 
information about whether mechanistic or conceptual independence in 
product generation which may have been used to improve the 
knowledge about trustworthiness (e.g. the usage of two independent 
teams, using similar (mechanistic) or diverse (conceptual) approaches 
to product evidence generation); 
o for review/inspection of product evidence: 
 independence of review/inspection activity, which provides 
information on the degree to which the review/inspection might have 
been undermined by project bias or lack of independent mind-set (e.g. 
review from another member of the development team, versus review 
from another team such as a test team or quality assurance team, 
versus review from another organisation); 
 complementary review/inspection evidence generation, which 
provides information about whether mechanistic or conceptual 
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independence in review process may have been used to increase the 
knowledge about trustworthiness (e.g. multiple layers of review by 
reviewers from different roles or backgrounds). 
It is important that evidence is used for the right purposes, and that the level of 
knowledge provided by the evidence can be assessed. Depending on the category of 
evidence, the existence of evidence affects the knowledge differently. Therefore, it is 
important to establish how the sufficiency of evidence can be evaluated. 
6.1.8 Establishing What the Evidence Does or Doesn’t Confirm 
In Chapter 3, it was identified that the body of evidence will never be infinite or 
absolute. In practice, there is never enough time or resources, and all systems are fielded 
with limitations in evidence.  Hence, it is important to focus on: 
• what is known? – i.e. what the available evidence can confirm about knowledge 
of product behaviours, or the trustworthiness of the knowledge therein?, 
• what is unknown? – i.e. what the available evidence can’t confirm about 
knowledge of product behaviours or the trustworthiness therein?, 
• what could be known? – i.e. what uncertainty results from evidence which does 
not exist (but could be given more time and resources)?, and 
• what should be known? – i.e. what additional evidence (should it be produced) 
would resolve such uncertainty?. 
Across each of these points, a major factor is the limitations in evidence, and how it 
contributes to uncertainty. If the uncertainty fundamentally undermines the knowledge 
of product behaviours, then the limitation in evidence may be intolerable. Safety 
assurance will only be achieved when the limitations in evidence are tolerable.  
6.1.9 Understanding the Origins of Limitations in Evidence 
There can be limitations in evidence because of the following: 
• insufficient methods were applied (so a particular type of evidence is missing) – 
e.g. claims of accuracy of the requirement is made based on review/inspection 
evidence only, and there has been no comparison to the results of previous 
designs, experiments or modelling analysis; 
• inappropriate methods or techniques were applied (so the wrong type of evidence 
is being proposed for assuring a specific attribute) – e.g. formal methods proofs 
evidence can’t be used to make claims about the validity of inputs and outputs of 
 215  
a system with respect to the operational environment, but formal methods proofs 
may be used to show that the precision of values are consistent throughout the 
design model;  
• the method or technique was applied incorrectly or non-rigorously (so the 
evidence may have errors in it) – e.g. the evidence was produced by a developer 
that has no qualification, training or experience, has not been subject to any level 
of review by competent supervisors, or there has been no conformity review to 
established that the developer applied the method properly; and 
• the results of application of the method or technique are contrary to the objectives 
of the method or technique – e.g. a test case shows that the low level design 
requirement doesn’t fully implement the higher level requirement, and that the 
behaviour in these cases may be undesirable. 
Results of Evidence 
The above bullet points also suggest an additional category of sufficiency of evidence 
not covered by (Weaver, 2003)’s definitions – the results36 of the evidence. For 
example, even if the evidence type is relevant to the attribute (or claim type) and 
trustworthy, it is still important that the evidence indicates success or failure against the 
objective for the evidence. Results that indicate failures, inappropriate behaviours or 
anything contrary to what is being claimed are all counter evidence to the claim. 
Therefore, in addition to relevance and trustworthiness, the results of evidence should 
be considered a distinct category of sufficiency of evidence. The results of the evidence 
are important because they: 
• provide positive indication of the behaviour of the software being appropriate 
with respect to the constraint and the safety of the system, 
• reveal direct counter evidence of a behaviour of the software that would violate 
the constraint with respect to safety; or 
• disclose uncertainty based on counter evidence which may raise questions with 
respect to the relevance and trustworthiness arguments. 
Acknowledging the results of evidence also avoids a common misconception that an 
absence of evidence infers evidence of absence of faults in a system. Two types of 
counter evidence have been identified above – direct counter evidence or uncertainty 
                                                 
36 ‘Results’ encompasses the outcome, meaning, interpretation and/or consequences of the evidence. 
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based counter evidence. For systems with severe failure modes, uncertainty based 
counter evidence is equally important as direct counter evidence, as either are not 
positive confirmation of appropriate behaviours.  
No Single Method 
Rarely will a single method address each attribute defined in Chapter 5. All methods 
have limitations that will impact the relevance of the evidence, and depending on how 
well they are applied, there may be limitations in the trustworthiness of the evidence. 
These limitations exist because almost all methods are defined based on a model of the 
problem they are intended to solve, and almost invariably, this model has limitations.  
One example of this is the application of formal methods to proving behaviours about 
software. Formal methods are good at showing the correctness and internal consistency 
of a formally defined model. However, to make the model manageable, associated 
behaviours (e.g. target computer behaviours, operational environment) are almost 
always simplified, or even excluded. For this reason, formal models may be used to 
complement testing on the target computer. Likewise there are limitations to testing. It 
is impractical to exhaustively test all combinations of input and output data, or states for 
problems that suffer state explosion, and thus complementary approaches (such as 
formal methods and static code analysis) are usually necessary to overcome the 
limitations of testing. Many such examples can be provided for a large range of 
methods, and each development needs to reason about how the totality of methods 
overcomes the limitations of each method. 
As all methods have limitations, it is necessary to ensure an evidence framework that 
requires arguments about limitations of evidence is explicit in identifying, evaluating 
and resolving limitations where necessary. 
6.1.10 Relating Evidence Assurance to Knowledge of Behaviours 
In Chapter 5, attributes of lifecycle products were defined in order to guide the 
consolidation of evidence with respect to constraints on the behaviour of the system. 
This chapter now examines how evidence can be allocated and measured against each 
of the attributes defined in Chapter 5, and a measure of knowledge established from the 
evidence provided. Figure 51 provides the linkage between Chapter 5 and the 
knowledge of attributes sought from evidence which is described by this chapter. 
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Figure 51: Knowledge of Attributes 
6.2 The Tolerability of Limitations Concept 
Section 6.1 has identified evidence and limitations in evidence as the key sources of 
knowledge and uncertainty respectively. Where the goal for knowledge is high, then 
limitations in evidence may be intolerable, whereas if the goal for knowledge is lesser, 
because the attribute can’t undermine the chain of evidence, then the tolerability of 
limitations maybe greater. This relationship is represented in Figure 52.  
 
Figure 52: Tolerability of Limitations in Evidence 
In Section 5.2 the relationship between the chain of evidence of lifecycle products was 
examined and used to frame three qualitative levels of tolerability in the chain of 
evidence: Intolerable, Constrained and Tolerable, as follows: 
G_Lim_Intolerable
Limitations in evidence are 
intolerable based on the strength 
of knowledge sought about the 
attribute {I}.
G_Lim_Constrained
Limitations in evidence are tolerable 
because the remaining limitations do 
not threaten to invalidate the 
established knowledge of the attribute 
{I}.
G_Lim_Tolerable
Limitations in evidence are tolerable 
because attribute {I} does not contribute 
additional knowledge of product 
behaviours in the presence of limitations 
in evidence of other attributes.
S_Attribute
Argument by qualifying the 
knowledge and uncertainty 
based on the tolerbility of 
limittions of evidence of the 
attribute {I}.
1-of-3
C_Attribute
Qualified levels are 
Intolerable, Constrained, 
Tolerable; as defined by the 
pattern presented below this 
strategy.
G_Attribute
Knowledge of attribute {I} of 
lifecycle product {A} is 
established with respect to 
constraint {X} 
Constraint Attribute 
(Figure 51)
C_Attrib_Group
Attribute {I} within 
attribute group {Exist, 
Spec, Ver, Val}
C_Attrib_Group_Lnk
Attribute {I} in context of 
relationships between 
attribute groups {Exist, 
Spec, Ver, Val}
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• Intolerable: limitations in evidence for assuring the attribute are intolerable based 
on the strength of claim about knowledge of product behaviours. 
• Constrained: limitations in evidence for assuring the attribute are tolerable 
provided those limitations don’t undermine the satisfaction of the attribute and the 
role of the lifecycle product in the chain of evidence. 
• Tolerable: limitations in evidence for assuring the attribute are tolerable because 
the attribute does not contribute knowledge of product behaviours in the presence 
of limitations in evidence for other attributes, and because of the role of the 
lifecycle product in the chain of evidence. 
Because of the judgmental nature of attributes, the developer should provide arguments 
or rationale about the ‘tolerability of limitations’ with respect to the specific attribute. 
6.2.1 Categories for Tolerability of Limitations 
If the developer is going to express arguments about the ‘tolerability of limitations’ in 
evidence, what should these arguments be about? Section 6.1 has suggested that 
evidence may be categorised based on the requirement for evidence (relevance, 
trustworthiness, results). Evidence is also categorised based on the origin of the 
evidence (product or process evidence). While arguments about tolerability of 
limitations should be made with respect to what is claimed (relevance, trustworthiness, 
results), the sources of limitations are most recognisable with respect to the origin of 
evidence (product or process evidence). In essence, evidence assurance needs to 
articulate the effect of limitations in product and process evidence categories of 
relevance, trustworthiness and results (refer Figure 53). 
Figure 53 provides a point in the top down argument developed from Chapters 4 and 5, 
where arguments become specific to solutions. Therefore, Figure 53 provides a junction 
(S_Attribute_Know) between the top-down argument, and the bottom up arguments 
about evidence.   
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Figure 53: Relevance, Trustworthiness and Results of Evidence 
The undeveloped goals are developed for relevance, trustworthiness and results in 
Section 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 respectively. 
6.3 Relevance of Evidence 
Arguments based on the tolerability of limitations (i.e. intolerable, constrained, or 
tolerable) should be presented for the relevance of evidence, as shown in Figure 54. 
These arguments are with respect to the specific attribute of the lifecycle product with 
respect to the constraint. 
 
Figure 54: Relevance of Evidence 
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6.3.1 Relevance – Intolerable Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the relevance of evidence are intolerable, it is necessary 
to make an argument that there are no limitations to the collective relevance of the 
methods used for product evidence generation with respect to the attribute of the 
lifecycle product. This is achieved by arguing over the systematic identification and 
treatment of all limitations of relevance of evidence. This argument is expressed in 
Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55: Relevance of Evidence – Intolerable Limitations 
Section 6.3.4 develops how the limitations of each method are systematically identified 
and treated by the application of complementary methods. 
6.3.2 Relevance – Constrained Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the relevance of evidence are constrained, it is necessary 
to adapt the argument used for intolerable to only require treatment of limitations where 
they are practical to treat. The means of establishing reasonable practicality of treatment 
is discussed in Section 6.3.4, albeit the principles of the legal tests of reasonability are 
intended to apply. 
Therefore, the argument is that limitations of the collective relevance of the methods 
used for product evidence generation are constrained with respect to the attribute of the 
lifecycle product. This is achieved by arguing over the systematic identification and 
treatment, where practical, of all limitations of relevance of evidence. This argument is 
expressed in Figure 56. 
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Figure 56: Relevance of Evidence – Constrained Limitations 
6.3.3 Relevance – Tolerable Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the relevance of evidence are tolerable, it is necessary to 
adapt the argument used for constrained to indicate that treatment of limitations may not 
have to be undertaken. Therefore, although there are notable limitations of the relevance 
of evidence with respect to the attribute of the lifecycle, this can be tolerated. This is 
achieved by reasoning about limitations that may not be identified or treated. This 
argument is expressed in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 57: Relevance of Evidence – Tolerable Limitations 
G_Relevance_Constrained
Limitations are constrained of the 
collective {Relevance} of the methods 
with respect to the attribute, where 
uncertainty must be constrained.
G_Constrained_Treat
Limitations of each method are 
systematically identified and treated 
by the application of complementary 
method/s, where reasonably 
practicable.
S_Relevance_Intolerable
Argument over the systematic 
identification and treatment of 
limitations in {Relevance} of 
evidence, where reasonably 
practicable.
C_Reasonably
Reasonable in this 
context is used to imply 
the legal tests of 
reasonabality.
Relevance 
(Figure 54)
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6.3.4 Treating Limitations in Evidence 
To argue that the limitations of each method are systematically identified and treated by 
the application of complementary methods it is necessary to argue in specific terms 
about the limitations of each method, as shown in Figure 58. 
 
Figure 58: Treatment of Limitations 
For each method, limitations are identified against the claim being made from the 
evidence. For each limitation it is then necessary to identify one or more methods which 
will treat the identified limitations and complement the evidence already provided, as 
shown in Figure 59.  
 
Figure 59: Identification and Treatment of Limitations 
6.3.5 Treating Limitations Where Practical 
There are cases where the argument that the limitation of each method are 
systematically identified and treated by the application of complementary methods, 
G_Lim_Ident_Treat
The limitations of method {Mx} 
with respect to attribute {Ax} are 
identified and treated.
S_Method_Treat
Argument over each 
method.
n methods
G_Treat
Limitations of each method are 
systematically identified and 
treated by the application of 
complementary method/s.
Relevance / Trust
(Figures 55, 64)
S_Lim_Ident_Treat
Argument over the 
identification and treatment 
of the limitations.
G_Method_Limitations
Limitations of method {Mx} with 
respect to the attribute {Ax} are 
systemactically identified.
G_Treat
Limitations of method {Mx} with 
respect to the attribute {Ax} are 
treated by complementary 
method {My} 
G_Lim_Ident_Treat
The limitations of method {Mx} 
with respect to attribute {Ax} are 
identified and treated.
Treat
(Figure 58)
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should only be made where it is reasonable practical to treat the limitation. In these 
cases it is necessary to argue in specific terms about the limitations of each method (or 
application of method), as well as the reasonability, as shown in Figure 60. 
 
Figure 60: Constrained Treatment of Limitations 
For each method and attribute claim, limitations are identified. For each limitation it is 
then necessary to identify one or more methods which will treat the identified limitation 
and complement the evidence already provided. Further, a justification should be made 
about the practicality of treating limitations, as shown in Figure 61. 
 
Figure 61: Constrained Identification and Treatment of Limitations 
Reasonable practicality of treatment involves an argument over the factors affecting 
reasonable practicality which are cost and safety benefit. An argument is required that 
the cost of treating the limitation is not disproportionate to the benefit of resolving the 
 224  
limitation, and the benefit must provide reasonable improvement of the knowledge of 
the attribute, as shown in Figure 62. Chapter 8 provides further elaboration for how this 
information impact safety. 
 
Figure 62: Where Practicable Treatment of Limitations 
6.4 Trustworthiness of Evidence 
Along the same lines as relevance, arguments based on the tolerability (i.e. intolerable, 
constrained, or tolerable) of limitations should be presented for the trustworthiness of 
evidence, as shown in Figure 63. As these argument patterns mirror the argument 
structures for relevance from Section 6.3, the explanation has not been repeated in this 
section. For completeness the GSN argument patterns have been included. 
 
Figure 63: Trustworthiness of Evidence 
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Figure 64: Trustworthiness– Intolerable 
Limitations 
 
Figure 65: Trustworthiness– Constrained Limitations 
 
Figure 66: Trustworthiness of Evidence – Tolerable Limitations 
6.5 Results of Evidence 
Arguments based on the tolerability (i.e. intolerable, constrained, or tolerable) of 
limitations should be presented for the results of evidence, as shown in Figure 67. These 
arguments are with respect to the specific attribute of the lifecycle product with respect 
to the constraint. 
G_Trustworthiness_Constrained
Limitations are constrained of the 
collective {Trustworthiness} of the 
methods with respect to the attribute, 
where uncertainty must be 
constrained.
G_Constrained_Treat
Limitations of each method are 
systematically identified and treated 
by the application of complementary 
method/s, where reasonably 
practicable.
S_Trust_Intolerable
Argument over the systematic 
identification and treatment of 
limitations in {Trustworthiness} of 
evidence, where reasonably 
practicable.
C_Reasonably
Reasonable in this 
context is used to imply 
the legal tests of 
reasonabality.
Trustworthiness 
(Figure 63)
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Figure 67: Results of Evidence 
6.5.1 Results – Intolerable Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the results of evidence would be intolerable, it is 
necessary to make three arguments about results, as follows: 
• the results of the evidence satisfy the attribute of the constraint (i.e. no additional 
results are needed to satisfy the attribute); 
• the results of the evidence contain no counter evidence (i.e. there is no evidence of 
faults or errors, or false results); and 
• there are no potential sources of counter evidence for which evidence is not 
available (i.e. there are no results missing that if present could be a source of 
counter evidence). 
These arguments are expressed in Figure 68. 
 
Figure 68: Results of Evidence – Intolerable Limitations 
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6.5.2 Results – Constrained Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the results of evidence would be constrained, it is 
necessary to adapt the three arguments from those used for intolerable to be permissive 
of counter evidence, but in way that it is constrained, as follows: 
• the results of the evidence contribute towards satisfying the attribute of the 
constraint, but it is not possible to claim that the results are complete; 
• the results may contain counter evidence, but the counter evidence is limited such 
that it does not invalidate the established results; and 
• the potential sources of counter evidence, which exist because the results are not 
complete, are limited such that they do not threaten the established results. 
These arguments are expressed in Figure 69. 
 
Figure 69: Results of Evidence – Constrained Limitations 
6.5.3 Results – Tolerable Limitations 
For cases where limitations in the results of evidence are tolerable, it is necessary to 
adapt the three arguments from those used for constrained to be permissive of counter 
evidence in way that may not be constrained, as follows: 
• the results of the evidence contribute towards satisfying the attribute of the 
constraint, but it is not possible to claim that the results are complete; 
• the results may contain counter evidence, but the counter evidence is limited such 
that it does not invalidate the established results; and 
G_Results_Con_C
Counter evidence to satisfying 
the attribute is limited such that it 
does not threaten to invalidate 
the established results.
G_Results_Constrained
Limitations are constrained of the 
collective results with respect to 
the attribute, where uncertainty 
must be constrained.
S_Results_Constrained
Argument over positive 
and negative aspects of 
results.
G_Results_Con_S
The results provide 
evidence towards satisfying 
the attribute.
G_Results_Con_SC
Potential sources (uncertainty) of 
counter evidence to satisfying the 
attribute is limited such that it does not 
threaten to invalidate the established 
results.
Results 
(Figure 67)
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• the potential sources of counter evidence, which exist because the results are not 
complete, may not be limited and as such they may threaten the established 
results. 
These arguments are expressed in Figure 70. 
 
Figure 70: Results of Evidence – Tolerable Limitations 
6.6 Assurance of Evidence 
6.6.1 Defining the Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) Concept 
This thesis proposes a framework that includes the concept of an Evidence Safety 
Assurance Level (ESAL) for determining the requirements for arguments about the 
‘tolerability of limitations’ of evidence. The ESAL provides an implementation of the 
meta-arguments for ‘tolerability of limitations’ for assuring the applicable attribute of 
the software lifecycle product. The ESAL serves two functions. The first is to set 
benchmarks for the importance (i.e. relationship to the CSAL) of specific attributes in 
assuring the specific ‘constraint’. The second is to set benchmarks for argument 
construction for: 
• relevance of evidence (and the combination of methods or techniques from which 
evidence is generated) with respect to the attribute of the software lifecycle 
product in the context of the ‘constraint’, 
• trustworthiness of the evidence (i.e. to what extent can the results of the evidence 
be tolerated to be incorrect?), and 
• results of the evidence (i.e. what the evidence actually shows?) to ensure that the 
presence of counter evidence is appropriately understood. 
Three ESALS are proposed as presented in Table 24 (see over). 
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Tolerability of 
Limitations to 
Assuring Attribute 
Relevance of 
Evidence 
Trustworthiness of 
Evidence Results of Evidence 
Intolerable (ESAL3) – 
limitations in evidence 
would be intolerable 
No limitations to the 
collective relevance of 
the method or methods’ 
with respect to the 
attribute 
 
Limitations of each 
method are 
systematically identified 
and treated by the 
application of 
complementary 
methods. 
No limitations to the 
evidence’s 
trustworthiness with 
respect to the attribute. 
 
Limitations of the 
trustworthiness of 
evidence are 
systematically identified 
and treated by the 
application of 
appropriate 
competencies, reviews 
and inspections, and 
independence. 
The results of the 
method or methods 
provides evidence of 
satisfying the attribute 
AND there is no counter 
evidence or potential 
source (uncertainty) of 
counter evidence to 
satisfying the attribute 
Constrained (ESAL2) –
limitations in evidence 
would be tolerable 
provided those 
limitations are 
constrained with respect 
to relevance, 
trustworthiness and 
results 
Constrained limitations 
to the method/s 
relevance with respect 
to the attribute 
 
Limitations of each 
method are 
systematically identified 
and treated where 
practicable by the 
application of 
complementary 
methods.  
 
Non-treatment of a 
limitation should not 
introduce uncertainty 
grossly disproportionate 
to the limitation such 
that it would likely lead 
to a violation of the 
constraint 
Constrained limitations 
to the evidence’s 
trustworthiness with 
respect to the attribute. 
 
Limitations of the 
trustworthiness of 
evidence are 
systematically identified 
and where practicable 
treated by the 
application of 
appropriate 
competencies, reviews 
and inspections, and 
independence. 
 
Non-treatment of a 
limitation should not 
introduce uncertainty 
grossly disproportionate 
to the limitation such 
that it would like lead to 
a violation of the 
constraint 
Results of the method or 
methods provides 
evidence of satisfying 
the attribute AND 
counter evidence to 
satisfying the attribute is 
limited such that it 
would not likely lead to 
violation of the 
constraint 
  
Uncertainty is 
constrained such that 
counter evidence is 
unlikely. 
Tolerable (ESAL1) – 
limitations in evidence 
would be tolerable 
Notable limitations to 
the method or method’s 
relevance with respect 
to the attribute. 
 
Limitations of each 
method may not be 
systematically identified 
and treated where 
practicable by the 
application of 
complementary 
methods. 
Notable limitations to 
the evidence’s 
trustworthiness with 
respect to the attribute. 
Results of the method or 
methods may provide 
evidence of non-
satisfaction of the 
attribute and/or 
violation of the 
constraint OR counter 
evidence indicates 
possible violation of the 
constraint OR 
uncertainty may be 
substantial 
Table 24: Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) Definitions 
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6.6.2 ESAL Assignment Methodology 
Section 2.4 identified that there are two factors that must be considered in the 
assignment of an assurance level, regardless of how it is defined. These are: 
• what the software level is being assigned to,  and 
• how the assignment is performed.  
Section 2.4 also identified that there are established instances where assurance levels are 
assigned to safety functions, configuration items, safety requirements or safety 
objectives. 
The ESAL is intended to be assigned to a specific attribute of a lifecycle product and its 
associated tolerability.  In some respects this is equivalent to the assigning of evidence 
assurance levels based on the importance of the evidence in the argument as performed 
by existing evidence assurance approaches. Each attribute will have an assigned 
tolerability and ESAL, and the ESAL assignment may differ across differing attributes 
within the same software product, depending on the importance of lifecycle product and 
the attribute in preserving the chain of evidence.  
ESAL assignment should be performed by: 
1. Identifying the applicable attribute of the software lifecycle product and the 
associated evidence tolerability level (i.e. Intolerable, Constrained, Tolerable), as 
determined from the architectural and claims assurance activities (refer Chapters 4 
and 5 respectively). 
2. Performing ESAL assignment for the attribute of the software lifecycle product 
with respect to the ‘constraint’ using Table 24, as follows: 
a. For the identified tolerability level (i.e. Intolerable, Constrained, Tolerable), 
identify the corresponding row from column 1 of Table 24. 
b. Set the requirements for the Relevance argument using column 2 of Table 
24 for the corresponding row assigned in step 2a. 
c. Set the requirements for the Trustworthiness argument using column 3 of 
Table 24 for the corresponding row assigned in step 2a. 
d. Set the requirements for the Results argument using column 3 of Table 24 
for the corresponding row assigned in step 2a. 
Once the ESAL has been assigned, it is necessary to establish if/how the ESAL will be 
achieved. Section 6.9 explains how this is done, but first we consider some related 
topics. 
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6.7 Dealing with the Human Element in Trustworthiness 
The generation of much evidence is highly dependent on human involvement, and this 
introduces a highly subjective element. While evidence that is known to be incorrect is 
easy to classify as not trustworthy, deciding if evidence which is presumed correct is a 
more difficult proposition. Furthermore, the typical methods or techniques that improve 
a piece of evidence’s trustworthiness (e.g. reviews and inspections) are also subjective 
and dependent on human involvement. Hence compared with relevance and results of 
evidence, arguments about trustworthiness will be more subjective. Therefore there are 
difficulties in implementing the approach that parallels the approach for ‘relevance’.  
Competency frameworks, such as (The IET, 1999), and its later evolution (The IET, 
2007) provide a means of measuring the human element, although adherence to the 
categories of competencies in these frameworks is still subjective.  
In paradigms such as model based development, there is motivation to utilise a larger 
number of tools in the development of software to reduce the opportunity for humans to 
introduce errors, however these tools still have to be built by someone, usually a human. 
So the challenge of trustworthiness does not go away, it simply moves somewhere else 
in the overall argument. 
Therefore, there are difficulties in implementing the approach described by this thesis 
that parallels the approach for ‘relevance’ which reasons about systematic identification 
and treatment of limitations. While it is possible to reason about the limitations of 
human involvement in developing evidence, in reviews and inspections, and the impact 
of independence being systematically identified and treated, in the more specific 
context, that approach is less practical. This is because the limitations might vary 
significantly depending on the competencies of the specific people involved throughout, 
their state of mind and mental condition or endurance throughout the activity, and the 
inevitable human error factor. It will also not be possible to benchmark competencies 
between different system developments because arguments in this context are entirely 
flexible. Developers may argue that they are competent, and that the reviews they 
carried out the development were effective. In practice this may not be the case. 
Hence limitations will be potentially difficult to use as any basis of comparison with 
benchmarks. Therefore, trustworthiness of evidence may benefit from an increased level 
of prescription over other parts of the framework, and this shall be examined. 
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Table 25 presents an example approach as to how the regulator might set benchmarks 
for measures of trustworthiness. This approach has been derived from an analysis of 
evidence trends from real world systems, such as those analysed in the evaluation 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 10. The approach is intended to set benchmarks that 
take into account the variability of human involvement and thus avoid the need to 
systematically model the resultant limitations of human involvement, which are more 
difficult to reason about in practice. Conceptually, this approach is similar to what 
current assurance standards prescribe. However it does provide a focus to ensure the 
trustworthiness of evidence is considered within the appropriate parts of the framework. 
6.7.1 Competency in Trustworthiness 
It has already been suggested that competency assessments are subjective. However, the 
competency element cannot be ignored when establishing the trustworthiness of 
evidence, both in terms of the generation of the evidence and the review or inspection of 
the evidence. Competency assessment frameworks are prominent within the established 
professions. Since establishing competency through competency frameworks by 
professional bodies is established practice across the known professions (Mason & 
Friedman, 2004), including but not limited to surveying, medicine, actuarial science, 
law, dentistry, engineering, architecture, and pilots; then, despite the subjectivity with 
these approaches, it is possible to conclude there is consensus on such as approach in 
professions where human safety can be at risk. In safety assurance, at least one such 
competency framework exists (refer to (The IET, 2007)) which can be the basis of 
competency evidence for safety assurance. 
However, in any engineering organisation there will often be a wide range of staff, some 
apprentices, some un-qualified, usually being supervised by a smaller number of staff 
with recognised competencies. Hence evidence may often be produced by personnel 
that don’t have recognised competencies. Any such evidence framework relating to 
competency evidence has to recognise that this occurs. At the same time though, any 
such framework must address questions such as is it tolerable for a non-expert to be 
responsible for the generation or review/inspection evidence for the most critical 
systems? Should there be evidence that the generator of important trustworthiness 
evidence be recognised by their peers as being an expert? These are important 
questions, but questions for which responses will vary across society. 
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ESAL3 – 
Intolerable 
Expert Systematic 
Inspection 
OR Criteria 
Review% 
Expert Organisational 
OR 
Intellectual 
None OR 
Applied 
(Expert, 
Organisation)* 
None OR Applied 
(Expert, 
Organisational)*% 
ESAL2 – 
Constrained 
Practitioner Criteria 
Review OR 
Adhoc 
Review# 
Expert OR 
Practitioner
# 
Peer None OR 
Applied 
(Expert, 
Intellectual)# 
None OR Applied 
(Expert, 
Intellectual)# 
ESAL1 – 
Tolerable 
Supervised 
Practitioner 
Adhoc 
Review 
Practitioner None None None 
ESAL0 – 
No 
Assurance 
No more 
than 
Supervised 
Practitioner 
None N/A None None None 
^ - Competency categorisations used from (The IET, 1999) and (The IET, 2007) 
% - Conceptual Independence de-obligates the requirement for the review and inspection to be a 
Systematic Inspection (which inherently contains conceptual independence) 
* - Organisational Independence of Mechanistic Independence or Conceptual Independence de-obligates 
the requirement for the review and inspection to have Organisational Independence (as organisational 
independence is achieved mechanistically or conceptually). 
# - Intellectual Independence of Mechanistic Independence or Conceptual Independence de-obligates the 
requirement for the review and inspection to have Intellectual Independence (as intellectual independence 
is achieved mechanistically or conceptually). 
Developer Competency – Expert, Practitioner, Supervised Practitioner 
Reviews and Inspections – Systematic Inspection, Criteria Review, Adhoc Review 
Competency – Expert, Practitioner, Supervised Practitioner 
Independence – Organisational Independence, Intellectual Independence, Peer Independence, None 
Mechanistic Independence – Applied, None 
Conceptual Independence – Applied, None 
Note – organisational independence assumes intellectual independence 
No independent approach (review and inspection, mechanistic, or conceptual) is ever applied by a lesser 
competency. 
Table 25: A Prescriptive Approach to Measuring Trustworthiness of Evidence 
Table 25 addresses these questions by setting benchmarks for ‘recognised’ experts only 
where limitations in evidence (or trustworthiness of evidence) are intolerable. For 
attributes where a limitation in evidence may be tolerable, then the competency 
benchmarks set may be less strict. In the event that the evidence generation or 
review/inspection does not meet these benchmarks, then this should prompt the 
presentation of arguments relating to what additional evidence will be provided to 
resolve such a limitation. Thus Table 25 suggests a way that allows argument for 
tolerability of limitations to be presented only where the evidence differs from what 
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Table 25 benchmarks. Evidence of trustworthiness will be required regardless of 
whether Table 25 is applied or not. 
6.7.2 Benchmarks for Reviews and Inspections 
Reviews and inspections are heavily human centric activities, and thus are also very 
subjective. However there are several things which contemporary assurance approaches 
recognise as improving the trustworthiness of review and inspection activities. 
Approach 
The first factor that might improve the trustworthiness of a human review or inspection 
is the approach used to undertake the review or inspection. For example, many different 
types of structured reviews have been described in the literature. Broadly these types of 
review can be classified in decreasing order of resulting confidence as: 
• systematic inspection, which uses a defined set of criteria, review/inspection 
format, and review/inspection conduct control to systematically review/inspect a 
piece of evidence (e.g. a Fagan inspection); 
• criteria review, which uses a defined set of criteria, but without the stricter format 
and conduct controls used for a systematic inspection (e.g. a checklist based 
desktop review, or walkthrough); and 
• adhoc review, which doesn’t place any controls on review/inspection criteria, 
format or conduct (e.g. a peer review). 
Table 25 uses this decreasing scale of review/inspection effectiveness to set benchmarks 
for evidence trustworthiness based on the idea that if a limitation is intolerable, then 
only a systematic inspection is compelling enough review or inspection evidence. 
Competency in Reviews and Inspections 
The role of competency in trustworthiness has been discussed; however there are a 
couple of additional points to make when establishing competency benchmarks for 
reviews/inspections. The most pertinent question is to understand if a higher 
competency person can make up for limitations in the competency of the person that 
developed the piece of evidence? The traditional supervisory model that exists in many 
engineering businesses and that is advocated by professional bodies such as Registered 
Professional Engineers of Queensland (RPEQ) (Board of Professional Engineers 
Queensland, 2013) suggests that it does. Hence Table 25 acknowledges this by 
permitting non-experts to develop evidence for circumstances where limitations in 
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evidence are tolerable, provided sufficient competency is applied to the 
review/inspection. 
Independence in Reviews and Inspection 
The final factor in trustworthiness of a review and inspection is the extent of intellectual 
independence of the reviewer/inspector from the generation of the evidence. 
Contemporary assurance practices, such as (RTCA Inc., 2011) and (Ministry of 
Defence, 1997) usually require either organisational (i.e. the independent safety 
assessor) or intellectual (i.e. independent from the evidence generating activity) for the 
most critical software to avoid undue bias from members of the development team. 
Such a concept is also utilised in Table 25 for setting benchmarks for the independence 
of a review. For circumstances where a limitation in evidence is intolerable, then 
contemporary practice suggests that it wouldn’t be compelling if the review/inspection 
did not achieve organisational or intellectual independence. 
6.7.3 Benchmarks for Mechanistic and Conceptual Independence 
There are cases where a developer may elect that a review or inspection is not sufficient 
on its own, and that greater trustworthiness can be achieved by using mechanistic or 
conceptual independence in the conduct of activities. Reviews and inspections will still 
be relevant, as the developer will still need to establish some trustworthiness in the 
evidence from each activity, and the resulting comparison of results that will be 
performed, however, it may be possible to tolerate some reduction in the rigour of 
individual reviews/inspections in the presence of comparative evidence. Table 25 uses 
this concept to set benchmarks for evidence trustworthiness when mechanistic or 
conceptual independence is used as a source of comparative evidence. 
This section illustrates one possible way that trustworthiness of evidence may benefit 
from an increased level of prescription over other parts of the framework. 
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6.8 Relationship to the Assurance Deficit 
The ‘tolerability of limitations’ concept proposed in this thesis has similarities to the 
Assurance Deficit concept proposed by (Menon, et al., 2009), albeit developed 
independently. However, there are a number of differences. The ‘tolerability of 
limitations’ approach is concerned with presenting arguments about the impact of 
limitations of evidence on preserving the chain of evidence between constraints and 
implementation through the hierarchy of lifecycle products. However, the Assurance 
Deficit is a more general acknowledgement of a shortfall in assurance. The ‘tolerability 
of limitations’ approach recognises that there is never absolute assurance (i.e. perfect 
assurance is never achievable), and that arguments will always be required to justify the 
limitations in the specific context. The necessity for the strength of the argument will 
come from the importance of the limitation.  
The Assurance Deficit, by definition, is with reference to a defined level of assurance or 
benchmark. There needs to be a benchmark, else there is nothing to measure the deficit 
against. However, the supporting guidance for the assurance deficit work, mostly avoids 
defining the benchmark, and instead focusses on describing the generic properties of 
evidence generation and usage in arguments (Menon, et al., 2009). In making this 
observation, it is noted that the Assurance Deficit approach is intended to be completely 
general (i.e. independent of domain or application), whereas the ‘tolerability of 
limitations’ concept been developed of focusing more narrowly on avionics systems 
with well-defined architectural approaches. However, it is evident from the presentation 
of the ‘tolerability of limitations’ concept in this chapter that it is also possible to use 
this concept generically. 
Because of these differences, the ‘tolerability of limitations’ approach has several key 
advantages approach over the Assurance Deficit approach. Namely the ‘tolerability of 
limitations’ approach addresses several key limitations of the Assurance Deficit concept 
(as it is described in (Menon, et al., 2009)). These are as follows: 
• Absolute assurance is never attainable, so there is always an assurance deficit. 
What is more important is determining if it impacts safety, and the value in 
providing additional evidence to address the limitation. 
• ‘tolerability of limitations’ sets benchmarks for where an assurance deficit would 
be tolerable or intolerable – and is explicit in the rationale behind the tolerability; 
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• ‘tolerability of limitations’ provides fidelity of assurance claims and attributes of 
lifecycle products at a level that is sufficiently detailed to provide a clear 
taxonomy of evidence; and 
• ‘tolerability of limitations’ clearly distinguishes between lifecycle product 
attributes with binary attributes and those where there is greater potential for 
justified tolerability in satisfaction. 
6.9 Defining a Process for Applying the ESAL Concept 
With the attribute identified, the level of tolerability of limitations in evidence 
identified, and the ESAL assigned, it is necessary to define an overall lifecycle process 
for using these concepts. Figure 71 provides an overview of the process, which 
incorporates those sub-processes defined in this chapter. 
 
Figure 71: ESAL Process Overview 
The following provides elaboration of each of the ESAL process steps: 
6.9.1 Step 1 – Establish Benchmarks 
a. Establish the benchmark for Relevance of evidence from the corresponding row of 
Column 2 of Table 24. 
b. Establish the benchmark for Trustworthiness of evidence from the corresponding 
row of Column 3 of Table 24. 
c. Establish the benchmark for Results of evidence from the corresponding row of 
column 4 of Table 24 
 238  
Example – A-DHC-4 
In Chapter 5 the A-DHC-4 example considered the constraint “Value failures of type 
fixed of sensor_data.attitude#1 shall be detected using reasonability checking against 
expected attitude data based on sensor_data.attitude#2, aircraft motion and lateral 
mode. Handling shall set the sensor_data.attitude#1.valid flag to invalid”. Specifically 
the Accuracy and Robust with Higher Abstraction attributes of the Low Level / Detailed 
Design Requirements lifecycle product were examined. 
For CSAL 3, the tolerability benchmark for both these attributes is ESAL 3 – 
Intolerable, as per Appendix B and Table 24. Therefore, the benchmarks are as follows: 
• Relevance: No limitations to the collective relevance of the method or methods’ 
with respect to the attribute. Limitations of each method are systematically 
identified and treated by the application of complementary methods. 
• Trustworthiness: No limitations to the evidence’s trustworthiness with respect to 
the attribute. Limitations of the trustworthiness of evidence are systematically 
identified and treated by the application of appropriate competencies, reviews 
and inspections, and independence.  
In this example, Relevance is assessed for the Robust with Higher attribute and 
Trustworthiness is assessed for Accuracy. In practice Relevance, Trustworthiness and 
Results would be assessed for each attribute. For the purposes of this example, let’s also 
consider the results category for the attribute Compliance with Higher at ESAL 3. 
• Results: The results of the method or methods provide evidence of satisfying the 
attribute AND there is no counter evidence or potential source (uncertainty) of 
counter evidence to satisfying the attribute. 
These are the benchmarks our arguments about evidence need to achieve. 
6.9.2 Step 2 – Identify the body of Evidence pertaining to the relevant 
Attribute 
a. Identify the body of evidence pertaining to the relevant attribute. 
b. Assemble the evidence ready for evaluation. 
c. Categorise the evidence based on both the attribute and the categories of evidence 
identified in Section 6.1. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The evidence has been identified and categorised as per Table 26. 
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6.9.3 Step 3 – Establish Arguments 
a. Establish the Relevance argument that relates the applicable product evidence to 
the attribute, and that adheres to the benchmark for the argument specified by 
column 2 of Table 24. 
b. Establish the Trustworthiness argument that relates the applicable process 
evidence to the attribute, and that adheres to the benchmark for the argument 
specified by column 3 of Table 24. 
c. Establish the Results argument that relates the applicable evidence to the 
attribute, and that adheres to the benchmark for the argument specified by column 
4 of Table 24. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The arguments for relevance, trustworthiness and results are summarised in textual form 
in Table 27.  
6.9.4 Step 4 – Evaluate the Arguments 
a. Evaluate the Relevance, Trustworthiness, and Results arguments against the 
benchmark for the argument specified by columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 24 
respectively. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The benchmarks for relevance, trustworthiness and results for the attributes considered 
in this example, are intolerable, thus implying no limitations are permissible. Step 5 
identifies the limitations that have been identified through the evaluation. 
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Verification 
Group: 
Robust with 
Higher  
 
Relevance Elaborating 
Rationale 
Software Design Description 
Software Development Plan 
Software Test Plan 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and 
Cases 
Specification 
Group: 
Accuracy 
Trustworthiness Competency 
(Domain) 
Design Authority Letter of 
Engineering Authority 
Qualification, Training and 
Experience Records 
Competency Assessment by 
Design Authority 
Competency 
(Method) 
As for domain competency, but for 
method instead. 
Method 
(Suitability) 
Software Development Plan 
Model-Based Development 
Procedure 
Model-Based Development 
Reports 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Method (Rigour) As for method suitability, but for 
rigour instead. 
Independence 
(Review/Inspectio
n) 
Software Development Plan 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Independence 
(Complementary) 
No Evidence 
Verification 
Group: 
Compliance 
with Higher 
Results Product Defining 
Information 
Requirements Management 
Database containing Software 
Requirements and Traceability 
Data 
Software Design Description 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and 
Cases 
Software Test Results 
Table 26: Examples of Evidence Categorisation for Selected Attributes 
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Engineering Authority (LEA) 
Qualification, Training and 
Experience Records 
Competency Assessment by 
Design Authority 
Regulator has authorised design authority 
based on competency assessment. 
Design authority has evaluated 
requirements staff QTE against flight 
control system domain competency 
requirements. 
All developers and reviewers are ‘Experts, 
except ‘Bloggs’ who isn’t allowed to 
generate evidence on this project. 
No limitations. All 
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trustworthiness.  
Adhoc peer review is 
not systematic. A 
systematic review is 
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more rigorous review method would have 
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Requirements Management 
Database containing Software 
Requirements and Traceability 
Data 
Software Design Description 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and 
Cases 
Software Test Results 
Software Problem Report 
Database 
Test descriptions cover the criteria for 
completeness of requirements based 
testing for ‘constraint’. 
Test procedures and cases are correct for 
‘constraint’. 
Test results are all passes. 
No additional testing is required. 
No test failures identified. 
No software problem reports are open. 
No limitations 
identified. 
Table 27: Example Assessments/Arguments of Limitations 
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6.9.5 Step 5 – Identify Limitations in Evidence 
a. Identify limitations in evidence with respect to Relevance 
b. Identify limitations in evidence with respect to Trustworthiness 
c. Identify limitations in evidence with respect to Results 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Limitations in evidence for Relevance and Trustworthiness are identified in Table 27 for 
the attributes Robust with Higher and Accuracy respectively. There are no limitations in 
evidence for Results of Compliant with Higher. 
6.9.6 Step 6 – Determine if the Evidence Limitations are Tolerable 
a. If the evidence limitations are intolerable, and the generation of additional 
evidence is possible, then go to Step 7. 
b. If the evidence limitations are intolerable, and the generation of additional 
evidence is not possible, then go to Step 8. 
c. If the evidence limitations are tolerable, then go to ESAL Process End. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
The limitations of the relevance of evidence with respect to the Robust with Higher 
attribute are assessed to be intolerable based on the requirements of ESAL3. Refer to 
Step 7 for their resolution. 
The limitation of the trustworthiness of evidence with respect to the Accuracy attribute 
is also assessed to be intolerable based on the requirements of ESAL3. Refer to Step 7 
for their resolution. 
There are no limitations of results of evidence with respect to the Compliance with 
Higher attribute, and thus this attribute is considered satisfied. 
6.9.7 Step 7 – Generate Additional Evidence Based on the Identified 
Evidence Limitation 
a. Generate additional evidence to resolve the evidence limitation with respect to 
relevance, trustworthiness or result respectively. 
b. Revise the arguments established in Step 3 to take into account the additional 
evidence. 
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Example – A-DHC-4 
The revised evidence provided in support of each of these attributes is described in 
Table 28. Additional evidence is shown in bold italics. 
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Competency Assessment by Design Authority 
Method 
(Suitability) 
Software Development Plan 
Model-Based Development Procedure 
Model-Based Development Reports 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Inspections by Walkthrough Records 
Method (Rigour) Software Development Plan 
Model-Based Development Procedure 
Model-Based Development Reports 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Quality Assurance Records for Inspections. 
CM records for Inspection Records. 
Problem Reporting Records 
Independence 
(Review  / 
Inspection) 
Software Development Plan 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Walkthrough Evidence by IV&V Team 
Independence 
(Complementary) 
Walkthrough Evidence  by IV&V Team 
Model-Based Development Simulation Results 
C
o
m
p
li
an
ce
 
w
it
h
 H
ig
h
er
 
R
es
u
lt
s Product Defining 
Information 
Requirements Management Database containing Software 
Requirements and Traceability Data 
Software Design Description 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and Cases 
Software Test Results 
Table 28: Examples of Revised Evidence Categorisation for Selected Attributes 
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The revised tolerability of limitations arguments are shown in Table 29. 
A
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 Evidence Evidence Assessment Limitations 
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t 
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 w
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h
 
H
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h
er
  
 R
el
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an
ce
 
E
la
b
o
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n
g
 R
at
io
n
al
e 
Software Design Description 
Software Development Plan 
Software Test Plan 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and Cases 
Additional Host Based Test 
Descriptions, Procedures, and 
Cases 
Model-Based Development Tool 
Analysis Results 
SPARK Analyser Procedure and 
Results 
Method is robustness demonstration by rig 
testing. Criteria for robustness cases are 
defined in SDP and meets RTCA/DO-178B 
robustness criteria. Testing carried on target 
hardware, except for code for hardware 
exceptions that the test rig can’t replicate. 
Exception related code robustness 
established via model-based development 
methodology and SPARK analysis. These 
methods don’t address target computer 
behaviour, but this limitation is addressed 
by the analysing similar results obtained 
from robustness testing on the target. 
No remaining 
limitations. 
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cc
u
ra
cy
 
T
ru
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C
o
m
p
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 (
D
o
m
ai
n
) 
Design Authority Letter of 
Engineering Authority (LEA) 
Qualification, Training and 
Experience Records 
Competency Assessment by Design 
Authority 
Regulator has authorised design authority 
based on competency assessment. 
Design authority has evaluated requirements 
staff QTE against flight control system 
domain competency requirements. 
All developers and reviewers are ‘Experts, 
except ‘Bloggs’ who isn’t allowed to 
generate evidence on this project. 
Staff  have undergone refresher training on 
flight control system fundamentals. 
No limitations. 
All staff are 
assessed as 
competent.  
C
o
m
p
et
en
cy
 
(M
et
h
o
d
) 
Design Authority Letter of 
Engineering Authority 
Qualification, Training and 
Experience Records 
Competency Assessment by Design 
Authority 
Regulator has authorised design authority 
based on competency assessment. 
Design authority has evaluated requirements 
staff QTE against Modelling and simulation 
tool competency requirements. 
All developers and reviewers are ‘Experts’. 
Staff have undergone refresher training on 
control system design using Modelling tool. 
No limitations. 
All staff are 
assessed as 
competent.  
M
et
h
o
d
 
(S
u
it
ab
il
it
y
) 
Software Development Plan 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Inspections by Walkthrough 
Records 
Method is trustworthiness by adhoc peer 
review. Adhoc peer review is not systematic 
enough to assure high level of 
trustworthiness.  
Additional method walkthrough applied. 
Walkthrough is systematic. 
No remaining 
limitations. 
 
M
et
h
o
d
 (
R
ig
o
u
r)
 
Software Development Plan 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Quality Assurance Records for 
Inspections. 
CM records for Inspection 
Records. 
Problem Reporting Records 
Walkthrough carried out in accordance 
with walkthrough procedure. Walkthrough 
is systematic. 
Quality assurance conformity review on 
walkthrough records confirms to process. 
No remaining 
limitations. 
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(R
ev
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w
 /
 
In
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o
n
) 
Software Development Plan 
Review and Inspections Procedure 
Peer Review Inspection Records 
Walkthrough Evidence by IV&V 
Team 
Walkthrough carried out by IV&V team, 
with development team participation. IV&V 
achieve both organisation and intellectual 
independence.  
No remaining 
limitations.  
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
 
(C
o
m
p
le
m
en
t
ar
y
) 
Walkthrough Evidence  by IV&V 
Team 
Model-Based Development 
Simulation Results 
Model-Based Development Model 
Analysis/Simulation of Requirements 
provides conceptual independence to 
review/inspection approach. 
No remaining 
limitations 
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R
es
u
lt
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P
ro
d
u
ct
 D
ef
in
in
g
 
In
fo
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Requirements Management 
Database containing Software 
Requirements and Traceability Data 
Software Design Description 
Software Test Description 
Software Test Procedures and Cases 
Software Test Results 
Software Problem Report Database 
Test descriptions cover the criteria for 
completeness of requirements based testing 
for ‘constraint’. 
Test procedures and cases are correct for 
‘constraint’. 
Test results are all passes. 
No additional testing is required. 
No test failures identified. 
No software problem reports are open. 
No limitations 
identified 
Table 29: Example Revised Assessments/Arguments of Limitations 
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6.9.8 Step 8 – Determine the Risk Impact of Intolerable Evidence 
Limitations 
a. Determine the impact of intolerable evidence limitations for communication to 
higher level product risk assessments, which will include consideration of: 
i. the attribute against which the evidence shortfalls exists, 
ii. the applicable ‘constraint’ to which it relates and the corresponding CSAL 
assignment for that ‘constraint’, and 
iii. the other fault prevention or fault tolerance mechanisms employed by the 
architecture to treat the source of fault. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
In addition to the attributes presented in the example above, assume that an evidence 
shortfall has also been identified against the Traceable to High Abstraction attribute for 
the Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements Lifecycle Product. Chapter 8 provides 
guidance and continuation of the A-DHC-4 example on revising risk assessments based 
on counter evidence. 
6.10 Summary 
This chapter has examined how knowledge of tolerability of limitations can be obtained 
through evaluation of evidence, based on categorisation and type of evidence with 
respect to the attributes of lifecycle products defined in Chapter 5. Specifically, several 
categorisations of evidence based on claim, and based on the type of the evidence have 
been examined and categorisations of evidence established. This chapter then illustrates 
how the categorisations of evidence can be used to reason about the suitability of 
evidence with respect to attributes. 
The role of relevance with respect to product and process evidence has been examined 
and expressed within meta-arguments, thus providing a means to satisfy Principle D of 
Figure 50 for product and process evidence respectively. The role of trustworthiness in 
relation to both product and process evidence has also been explained (satisfying 
Principle X of Figure 50). A means of evaluating the impact of limitation in both 
product and process evidence with respect to both relevance and trustworthiness has 
been expressed using meta-arguments (satisfying Principle Y of Figure 50). 
Using the identified categorisations of evidence, the ESAL framework has been 
proposed for evaluating the tolerability of limitation in evidence with respect to 
attributes of lifecycle products. The sources of limitations in evidence are categorised 
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based on relevance, trustworthiness and results, and the type of evidence used to support 
these claim types. Arguments are required for each of these categories to relate the 
evidence to the attribute, and to reason about limitations in evidence. For 
trustworthiness, which may not be well suited to the argumentation approach, an 
alternative approach has also been suggested that provides a greater level of prescription 
to minimise the need for subjective arguments.  
A process has been defined for applying the evidence assurance and assigning ESALs. 
An example has been presented which illustrates how the evidence assurance can be 
applied. The example illustrates that it is feasible to construct arguments about 
‘tolerability of limitations’ in evidence with respect to attributes of software lifecycle 
products. 
The ESAL framework has been developed to also adhere to the usability guidelines 
identified in Figure 50. The ESAL framework minimises variability (adhering to 
Guideline 1) by specifying deterministic requirements for evaluating evidence against 
attributes based on both category and type of evidence. The ESAL framework 
minimises subjectivity (adhering to Guideline 2) by ensuring that the evidence 
categorises are mutually exclusive and through traceability to a specific attribute of the 
lifecycle product. Through exposing limitations of methods with respect to the evidence 
categories and type categorisations, it is also feasible that subjectivity may be further 
reduced once limitations of method become systematically documented and widely 
acknowledged by the industry. Finally, the articulation of differences between the 
ESAL levels helps assessors distinguish between tolerable cases for limitations and 
intolerable cases. 
This chapter completes the final element of the architectural (Chapter 4), product 
behavioural knowledge and claims (Chapter 5), and evidence aspects of the framework 
proposed by this thesis. Chapter 7 examines how this framework could be contracted for 
in the military aviation environment, and Chapter 8 examines how the impact on safety 
risk can be evaluated as a result of limitations in evidence.   
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7 Contracting for Architectural, Claims and Evidence 
Assurance 
Chapter 2 established that contracts are used to achieve the regulatory and safety 
assurance outcomes for military programs. Military contracts achieve this by 
referencing the applicable regulations and safety standards. However, Section 2.3 
established that this does not guarantee that safety assurance will be successful. 
Section 2.3.1 indicated that a value for money and on-time/on-budget contract will only 
be possible when both the acquirer’s and supplier’s expectations are aligned. This 
implies that the acquirer and supplier must align their expectations of the product and 
evidence requirements prior to contract signature. When there is ambiguity in a contract, 
a contract dispute will often find in favour of the organisation that didn’t draft the 
contract (i.e. the supplier). Hence supplier understanding is predicated by the clarity of 
communication of these expectations by the contract. The contract must communicate 
certification requirements, include activities and controls for evidence provision, 
incentives for suppliers to comply, and provide mechanisms for enforcement when 
suppliers don’t comply. This chapter examines how this might be achieved using the 
approach described in Chapters 4 through 6. 
7.1 Integrating Safety Assurance and Tender/Contract 
How a safety assurance standard integrates with the contractual lifecycle is an important 
factor in achieving and demonstrating safety. A safety assurance standard should reduce 
uncertainty about the delivered product, argument and evidence prior to the 
establishment of a contract. This is important because acquirer and supplier will seek 
confidence that the contract will be successful. Similarly, the standard should assist 
during contract execution. Should safety issues emerge during the contract, then timely 
and cost-effective resolution will be a goal for both supplier and acquirer. The contract 
and standard should support the resolution of safety issues, and not hinder it by 
contributing to a dispute. There is evidence in historical projects that standards, 
particularly those where product and/or evidence requirements are less prescriptive, 
actually increase contractual dispute in projects (refer Chapter 10). 
An inspection of contemporary safety standards reveals that integration between the 
standard’s lifecycle and contract lifecycle varies significantly between standards. The 
following sub-sections examine these variations. 
 248  
7.1.1 ARP4754 and DO-178B 
ARP4754 and RTCA/DO-178B don’t mention integration with contracts. This is 
understandable because they are used where there is legal enforcement of certification 
requirements. However, these standards can be used to achieve elements of contract 
integration through the certification authority liaison and artefact requirements within 
these standards. It is necessary to supplement them with contract requirements in order 
to interface the standards’ certification environment assumptions to the certification 
environment of the acquirer. Guidance on a means of doing this is provided in 
(Directorate General Technical Airworthiness, 2010). 
7.1.2 UK Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 
UK Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 mentions the contractor, and defines requirements 
on contractors with respect to safety. However, limited guidance is provided with 
respect to how to prepare Statement of Requirement (SOR) and Statement of Work 
(SOW) clauses for the standard, and the standard doesn’t provide requirements for the 
provision of arguments or evidence across the contracting lifecycle. Hence, one factor 
that has limited the effectives of this standard in practice is the lack of contractual 
implementation guidance (McDermid, 2010). 
7.1.3 MIL-STD-882 
MIL-STD-882C/D/E includes contract integration. There are references to 
recommended contract clauses, tender processes and data requirements, although this 
guidance is not always adhered to by project authorities (Joint Software Systems Safety 
Engineering Workshop, 2010). The standards don’t address how safety or evidence 
limitations should be resolved, other than via contractual dispute. They also don’t 
include information provision required to inform the tender process of architectural and 
evidence limitations prior to contract signature. 
7.1.4 Integrating Safety Standards and Contracts 
The requirements of the standards have a substantial effect on the integration of the 
standard across the tender/contract lifecycle. Therefore, it should be understood what 
elements of standards and their implementation in contracts, provides appropriate 
certainty (regarding product and assurance evidence) for acquirers and suppliers? Is it 
possible to define requirements for safety and assurance standards to achieve effective 
contract process integration?  
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Ultimately, it is vital that the regulatory and safety assurance standards used be 
compatible with the contracts used for military acquisitions, without impairing or 
detracting from the achievement and demonstration of safety. This chapter investigates 
an approach to answering the questions from the previous paragraph. Based on the 
discussion at Section 2.3.1, the focus is on fixed-price contracts.  
7.2 Roles for Military System Contracts 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 establish that military system contracts are used for regulation of 
safety assurance. Their importance is examined in the following sub-sections. 
7.2.1 Enforcement of Design Requirements 
In military aviation, the airworthiness design requirements (or requirement to establish 
and agree them) must be included in the contract if they are to apply to the development 
(refer to Section 2.2.4). This means that the SOR should include or reference applicable 
airworthiness design requirements, including product safety and safety assurance 
requirements. In addition, the SOW should include activities to ensure elicitation and 
agreement of any additional airworthiness or design requirements relevant to the design.  
Hence an important role for achieving safety assurance through a contract is to ensure 
that product design requirements pertaining to safety can be communicated, established 
and agreed through the contracting process. 
7.2.2 Obtaining Assurance Evidence through the Contract 
In military aviation, the regulator (as part of the acquirer organisation) obtains evidence 
required for certification via the contract. This means that the SOW must include 
applicable activities for the generation of evidence. Delivery versus access to evidence 
is usually dictated by intellectual property and export control considerations (which are 
outside the scope of this thesis). Whether delivery of evidence is sought is usually 
evident from the artefacts listed in the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL), and 
supporting Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) which describe content requirements. 
Hence an important role for achieving safety assurance is to ensure that the 
requirements for access and delivery of assurance evidence are explicit. This is more 
challenging than preparing a CDRL, as it should articulate benchmarks that will assure 
evidence sufficiency, but without constraining the design solution unnecessarily. 
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7.2.3 Resolving Shortfalls in Product and Evidence 
In the military aviation circumstance, resolving a shortfall in product or evidence will 
depend on whether it is in or out of scope of the contract. If the issue is within scope, 
then the onus is on the supplier, but if there is any ambiguity regarding scope of the 
contract pertaining to the issue, then the onus for resolution is shared by the acquirer. If 
the supplier and acquirer can’t agree that it is wholly within the scope of the contract, 
then the issue may be the subject of contractual dispute.  
The ramifications of a contractual dispute can include cost and schedule implications 
while the dispute takes place, a requirement to elevate beyond project staff, a 
requirement to negotiate over contractual interpretation and compliance, etc. These 
issues potentially degrade the effectiveness of safety regulation achieved through the 
contract, particularly where projects must seek additional funding from Government (an 
onerous process) to resolve the safety shortfalls via contract change proposals.  
Hence an important role for achieving safety assurance through a contract is to ensure 
that arrangements for resolving shortfalls in product and evidence are explicit in the 
contract and meet both acquirer and supplier expectations. 
7.3 Contract-based Acquisition Paradigms 
Before examining how to contract for architectural, claims and evidence assurance, it is 
worthwhile clarifying the terminology related to contracts. The three most common 
acquisition paradigms (Defence Materiel Organisation , 2012) are the: 
• Open Tender,  
• Restricted Tender, or 
• Sole Source Acquisition.  
The paradigms pursued by the contracting authority depends on the extent to which: 
• the solution will be developmental or off-the-shelf; 
• a supplier or suppliers are known prior to the acquisition; 
• engaging a larger market improves competition and value for money; and 
• engaging a narrower market improves contractual response times. 
The following sub-sections summarise the three different paradigms, and emphasises 
implications for contracting for architectural, claims and evidence assurance. 
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7.3.1 Open Tender 
The Open Tender involves the release of a Request for Tender (RFT) to the whole 
market. This will be a large number of prospective tenderers, and include a cross section 
of maturity across the market. Hence it is important within this paradigm that ‘strong’ 
tenders can be distinguished from ‘weaker’ tenders during tender evaluation. A ‘strong’ 
tender would include forecast compliance and demonstration with safety objectives, 
whereas a weaker tender may include substantial uncertainty. 
The RFT typically contains a version of the Tender Statement of Requirement (SOR) 
and a Statement of Work (SOW) which includes: 
• the envisaged contract requirements and scope of work (i.e. what the tender is 
bidding against from a product and evidence perspective), and 
• the tender submission requirements and scope of work (i.e. what information the 
tenderer has to provide as part of the tender for the purposes of tender evaluation). 
The RFT responses would then be evaluated and a preferred tenderer identified, with 
whom contract negotiations would commence. At the time of contract negotiations a 
draft contract is refined based on the original tender documents, and amended (as 
necessary) based on any limitations in the preferred tenderers RFT response. Presuming 
the contract negotiations are successful, contract signature would be achieved. 
Note that some tender processes involve an initial release of a Call for Expressions of 
Interest (EOI) to identify the market, and then release of the RFT to only suitable 
responses to the EOI. This approach is really a hybrid of the Open Tender and 
Restricted Tender (refer Section 7.3.2), but with the luxury that the actual tender SOR 
and SOW can be refined based on the initial look to the market under the Call for EOI. 
Where the acquisition or modification is of substantial complexity, then the single phase 
tendering process may not incentivise suppliers to invest a level of effort to develop 
their solution to a level that permits effective evaluation. This is often the case for a new 
aircraft development. In this case a two-phase tender may be more suitable, such as 
those used in the JSF selection process (JSF Program, 2013). The first phase would 
identify solutions that accord with the program objectives and use a normal tender 
construct. The second would be a partially funded tender phase, where funding is 
provided to a restricted set of tenderers to further develop the tender artefacts supporting 
evaluation. The second phase is synonymous with a Restricted Tender, but includes 
funding so that tenderers can invest a level of effort which they are compensated for. 
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Such options are available where the acquirer is not satisfied that the tenderer is 
incentivised to offer competitive solutions, or to resolve the uncertainty to a level 
consistent with the constraints on acquirer funding.  
7.3.2 Restricted Tender 
Restricted Tender involves the release of the Request For Tender (RFT) to a restricted 
number of market participants. This subset of market participants will have been 
predetermined either by a market selection activity (such as a Call for Expressions of 
Interest, Request for Proposals, etc.), or through market research.  
The key factor that distinguishes this approach from the Open Tender is that the tender 
is restricted to a nominated number of tenders. Otherwise the processes are very similar 
to the Open Tender. The goal of identifying ‘strong’ and ‘weaker’ tenders still remains 
with respect to safety assurance compliance. 
7.3.3 Sole Source 
Sole Source Acquisition involves confining the acquisition to a single supplier, because 
the supplier has been predetermined to provide an off-the-shelf solution, or because the 
supplier has been assessed as the most suitable. Examples of common circumstances 
include rapid acquisitions due to operational imperatives, and standing intellectual 
property restrictions that prevent the work being contracted to another supplier. 
For Sole Source Acquisition, the Request For Tender (RFT) is usually replaced by a 
Request For Quote (RFQ) or Request for Proposal (RFP) to reflect the definite nature of 
the acquisition. In some cases the proposal request is similar in nature to an RFT, as 
much of the same information is needed. This step is sometimes overlooked because of 
perceptions that the project scope is already defined by the solution. While this 
perception may be true for physical tangibles, it is less applicable to the body of 
evidence needed to form the safety case. For Sole Source Acquisition, the proposal 
evaluation and contract negotiations phase usually has a greater burden for establishing 
evidence requirements into the contract SOW and SOR. If overlooked then the contract 
will likely be inadequate and result in certification challenges. Once on contract, there 
little difference between Sole Source and the Open and Restricted Tender approaches. 
7.3.4 What Do the Paradigms Mean for Contracts 
From Sections 7.3.1 through 7.3.3, it is evident that the acquisition paradigm changes 
the focus of the contract. In an Open Tender the acquirer has the opportunity to 
eliminate tenders whose safety objectives or evidence is not to the acquirer’s 
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satisfaction. However, in a Sole Source acquisition, the product may already be pre-
determined, and as such the contract has to predominantly inform the acquirer of the 
potential risks and evidence shortfalls of the solution to inform decisions on treatment 
or retention, depending on the capability or operational imperative.  
Hence it can be seen that the balance between roles for contracts identified throughout 
this thesis so far may alter depending on the acquisition paradigm and that the 
construction of the tender and contract needs to be flexible to accommodate this. 
7.4 Impact of Uncertainty at Contract Signature 
Sections 2.3 and 7.2 identified several responsibilities of contracts if achievement and 
demonstration of safety is to be effective. There is an increased risk of a contract being 
unsuccessful if there is uncertainty with respect to: 
• communication and enforcement of design requirements,  
• generation and access to assurance evidence, and  
• expectations for resolving shortfalls in assurance evidence. 
7.4.1 The Gamble of Entering Into Contract 
Signing a contract involves a gamble. It is a wager for supplier and acquirer that the 
supplier can provide a system that meets the acquirer’s requirements within the cost and 
schedule of the contract. Contract success risk is a function of the uncertainty at contract 
signature. Lots of uncertainty and the odds may be against success; lesser uncertainty 
and the odds might favour success. Fortunately, the project definition and tender phases 
provide the contract authority with a way of seeking important information prior to 
contract signature. This information, if sought and used effectively, can reduce 
uncertainty, and thus reduce potential contract risks. 
How to seek the right information and effectively evaluate it with respect to safety is a 
challenge. The existing standards and contracting approaches offer limited guidance on 
how this might be achieved. Industrial examples (refer Chapter 1 and 2, and also 
Chapter 10) involving project overruns and cancellations due to safety assurance 
concerns suggests that the current approaches are also insufficient. 
7.4.2 Potential Sources of Uncertainty at Contract Signature 
To further understand the implications of uncertainty at contract signature for safety it is 
necessary to establish where it might exist. Uncertainty may exist with the following: 
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• Will the design requirements proposed by the acquirer be adequate to achieve the 
safety objectives? Specifically, from an architectural (refer Chapter 4) safety 
assurance perspective, will: 
o the software and system architecture, including the use of redundancy, 
diversity, and fault avoidance/tolerance likely permit achievement of the 
safety objectives?  
o the architecture provide adequate protection against systematic faults? 
• Will compliance with the design requirements and safety objectives be compelling 
based on the evidence provided? Specifically, from a claims and evidence 
perspective (refer Chapters 5 and 6), will: 
o the behaviours of the system and its software be sufficiently understood and 
valid under both normal and failure circumstances?  
o these behaviours be appropriate with respect to safety? 
o the evidence support the safety assurance claims made by the supplier about 
these behaviours?  
o any limitations in evidence be tolerable? 
• Will limitations in evidence be resolvable within the scope of the contract? 
Specifically, what is: 
o within scope? 
o out of scope, requiring a contract change and additional funding? 
Whenever there is uncertainty with respect to these questions, then these manifest as 
contract risks. Uncertainty might undermine the acquirer’s aspiration to establish if the 
system will likely achieve safety. Thus the supplier might be eliminated during the 
tender evaluation based on perceived uncertainty in suitability of product and evidence 
(when the product may achieve safety). More seriously, the design solution may be 
contracted for, yet have unsuitable behaviours. In this case the acquirer may not be able 
to complete safety certification within the contract. Worse still, it may require the 
acquirer to retain risks and these risks prove to be intolerable in practice. No acquirer 
enters into a contract with an aspiration to retain safety risks at the time of delivery. 
If these factors are extrapolated, then the result is obvious: have the supplier provide full 
disclosure to the acquirer during the tender process. However, the realities of the 
commercial business quickly make this impractical. In domains where highly 
developmental systems are common-place, it is uneconomical to require suppliers to 
complete their development lifecycle to the point that answers to the above bullet point 
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questions become certain during the tender process. As only a small percentage of 
tender responses are actually successful, and tenderers invest substantial resources in 
preparing them, the acquirer must avoid deterring potentially suitable tenderers due to 
the level of effort required to tender. Therefore, the tender response must provide for 
sufficient disclosure and understanding, but while ensuring the minimum imposition on 
tenderers. This is a difficult balance.  
7.4.3 Acquirer and Supplier Motivations 
Acquirers and suppliers have motivations, aspirations and perspectives which are a 
unique contrast between goals for project success, mixed with broader commercial goals 
and commercial restrictions. Each of these will vary between every acquirer, supplier 
and circumstance. The most obvious motivations for the acquirer and supplier are that 
the solution will achieve the safety objectives, and that the evidence will show this. But 
the additional motivations vary the perspective on achievement. Acquirer motivators 
include: 
• satisfying capability requirements, 
• credibility of supplier cost and schedule forecasting, 
• avoiding contract changes (because they are onerous to get approved),  
• costs of solutions falling within notional budgets (because getting additional 
funding often involves going back to government, which is difficult), and 
• delivery within capability fielding/scheduling requirements. 
Supplier motivators include: 
• providing a competitive tender cost/schedule,  
• preservation of profit margins within the contract price,  
• avoidance of contract penalties,  
• ensuring that out of scope work requires a contract change (to protect the profit 
margin with the contract), and  
• delivery of a broadly satisfactory product with minimal application of resources.  
These motivators are linked because cost and schedule are required to produce 
evidence, and evidence is required to show the solution meets objectives. Because of 
this dependency, these motivators may conflict, and may cause divergence in supplier 
and acquirer behaviours. The emergent (commercial) behaviours that arise depend on 
the relationship between supplier and acquirer, the seriousness of the safety concerns or 
cost impacts, and the supplier’s and acquirer’s worldviews (McDermid & Rae, 2012). 
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Given these issues, how might a framework be established to ensure that uncertainty at 
the time of contract signature can be bounded? What is the compromise that enables the 
appropriate design solution to be identified during tender processes, and this solution to 
be achieved during contract execution? 
The remainder of this chapter examines how an approach may be established. 
Illustration of the benefits of the approach will be via the fictional example used 
throughout this thesis. Consider the upgrade of the DHC-4 Caribou’s flight control 
system to a digital flight control system. The objective of the acquirer is to achieve this 
upgrade, including the safety regulatory functions on behalf of the acquirer’s regulatory 
authority, through a contract. The tender process for this contract needs to identify the 
possible solutions that will achieve and demonstrate safety. The following sections 
examine how this can be effectively achieved. 
7.5 Bounding Uncertainty Using the Tender Process 
The tender phase provides a means for the acquirer to seek information prior to contract. 
This information, can reduce uncertainty and thus reduce potential contract risks. How 
much the uncertainty has to be reduced is an important question, and this suggests the 
concept of bounding uncertainty. 
Firstly, it is important to elaborate what is meant by bounded uncertainty in this context. 
Put in contractual terms, it is establishing limits (upper bounds) on the cost of producing 
a product that achieves safety and an acceptable safety case that demonstrates safety. 
Bounds can be narrowed by the provision of information to the acquirer from the 
supplier during pre-contract phases (e.g. tender phase). The limiting factor on 
information provision will be the affordability, for a tenderer, of conceptual and 
preliminary phases of requirements and design lifecycle phases within the resources that 
are commercially viable during the tender.  
In Section 7.4.2 a set of fundamental questions was introduced based on the identified 
roles for contracts with respect to safety regulation: enforcement of design 
requirements, obtaining assurance evidence, and resolving shortfalls in assurance 
evidence. These questions were refined with respect to: architecture, behavioural 
arguments and evidence provision/suitability; the topics of Chapters 4 through 6. How 
much should the regulator know about these topics during the tender phase to be 
satisfied of a likely positive outcome, should the project go to contract? 
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Returning to the flight control system example, and assuming that the contract authority 
is using an open tender. The original aircraft manufacturer has no off-the-shelf solution 
available, and other contractors have expressed interest in developing a solution. 
The remaining sections of this chapter describe how this tender may be prepared and 
evaluated, a preferred tenderer identified, and a contract established and executed for 
this option. Section 7.6 will consider the architectural topic. Section 7.7 will consider 
the behavioural arguments and evidence topics. Section 7.8 will then examine how 
issues arising as a result of the remaining uncertainty are identified and resolved post 
contract signature. The example will assume a single phase tender process, albeit the 
concepts can conceivably be applied to multi-phase tender processes also. 
7.6 Obtaining Solution Architectural Certainty 
Obtaining architectural certainty from the tender phases prior to entering into a contract 
is important as it enables insight into potential architectural shortfalls. It also forces 
supplier consideration of architectural suitability including fault avoidance and 
tolerance. This is important as there is evidence in industrial practice that this is 
sometimes overlooked (refer Chapter 10). A four step process is proposed, as follows: 
1. Set measurable benchmarks for architectural suitability, 
2. Inform architectural suitability using the tender process, 
3. Evaluate architectural suitability during the tender evaluation, and 
4. Provide architectural assurance during contract execution. 
7.6.1 Setting Benchmarks for Architectural Suitability 
The first step to obtaining architectural certainty is to set benchmarks for solution 
architectural suitability. The benchmarks should not be specifying solutions so they do 
not stifle novelty or limit flexibility; they should set measurable criteria against which 
different solutions can be evaluated. Benchmarks provide the acquirer a way of 
specifying what attributes the design has, and a way of comparing solutions.  
A review of the literature reveals that there is limited published guidance on 
benchmarks for architectural suitability, particularly for systematic faults and failures. 
Some standards permit assurance levels to be reduced based on architecture, but this is 
not a measure of the architectural adequacy. Therefore, new approaches are required if 
architectures are to be effectively evaluated during tender evaluations. One such 
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approach (refer Chapter 4) uses the concept of an Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
and Layered Fault Tolerance Requirements.  
To set the benchmark for the supplier, clauses are required for the tender and contract 
SOR. The following is an example of a generic SOR clause to achieve this: 
The [System Name] architecture and mechanisms for achieving fault avoidance and 
fault tolerance, against each type of credible systematic fault, shall meet the 
requirements for layers of fault avoidance and fault tolerance, where the number of 
layers is commensurate with the worst credible failure condition, as specified at 
{reference a Table in the SOR detailing the benchmark numbers of layers for each 
failure condition severity} 
A specific instantiation of this clause for the Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
approach is presented below. Note that the top level safety objective clauses have also 
been included to provide context to the ASAL framework clauses, and were adapted 
from clauses existing in the Australian Defence Force Contracting Templates (Defence 
Materiel Organisation , 2012) and (Directorate General Technical Airworthiness, 2010).  
Top-level Safety Goal 
The [System Name] shall not cause an intolerable hazard to safety when operating in 
the intended roles, configurations and operating environments of the [Acquirer]. 
Criteria for Risk Treatment and Retention 
The [System Name] shall meet the requirements of 14CFR25.1309
37
, and all associated 
Advisory Circulars, Orders, and Notices. 
The risk of the [System Name] causing a hazard to safety when operating in the 
intended roles, configurations and operating environments of the [Acquirer] shall be: 
• tolerable to the [Acquirer] per a risk management framework agreed by the 
[Acquirer]; and 
• explicitly documented and communicated to the [Acquirer]. 
                                                 
37 (United States of America, 2012) Subpart F – Equipment §25.1309 Equipment, systems, and 
installations sets the acceptable risk criteria for civil transport category airplanes. Similar clauses exist for 
other classes of aircraft in Part 23, 27 and 29 for civil aircraft and in MIL-HDBK-516B or DEF STAN 
00-970 for military types. 
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Architectural Safety Requirements 
The [System Name] design shall employ the fail safe design criteria of AC25.1309
38
 to 
provide protection against both random and systematic classes of faults and failures, 
regardless of their origin. 
The [System Name] architecture and mechanisms for achieving fault protection and 
fault tolerance against systematic faults shall meet the Architectural Safety Assurance 
Level (ASAL) requirements defined in [Table 15].  
The [System Name] shall meet the ASAL Architecturally Layered Fault Tolerance 
Requirements as defined in [Table 16]; or be shown to provide an equivalent level of 
fault tolerance by alternative means.
39
 
7.6.2 Informing Architectural Suitability 
To reduce architectural uncertainty before contract signature, the tender phase requires 
information about architecture. Since the information will be used by the acquirer to 
evaluate the suitability of the architecture against the benchmarks, it is useful to ensure 
the information directly addresses the benchmarks set out in Section 7.6.1. 
One approach is to require the tenderer, through the tender SOW, to provide a 
Conceptual System and Software Architecture Suitability Document, or similar 
document. It would describe how the system’s architecture and mechanisms for 
achieving fault avoidance and fault tolerance against systematic faults would meet the 
benchmarks. The intent is to provide a description of the architecture that the acquirer 
can evaluate against the benchmark, without forcing the supplier to completely design 
and implement the system before contract signature. For a largely mature design, the 
document can focus on what already exists, and whether or not it requires 
supplementation; for a developmental design it provides a framework for the supplier to 
cost the architectural elements of their system with improved accuracy. The following is 
an example of the generic Tender SOW clauses to achieve this: 
                                                 
38 (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988) describes the acceptable means of compliance with 
14CFR25.1309. Similar guidance exists for other classes of aircraft. 
39 An alternative means may be appropriate where the system architecture does not conform to the 
software, LRU and system level model used for expressing protection mechanisms against systematic 
faults in Table 16. 
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Total Layers of Defence. The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Conceptual System and 
Software Architecture Suitability Document] per TDRL [XX] to describe how the 
[System Name] architecture and mechanisms for achieving fault prevention and fault 
tolerance, against each type of credible systematic fault, is proposed to meet the 
{reference to SOR’s requirements for number of layers of fault prevention and fault 
tolerance to systematic faults}. 
Adequate Constraints. The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Conceptual System and 
Software Architecture Suitability Document] per TDRL [XX] to describe how each 
constraint (i.e. absence assertion or detection and handling mechanism) is proposed to 
achieve the architecturally layered fault prevention and fault tolerance requirements as 
defined by the SOR {reference the SOR requirement}. 
A specific instantiation of these clauses for the Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
approach is as follows: 
Informing Architectural Suitability 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Conceptual System and Software Architecture 
Suitability Document] to describe how the [System Name] architecture and mechanisms 
for achieving fault prevention and fault tolerance against systematic faults meets the 
Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) requirements defined in [Table 15]. 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Conceptual System and Software Architecture 
Suitability Document] to describe how each constraint (i.e. absence assertion or 
detection and handling mechanism) is proposed to achieve the ASAL Architecturally 
Layered Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance Requirements as defined in [Table 16]; 
or be shown to provide an equivalent level of fault prevention and fault tolerance by 
alternative means. 
An example of a TDRL and Conceptual System and Software Architecture Suitability 
Document DID is provided at Appendix C. 
For the flight control system example, let’s assume that each of the proposed options 
provides a Conceptual System and Software Architecture Suitability Document, for 
which the proposed architecture are described as follows: 
• Option A 
o Redundant digital flight control system consisting of triple redundant 
primary flight control computers, and dual redundant secondary flight 
control computers. 
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o Primary and secondary flight control computers are architecturally spread 
between pairs of control surfaces in each axis to provide protection against 
mechanical control system elements failures or jamming. 
o Dual sensors including air data and inertial reference systems, 
attitude/heading reference systems and triplex actuators and actuator 
sensors.  
o Command/monitor architecture flight control computers, with fault 
prevention on the command channel and fault tolerance from the monitor 
channel, and flight control computer interactions. 
o Fault tolerance on input sensor data, control law outputs, and system state. 
• Option B 
o Quad redundant digital flight control system incorporating two flight control 
computers with two independent channels per computer.  
o Computers and channels are architecturally spread between pairs of control 
surfaces in each axis to provide protection against mechanical control 
system elements failures or jamming. 
o Dual sensors including air data and inertial reference systems, 
attitude/heading reference systems and triplex actuators and actuator 
sensors.  
o Incorporation of software fault prevention and tolerance within each 
computer. 
o Fault tolerance on input sensor data, control law outputs, and system state. 
• Option C 
o Quadruplex digital flight control computers incorporating a single channel 
per computer.  
o Computers are architecturally spread between pairs of control surfaces in 
each axis to provide protection against mechanical control system elements 
failures or jamming. 
o Incorporation of fault prevention and fault tolerance within each computer. 
o Fault tolerance on input sensor data and control law outputs. 
• Option D 
o Quad redundant digital flight control system incorporating two flight control 
computers with two independent channels per computer.  
o Sensors include a single air data system, dual attitude/heading reference 
systems and dual actuators and actuator sensors.  
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o Design is based upon a flight control system from a fixed wing military 
aircraft, and adapted for this application. 
o Fault tolerance on input sensor data and control law outputs. 
• Option E 
o Simplex digital control system, single control panel, and single sensors 
including air data system, attitude and heading references, and actuator 
position sensors. 
o Flight tolerance as range and rate checks on control law outputs only. 
Note that these architectural descriptions are deliberately brief. They are intended to be 
illustrative for the purposes of making a point about how contracting processes can be 
used to inform their suitability. In practice, the level of detail would need to be superior 
to the level of detail provided in Chapter 4, as Chapter 4 was deliberately brief. 
7.6.3 Evaluating Architectural Suitability 
The purpose of requesting this information is to permit evaluation of how the safety and 
software architecture requirements are priced in the tender response. The retrospective 
incorporation of constraints to treat systematic failure modes is rarely straightforward, 
particularly when architectural change is required. Therefore, it is in the acquirer’s 
interests to establish that the contractor has determined an architecture based on the 
types of constraints required to meet safety objectives. While sub-system architectures 
may not be fully defined, the absence of this information will permit the acquirer to 
adjust the contractor’s proposed costing based on the suitability and uncertainty of the 
tenderer’s proposed architecture. This provides normalisation of tenderers’ responses.  
As can be seen from the differing architectures proposed by Options A through E, the 
complexity of each solution differs notably. Using the benchmarks set for the 
architecture, each option is evaluated. The evaluation results are as follows: 
• Options A and B – Treatments to all general classes (i.e. omission, commission, 
early, late and value) of systematic fault use layers of fault avoidance and fault 
tolerance mechanisms. Architectures are likely to be suitable. 
• Option C – Treatments to all general classes of systematic fault use layers of fault 
avoidance and fault tolerance mechanisms, with the exception of several sub-
classes of omission and commission failures relating to system state anomalies. 
Architecture is potentially suitable with some enhanced fault tolerance. These 
issues are flagged for further consideration once evidence provision is evaluated. 
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• Option D – Treatments relating to value failures of the air data system sensor rely 
on fault avoidance via absence arguments only. The fidelity of the output range 
and rate checks does not adequately detect credible value failures resulting from 
the undetected sensor failures. There is limited software fault tolerance proposed 
for these failures. Therefore the architecture is deemed to contain weaknesses 
against these systematic faults and thus would require changes to adequately treat. 
Architecture is potentially unsuitable, and is flagged for further consideration 
once evidence provision is evaluated.  
• Option E – Treatments relating to omission and value failures of sensors and 
flight control computers rely on fault avoidance from absence arguments only. 
The fidelity of the output range and rate checks does not adequately detect the 
aforementioned classes of sensor failures either. This is assessed to provide 
grossly inadequate defences against these classes of systematic failures. 
Architecture is deemed unsuitable, and option is eliminated from the selection. 
7.6.4 Providing Architectural Assurance 
Once the preferred tenderer has been identified, and any uncertainties regarding the 
architectural assurances are tolerable (assuming in this case that it will end up being 
either Options A, B, or C because of their architectural suitability), then it is possible to 
develop a contract between the supplier and acquirer. 
Under the contract, the acquirer will need to maintain the benchmarks for product 
suitability by inclusion of SOR clauses similar to those defined in Section 7.6.1. Further 
the acquirer will require a way to establish if the final ‘as-delivered’ architecture meets 
the prescribed benchmarks. This can be achieved by requiring the contractor to deliver 
(via appropriate SOW contract clause) a System and Software Architectural Assurance 
Document, or similar. The document should describe how the system’s architecture and 
mechanisms for achieving fault prevention and fault tolerance against systematic faults 
actually achieves the benchmarks. The following is an example of the generic Contract 
SOW clauses to achieve this: 
Total Layers of Defence. The [Contractor] shall prepare a [System and Software 
Architectural Assurance Document] per CDRL [XX] to describe how the [System 
Name] architecture and mechanisms for achieving fault prevention and fault tolerance, 
against each type of credible systematic fault, meets the {reference to SOR’s 
requirements for the number of layers of fault prevention and fault tolerance to 
systematic faults}. 
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Adequate Constraints. The [Contractor] shall prepare a [System and Software 
Architectural Assurance Document] per CDRL [XX] to describe how each proposed 
constraint (i.e. absence assertion or detection and handling mechanism) achieves the 
architecturally layered fault prevention and fault tolerance requirements as defined by 
the SOR {reference the SOR requirement}. 
A specific instantiation of these clauses for the Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
approach is as follows: 
Total Layers of Defence. The [Contractor] shall prepare a [System and Software 
Architectural Assurance Document] per CDRL [XX] to describe how the [System 
Name] architecture and mechanisms for achieving fault prevention and fault tolerance 
against systematic faults achieves the Architectural Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) 
requirements defined in [Table 15]. 
Adequate Constraints. The [Contractor] shall prepare a [System and Software 
Architectural Assurance Document] per CDRL [XX] to describe how each proposed 
constraint (i.e. absence assertion or detection and handling mechanism) is proposed to 
meet the ASAL Architecturally Layered Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance 
Requirements as defined in [Table 16]; or be shown to provide an equivalent level of 
fault prevention or tolerance by alternative means. 
The Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) should require that various iterations of 
the document be delivered at relevant systems engineering milestones to permit the 
acquirer to monitor the evolution of the architecture. This monitoring is important 
because it allows the acquirer to measure the progression of the architecture throughout 
the lifecycle, and to respond if there are divergences to acquirer understanding and 
assumptions from the tender evaluation. An example of a CDRL is included at 
Appendix C. 
Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) are required for all the deliverables listed in the CDRL 
(or TDRL mentioned in the previous section). DIDs are provided at Appendix C. DIDs 
are generally structural, and provide a heading framework to support provision of the 
relevant information. However the SOR clauses setting benchmarks for the product, and 
the SOW clauses requiring provision of the information, are the means by which the 
adequacy of the architecture is enforced. DID compliance only ensures that topical 
information is provided.  
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7.7 Obtaining Argument and Evidence Certainty 
Obtaining argument and evidence certainty from the tender phases is important because 
it enables early insight into potential argument and evidence shortfalls. It also provides 
context specific agreement between acquirer and supplier on the measures of argument 
and evidence sufficiency for which there is no agreed universal approach. A four step 
process is proposed as follows: 
1. Set benchmarks for argument and evidence suitability, 
2. Proposal of argument and evidence using the tender process, 
3. Evaluate argument and evidence suitability during the tender evaluation, and 
4. Provide argument and evidence assurance during contract execution. 
7.7.1 Setting Benchmarks for Arguments and Evidence 
The first step for obtaining argument and evidence certainty is to set benchmarks for 
argument and evidence sufficiency. In keeping with the notion of a compromise 
between goal-based and prescriptive paradigms, and the notion of pre-constraining parts 
of the argument, the benchmarks should not identify specific techniques or methods for 
evidence generation. They should instead provide a coherent framework for how 
evidence will be related to safety properties, and provide a set of criteria for establishing 
when evidence generation is completed.  
A review of the literature reveals that there is limited literature in the public domain that 
sets explicit benchmarks for measuring argument and evidence sufficiency (refer 
Chapters 2, 5 and 6). Therefore, new approaches are required. 
For argument and claims, one approach has been described in Chapter 5. The approach 
uses concept of a Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL), and a set of generic 
arguments centred around the ‘attributes’ of lifecycle products of specified ‘constraint’ 
level requirements and applicable abstract level requirements, low level requirements, 
source code and executable object code. For evidence, one approach has been developed 
in Chapter 6. It introduces the concept of an Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) 
and ‘Tolerability of Limitations’. The remaining sub-sections discuss how these 
approaches can be incorporated into tenders and contracts. 
7.7.2 Proposal of Argument and Evidence 
To reduce uncertainty about the intended safety argument at the time of contract 
signature, the tender phase requires a mechanism to be informed of the argument. This 
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implies that it is useful to know which claims are going to be applied to each 
architectural ‘constraint’.  
One approach is to require the tenderer, through the tender SOW, to provide a Safety 
Assurance Plan, or similar. The document would describe which set of claims will be 
demonstrated for each ‘constraint’. This may be tabular or using argument notations 
such as those described by Section 2.4.4 (e.g. GSN). To ensure consistency in tenderer 
responses it is advantageous to align where possible the claims to the hierarchy of 
lifecycle products and associated attributes. A DID for the Safety Assurance Plan is 
included at Appendix C. The following is an example of a generic Tender SOW to 
achieve this: 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] per TDRL [XX] to propose the 
attributes/properties that will be assured, for each lifecycle product, for each constraint 
described in the [Conceptual System and Software Architecture Suitability Document]. 
A specific instantiation of these clauses for the Claims Safety Assurance Level approach 
is as follows: 
Assurance of Constraints using Claims Assurance (CSAL) 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] to describe the Claims Safety 
Assurance Level (CSAL) proposed for each constraint described in the [Conceptual 
System and Software Architecture Suitability Document] as per [Table 20]. 
The tender phase also requires a mechanism to provide information on the likely scope 
of the body of evidence and its potential limitations. One approach would be to require 
the tenderer, through the tender SOW, to provide two things: 
• a Development Plan to describe which methods and techniques are going to be 
applied across the development, and 
• a Safety Assurance Plan to describe how any limitations in the evidence produced 
from the methods and techniques described in the development plan are tolerable 
with respect to relevance, trustworthiness and results. 
Development Plans are routinely used. However the key contribution is a partner 
document (the Safety Assurance Plan) that presents the analysis and justification for the 
adequacy of the Development Plan, with respect to the tolerability of limitations in 
evidence concept. By requiring each tenderer to explicitly justify the adequacy of their 
development against defined criteria (e.g. the CSAL and ESAL framework), then 
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suppliers are provided a consistent set of expectations for costing their development 
programs. The Safety Assurance Plan may be similar to documents such as the: 
• System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) from MIL-STD-882, 
• Plan for Software Aspects of Certification (PSAC) from RTCA/DO-178B, or  
• Software Safety Plan from DEF STAN 00-55.  
However the plan described in this chapter is focussed at demonstrating a specific set of 
outcomes with respect to arguments and evidence. 
The Safety Assurance Plan is quite different from a Verification Plan. A Verification 
Plan will usually provide the description of activities used to demonstrate requirements 
satisfaction. The Safety Assurance Plan presents the analysis and justification for the 
adequacy of the Development Plan, by describing the claims and justifying the evidence 
proposed for each type of ‘constraint’. Conventional plans such as verification plans, 
test plans, etc. are still envisaged as companion documents to the Safety Assurance Plan 
and will form part of the body of evidence for the Safety Case. DIDs for the 
Development Plan and Safety Assurance Plan are provided at Appendix C. 
The following is an example of a generic Tender SOW clause to achieve production of 
the Development Plan and Safety Assurance Plan: 
Development Plan. The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Development Plan] per TDRL 
[XX] to describe the methods and techniques proposed to be used throughout the 
development lifecycle, including description of techniques or methods used prior to this 
development but for which evidence is relevant. 
Safety Assurance Plan. The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] per 
TDRL [XX] to describe how the evidence produced from the application of the 
[Tenderer] proposed methods and techniques is proposed to assure tolerability of 
limitations in evidence with respect to relevance, trustworthiness and results, for each 
attribute of each lifecycle product, for each constraint described in the [Conceptual 
System and Software Architecture Suitability Document]. 
A specific instantiation of these clauses for the Evidence Safety Assurance Level and 
Claims Safety Assurance Level approach is as follows: 
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Assurance of Evidence (ESAL and Tolerability of Limitations) 
Defining the Evidence 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Development Plan] to describe the methods and 
techniques proposed to be used throughout the software development lifecycle, 
including description of techniques or methods used prior to this development but for 
which evidence is relevant. 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Development Plan] to describe how all evidence, both 
new and existing, or produced from the application of [Tenderer] proposed methods 
and techniques will be documented, stored, and retrievable. 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Development Plan] to describe how CDRLs [refer list 
at Appendix C] will be produced per the schedule [X]. 
Assessing the Evidence 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] to describe how the evidence 
produced from the application of the [Tenderer] proposed methods and techniques is 
proposed to achieve the Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) requirements for 
tolerability of limitations as defined in [Table 24]; for each attribute of each lifecycle 
product [per Appendix B to this paper], at the CSAL [defined per Table 19] and as 
described in the [Conceptual System and Software Architecture Suitability Document] 
for each proposed constraint. 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] to describe the means, either 
via provision of evidence or via access provisions to tenderer facilities and data, for the 
[Acquirer] to inspect or review all evidence, both new and existing, from the 
application of [Tenderer] proposed methods and techniques for the purposes of 
certification evaluation by the [Acquirer]. 
It is also beneficial to evaluate the tenderer’s understanding of implementing the plans 
and how they will demonstrate safety. Therefore, exemplar elements of the safety case 
should be sought. The following SOW clause elicits such examples. The tenderer is free 
to propose how the information is presented (tabular or using an argument notation such 
as GSN). Chapters 5 and 6 provide an example of how this may be done. 
Exemplar Elements of the Software System Safety Case 
The [Tenderer] shall prepare an [Exemplar Software System Safety Case] to show the 
implementation of the ASAL, CSAL and ESAL framework for at least one constraint in 
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each generalised category, type or class of constraint proposed. The [Tenderer] shall 
describe the set of categories, types or classes by which they have categorised the 
proposed constraints. 
For the flight control system example, assume that each of the proposed options 
provides a Development Plan and Safety Assurance Plan. Note that for the purposes of 
clarity this is an illustrative summary without the corresponding justification. The full 
content of the plans is described by the DIDs at Appendix C, and the examples from 
Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate how such arguments and evidence may be presented. 
Because this chapter is demonstrating how the contracting process can be used to down-
select tenders from a safety assurance perspective, the focus of this example is to 
highlight the differences between the proposals, rather than the detail of what the 
proposals present. 
• Options A and B are holistically quite similar in the range of information – 
evaluation is required to determine the specific evidence differences. 
o ARP4754 system safety program with software development assurance to 
RTCA/DO-178B Level A. 
o Constraints identified for each fault prevention and fault tolerance objective. 
o Constraint assurance proposed, attributes identified and template arguments 
provided for each attribute of each lifecycle product. 
o Draft arguments for relevance, trustworthiness and results for each attribute. 
Attributes traceable to RTCA/DO-178B objectives. 
o Evidence listed corresponding to evidence listed in template argument 
patterns for attributes (refer to Chapter 6 from an example of how evidence 
may be presented). 
• Option C 
o Defence Standard 00-56 Iss 4 system safety program with software 
assurance to Defence Standard 00-55 Iss 2 SIL4, including the application 
of formal methods. 
o Constraints identified for each fault prevention and fault tolerance objective. 
o Constraint assurance proposed, attributes identified and template arguments 
provided for each generalised class of attribute. 
o Draft arguments for relevance, trustworthiness and results for each 
generalised attribute classes. Some repetition in arguments and evidence 
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traceability between high level requirements, abstract refined level 
requirements and low level requirements that requires close evaluation. 
o Evidence listed corresponding to evidence listed in template argument 
patterns for attributes. 
• Option D 
o MIL-STD-882D system safety program, with new software developed to 
RTCA/DO-178B Level A, and reused software developed to MIL-STD-498.  
o Attributes, attribute arguments for relevance, trustworthiness, and results of 
evidence provided for all newly developed software. 
o Substantial reuse of software is proposed, with arguments relating to 
relevance and trustworthiness of evidence proposed to be satisfied by 
service history. 
• Option E 
o MIL-STD-882D safety program, with software developed to MIL-STD-498. 
o Limitations in arguments being provided against any attributes. Relevance 
of evidence is not argued. Trustworthiness of evidence is by peer review. 
o Limitations in evidence against notable attribute categories including 
traceability and verification coverage. 
7.7.3 Evaluation of Argument and Evidence 
The purpose of the tender requesting this information is for evaluation of how evidence 
requirements are priced in the tender response. The retrospective supplementation of 
evidence is rarely straightforward, particularly when it results in a change to 
requirements, design or code. Therefore, it is important to establish if the contractor has 
proposed sufficient evidence. Insight into the following is required: 
• the techniques and methods proposed,  
• what evidence will be produced?,  
• how this evidence will combine?, and  
• what limitations in the evidence might be intolerable?;  
This will permit the acquirer to adjust the contractor’s proposed costing based on the 
suitability and uncertainty of the tender’s proposed evidence set. For example, if there is 
an intolerable limitation in evidence, the acquirer could estimate the cost to resolve the 
limitation, and increase the tenderers cost proposal accordingly. This provides 
normalisation of tenderers responses.  
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Considering the examples proposed in the previous section, it is evident that the 
evidence set proposed by Options A through E varies substantially for each proposal. 
Using the benchmarks set for argument and evidence, each option is evaluated. The 
evaluation results are summarised as follows: 
• Option A – There is a limitation with the extensiveness of normal and robustness 
verification proposed against low level requirements relating to time-dependent 
properties, including synchronisation, of the flight control laws with respect to 
fault tolerance for jitter (early and late) related effects and failure modes on sensor 
inputs. The tenderer is requested to clarify their proposal. 
• Option B – There is a limitation in the extensiveness of analytic and empirical 
verification of behaviours relating to fault tolerance of value failures of air data 
system and attitude/heading reference system sensors. This is due to fault 
tolerance mechanisms being used into device drivers which can only be verified in 
the Systems Integration Laboratory but for which there is no means with the 
current toolset to inject these fault conditions for the purposes of verification. This 
limitation is flagged for clarification with the tenderer. 
• Option C – Limitations in evidence for requirements and verification traceability 
exist between abstract refined, low level requirements, and source code. The 
contractor states that they will not resolve such a limitation, as this evidence is not 
required by their established processes. The limitations are assessed to be 
intolerable due to the role of traceability in understanding behaviours of a product. 
• Option D – Limitations in evidence for reused software are substantial with 
respect to low level requirements, low level requirements verification, and 
coverage of implementation from requirements based verification. These 
limitations are assessed to be intolerable. 
• Option E – Already eliminated based on architectural evaluation. 
Options A and B require further clarification with the Tenderers, and this will be 
sought. Options C and D are eliminated from the tender evaluation due to intolerable 
evidence limitations, and Option E was already eliminated based on architectural 
shortfalls. Clarification with Options A and B reveals the following additional 
information for the evaluation: 
• Option B – the limitation remains as the tenderer claims that low level verification 
undertaken prior to integration verification will provide sufficient evidence in this 
regard. Therefore verification of these requirements on the target computer with 
 272  
credible fault conditions is via inference only. These limitations are assessed to be 
intolerable. Option B is eliminated from consideration. 
• Option A – the extensiveness of normal and robustness verification has been 
adequately clarified and is acceptable. 
Therefore, Option A is selected as the preferred Tenderer, and negotiations are 
commenced to progress to contract signature. By coincidence, Option A corresponds to 
the examples used in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
Note that in reality there are many other selection criteria for a product, and so it is 
common for capability, force integration, and political factors amongst others to affect 
selection. These other factors may sometimes require compromise on the ideal safety 
solution. This doesn’t invalidate the process proposed in this thesis, and the process in 
this thesis enables the acquirer to be informed about the safety assurance aspects such 
that it is possible to make informed trade-offs between safety assurance and other 
selection criteria. For example, it may be possible to choose one of the other options, 
and make decisions regarding risk treatment or retention, because other benefits 
outweigh the impact of its limitations. This may be the strategy chosen for rapid 
acquisitions with operational imperatives. 
7.7.4 Providing Argument and Evidence Assurance 
Once the preferred tenderer has been identified (Option A); and uncertainties regarding 
the claims and evidence assurances are tolerable, then a contract can be written. 
Under the contract, the acquirer will require a means to establish if the final ‘as-
delivered’ claims and evidence meets the prescribed benchmarks. This can be achieved 
by requiring the contractor to deliver (via appropriate SOW contract clause) a Safety 
Assurance Summary Document. The document would describe how the assurance of 
the ‘attributes’ of software lifecycle products actually achieves the benchmarks 
established during tender processes. The following is an example of the generic 
Contract SOW clauses to achieve this: 
Achievement of Claims and Attributes of Software Lifecycle Products 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Summary] per CDRL [XX] to 
describe the attributes that have been assured, for each software lifecycle product, for 
each constraint described in the [System and Software Architecture Document]. 
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Assessing the Evidence 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Summary] per CDRL [XX] to 
describe how the evidence produced from the application of the [Contractor] proposed 
methods and techniques has assured the tolerability of limitations in evidence with 
respect to relevance, trustworthiness and results, for each attribute of each software 
lifecycle product, for each constraint described in the [System and Software 
Architecture Document]. 
A specific instantiation of these clauses for the Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
approach is as follows: 
Assurance of Constraints using Claims Assurance (CSAL) 
Proposal of CSAL 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] per CDRL [XX] to describe 
the Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) proposed at commencement of development 
for each constraint described in the [(Preliminary) System and Software Architecture 
Document] as per [Table 20]. 
Achievement of CSAL 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Summary] per CDRL [XX] to 
describe the Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) established for each constraint 
described in the [System and Software Architecture Document] as per [Table 20]. 
Provision of Evidence (ESAL and Tolerability of Limitations) 
Defining the Evidence 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Development Plan] per CDRL [XX] to describe the 
methods and techniques proposed to be used throughout the development lifecycle, 
including description of techniques or methods used prior to this development but for 
which evidence is relevant. 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Development Plan] to describe how all evidence, 
both new and existing, or produced from the application of [Contractor] proposed 
methods and techniques will be documented, stored, and retrievable. 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Development Plan] to describe how CDRLs [XXXX] 
will be produced per the schedule [refer Appendix C]. 
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Assessing the Evidence 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Summary] to describe how the 
evidence produced from the application of the [Contractor] proposed methods and 
techniques achieves the Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) requirements for 
tolerability of limitations as defined in [Table 24]; for each attribute of each lifecycle 
product [per Appendix B], at the CSAL [Table 19] and as described in the [System and 
Software Architectural Assurance Document] for each constraint. 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Configuration Index] to describe the configuration of 
the [System] and [Software] relevant to the evidence, claims and architecture described 
by the [Safety Assurance Summary]. 
Safety Case 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Case] per CDRL XX to describe how the 
safety objectives, and safety assurance requirements of the contract SOR have been 
achieved for [System] and [Software], and to provide the argument and evidence to 
show the satisfaction of ASAL/CSAL/ESAL criteria for each constraint. 
Examples of the argument and evidence to show the satisfaction of ASAL/CSAL/ESAL 
criteria for each constraint have been presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is envisaged 
that this information forms the content of the safety assurance summary and that the 
safety case is a summary level argument about what has been achieved (or not achieved) 
and demonstrated (or not demonstrated). The safety case must also identify the risk of 
what hasn’t been achieved and demonstrated, as described by Chapter 8. 
Certification Evaluation 
The [Contractor] shall prepare a [Safety Assurance Plan] to describe the means, either 
via provision of evidence or via access provisions to tenderer facilities and data, for the 
[Acquirer] to inspect or review all evidence, both new and existing, from the 
application of [Contractor] proposed methods and techniques for the purposes of 
certification evaluation by the [Acquirer]. 
The [Contractor] shall provide evidence or access to evidence as described in the 
[Acquirer] approved [Contractor]’s [Safety Assurance Plan] for the purposes of 
certification evaluation by the [Acquirer]. 
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The [Contractor] shall prepare the following deliverables and deliver them in 
accordance with the document delivery schedule defined in the CDRL (refer to 
Appendix C): 
• [System and Software Architectural Assurance Document] [CDRL XX] 
• [Development Plan] [CDRL XX] 
• [Safety Assurance Plan] [CDRL XX] 
• [Safety Assurance Summary] [CDRL XX] 
• [Safety Case] [CDRL XX] 
The following DIDs (non-exhaustive list) may also be in the CDRL depending on 
intellectual property rights. These are optional with respect to this framework, and the 
acquirer’s contracting policy and certification guidance documents should be sought for 
specific requirements regarding deliverables. 
• System Development Specification 
• Sub-System Design Document 
• Software Requirements Specification 
• Software Design Document 
• Source Code Repository 
• Executable Code Repository 
• Toolset Repository 
• Configuration Index / Version Description 
• System and Software Lifecycle Data Repository 
• Verification Plan / Software Verification Plan 
• Verification Results / Software Verification Results 
• System Verification Results 
7.8 Resolving Issues after Contract Signature 
Despite best intentions, whenever there is uncertainty there is potential for it to lead to 
an undesirable outcome as development progresses. The previous sections have largely 
been focussed on bounding the uncertainty in areas that affect safety. However, once a 
contract is commenced, if issues do arise with respect to architecture, claims or 
evidence, then it is important to agree the approach for resolution of these issues.  
Considering the on-going example of Option A, and let’s assume that during 
preliminary design review several issues are identified as follows: 
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• Issue 1 – Proposed treatments to value failures of air data system airspeed data are 
identified to be inadequate under simulated high alpha conditions. A revised 
treatment is proposed requiring an adaptation to flight control law transition 
criteria to provide an improved fault tolerance against this fault.  
• Issue 2 – Verification and validation of the accuracy of the requirements relating 
to discrete implementation of the legacy analogue control laws is identified to 
contain shortfalls relating to the reuse of modelling. Additional modelling is 
viewed as required by the acquirer. 
There are two main options for providing contract scope for the work to resolve 
unforeseen issues that arise: either within the original contract, or through a contract 
change. Both are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
7.8.1 Resolution within Contract Scope 
Resolution within the contract scope is dependent on the supplier acknowledging the 
requirement to resolve the issue. However, when profit margins and schedule are at risk, 
suppliers may argue work is out of scope. Consider the two issues: 
• Issue 1: This treatment is deemed in-scope of contract because it was a contractor 
oversight during the conceptual design proposal. The contractor accepts this and 
evidence is provided commensurate with previously identified attributes, lifecycle 
products and constraints. 
• Issue 2: Acquirer and supplier enter into contractual dispute regarding the 
provision of additional evidence modelling the discrete implementation, because 
the supplier claims their limitations in the modelling are tolerable. 
One way to address Issue 2 is to make absolutely explicit this requirement for 
limitations to be resolved to the satisfaction of the acquirer through a statement of work 
line item. This line item can then be priced and suppliers will be empowered to resolve 
such issues. An example of how this might be achieved is as follows: 
Intolerable Limitations in Evidence, Claims or Architecture 
Where the [Acquirer]’s certification evaluation establishes that the [Contractor] has 
not achieved the requirements of the {reference applicable SOR and SOW clauses 
relevant to architecture, argument and evidence}, or there are shortfalls in the 
‘Tolerability of Limitations’ of evidence versus the criteria specified by this contract, 
then the [Contractor] shall undertake one or more of the following remediation actions 
to resolve the shortfalls to the satisfaction of the certification authority: 
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• engineering change to architectural constraints,  
• engineering change to implementation of architectural constraints, or 
• additional analysis, verification and validation by further or supplementary 
application of methods or techniques.  
The [Contractor] shall amend all relevant deliverables per the CDRL to incorporate the 
engineering changes and additional evidence. 
Note to Contractors 
The above clause provides the means for the certification authority to address shortfalls 
against architecture, argument and evidence expectations. It is intended to require the 
contractor to accurately cost the full value of achieving a certifiable product, and not 
simply to provide the product as is based on the specification or scope of work defined.  
While this clause may be interpreted to result in unbounded programmatic risk for the 
contractor, the intent is to focus both acquirer and contractor efforts at establishing 
unambiguous consensus during the tender process and contract negotiations. The 
contractor should not sign the contract if they believe there remains substantial 
uncertainty regarding the provision of evidence against the framework, and instead 
request further clarification during contract negotiations. 
The aim is to ensure that the tender phases and contract negotiation phases have 
systematically identified, disclosed and evaluated the intended body of evidence and 
that all intolerable shortfalls have been included within the contract. Thus the example 
clauses would only come into effect if an issue remains, and this would be less likely 
and less serious because the evidence planning was systematic in the first place. 
The drawback is that suppliers may interpret this as a risky statement of work line item 
and cost it commensurately. Some may even push back and ask for it to be removed. 
However there are benefits to the behaviour this generates for tender evaluation. If the 
acquirer evaluates the cost attribution against this line item from each tenderer, and 
there are notable differences in the costing (or absences because it isn’t priced), then the 
acquirer can use this to establish the tenderer’s confidence in their own estimates. This 
is a very useful during tender evaluation. Even if the clause is removed during contract 
negotiations, its inclusion during the tender process is revealing about supplier 
confidence in their proposals and costing. 
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7.8.2 Resolution Outside of Contract Scope 
Resolution of shortfalls outside the contract scope is easy from the perspective of 
defining the scope of work; as usually the analysis to determine that the architectural 
changes, design changes or evidence supplementation will be clear from the analysis 
done to demonstrate it is outside the original contract. If there is contingency funding to 
fund the contract change, then it will also be relatively straightforward for the acquirer. 
However, if contingency funding is not available then additional funding must be 
sought from Government. Most Governments responsible for funding military aviation 
system acquisitions are not sympathetic to issues that emerge which were not forecast 
within original funding, allocated as contingencies, or articulated as program risks.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the approach described at Section 7.8.1 is preferred at 
the tender phase, so that the likelihood of additional out of scope work is well 
understood during the tender phase, and minimised in the contract phase. 
7.9 Contract Execution 
The contract execution phase of the lifecycle is where the contractor develops an 
architecture and body of evidence in-line with the ASAL/CSAL/ESAL benchmarks. 
Focus will be on progressively establishing achievement of the objectives of the 
ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework over the lifecycle. The recommended approach is 
through on-going visibility through a series of systems engineering reviews, and 
through progressive delivery of evidence via drafts at these reviews. For example the 
Design Reviews (Conceptual, Preliminary, Critical at System and Sub-system levels) 
defined by (US DoD, 1995), and (United States Air Force Space Command, 2009) 
provides an example of how this might be achieved. 
The key goals of the certification authority during the contract execution will be 
visibility of potential shortfalls against the ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework such that 
these can be addressed in a cost effective manner for the contractor under the terms of 
the contract. The following types of shortfalls should be monitored for: 
• evidence shortfalls that inform product suitability against ASAL benchmarks, 
• product shortfalls against ASAL benchmarks, 
• shortfalls against CSAL benchmarks, and 
• evidence shortfalls against ESAL benchmarks. 
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A goal of the contractor during the contract execution will be to achieve contract 
milestones within costs and schedule constraints, while meeting the requirements of the 
contract SOR and SOW. Timely visibility of shortfalls will be essential to keeping the 
project within cost and schedule constraints. It is recommended that the contractor 
employ specialists that understand fault tolerance and the principles on which the 
ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework is based, in order to minimise potential of 
ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework ignorance based rework. It is also recommended that 
these specialists have a direct line to the project manager in order to ensure technical 
assurance aspects of the project inform project management and resourcing decisions. 
7.10 Summary 
This chapter has examined factors affecting the provision of safety assurance evidence 
and safety regulation for military aviation contracts, including integration of the 
standard with the contract lifecycle, enforcement of design requirements, obtaining of 
assurance evidence and resolution of shortfalls in product and evidence. 
This chapter has examined how the proposed ASAL/CSAL/ESAL assurance framework 
might be contracted for in the acquisition or modification of military aviation systems. 
Examples of Tender SOR, Tender SOW, Contract SOR and Contract SOW clauses to 
implement the ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework have been provided and the rationale 
behind these explained. DIDs have been provided at Appendix C. 
The approach chosen to implement the ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework is based upon 
establishing the minimum necessary understanding of architectural fault tolerance and 
assurance during the tender/proposal phase, to enable effective tender/proposal 
evaluation, and to support bound-able contract negotiations and contract signature. 
Furthermore, guidance is provided on contracting for architectural, claims and evidence 
assurance across the tender/contract lifecycle, including project definition and approval, 
tender preparation, tender responses, tender evaluation, contract preparation, contract 
negotiation and contract execution. 
The impact of uncertainty at the time of contract signature has been examined with 
respect to the potential for a successful contractual outcome. Approaches have been 
proposed for obtaining assurances and bounding uncertainty by pre-contract and 
throughout the contract. An example was used to illustrate the benefit in the approach. 
The proposed framework ensures that product design requirements pertaining to safety 
can be communicated, established and agreed through the contracting process. It 
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achieves this by setting SOR and SOW requirements for both the tender and contract 
phases. The framework also make the requirements for access and delivery of assurance 
evidence explicit by setting benchmarks, but without constraining the design solution 
unnecessarily. The framework also provides a means to address both new and legacy 
developments through using the tender process (and contract process) as an uncertainty 
reduction activity, thus providing flexible accommodation across differing acquisition 
paradigms. Finally, the framework provides arrangements for resolving shortfalls in 
product and evidence are explicit in the contract and meet both acquirer and supplier 
expectations.  
At the start of the chapter, the question was raised as to how to seek the right 
information and effectively evaluate it with respect to safety for military aviation 
software systems. This chapter has provided a way to improve this activity, and address 
the challenges it creates. Evaluation of feasibility and effectiveness is presented in 
Chapter 10. 
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8 Relating Assurance to Risk 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have presented a framework for reasoning about the suitability of 
product behaviours and the evidence used to provide knowledge of them. The 
knowledge of product behaviours; layers of defences; individual defences; constraints; 
lifecycle products; attributes of lifecycle products; and the relevance, trustworthiness 
and results of evidence all provide confidence in the knowledge of risks. The ASAL, 
CSAL and ESAL frameworks (of Chapters 4, 5 and 6) have defined properties of these 
aspects to measure the knowledge of product behaviours and knowledge.  
In practice, however, there will often be issues with development. The reality of project 
cost and schedule constraints means that authorities may be faced with shortfalls. There 
may be a product shortfall that is known to affect a defence, or there are evidence 
shortfalls which lead to uncertainty. Both have an impact on risk. 
In Chapter 3, a model containing principles and usability guidelines was established. 
This chapter describes how the knowledge gained from the frameworks of Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 can be used to inform knowledge of risks, and decisions regarding the treatment 
or retention of risks duly informed. Hence, this chapter focusses on addressing the 
principles and usability criteria shown in bold italics within Figure 72. 
 
Figure 72: Implementing Key Principles of Safety Assurance with Respect to Risks 
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8.1 What is Risk? 
Section 1.2 defined risk as the combination of the likelihood of harm and the severity of 
that harm (Ministry of Defence, 2007). In the context of aircraft systems in this thesis, 
harm would normally be associated with an aircraft accident or incident. Based on this 
definition common practice has been to define risk matrixes in terms of these two 
elements of risk, as shown in Table 30. Note that Table 30 shows a composite of risk 
matrixes (and risk language) from several standards. The displaced colour segments 
emphasise differences between the constituent risk matrixes, highlighting that the 
definitions may vary by standard or be contextual to the system being developed. 
Severity 
 
Probability / 
Frequency 
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent High / 
Unacceptable / 
Intolerable 
High / 
Unacceptable / 
Intolerable 
Serious/ 
Undesirable / 
Intolerable 
Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Undesirable 
Probable High / 
Unacceptable / 
Intolerable 
High / 
Unacceptable / 
Intolerable 
Serious / 
Undesirable / 
Undesirable  
Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Tolerable 
Occasional High / 
Unacceptable / 
Intolerable 
Serious / 
Undesirable / 
Undesirable 
Medium/ 
Undesirable / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Low / Acceptable / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Remote Serious / 
Undesirable / 
Undesirable 
Medium / 
Undesirable / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Low / Acceptable / 
Tolerable 
Improbable Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Medium / 
Acceptable with 
Review / 
Tolerable 
Low / Acceptable / 
Tolerable 
Eliminated / 
Incredible 
Eliminated / 
Tolerable with 
Review 
Eliminated / 
Tolerable 
Eliminated / 
Tolerable 
Eliminated / 
Tolerable 
Table 30: Risk Matrix Composite from MIL-STD-882C/E and DEF STAN 00-56 Iss 2 
While the aforementioned definition of risk is consistent with the widespread usage of 
risk definitions in safety and risk management standards, there are drawbacks to this 
definition. 
8.1.1 Difficulties Estimating Likelihood 
A notable difficulty with the definition of risk is in relation to how the likelihood of 
harm is estimated (Rae, et al., 2012). In traditional safety assessments, this is by 
assuming the likelihood is characterised by probability distribution functions or 
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frequency measurements, and thus assuming that likelihood equals 
probability/frequency of failure. This had led to traditional safety methodologies using 
quantitative analysis of probabilities of failures to establish if probabilistic targets have 
been met (e.g. probabilities calculated during fault tree analysis). However, there is 
increasing recognition that while the quantitative approach is supported by reasoning 
based on logic, there is very limited empirical evidence that the quantitative estimates of 
probability are reliable when used for assessing risk for non-trivial systems (Rae, et al., 
2012). If the probabilistic approach to risk evaluation were valid, then there should be 
evidence of the following: 
• random processes (i.e. those characterised by probability distributions) 
contributing to accidents – in having reviewed numerous accident reports from 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2012) and (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 2013), the author hasn’t found widespread evidence of random processes 
being major contributors to accidents; 
• probabilities estimated during safety analysis being achieved in practice – analysis 
of predicted manufacturers data versus in-service data collection from aircraft 
operations, and evidence of development, review or approval of design and 
maintenance treatments to such shortfalls (Air Lift Systems Program Office, 
2011), suggests that the estimated probabilities are often not achieved; and 
• risk assessments based on probabilities being complementary to the risk treatment 
or retention decision process – in risk assessments for shortfalls of aircraft 
systems, improving the reliability of the failed item doesn’t often equate to safety 
improvement, as it doesn’t always improve the system’s resilience against the 
source of the problem (Air Lift Systems Program Office, 2011). 
In addition to (Rae, et al., 2012)’s evidence, this suggests evidence of the probabilistic 
approach being valid is limited. 
8.1.2 Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Some developers try to avoid the problems of quantitative probabilities by presenting 
qualitative assessments of likelihood instead. Unfortunately many of them fall into one 
of more of the following traps: 
• presenting a qualitative indication of event frequency without justification; 
• a quantitative combination of contributing qualitative factors; and 
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• presenting a qualitative assessment that summarises many factors that would 
reduce the likelihood, but with the following drawbacks: 
o it is difficult to distinguish likelihoods more remote than occasional, 
o it is difficult to determine what is overlooked in the assessment, and 
o arguments tend to focus on the remoteness of initiating conditions and 
operational mitigations, rather than on the effects on the behaviours of the 
system and the operator/s. 
While the qualitative assessments of risk are often more compelling than the 
quantitative assessments based on probabilities, there isn’t an established means of 
consistently qualifying the risk estimate assessment, and thus prompting appropriate 
decisions on additional risk treatment or retention. 
8.1.3 Likelihood versus Probability 
As stated above, likelihood is often equated to probability of failure in definitions of 
risk. While there are some similarities between what the words mean, there are 
differences between these terms that may be suggestive of the problems outlined above. 
In the English language (refer (Oxford University Press, 2010) and (The Macquarie 
Library, 2002)) they are basically synonymous, often defined in terms of each other. 
Sometimes probability is associated with quantitative values, whereas likelihood is 
qualitative, but this distinction is not universally agreed. 
In general mathematics they are identical - Likelihood(parameter) = P (event | 
parameter) (Azzalini, 1996). However, in the statistical branch of mathematics they 
mean different things. For probability, the probability distribution function (PDF) is 
characterised based on observed or estimated data (Devore, 2011). For example, if a 
large sample of historical data has been collected, then using this data it is possible to 
find the probability of an individual event within the PDF approximated by the data 
sample. The PDF models the frequency of events, not the reasons for them. 
For likelihood, the specific outcome is anticipated but the PDF parameters are unknown 
(Azzalini, 1996). The type of PDF may be known in some specific cases where the 
underlying mechanisms are well understood, but usually the parameters may not be 
known. Likelihood is equal to the probability of the observed data given some unknown 
parameter value (Azzalini, 1996). Likelihood can be used to estimate the PDF and its 
parameters and to quantify uncertainty in those estimates. In essence likelihood implies 
that the underlying factors need to be understood before the probability of the PDF can 
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be estimated, and based on the level of knowledge of those factors there will be a 
‘proportionate’ amount of uncertainty. The definition of likelihood suggests that the 
knowledge required to inform a likelihood assessment differs from that required to 
establish a PDF based on estimated or observed data. 
8.1.4 Alternatives to Probabilities in Risk Matrices 
The most widespread recognition of difficulties with probabilities is evident from the 
way safety assurance standards have dealt with software by equating software levels or 
integrity levels with severity (refer to Section 2.4), albeit by adopting this approach the 
assessment of risk is no longer explicit. MIL-STD-882C/E proposes that risk can be 
assessed by replacing probability with the degree of control the software has in relation 
to the hazard or accident. The degree of control is categorised and a risk matrix 
established, as shown in Table 31. The assumption then is that the level of risk is 
equated to a level of rigour to treat the risk, and not for example that an autonomous 
piece of software is reduced to no safety impact.  
Severity 
 
Control Category 
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
I – Autonomous  High High Medium Low 
II – Semi-
Autonomous 
High Serious Medium Low 
III – Redundant 
Fault Tolerant 
Serious Medium Low Low 
IV – Influential Medium Low Low Low 
V – No Safety 
Impact 
Low Low Low Low 
Table 31: Software Risk Matrix Composite from MIL-STD-882C/E 
The control category approach assumes that the degree of control the software has over 
critical functions and information is central amongst the underlying factors contributing 
to likelihood of the hazard. This is true in part; but the degree of control is not the only 
factor. So while the control category approach offers an improvement over probabilities, 
it is too narrow minded with respect to the complete set of factors that would 
characterise the likelihood of the hazard or accident. It also doesn’t provide a means of 
treating risk via changing the parameters of the risk matrix. Treatment was by level of 
rigour, which doesn’t really measure the likelihood of a fault or event and the associated 
consequences being realised (implicitly it assumes the level of rigour has been 
successfully achieved, which we’ve shown is rarely the case). This thesis proposes that 
both product and evidence knowledge factors are necessary to inform likelihood. 
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8.2 Redefining Risk – a Strength of Defences Paradigm 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis have established a range of factors that inform 
knowledge of mechanisms which could contribute to risks. Based on these factors, risk 
of an accident is a function of: 
• the accident consequence severity (i.e. how bad the accident could be in terms of 
fatalities, injuries, material loss, economic loss, etc.), and 
• the likelihood of any event or fault propagating through the causal chain to an 
accident: which is a function of: 
o the strength of defences (refer Chapter 4) in the causal chain between 
events, initiation of faults and the accident; and 
o the knowledge established from evidence (refer Chapters 5 and 6) of the 
behaviour of the defences in the implementation. 
The stronger the defences are, the better the defences are at blocking the causal chain to 
the accident, and the better our knowledge of the behaviours of the defences, then the 
lesser the risk of the accident. The goal is to seek knowledge of the defences in the 
causal chain, and to seek knowledge of the behaviours of these defences from evidence 
under applicable conditions to establish the strength of defences in a given causal chain 
or propagation path. Concurrently, it is important to characterise or measure the 
uncertainty that remains in order to characterise the likelihood that the underlying 
knowledge is valid.  
The following sub-sections present the rationale using GSN for how these factors relate 
to evaluating confidence in the knowledge of risks, using the factors identified from 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
8.2.1 Confidence in the Knowledge of Risks 
Figure 73 proposed that confidence in the knowledge of risks is characterised by the 
extent to which the knowledge of risks outweighs uncertainty. Knowledge and 
uncertainty of risks can only be compared if they can be characterised by measurement, 
and thus it is necessary to establish how knowledge and uncertainty can be measured. 
The goals G_Knowledge_Risks and G_Uncertainty_Risks from Figure 73 are 
developed in Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 respectively. C_Knowledge_V_Uncertainty is 
examined in Section 8.2.3. 
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Figure 73: Confidence in the Knowledge of Risks 
8.2.2 Knowledge of Risks 
Knowledge of risks is a function of the knowledge of the severity of credible 
consequences and of the strength of defences in the causal chain between the event or 
fault initiation and the realisation of the consequence. Figure 74 presents an argument 
over both of these factors.  
 
Figure 74: Knowledge of Risks 
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The goal G_Severity_Consequence would be developed by arguing over the extent of 
the identification, analysis and evaluation of the consequences and their associated 
severity. In essence it is an argument about the extensiveness of the hazard and accident 
analysis, with focus on identifying the range of consequences that could occur under 
intended and unintended behaviours of the system. Chapter 2 has identified the types of 
techniques that may be relevant to such analysis and Chapter 4 (Figure 16 and Figure 
17) provides guidance on how it may be modelled and analysed. As developing this 
goal further is dependent on the type of hazard and analysis undertaken, it isn’t 
developed further within this thesis. The developer may use existing hazard analysis 
argument patterns, such as (Department of Computer Science, 2004), to reason about 
knowledge of severity of consequences using evidence from hazard analysis. 
The goal G_Stength_of_Defences is used to represent the knowledge of defences 
obtained through the reasoning presented in Chapter 4. Refer to Chapter 4 for 
continuation of the development of this goal. 
8.2.3 Uncertainty of Risks 
Figure 75 is the complement of Figure 74 in that it details the measuring of limitations 
in identification, analysis and evaluation of the severity of consequences and the 
strength of defences. This branch of the argument is very important for characterising 
likelihood in the risk equation as its purpose is to measure uncertainty, a key property of 
a likelihood estimate. 
 
Figure 75: Uncertainty of Risks 
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The goal G_Uncertain_Sev_Conseq would be developed by arguing over the limitations 
of the extent of the identification, analysis and evaluation of the consequences and their 
associated severity. In essence it is an argument about the identification of shortfalls of 
the hazard and accident analysis. As developing this goal further is dependent on the 
type of hazard and analysis undertaken, as per Section 8.2.2, it isn’t developed further 
within this thesis. 
The goal G_Uncertain_Strength_Defence is developed in Figure 76. Figure 76 is a 
complement to Figure 23 in Chapter 4. While being based on the same underlying 
models as the Chapter 4 case, Figure 76 adjusts the sub-goals to provide positive 
measurement of shortfalls. For example G_Paths _Limitations examines for existence of 
additional propagation paths, G_LoD_Limitations examines for the necessity for 
additional defences in propagation paths, and G_Suitability_of_Defence_Limitations 
examines for unresolved weaknesses in individual defences.  
 
Figure 76: Uncertainty of Strength of Defences 
G_LoD_Limitations and G_Suitability_of_Defence_Limitations refer to Chapter 4 for 
information on how they are developed further. While Chapter 4 doesn’t develop these 
goals specifically, the information to develop these goals is obtained from examining 
G_Uncertain_Strength_Defence
Knowledge of limitations in 
idenification/analysis/evaluation of 
strength of defences informs 
uncertainty
S_Uncetainty_Strength_D
efences
Argument over possible 
sources of limitations in the 
strength of defences.
G_Suitability_of_Defence_Limita
tions
Unresolved weaknesses in the 
suitability of individual defences 
can be shown to exist.
C_Uncertainty_Strength_of_Def
ence
Factors affecting the strength of 
defences are: knowledge of 
propagation paths, suitability of 
individual defences, and the 
defence in depth.
G_Paths_Limitations
Additional propagation paths (i.e. not 
yet identified/analysed/evaluated) 
between initiating events or faults and 
the respective consequences can be 
shown to exist for which there 
insufficient defence.
M_Prop_Paths
Refer to Figure 17 (Fault/
Event Propagation Paths)
S_Paths_Limitations
Argument over opportunities 
where additional propagation 
paths may exist.
M_Defence_In_Depth
Refer to Figure 16 
(Provision of Defences, 
Defence in Depth)
G_LoD_Limitations
Additional layers of defence are 
necessary to bound the uncertanty 
that the initiating event or fault will 
propagate to the respective 
consequence.
C_Suitability_of_Defence
Strength of an individual 
defence with respect to the 
relevant initiating event or 
fault, the respective 
propagation path, and 
consequences.
n defences
n paths
Chapter 4 – Section 4.6
Chapter 4 –
Section 4.6
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the adequacy of analysis supporting the knowledge aspects from Chapter 4, and the 
associated relationships to Chapters 5 and 6. 
8.2.4 Knowledge Versus Uncertainty 
Sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 explain how knowledge and uncertainty of risks may be 
characterised, such that confidence in the knowledge of risks could be obtained from 
comparison per the discussion of Section 8.2.1 (Figure 73). Figure 77 describes that the 
knowledge outweighs the uncertainty when the knowledge no longer makes 
improvement to the knowledge reasonable. Figure 77 defines reasonable as being based 
the notion of a cost benefit analysis. There must be perceived benefit to improved 
knowledge of control of the risks, perhaps because the source of uncertainty reveals 
additional information about the behaviour of a defence which might undermine the 
utility of the defence, or because there are credible propagation paths not yet revealed 
by the existing knowledge. If the costs of turning uncertainty into knowledge are 
grossly disproportion to the potential benefit, then the knowledge improvement may not 
be reasonable. 
 
Figure 77: Knowledge versus Uncertainty 
Goals G_Cost and G_Benefit are developed further in Figure 78 and Figure 79. 
Cost 
Figure 78 shows that the total cost of reducing elements of uncertainty is made of the 
sum of the cost of reducing the uncertainty for each element of uncertainty. The cost of 
reducing elements of uncertainty has to be considered both individually for each 
element of uncertainty, and in total. S_Cost is argued both individually and in total. This 
G_Cost
Cost of further reducing elements 
of uncertainty is not 
disproportionate to the 
knowledge gained.
S_Know_V_Uncertainty
Argument over the factors that 
make improvement in 
knowledge reasonable.
G_Benefit
There is benefit in improved 
knowledge of control of 
risks.
C_Knowledge_V_Uncertainty
Factors affecting the 
reasonability of knowledge 
improvement are: the cost of 
obtaining the knowledge; and 
benefit in terms of improved 
knowledge of control of risks.
C_Reasonably
Reasonable in this 
context is used to imply 
the legal tests of 
reasonabality.
G_Knowledge_V_Uncertainty
Knowledge of risks outweighs the 
impact of uncertainty of risks if further 
reduction of uncertainty does not 
reasonably improve knowledge of 
risks
Confidence Knowledge 
Risks (Figure 73)
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is because the proportionality of the relationship between cost and benefit may differ 
depending on which pieces of uncertainty are combined. 
 
Figure 78: Cost of Additional Knowledge 
Benefit 
There is a benefit to improved knowledge, if the knowledge changes any of the factors 
informing risk (Figure 79). 
 
Figure 79: Benefit of Additional Knowledge 
Figure 80 identifies the factors informing risk and how additional knowledge of these is 
likely to change the evaluation of risk. Specifically, the severity, additional paths, need 
for additional defences at differing layers and the adequacy of individual defences are 
all factors that might change the risk evaluation. 
G_Benefit
There is benefit in improved 
knowledge of control of 
risks.
G_No_Risk_Change
The knowledge of risks is not 
improved if there is no change 
in factors informing risk.
S_Benefit
Argument that knowledge 
improvement is benefiticial if 
there is a change to the 
factors informing risks.
C_Benefit
Factors informing risk 
relate to those defined in 
subGoals to 
G_Knowledge_Risks 
(Figure 74)
Knowledge v Uncertainty 
(Figure 77)
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Figure 80: No Change in Risk from Additional Knowledge 
The goals G_Severity, G_Additional_Paths, G_Additional_Defence, and 
G_Additional_Layer depend on the specific element of uncertainty, in the context of the 
chain of evidence and defences of a specific solution. For this reason, they are context 
dependent and are not developed further in this thesis. 
A critic might ask how is the value of the knowledge known when the knowledge is not 
yet known. At one extreme, there is the value of knowing there is a problem, perhaps 
because some issue is known about from the evidence that already exists. At the other 
extreme, the value may not be fully appreciated until the evidence exists. The developer 
must estimate the value of the as yet unattained evidence based on the evidence they 
already have. If the uncertainty is significant, then it is not possible to show the cost is 
grossly disproportionate, unless the severity is very low. However, if the uncertainty in 
small, then the extent of knowledge will be suggestive of the value from the more 
specific sense in which the uncertainty can be characterised. Basing the comparison on 
the concept of a gross disproportionality aids in resolving this conundrum, by favouring 
seeking the knowledge unless it is very certain that it won’t provide a benefit. 
8.3 Conducting the Risk Evaluation 
One means of establishing when knowledge outweighs uncertainty, is to use the ASAL, 
CSAL, and ESAL frameworks as the threshold for when knowledge outweighs 
uncertainty. In these cases, risk is increased when there is a limitation against the 
applicable ASAL, CSAL and ESAL thresholds specified by Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
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respectively. The following sub-sections explain how the risk maybe evaluated based on 
the architectural, claims and evidence aspects. 
This approach of using the ASAL, CSAL and ESAL benchmarks as the threshold for 
knowledge outweighing uncertainty is valid because inherent within each SAL 
framework is an explicit evaluation of the impact of uncertainty.  
8.3.1 Architectural Assurance Impact on Risk 
Chapter 4 has established that the risk is related to the adequacy of defences for each 
propagation path between the initiating fault or event and the realisation of 
consequences. Therefore, the risk is increased whenever insufficient defences are 
provided within each given propagation path. Table 32 proposes a way in which this 
relationship may be expressed, with risk increasing for every reduction in defences on a 
propagation path. 
Assured Layers 
of Defences
1
 at 
Perspective 
Layers
2
 
Severity of Consequences 
Catastrophic Hazardous / 
Major 
Minor No Safety Effect 
No Defences Very High High Medium Low 
One Layer 
Defence 
High Medium Low Low 
Two Layer 
Defences 
Medium Low Low Low 
Three Layer 
Defences 
Low Low Low Low 
Notes: 
1. A defence is assured when the CSAL is satisfied for each requisite lifecycle product needed to avoid a 
discontinuity in the chain of evidence, and each attribute of each lifecycle meets the requisite ESAL 
criteria. 
2. The perspective layers are defined as per Chapter 4. 
3. Risks are characterised as Low, Medium, High and Very High. Low risks are acceptable risks in this 
framework. High and Very High risks are generally unacceptable. Medium risks are only tolerable if 
the certification authority decides to retain the risk due to operational imperative rather than to treat it. 
There may be time bounds on how long the certification authority may wish to retain a medium risk, 
when the exposure to risk is evaluated against the cost of treating the risk. 
Table 32: Architectural Impact on Risk 
The risk quantities used in Table 32 are intended to be interpreted as relative rather than 
absolute. The quantities are intended to communicate the relative increase in risk over 
the specified benchmarks, and should be used to compare which risks are afforded the 
primary attention for treatment. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Recall the example from Chapter 4 (Section 4.8). The initial design iteration only 
included defences at the intra-system and extra-system layers, and thus there was no 
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defence at the direct layer. Using Table 32, the risk associated with using this design 
would be Medium, based on there being only two layers of defence and the severity 
being Catastrophic. Assume now that the system has already been designed, and that 
rather than simply revising the design at the conceptual or preliminary phases the design 
progresses to final certification with this limitation. The certification authority is faced 
with a Medium risk and must decide if the risk should be treated.  
For this specific circumstance, the cost of doing this would be the cost of implementing 
the software change to perform the reasonability check of attitude data sources, a 
software change to the sensor data conditioning software component. This would 
require changes to requirements and design documentation, in addition to revised safety 
analysis, and verification and validation, including regression work. The developer 
estimates the cost of this to be $1M and three months impact to the schedule, although 
in practice the costs used within the cost benefit analysis will be dependent on much 
greater range of factors than just the developer price proposal. For example, the 
operational impact of delaying the capability, project office resources needed to deal 
with the extension, contract change proposal costs, etc. Full modelling of these costs is 
outside the scope of this example, but would be required in practice. 
The benefit in risk terms is the reduction of risk from Medium to Low, based on the 
provision of the additional defence. The defence provides a means to ensure that the 
divergent attitude sources are now being trapped by the primary control computer, and 
therefore the primary computer continues operation during these events. By having the 
primary computer continue to operate, most importantly the defences for numerous 
other propagation paths that are implemented by the primary control computer are also 
preserved.  
The project office would then evaluate the cost and benefit with respect to the grossly 
disproportionate measure, based on knowledge of all known risks they need to manage 
in order to establish if this treatment is to be implemented.  
8.3.2 Claims Assurance Impact on Risk 
Chapter 5 has established that the assurance of a defence is related to both the continuity 
in the chain of evidence of lifecycle products between constraint and implementation, 
and the degree to which knowledge of certain attributes of each lifecycle products is 
provided by evidence. Therefore, if there is an intolerable limitation in either the chain 
of lifecycle products or attributes of each lifecycle product, then the defence to which 
the constraint relates can no longer be claimed to be adequately assured. In these cases 
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the achieved CSAL must be reduced for that defence to a CSAL for which the lifecycle 
hierarchy and evidence does achieve with tolerable limitations in evidence. 
The assertion that a defence is not adequately assured has a direct bearing on the 
achieved ASAL and risk should be evaluated per Table 32 based on the revised 
numbers of assured defences at perspective layers. An example is provided at Section 
8.3.3. 
8.3.3 Evidence Assurance Impact on Risk 
Chapter 6 has established that the assurance of an attribute of a lifecycle product is 
related to the relevance, trustworthiness and results of evidence. The tolerability of 
limitations in evidence with respect to relevance, trustworthiness and results of evidence 
has a direct bearing on the degree to which the CSAL can be claimed to be achieved. 
Therefore, if there is an intolerable limitation in evidence of an attribute of a lifecycle 
product, then the CSAL of the lifecycle product hierarchy can no longer be 
substantiated and must be reduced.  
Because of the direct relationship between ESAL, CSAL and defences, the reduction in 
achieved CSAL has a direct bearing on the achieved ASAL and risk should be evaluated 
per Table 32 based on the revised numbers of assured defences at perspective layers. 
Example – A-DHC-4 
Recall the example from Chapter 5 (Section 5.5) and Chapter 6 (Section 6.9), which 
considered that the direct layer defence, when implemented in the original design 
activity, has an identified evidence shortfall against the Traceable to High Abstraction 
attribute for the Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements Lifecycle Product.  
An evidence shortfall against this attribute is intolerable for CSAL 3 because it breaks 
the chain of evidence between the implementation and the constraint level requirements. 
Using the approach describe above, this means the direct defence is un-assured and the 
risk is identified at Medium using Table 32. Closer examination reveals that the issue is 
due to incomplete traceability tables, due to a lack of independent review and software 
quality assurance review of the traceability tables. This impacts the traceability attribute 
but also the related verification attributes, due to the relevance and trustworthiness of 
the traceability information being degraded. 
The cost to resolve the traceability issue and conduct the additional verification 
activities is $30K, based on approximately 300 hours work. The benefit is as per the 
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examples discussion from Section 8.3.1, and so the comparison should find in favour of 
the treatment as $30K is much smaller than $1M from the earlier case. 
Further, assume that during the verification based on the revised traceability table, 
additional faults are found with the direct defence, and problem reports raised to 
investigate the additional problems. In these cases the costs for correcting these would 
need to be estimated and the cost benefit activity repeated.  
While this thesis doesn’t spell it out further, it does reveal an interesting property of the 
way the cost benefit activity is structured. Note that in the first activity, introducing the 
direct defence in total was much more expensive than resolving the traceability issue for 
the evidence. In practice, the cost to resolve an uncertainty issue based on an evidence 
shortfall is usually proportionally much less than the cost to introduce additional 
defences. This suggests that a cost benefit analysis should often find in favour of doing 
analysis of the uncertainty, rather than not doing the analysis. In practice doing the 
analysis is usually much cheaper than changing the design, particularly in retrospect. 
While doing the analysis may suggest a design change, the investment to know either 
way, is usually proportionally smaller. This suggests that the factor identified in Section 
8.2.4 which might undermine the cost benefit approach, will rarely undermine the 
viability of the approach in practice. These concepts are similar to Buying Information 
To Avoid Risk (BITAR) (Boehm, 2008). 
8.3.4 Treating Risks 
In the event that Table 32 identified that the risk is increased for a particular 
propagation path, then the developer has the following treatment options:  
• reduce the severity of the consequences, thus reducing the need for additional 
layers of defences; 
• provide an additional defence, in lieu of this inadequately assured defence; or 
• resolve issues or provide additional evidence to satisfy the target CSAL/ESALs 
for this defence to provide adequate assurance of the defence. 
Which option the developer chooses depends on the specific system and circumstances 
of the project. In civil aviation, the developer is normally bound to treat the issue within 
their system, whereas in military aviation, the airworthiness authority has greater 
flexibility to make choices about treatment and retention of risks. In cases where there 
are operational imperatives, the military authority may also choose to utilise external 
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defences to manage risks, or at worst retain risks, until such a stage as one of the above 
treatments can be implemented (refer Chapter 4). 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has examined how the concepts of assurance described in Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 may be related to risk. Specifically, the traditional definition of risk has been 
examined, and difficulties with estimating likelihood in practice have been summarised.  
A revised approach to evaluating risk has been described based on the strength of 
defences in the propagation paths between initiating faults or events, and the applicable 
consequences. The strength of defences is further characterised based on the 
proportionality of knowledge and uncurtaining pertaining to the defences and their 
evidence (refer Principle X and Y from Figure 72). The revised approach has been 
defined based on the work of earlier chapters within this thesis. A method has also been 
introduced for establishing when knowledge outweighs uncertainty based on a cost 
benefit analysis of improving knowledge through additional analysis, revised/additional 
defences, or revised/additional evidence. This information is then used to inform risk 
treatment and retention decisions and to inform ALARP evaluations (Principle A and B 
from Figure 72). An example was provided to illustrate the utility of using the described 
approach to risk evaluation. 
The approach has been developed to adhere to the usability guidelines identified in 
Figure 72. The method minimises variability of risk communication by using a set of 
defined terms for qualitative risk evaluation (Guideline 1). Although subjectivity will 
never be absent, the method removes subjectivity from being immediately contributory 
to the risk evaluation by replacing a direct likelihood assessment with a more 
measureable indication of the strength of defences (Guideline 2). Acceptable and 
unacceptable risks are implied by the qualified terms used to describe risk level 
(Guideline 3), and the approach uses a cost benefit analysis to guide the extent of 
additional treatments determination (Guideline 4). 
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9 Issues and Assumptions 
This chapter examines a series of issues relating to the assumptions made in this thesis, 
and reasons about their potential impact. 
9.1 Imperfect Hazard or Failure Analysis 
One problem is when the hazard or failure analysis is imperfect. This is because 
knowledge of hazards and failures is fundamental to making decisions about treating 
them. Depending on the framework, this dependency and impact may differ. Thus, it is 
important to question the impact of imperfect failure analysis, and how does this impact 
compare to other contemporary approaches? 
9.1.1 Dependency No Worse Than Contemporary Approaches 
One can argue that the dependency on hazard and failure analysis of the principles and 
framework in this thesis is no worse than standards such as ARP4754/DO-178, MIL-
STD-882C/D/E, or DEF STAN 00-56 Iss 2. This is because the hazard and failure 
condition information used for decisions about establishing layers of defences (fault 
prevention and fault tolerance), is fundamentally the same information that these other 
paradigms use to make decisions about defining safety requirements. Thus any 
limitation in this information will have an impact on the completeness and 
appropriateness of what is allocated in any of these frameworks. The same can also be 
said for the safety argument paradigm (e.g. DEF STAN 00-56 Iss 4), where product 
related safety arguments tend to only argue the hazards and failures they know about. 
However, there are several perspectives that the layered defence concept helps to reduce 
the impact of imperfect hazard and failure information. 
Limitations Made Explicit 
This framework prompts the developer to explicitly reason about limitations in the 
hazard and failure analysis, and to seek evidence of limitations in knowledge of severity 
of consequences, propagation paths, and defences. This provides a benefit in that the 
limitations in hazard and failure analysis are made explicit.  
More Systematic 
The framework incorporates the taxonomy of failure categorisation that can be applied 
from extra-system layer defences right down to direct defences. The application of these 
categories and the associated analysis to identify propagation paths, improves the degree 
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to which the analysis and results will be systematic, and thus reduces the opportunity for 
omissions in hazard and failure analysis. 
Defence in Depth 
Thirdly, a major element of this framework is the concept of layered defences. This 
means that more than one defence is provided to prevent more severe failure 
consequences. If a hazard or failure has been missed in the analysis, then there is a 
greater potential that the higher level defences provide coverage for the unknown fault. 
The opportunity for defences to take a differing perspective (refer Section 4.4.2) 
depending on the layer in which they are defined (i.e. fault perspective, system 
perspective, functional perspective), greatly aids with coverage of faults that may not be 
known about at the fault perspective. While the unknown fault or event may not be 
treated in a way that it would have been had knowledge of it been forecast and treated 
directly, the perspective taken by the intra and extra-system layers should help to ensure 
the overall behaviour is within tolerable consequences. While absolute confidence can’t 
be established from this, layered defences against the taxonomy of fault categories is a 
better circumstance that relying on single defences against unknown faults or events. 
9.1.2 Facilitates Understanding of the Impact 
If, once a system is fielded, an omission in the hazard or failure analysis is identified, 
this can have significant ramifications for the continued operation of the system. In 
some cases the operation of the system may have to be ceased until such a stage as the 
impact can be properly established. Therefore, it is important that the output of safety 
assurance frameworks facilitate impact analysis of such issues. To do this it will need to 
allow any substantive treatments to an issue to be identified, so that an accurate risk 
assessment can be prepared based on estimated consequences and the extant behaviours 
of the system that might treat it. 
The framework provided by this thesis assists the impact analysis because it effectively 
provides a catalogue of defences (i.e. the fault prevention and fault tolerance 
mechanisms) the system has, how many of them there are, and information on how 
those defences work. This information can be used to assess if any existing defence 
treats the issue arising from the imperfect hazard and failure analysis, and permits an 
accurate risk to be established with minimal additional engineering investigation. This 
is an improvement over many existing frameworks because these other frameworks may 
‘obscure’ possible defences that are implemented at component level, but that don’t 
have obvious traceability and consideration at the system architectural level. Risk 
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assessments in this framework are also built upon this knowledge of layered defences, 
and thus revising the risk assessment (refer Chapter 8) should be straightforward based 
on any shortfalls in defences. 
9.2 Suitability of Defences and ‘Constraints’ 
The suitability of a defence (and the associated ‘constraint’ which communicates the 
requirement for implementation by the system) is a function of the following: 
• the coverage of the initiating fault or event in the applicable propagation path, 
• the viability of the prevention or tolerance strategy based on the properties of the 
prospective fault or event, 
• for fault tolerance strategies: 
o the detectability of the fault or the event, 
o the appropriateness of the handling mechanism, 
o the accuracy to which the fault transformation of the handling 
mechanisms can be estimated, and 
• the degree to which the ‘constraint’ implements the defence. 
While Chapter 4 and 5 provides stimuli for reasoning about these factors, it is evident 
that the suitability (or unsuitability) of these factors is a major contributor to the 
usefulness of a defence in depth based framework. In Chapter 4, the Fault Propagation 
and Transformation Notation (FPTN) was used to support reasoning about some of 
these factors, however it was evident that this notation and associated analysis is not 
conclusive about these factors alone. Therefore, the suitability of defences is dependent 
on validating the above factors. As validation requires sufficient target system context, 
it may be necessary to conduct laboratory and controlled test and evaluation (ground or 
flight) in order to generate the necessary evidence. 
While a number of contemporary safety assurance standards refer to safety verification 
and validation of safety requirements, the benefit this framework offers is that it 
provides a structured framework for determining what properties of the system need to 
be validated (by evidence). However, it may be a more difficult property of the 
framework to implement because it may require a more empirical approach to validating 
defences than is currently evident in real world practice. 
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9.3 Independence and Diversity of Defences and ‘Constraints’ 
Independence and diversity of defences (and the associated ‘constraint’ which 
communicates the requirement for implementation by the system) is fundamental to 
assuring the defence in depth of the layered approach. While Chapters 4 and 5 clearly 
identify the requirements of this independence and diversity, the practicalities of real 
systems means that there are many dependences and inter-relationships within a system 
that must be considered in establishing the independence and diversity. This can quickly 
become very complex and potentially unmanageable. 
Figure 17 in Chapter 4 illustrates some of this complexity by superimposing fault 
propagation paths on each defence. Further to this, it is necessary to consider all enabler 
(e.g. common power supplies, data-buses), and interrelationships (both intended and 
covert), in establishing the strength of independence and diversity. Such considerations 
may suffer from similar limitations to those identified in Section 9.1. 
There are notable examples where these relationships were not well understood in 
design (e.g. Anomalies in Digital Flight Control System F-16, X-28, X-3, C-17, YC-14, 
A320/330/340 (Rushby, 1993), B777 (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2007)). It 
continues to be a difficult and complex aspect of critical system design.  
The benefits of the framework in this thesis are that it makes reasoning about defences, 
including their independence and diversity explicit, and the requirement to provide 
evidence of the analysis also explicit. 
9.4 Managing Change 
Change is inevitable, and thus an important usage for safety assurance information 
established during development is for that information to inform change impact 
analysis. Change may be imposed on a system externally by changes in operating 
environment, usage context and other external influences. Alternatively it may be 
imposed internally as a result of modifications, re-design and changed operational 
practices. Often these internal changes are prompted by one or more external impacts. 
To inform change impact analysis, it is necessary to know such things as: 
• the physical and logical make up of a system,  
• the interfaces between its physical and logical components,  
• the system behaviours and the components that make it up, and  
• the system behaviours in the presence of faults (internally and externally induced).  
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While much of this information is outside the safety assurance context, safety assurance 
information can contribute to knowledge about each of these things. In Section 9.1.2 the 
usage of the information provided by the framework from this thesis was discussed with 
respect to managing the impact of imperfect hazard analysis. In many respects the 
catalogue of defences (i.e. the fault prevention and fault tolerance mechanisms) the 
system has, how many of them there are, and information on well those defences might 
work also assists change impact analysis. At a lower level, the knowledge of limitations 
in evidence also informs change impact analysis, as it provides a starting context on 
where evidence generation might best preserve or improve the tolerability of limitations 
during any change. 
9.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided explanation of issues and assumptions that impact definition 
and application of the concepts and framework described by this thesis. The layers of 
defences and the tolerability of limitations concepts offer a number of benefits when 
dealing with the impact of imperfect hazard and failure analysis, suitability of defences 
and ‘constraints’, and managing change. The next chapter provides evaluation of the 
contributions of this thesis. 
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10 Evaluation 
In Chapter 1 the thesis proposition was stated as follows: 
It is feasible to establish principles for defining effective safety assurance 
frameworks. These principles enable frameworks to be developed to satisfy safety 
objectives for military aviation systems in typical acquisition contexts. 
Based upon the analysis of literature surveyed in Chapter 2, the thesis proposition was 
extended as follows: 
This thesis demonstrates that it is feasible to establish principles and usability criteria 
for defining effective safety assurance frameworks for aviation systems in typical 
acquisition contexts. This thesis provides meta-arguments that can be used as the 
basis for defining a novel integrated framework for the assurance of aviation systems. 
The thesis demonstrates how this approach can be used to address the identified 
limitations and challenges of the certification of aviation systems. Further, by 
reducing uncertainty for supplier delivery of safety evidence across contracting 
processes, the framework is intended to help limit emergence of safety evidence 
issues, the resultant cost and schedule implications, and reduce the likelihood of 
retaining intolerable safety risks. 
The proposition is supported by: 
• establishing principles based on concepts that preserve the benefits and reduce the 
limitations of existing assurance paradigms for aviation certification; 
• by examining the principles in the practical context of real aviation systems; and 
• through the development and application of a novel integrated framework for 
assurance of aviation software systems based on these principles, addressing 
identified deficiencies in existing assurance frameworks. 
The evaluation of this thesis proposition is addressed from two perspectives: 
• demonstrating the feasibility and utility of the principles and framework defined 
by this thesis, and 
• demonstrating the framework provides practical benefits in addressing the 
deficiencies of existing assurance frameworks. 
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10.1 Forms of Evaluation Applied 
To establish the forms of evaluation to be applied, literature regarding the design of 
studies for research for social sciences has been consulted (refer (Van de Ven, 2007), 
(Oppenheim, 2001), (Robinson, 2000)). It is difficult to apply novel approaches to real 
projects at their initial proposal, and thus evaluation by practical experiment is not 
straightforward. The following forms of evaluation have been applied to evaluate the 
principles and framework presented in this thesis: 
• Peer Review 
• Constructed Example Case Study 
• Anti-hypothesis Evaluation 
• Audit Tool for Real System Development 
• Contract Evaluation for Projects 
These methods have been selected based on an assessment of the most effective way of 
evaluating the approach given the constraints of real-world evaluation. It is also not 
feasible to run real projects multiple times to provide both a control group and 
experimental groups, as is traditionally required in experimentation; to put it another 
way, the scientific method cannot be applied.  
10.2 Overview of Research Evaluation 
The following sub-sections provide an overview of how each form of evaluation was 
conducted and the level of evaluation the method provides. 
10.2.1 Peer Review 
Peer review provides evaluation with respect to the experience of participants. 
Therefore, it is important that suitable participants are selected and suitable methods are 
used to capture the experiences and judgments of practitioners. To address this, peer 
review has been undertaken by the following methods: 
• survey questionnaire of stakeholders to safety assurance for aviation systems, 
• one-on-one interviews with stakeholders, 
• workshop sessions involving a group of stakeholders, and 
• seminars providing presentation and opportunities for questions on the concepts. 
The survey methods included both in-person interviews and independent completion by 
respondents in order to reduce the sensitivities of results to biases in just interviewing. 
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A detailed survey questionnaire was prepared using the principles for questionnaire 
design from (Oppenheim, 2001) and (Berdie, et al., 1986). The questionnaire asked a 
mix of open and closed questions regarding the concepts and application thereof 
presented in this thesis and the supporting literature (refer Appendix D). The following 
provides an overview of the structure of the survey questionnaire. 
• Part A – Demographic 
• Part B – Architectural Assurance 
o B1 Motivating Issues 
o B2 State of Practice 
 Treatment of Systematic Faults 
 Role of Architecture 
 Fault Avoidance and Tolerance 
 Fail Safe Design Criteria 
 Examination of Real Systems 
o B3 General Principles 
 Layers of Defences and Bounding 
Uncertainty 
o B4 Our approach 
 ASAL definition 
 ASAL Framework Application 
 Certification Assessments / Audits 
 Development by Design Agency 
• Part C – Claims & Evidence Assurance 
o C1 Motivating Issues 
o C2 State of Practice 
o C3 General Principles 
 Key Principles of Assurance Levels 
 Relationship to Architecture 
o C4 Our Approach 
 CSAL Definition 
 Accounting for Behaviours 
 ASAL to CSAL Relationship 
 Attributes of Lifecycle Products 
 ESAL Definition 
 Trustworthiness of Evidence 
 Framework Application 
• Part D – Contracting for Assurance of 
Military Aviation Software Systems 
o D1 Motivating Issues 
 Paradigm: Goal-based / Prescriptive 
 Integrating the Standard’s Lifecycle 
with the Tender/Contract Lifecycle 
 Differences with Military System 
Acquisition Contracts 
 Impact of Uncertainty  
o D2 State of Practice 
o D3 General Principles 
o D4 Our Approach 
 Obtaining Architectural Certainty 
 Setting Benchmarks for 
Architectural Suitability 
 Informing Architectural Suitability 
 Evaluating Architectural Suitability 
 Providing Architectural Assurance 
 Obtaining Argument & Evidence 
Certainty 
 Setting Benchmarks for Argument 
& Evidence 
 Proposal of Argument & Evidence 
 Evaluation of Argument & Evidence 
 Argument and Evidence Assurance 
 Contracting Framework Application 
 Cost and Schedule Implications 
 Lifecycle Implications 
 Management Implications 
 Resolution within Contract Scope 
 Usability 
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Each part of the survey was structured to relate motivating issues to state of practice, to 
general principles to our approach. This structure provides a means of identifying 
deviations between supposed relationships between the different sections. It permits 
identification of where respondents diverge from the hypothesis, and provides 
correlation as to whether respondents are divergent at a general principle perspective, or 
at an implementation perspective. 
Part A of the survey used rating scales based on demographic ranges specific to each 
question. To avoid scale bias, the rating scale for Parts B to D was designed to provide a 
symmetrical full scale for respondents per the guidance of (Berdie, et al., 1986), as 
follows: 
• Strongly Disagree 
• Inclined to Disagree 
• Undecided 
• Inclined to Agree 
• Strongly Agree 
The survey covered more than 20 participants representing stakeholders from: 
• military and civil aviation domains; 
• government and industry; 
• certification authorities, project authorities, specialist consultants, industrial 
practitioners, and scientific laboratories; 
• nations including Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 
United States of America; and 
• Military Regulatory/Certification Authorities. 
The criteria for participant selection included the follow factors: 
• providing coverage of the aforementioned demographic categories; 
• ensuring that the participants had appropriate qualifications and training in the 
domain, and have a professional attitude to improving safety assurance; 
• establishing that the participants experience with real industrial programs; was 
first hand, and relevant to the topic and domain; 
• confirming that participants represented a variety of ‘world views’; and 
• ensuring that sample size of participant responses was sufficient to ensure trends 
could be clearly distinguished across the majority of the survey. 
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Respondent acquiescence to survey fatigue was avoided by giving respondents plenty of 
time (i.e. three months) to complete the survey, and by structuring the survey into 
separable sections that allowed completion in smaller sessions. Respondent 
acquiescence to the author’s ‘world view’ was avoided to ensuring diversity of 
responses in the motivating issues, state of practice and general principles section, such 
that these diversity of viewpoints would be applied to the section on our approach. A 
public forum survey was not pursued because it would be too difficult to control the 
other participant selection criteria in such a context. 
This coverage of stakeholders is somewhat unique and not typically achieved by other 
theses. Six of the surveys were elicited during a series of three workshops held at 
Australian defence facilities, in which the content of the survey topics was briefed by 
the author, and then the surveys completed through facilitation of discussion on each 
topic. Material from this thesis was also evaluated through the following conference 
presentations and seminars: 
Event Topic Academic Peer 
Review 
Improving Systems and Software Engineering 
Conference (ISSEC) Aug 2010 
Architectural Assurance Yes 
IET System Safety Conference Oct 2010 Claims and Evidence 
Assurance 
Yes 
Australian System Safety Conference May 2012 Contracting Framework Yes 
Seminar to RAAF, DMO and Contractors at RAAF 
Richmond Mar 2011 
 
Architectural, Claims and 
Evidence Assurance 
No 
Seminar to RAAF, DMO and Contractors in 
Canberra Jun 2012 
Full Framework No 
Table 33: Conferences and Seminars 
The limitation of the peer review form of evaluation is that potential deficiencies in the 
approach may not be revealed, as it is an intellectually abstract approach rather than a 
practical end-to-end approach. Participant selection may also affect the results. 
Therefore, peer review needs to be complemented by other methods that provide 
practical end-to-end evaluation, and avoid participant bias. 
10.2.2 Constructed Example Case Study 
Evaluation through case study has involved application of the approach using 
constructed examples derived from real-world systems. A constructed example has been 
used because application to a real project was not feasible within a doctoral program. 
Throughout Chapters 3 through 9 of this thesis the A-DHC-4 Advanced Caribou 
example has been used both for the purposes of explanation, but also to provide 
confidence in the utility of the principles and framework. 
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This form of evaluation must address the practicalities of real world systems. For this 
thesis, realism of the example has been achieved by deriving the A-DHC-4 example 
from elements of real world systems.  
The limitation of the constructed example case study is that potential deficiencies in the 
approach may not be revealed as, while the example provided end-to-end evaluation, the 
example is limited to specific aspects. Therefore the constructed example case study 
needs to be complemented with a method of evaluation that identifies issues from 
coverage of entire projects. 
10.2.3 Anti-hypothesis 
The purpose of anti-hypothesis evaluation is to show whether or not known project 
problems can be correlated to aspects the principles and framework of this thesis. In 
essence, it is a search for evidence of problems when the approach suggested by this 
thesis is not used. This form of evaluation provides the benefits of revealing issues 
encountered across the full scope of real historical projects.  
Anti-hypothesis evaluation has been conducted by examining problems in historical 
projects and correlating these problems as evidence of the anti-hypothesis. A review of 
22 historical Australian Defence Force aviation projects between 1998 and 2012 has 
been conducted (refer Appendix E). 
The limitation with anti-hypothesis evaluation is that it doesn’t address the application 
to newly encountered problems. Therefore the anti-hypothesis evaluation has to be 
complemented by a method that evaluates the application to a problem in real time. 
10.2.4 Audit Tool for Real System Development 
In order to provide an evaluation method that examines a problem in a real world 
system, the principles and framework were applied as an audit method for a real world 
system development. During the development and verification audit phases of the 
C-130J Hercules Block 7.0 upgrade mission computer and flight management system 
software audit program, members of the international audit team trialled parts of the 
architectural, claims and evidence assurance framework as an audit tool to identify 
potential product and process shortfalls within the program.  
This evaluation approach used lifecycle evidence from a real project to identify the 
effectiveness of problem identification when compared to RTCA/DO-178B audit 
methodologies (refer (Federal Aviation Administration, 2003), (Head of Certification 
Experts Department, 2011)). The limitation with this approach is that the principles and 
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framework of this thesis were used to identify shortfalls, rather than to also treat them. 
However the constructed example case study evaluation described by Section 10.2.2 
provides end to end application including treatment. 
10.2.5 Contract Evaluation for Project 
In order to provide an evaluation method that examines the principles and methods of 
this thesis for contract decision-making, elements of this thesis have been applied to the 
establishment and evaluation of a two phase contract arrangement (risk mitigation 
activity, and prime contract) for the Australian Lead In Fighter Capability Assurance 
Program, which is currently in progress. The development of the prime contract SOW 
was informed by assessing safety and assurance evidence produced under the risk 
reduction activity contract in order to establish the adequacy of the architecture and 
assurance evidence. While the ASAL, CSAL and ESAL method was not applied 
directly, the reviews of safety evidence directly considered the principles of 
architectural, claims and evidence assurance. Prime contract SOW clauses and CDRL 
requirements were refined based on the outcomes of these assessments. 
The limitation with this approach was that the contractual framework was not applied in 
its entirety to this project. However, the evaluation of historical project contracts as part 
of the anti-hypothesis evaluation does evaluate circumstances where the framework of 
this thesis wasn’t applied, and contracts were deficient in these respects. 
10.3 Evaluation Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results and discussion associated with each form of evaluation. 
10.3.1 Peer Review Results and Discussion 
Twenty surveys were completed by either individual response, interview or through 
several organised workshops over the period of February to May 2012. This sub-section 
summarises the results from the survey and discusses their implications for the 
framework described by this thesis. The results are presented per the structure of the 
survey questionnaire. Responses are characterised in the narrative of this chapter using 
the following definitions: 
• weak – the two-thirds majority of responses either strongly disagree or are 
inclined to disagree. 
• mixed – the responses are spread between disagree, undecided and agree. 
• positive – the two-thirds majority of responses were inclined to agree. 
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• positive to strong – the two-thirds majority of responses are spread between 
inclined to agree and strongly agree, with inclined to agree having the majority of 
these responses. 
• strong to positive – the two-thirds majority of responses are spread between 
inclined to agree and strongly agree, with strongly agree having the majority of 
these responses. 
• strong – the two-thirds majority of responses strongly agree. 
Normalisation of the results is achieved through constructing the survey with a 
consistent scale and approach to structuring questions across the different parts of the 
survey. Each section of the survey is also qualitatively40 analysed in isolation, therefore 
avoiding numerical correlation between specific survey sections, and minimising the 
need to normalise sections of the survey against others. 
Demographic 
• Respondent experience was evenly spread in terms of years. 
• Respondents were primarily from the aviation domain, although one third of 
responses took in the maritime, land and information systems domains also. 
• Respondents were evenly spread between development and compliance assurance 
roles. 
Architectural Assurance 
Motivating Issues. There was strong indication in contemporary industrial practice of: 
• hazardous sources of systematic faults not being adequately treated, or systematic 
faults preventing or disrupting the design certification and service release, 
• architecture being used to provide mitigations to systematic faults in systems, and 
to provide layers of defences against sources of systematic faults, and 
• the fail safe design criteria being used to treat of sources of systematic faults. 
                                                 
40 Quantitative statistical analysis of survey results has not been undertaken, as it would provide limited 
benefit for the topics covered by the questionnaire. Should further quantitative statistical analysis be 
undertaken, results would require normalisation by assigning weights based on the relative strength of 
each question, importance of the question in the topics of evaluation, and the variance of response data. 
 311  
State of Practice  
Treatment of Systematic Faults. There was positive indication of inadequate treatment 
of systematic faults due to limitations in: 
• design practices and assessment of requirements validity across the coupling of 
current software assurance standards with system safety methodologies, 
• evidence showing that the behaviours of the system and software are appropriate 
with respect to safety, and 
• current software assurance standards due to emphasis on process adherence rather 
than critical evaluation of product properties and behaviours. 
Role of Architecture. There was strong indication that existing software assurance 
standards don’t deal with system and software architecture in terms of its role to provide 
fault avoidance or fault tolerance of systematic faults. 
Qualifying the Extent of Fault Avoidance and Tolerance. There was a mixed 
indication that current software assurance standards assist certification authorities 
establish the: 
• effectiveness of the system’s tolerance against systematic faults, 
• the classes of systematic faults the system is tolerant against, and 
• the extent to which any redundancy or other documented fault avoidance or fault 
tolerance mechanisms may be violated by the occurrence of systematic faults. 
Fail Safe Design Criteria. While there was strong indication that the fail safe design 
criteria are intended to apply to both random and systematic sources of faults, and that 
architecture plays a critical role, there was mixed indication as to whether existing 
standards adequately encompassed the fail safe design criteria. 
Examination of Real Systems. There was positive indication that the observations 
made in Chapter 4 regarding fault avoidance and fault tolerance with respect to 
systematic faults is valid. This indication was strong in regards to both the 
categorisation of layers, and also the numbers of perspective of layers when compared 
to real systems in practice. 
General Principles 
Layers of Defences. There was a positive indication that the layers of defences 
principle helps to bound the uncertainty of overall system behaviour in the presence of 
item/component/system failures. 
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Bounding Uncertainty. There was strong to positive indication that dealing with 
uncertainty is important in risk evaluations, and that architectural assurance is a suitable 
means of qualifying how uncertainty impacts risks. 
Our Approach 
ASAL definition. There was positive to strong indication that the ASAL framework is 
feasible, both in terms of the requirements of defences and also the role and perspective 
of the layers. There was also positive indication of the benefits of the ASAL framework. 
Respondents did note though that the ASAL framework needs to be coupled to an 
evidence framework in order to provide adequate evidence for certification. 
ASAL Framework Application. There was positive indication that the ASAL 
framework would be both useable and beneficial to certification authorities for 
certification assessments, and that there would be benefits beyond current standards’ 
approaches. Indication from design agencies was more mixed, although on the balance 
favoured positive indication rather than disagreement. Some respondents were positive 
about the concept of defences and ‘constraints’ although they had reservations that 
supporting methods as yet wouldn’t enable them to model the relationships effectively. 
Extension to existing methods might be required. 
The evaluation responses resulted in the labels for defence layer categories being 
refined from software, LRU and system levels to direct, intra-system and extra-system 
(refer Chapter 4), to provide a more universal description for the layers role in defence 
in depth. 
Claims & Evidence Assurance 
Motivating Issues. There was strong to positive indication that safety assurance 
standards should set product safety outcomes and evidence provision requirements 
(including benchmarks). There was mixed indication that safety assurance standards 
should set process requirements, although responses in the positive outnumbered those 
is disagreement. While flexibility was favoured, there was positive support for 
removing flexibility that leads to unsafe design (i.e. unsafe designs should not comply 
with the standard). There was strong indication of confusion over the role of current 
assurance levels in achieving safety. 
State of Practice. There was positive to strong indication that assurance levels and 
integrity levels don’t have any inherent product meaning, but that they should either 
have a direct product meaning, or be explicitly relatable to other qualitative measures 
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that do have a product meaning. There was mixed indication that stakeholders know 
what claims and evidence are most appropriate for arguing safety. 
General Principles 
Key Principles of Assurance Levels. There was positive indication that assurance 
levels should have a product meaning, and that they should set objective benchmarks 
for the properties of the product that should be established. There was also positive 
indication that the assurance framework should make explicit the claims supporting the 
definition of the assurance framework. There was positive indication that the impact of 
limitations in compliance must be comprehensible. 
Relationship to Architecture. There was positive indication that product and evidence 
assurance should be explicitly related, and that linking architectural and claims/evidence 
assurance was a plausible focal point. Respondents did not identify any other ways of 
linking product and evidence assurance. 
Our Approach 
CSAL Definition. There was positive to strong indication that the CSAL framework is 
feasible, both in terms of the hierarchy of lifecycle products and the attribute of them. 
There was also positive indication of the benefits of the CSAL framework for 
structuring claims.  
The evaluation responses resulted in the expression of CSAL being refined when 
compared to earlier work to better express the intended relationship to limitations and 
discontinuities in the lifecycle product hierarchy. 
CSAL Framework Application. There was positive indication that the CSAL 
framework would be both useable and beneficial to certification authorities for 
certification assessments, and that there would be benefits beyond current standards 
approaches. Indication from design agencies was consistent with the certification 
authority views. 
Systematically Accounting for Behaviours. There was positive to strong indication 
that the lifecycle product hierarchy was appropriate, and that it captured the different 
abstractions at which evidence should be presented for systems. 
ASAL to CSAL Relationship. There was positive indication that the proportional 
relationship between ASAL and CSAL levels was feasible, although it was 
acknowledged that there may be other approaches that would work in some contexts. 
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There was positive to strong indication that the CSAL to ASAL relationship provided 
appropriate failure condition severity and consequence context to the claims assurance. 
Attributes of Lifecycle Products. There was positive indication that the attributes of 
the lifecycle product hierarchy was a feasible basis for an assurance framework, as this 
provides a logical structure for claims about evidence. There was positive indication 
that the set of attributes for lifecycle products is adequate. Respondents were positive 
about the benefits of the lifecycle product hierarchy and attribute models. 
The evaluation responses resulted in the expression of Appendix B tables being refined 
when compared to earlier work to better align with the lifecycle product hierarchy and 
attribute relationships. 
ESAL Definition. There was strong to positive indication that basing evidence 
assurance on the tolerability of limitations in evidence provision is feasible, and that it 
prompts useful questioning of the sufficiency of evidence. The perspectives of 
relevance, trustworthiness and results seemed logically sound. There was positive to 
strong indication that the ESAL framework is feasible. There were numerous concerns 
though that many developers are process oriented and may not be capable of structuring 
tolerability of limitations arguments objectively, although there was acknowledgment 
that this may be a better circumstance that an entirely unconstrained goal-based 
paradigm. There was a very mixed response regarding the characterisation of 
trustworthiness based on competency frameworks, indicating limitations in the support 
for current competency frameworks. There was also concern that arguments about 
trustworthiness would be nothing more that rhetoric. 
ESAL Framework Application. There was positive indication that the ESAL 
framework would be both useable and beneficial to certification authorities for 
certification assessments, and that there would be benefits beyond current standards’ 
approaches. Indication from design agencies was consistent with the certification 
authority views.  
Many respondents indicated that the ‘tolerability of limitations’ concept appeared useful 
in that it provides some inherent rules for providing and measuring supplier 
justifications. There was some support for developing the concept further, and providing 
further examples. 
Overall ASAL, CSAL, ESAL Framework 
In regards to the framework overall, the survey indicated the following: 
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• Acquirers and Certification Authorities indicated that the approach may avoid 
several historical (and current) project issues where architectural safety shortfalls 
were responsible for project cancellation or significant project delays and cost 
increases. However, they noted that correlation in retrospect is easier than while 
projects are running. 
• Some respondents were deterred by the notion of yet another assurance 
framework. Others noted that current approaches had limitations, and this 
approach seems compatible and extends current approaches. 
• Some respondents were deterred by the complexity of the inter-related assurance 
concepts and contracting mechanisms, although several indicated that the 
concepts were less complex than many of the systems to which they would apply. 
This would perhaps provide natural selection of suppliers that cope better with 
complexity. 
• The majority of respondents indicated that one or more fully worked examples of 
implementing the underlying ASAL/CSAL/ESAL frameworks would be 
beneficial. 
Contracting for Assurance of Military Aviation Software Systems 
Motivating Issues. 
Standards Paradigm: Goal-based or Prescriptive. There was positive to strong 
indication that: 
• the standard paradigm (i.e. goal-based or prescriptive) is a crucial factor in 
contracts for achieving adequate provision of evidence and thus effective 
regulation; 
• goal-based standards permit flexibility for designers which give benefits in 
defining effective products, but goal-based standards may lead to limitations with 
establishing contractually enforceable benchmarks; 
• prescriptive standards set benchmarks for evidence and activity completion, but 
they may lead to limitations in relevance of the evidence to product safety; and 
• the safety assurance paradigm should be compatible with contracts and that 
contracts which provide cost and schedule certainty are preferred by both 
suppliers and acquirers. 
Integrating the Standard’s Lifecycle with the Tender/Contract Lifecycle. There was 
positive to strong indication that: 
 316  
• integration of the safety assurance standard with the contract is crucial and that it 
should assist in reducing uncertainty about the product, argument and evidence 
prior to the establishment of a contract (i.e. through pre-contract processes); 
• the contract and standard should support the resolution of safety issues, and not 
hinder it by contributing uncertainty to the dispute; and 
• there is evidence in industrial practice of project slippages, overruns or 
cancellations due to issues concerning safety assurance and certification using 
current approaches.  
Differences with Military System Acquisition Contracts. There was positive to 
strong indication that regulatory enforcement is enabled by the contract rather than via 
laws for the military circumstances, although respondents acknowledged that laws still 
applied. 
Impact of Uncertainty. There was positive to strong indication that: 
• uncertainty in the specification of design requirements and provision of assurance 
evidence through the contract increases the risk of the contract being 
unsuccessful; and 
• information regarding design solution, safety argument and evidence, if sought 
and used effectively during tender processes, can reduce uncertainty, and thus 
reduce potential contract success risks. 
State of Practice. There was positive indication that existing standards and contracting 
approaches offer limited guidance on how: 
• safety assurance standard and contract integration can be achieved effectively; and 
• safety regulation should be achieved through contractual mechanisms. 
General Principles. There was positive indication that: 
• obtaining architectural certainty from the tender phases and prior to contract 
enables early insight into potential architectural shortfalls that may impact safety; 
• setting of benchmarks for architectural suitability assist with architectural 
certainty, and they should set measurable criteria against which different solutions 
can be evaluated; 
• obtaining argument and evidence certainty from the tender phases and prior to 
contract enables insight into potential argument and evidence shortfalls;  
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• setting of benchmarks for argument and evidence suitability assists with claims 
and evidence certainty, and that they should set measurable criteria against which 
argument and evidence can be evaluated; and 
• such information can be used to evaluate tenders. 
Our Approach. There was positive indication that the contracting process defined by 
this thesis is feasible. There was positive response to knowledge of architecture being 
provided during tender processes, although some suppliers were concerned about how 
they might progress their design processes to that point for some tenders, particularly 
those involving sub-vendors. Acquirers and suppliers indicated that the proposed 
approach does provide product and evidence focus during the tender phase that appears 
beneficial, although until they actually apply it, this is only speculation. There was 
consensus that knowledge of architecture and knowledge of evidence at tender would 
reduce the difficulty of contract execution. The majority of respondents indicated that 
one or more worked examples of a tender costing based on the proposed tender clauses 
would be beneficial. 
Cost and Schedule Implications 
• Suppliers expressed reservations about being able to resolve issues they haven’t 
costed within contract scope, although praised that the underlying frameworks 
would potentially provide improved knowledge of product and evidence 
requirements during tender phases and thus reduce the risk of a need for issue 
resolution within contract. 
• Some suppliers and acquirers expressed concern that this would increase the cost 
of tender processes, and potentially deter some tenderers. 
• Some suppliers had reservations about the perceived paradigm shift, and how they 
would cost effectively educate their staff to work within such a framework. 
Risk Evaluation 
• Regulators and operational representatives indicated that knowledge of product 
behaviours and remaining defences would help with planning operational 
treatments, and with developing emergency procedures. 
• Regulators indicated that they were still unclear how evidence/assurance shortfalls 
correlated to risks, and suggested developing the framework further to address 
risk measurement. 
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Analysis of Peer Review Results 
Analysis of the peer review results indicates the following: 
• There is correlation between the respondent comments and the motivating issues. 
This indicates that the motivating issues are probably valid. 
• A cross section of prescriptive versus goal-based ‘world views’ were evident in 
responses to motivating issues and general principles revealing that there is 
diversity in ‘world views’, although the results don’t directly suggest a resolution. 
• There was not a direct correlation between ‘world views’ of supplier and 
regulators and position/negative comments indicating that there are broader issues 
of ‘world view’, education, paradigm shaping, and framework limitations 
involved. 
• There is correlation between respondent comments on feasibility and usefulness 
and the general principles on which the framework is based. This indicates that 
the general principles may be widely agreeable, even if their opinions on the 
framework differ.  
• Suppliers focussed strongly on cost and schedule implications, and 
competitiveness with respect to other suppliers. The level of knowledge on the 
topic of safety assurance varied substantially between suppliers, and also between 
suppliers, acquirers and regulators. 
• While there was supplier sentiment that regulations are already too constraining 
for their businesses to be innovating, there was acknowledgement of the problems 
with the current approaches to assurance. 
• Acquirers focussed on successful tender processes leading to successful contract 
execution. The level of knowledge on the topic of safety assurance varied 
substantially between acquirers and regulators.  
• Views of safety and risk varied between respondents, as did appetite for risk. 
Overall the peer review has provided evidence of feasibility of both the underlying 
principles, concepts and framework of this thesis. Benefits have been confirmed, and in 
some cases additional benefits highlighted. A number of issues pertaining to 
clarification of the framework were identified, and these have been addressed 
throughout the write-up of this thesis. A number of limitations with the effectiveness of 
the framework have also been identified, and these will require further evaluation in the 
context of a real world case study, albeit the evidence suggests that the benefits may 
outweigh the limitations. 
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10.3.2 Constructed Example Results and Discussion 
The use of the A-DHC-4 Advance Caribou example (which is abstracted from several 
real world systems) through Chapters 4 – 8, has demonstrated both the feasibility of the 
concepts and framework, as well as the potential applicability to real systems. Because 
it is abstracted from elements of several real world systems and architectures, the 
example has validity to other similar aviation systems. The properties of architectures 
used in these systems also have commonality with the automotive and rail domains, and 
thus the results have potential read across to these domains also. Domains that use 
protection systems, such a nuclear power, use architectures that differ from those 
addressed by this example, and thus further analysis outside the scope of this thesis 
would be required to establish the amount of read across to these other such domains. 
The examples has also shown that it is feasible to use the processes established by 
Chapter 4 to 8 for architectural assurance, claims assurance, evidence assurance, 
contracting for assurance and relating assurance to risk. As these processes are based on 
the concepts and principles used by the framework, then the example also provides 
evidence of the feasibility of the concepts and principles. Chapter 9 also provides 
analysis of the soundness of concepts. 
Each example fragment shows the benefits of the approach, in terms of how the product 
design is improved, or how limitations in assurance evidence are resolved. Give that the 
A-DHC-4 example was based on elements of several real world systems, then it is likely 
that these benefits would be realised in practice also. 
10.3.3 Anti-hypothesis 
The review of 22 historical Australian Defence Force aviation projects between 1998 
and 2012 (refer Appendix E) has identified the following correlations between the 
concepts of this thesis not being applied and risks based on either product shortfalls or 
risk/uncertainty being retained. The study examined historical project evidence using 
the following criteria: 
• Project Paradigm – new acquisition, modification, or acquisition including 
modification, 
• Purchase mechanism – commercial contract or foreign military sales, 
• Airworthiness Authority – civil or military authority, 
• Safety and Software Assurance – safety standard, safety argument notation, 
software assurance standard, 
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• Risk Retention via formal instrument such as an issue paper – product and 
uncertainty based risks, 
• Safety Architecture – evidence of the architectural concepts of this thesis, 
• Assurance Evidence – evidence of the assurance concepts of this thesis, and 
• Contractual Impact – the cost / schedule impact due to limitations in any of the 
aforementioned topics.  
Appendix E shows the following: 
• limitations in assurance evidence or safety architecture, correlates with elevated 
risks based on product safety limitations; 
• limitations in assurance evidence or safety architecture, correlates with elevated 
risks based on uncertainty; 
• limitations in assurance evidence or safety architecture, correlates with cost and 
schedule impacts; 
• the non-application of software or safety standards, correlates with elevated risks 
based on uncertainty; 
• while the purchasing mechanism could not be correlated to retention of risk 
directly, there was evidence that foreign military sales purchases sometimes 
tolerated greater levels of uncertainty; 
• there was variation in the risk appetite between civil and military airworthiness 
authorities, as was there variation from military authorities of different countries; 
• modification seemed to lead to a greater opportunity for uncertainty based risks 
than did initial acquisitions – data access seemed to be a major reason for this; 
Interestingly there was not a specific correlation between limitations in knowledge of 
architecture and in claims/evidence leading only to uncertainty based risks. There was 
also indication that uncertainty in architecture and claims/evidence can relate to product 
risks. This observation reveals that it is necessary to relate architecture and evidence in 
informing knowledge and risks, as has been recognised by the principles established by 
this thesis, and the ASAL/CSAL/ESAL framework that implements the principles. 
While not conclusive proof of the effectiveness of the concepts and framework of this 
thesis, the anti-hypothesis evaluation has shown strong evidence of problems 
developing in real projects when the concepts and principles asserted by this thesis are 
not applied in their entirety. As a major case study has not yet been conducted, it is not 
yet possible to assess if there are cases where these concepts and framework also lead to 
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similar problems as those in historical projects, however the other evaluations in this 
thesis do suggest the benefits should be realisable. 
10.3.4 Audit Tool for Real System Development  
The concepts and principle of this thesis were used as an audit tool during audits the 
C-130J Hercules Block 7.0 upgrade mission computer and flight management system 
software development. The audit team members made the following conclusions: 
• Positives – several benefits were identified: 
o Defences could be identified that correlated to the direct, intra-system and 
inter-system layers. For several fault propagation paths examined, the 
numbers of defences was proportional to the severity of the hazard. 
o Identified shortfalls in defences in several areas lead to the identification of 
shortfalls in software safety analysis evidence, thus revealing the benefits of 
examining for defences. 
o Examining for defences to specific faults/failures of interest was beneficial 
to the audit process. 
o Constraints in the form of software safety requirements were identifiable 
and could be associated with defences. Using selected constraints as the 
focal point for evidence examination was both feasible and beneficial, and 
was also consistent with the underlying methods of the civil software 
approval guidelines. 
o It was feasible to establish lifecycle product hierarchies using real evidence. 
o Identifying evidence limitations using the lifecycle product attributes and 
the properties of evidence: relevance, trustworthiness and results was both 
feasible and beneficial. 
o Ranking limitations in evidence using the tolerability of limitations concept 
was both feasible and beneficial to making audit recommendations. 
• Issues – several issues were raised: 
o Identifying the fault propagation paths was not always possible due to 
deficiencies in contractor evidence. However, the positive to this finding 
was that the deficiencies in contractor evidence were now made explicit, 
and could be ranked along with the other audit findings. 
o The language used to define to layers of defences in the earlier iterations of 
the architectural assurance work were associated with where and how the 
defence was implemented, but didn’t properly indicate the perspective with 
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regard to the fault being treated. This issue has been addressed, through the 
clarification of layers of defences and perspectives in Chapter 4. 
o Auditors sometimes disagreed on the limitations of methods to relevance 
and trustworthiness, although the disagreement was beneficial in regards to 
the debate that followed. This issue has been addressed, through the 
categorisation of limitations in Chapter 6. 
o The auditors commented on the possibly large number of propagation paths 
and therefore tolerability of limitations assessments required for most 
practical systems. While each assessment would be a valid assessment, the 
auditors expressed interest as to whether the assessments could be grouped 
or prioritised. While the number of propagation paths is a function of the 
size and complexity of the system in question, opportunities have been 
identified in Chapters 5 and 6 on how to group assessments. Chapter 8 also 
suggests a means of ranking the extensiveness of assessments based on 
failure mode severity and risk. 
The trial application of the framework showed that it complemented existing audit 
approaches, and the framework will have further usage by Australian Defence Force 
audit programs. 
10.3.5 Contract Evaluation for Project 
Under the risk mitigation activity contract phase of the Lead-In-Fighter Capability 
Assurance Program, the following relevant safety assurance planning and evidence 
generation has been undertaken: 
• Type Certification Planning 
• System Safety Program Planning 
• Software Safety Program Planning 
• Software Development Assurance 
Planning 
• Systems Requirements Specification 
• Design Specifications 
• Design Documents 
• Preliminary Hazard Identification 
• Mitigation Strategies for Hazards 
• System-level Fault Trees 
Reviews by the project office of safety assurance plans and evidence were undertaken 
against the concepts of this thesis in order to inform SOW development for the Prime 
contract phase. Safety evidence was reviewed by the project office in order to identify 
possible architectural defences, and the associated design requirements as constraints. 
System Safety and Software Plans were reviewed to identify lifecycle product 
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hierarchies applicable to constraints, as were they reviewed to identify the scope of 
evidence proposed. The evidence was gauged in critical areas by carrying out relevance 
and trustworthiness assessments. The results of these assessments identified a number 
of shortfalls against the CSAL and ESAL benchmarks. These findings were used to 
inform project office CDRL feedback comments. 
A holistic assessment of the limitation in confidence in the knowledge of risks based on 
knowledge and uncertainty from the aforementioned assessments was undertaken in 
order to inform SOW clause development for the prime. The assessments resulted in 
additional SOW clauses being developed in the topics of type certification, system 
safety and software assurance, and DID content of several safety and software CDRLs 
being revised. In some key areas, these revisions were undertaken through instantiating 
clauses based on similar intent to those clauses defined in Chapter 7 of this thesis. Due 
to the current nature of this project, additional information can’t be disclosed in this 
thesis due to commercial sensitivities.  
Approval to enter into the contract for the Prime Contract phase by the Australian 
Government and Defence Materiel Organisation was provided and contract signature 
was achieved in June 2013. The contract authority was able to obtain approval from the 
Australian Government to proceed to contract signature based on sufficient confidence 
in the knowledge of risks, and tolerable understanding of the uncertainty involved in 
those risks. This risk assessment was supported by independent attestations from 
technical and operational authorities who were informed by the project office’s 
evaluation activities and evidence provided. This outcome provides some practical 
evidence that contract evaluations and refinement based on the concepts of this thesis 
was able to clearly inform contract approval decisions based on project risks. 
The outcomes from the trialled application to this contract evaluation were positive, 
particularly when coupled with a two phase contracting approach that conforms to the 
intent of the tender / contract distinction used in Chapter 7.  
10.4 Further Evaluation 
Due to the type of problem this thesis covers, and due to the timescales of a Doctoral 
Program, it has not been possible to completely exhaust the chosen means of evaluation. 
For example, the peer review and constructed example were both bounded to fit to 
timescales. Peer review would benefit from an expanded set of respondents, and the 
construction example could be expanded in scope, both of which might provide 
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additional information useful to evaluation. Furthermore there are opportunities to 
expand the application as a contract evaluation and audit tool to more projects. In terms 
of providing more conclusive evaluation of the feasibility and effectiveness of concepts 
and integrated framework of this thesis, such expansion of the evaluation would be 
required. Further work in relation to evaluating under a major real world case study is 
also suggested in Section 11.2.1 
10.5 Summary 
The thesis proposition given in Chapters 1 and 2 stated that it was feasible to establish 
principles for defining effective system and software safety assurance frameworks, and 
that it is feasible to develop and contract to a framework that is based on those 
principles. The thesis and the evaluation in this chapter have demonstrated the 
feasibility of established principles for safety assurance and defining an assurance 
framework based on these principles. Benefits of the assurance framework based on 
these principles have been identified. A number of limitations with the effectiveness of 
the framework have also been identified, and these will require further evaluation in the 
context of a real world case study, albeit the evidence suggests that the benefits may 
outweigh the limitations. Opportunities for further evaluation have also been identified. 
However, it will only be through the extended practical application of the concepts 
described in this thesis on real projects, that the feasibility and practicality of the 
approach can be fully evaluated. 
 
 325  
11 Conclusion 
11.1 Contribution 
This thesis has defined and presented the results of evaluation of an approach to the 
safety assurance of aviation systems to combat limitations in contemporary safety and 
assurance standards which cause programmatic and certification difficulties. These 
limitations have been identified from a study of Australian Defence Force aviation 
projects. However as many Australian projects are multi-national, the limitations are 
more widely experienced. The contribution of this thesis is in the following areas: 
• clarification of the purpose of safety assurance; 
• definition and evaluation of principles of safety assurance and usability 
criteria based on the improved purpose statements; 
• definition and evaluation of meta-arguments which provide the rationale for 
definition of an assurance framework based on the stated principles and 
usability criteria; 
• definition and evaluation of a novel integrated framework for the safety 
assurance of aviation systems based on the defined principles and usability 
criteria; 
• definition and evaluation of a process for application of the novel integrated 
framework; and 
• definition and evaluation of an approach for contracting for safety assurance. 
The following sections draw conclusions from each of the elements on the research. 
11.1.1 Conclusions on the Principles and Usability Criteria 
In Chapter 2 the current state of safety assurance and assurance standards is surveyed. 
The survey identified variation in the ‘world-view’ or ‘Weltanschauung’ of what’s 
important in safety assurance, leading to a need to clarify the purpose of safety 
assurance and assurance standards. The improved statements (Chapter 3) of the purpose 
of safety assurance and assurance standards provide clarification and explanation for 
variation in ‘world-view’, and are in that sense a contribution.  
While Chapter 2 revealed a wide range of research into specific issues associated with 
safety assurance, there has been limited integration of contemporary concepts into a 
holistic model for safety assurance. This thesis has established principles of safety 
assurance and usability criteria (Chapter 3) based on the improved purpose statements. 
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They are intended to capture important relationships between topics of process and 
product evidence, argument/rationale, product behaviours, and risk evaluations; and to 
contextualise these principles by establishing usability criteria for practical 
implementations of safety assurance. The model emphasises that safety assurance is a 
substantially greater topic than the safety argument, due to the broader role of standards. 
The contribution here is twofold: the holistic model of principles and usability criteria; 
and capability to deal with systematic behavioural properties which have previously 
been problematic to deal with in risk assessments.  
The evaluation has provided positive indication for general principles, and confirmation 
that the principles preserve benefits and reduce some of the limitations of existing 
assurance paradigms for aviation systems. 
11.1.2 Conclusions on Architectural Assurance 
Chapters 4 and 8 identify that architecture is an important factor in characterising the 
knowledge and uncertainty of product behaviours, which is crucial to evaluating 
systematic behavioural risks. This is a topic that has been largely absent from 
contemporary assurance standards. A model is established for classifying architectural 
defences, where no model existed previously. The key contribution is the definition of 
meta-arguments which provide the rationale for architectural properties as a basis for an 
assurance framework. An architectural assurance framework is established based on 
these principles and meta-arguments.  
The evaluation has provided positive indication of the benefits of using architectural 
properties to inform risk evaluations. Evaluation of the approach also indicates that 
subjectivity is limited to reasoning about specific architectures adhering to general 
principles of the role of architecture, rather than diversion from general principles 
through inferior argument. While it is acknowledged that the aviation domain specific 
context to assumptions underpinning architectural solutions may ultimately limit the 
universality of framework, the underlying concepts are sufficiently generic that they 
could be evaluated for other domains. 
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11.1.3 Conclusions on Assurance of Product Behavioural Knowledge and 
Evidence 
Chapters 5 and 6 identify that the role of evidence in informing product behaviours 
depends on where and how the evidence is used in the hierarchy of lifecycle products. A 
consolidated view of the role of evidence with respect to assurance has been largely 
absent from contemporary assurance standards. A model is established for classifying 
the hierarchy of lifecycle product evidence, and the properties of evidence. The key 
contribution is the definition of meta-arguments which provide the rationale for 
properties of lifecycle product evidence as a basis for part of an assurance framework, 
and the concept of tolerability of limitations in evidence. A claims and evidence 
assurance framework is established which builds on the meta-arguments and the 
properties of evidence in establishing knowledge of product behaviours. 
The evaluation has provided positive indication that the evidence categorisations are 
consistent with the types of evidence used, and that the tolerability of limitations 
concept is beneficial in terms of addressing the practical aspects of assurance. 
Evaluation of the approach also indicates that subjectivity is limited to reasoning about 
specific evidence adhering to general principles. The meta-arguments also offer 
explanation for assurance level definition that have been largely absent from 
contemporary assurance standards. 
11.1.4 Conclusions on Contracting for Assurance 
Chapter 7 identifies that safety assurance approaches have often ignored the topic of 
contracting for safety assurance, and have presented difficulties across contractual 
boundaries. The key contribution is the definition and evaluation of an approach for 
contracting for safety assurance based on the rationale of Chapters 4 through 6.  
The evaluation has indicated that the approach should help identify ‘strong’ versus 
‘weak’ solutions, and thus better inform tender selection, and contract execution. In the 
long term, it is hoped that this will reduce the frequency and magnitude of 
programmatic and certification difficulties due to limitations in safety assurance. 
11.1.5 Overall Conclusions 
The topic of safety assurance continues to generate widespread debate across both 
academia and industry. This thesis has stated that safety assurance frameworks are only 
effective if it is not only possible to produce a compelling safety case, but it is probable. 
The use of case-by-case arguments in goal-based approaches, or the use of prescriptive 
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methods all present practical issues which limit effectiveness. This thesis has examined 
an approach which applies a compromise between case-by-case arguments and pre-
constraining arguments to reduce the impact of issues which limit the practical 
effectiveness of safety assurance approaches. The contribution of this thesis is to show 
that there are practical benefits of minimising subjectivity and reducing variability by 
compromising between case-by-case arguments and pre-constrained arguments. Where 
subjectivity and variability is limited to the specific solution and evidence set, rather 
than with regards to adherence to general principles of architecture, product behaviours 
and the hierarchy of evidence, then subjectivity and variability is better managed and 
fewer ‘bad’ solutions should result. The thesis also shows that it is feasible for 
assurance levels to be traceable to a product meaning, and to be informative to risk 
evaluations in ways that existing approaches are not. While it hasn’t been possible to 
provide conclusive proof that the models and rationale of this thesis are scientifically 
complete, it is not necessary to do so to show that frameworks developed based on these 
principles are useful. The likelihood of wasting resources on matters which are not 
material to safety should, on balance, be lower than using contemporary approaches. 
The practical limitations of the evaluation lead to the conclusion being indicative rather 
than definitive. Section 11.2 suggests further work to satisfy the demand for evidence to 
improve the robustness of conclusions. 
11.2 Further Work  
During the conduct of the research presented in this thesis, opportunities for future work 
have been identified. These opportunities provide indication that the contribution of this 
thesis offers more widespread benefits than those concluded within. A brief introduction 
to these areas of research is presented in the following sections. 
11.2.1 Major Real World Case Study 
While the soundness of concepts and the novel integrated framework has been 
evaluated, it is not been possible to carry out a major real world case study within the 
timescales of a Doctoral Program. Further validation by one or more real world case 
studies is necessary. 
Such a real world case study would involve the application of this novel integrated 
framework to the entire design lifecycle. The design problem should be one that avoids 
novelty, as it will be necessary to make a comparison of the architectures, claims and 
evidence generated in such a case study against those developed using traditional 
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approaches to assurance. Comparisons could then examine differences in the 
architectures, claims, and evidence between approaches, reason about how these 
differences inform risk evaluation, and draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the 
framework from such results. 
11.2.2 Investigation into Other Safety Standards from Other Domains 
The meta-arguments expressed by Chapters 4 through 6 of this thesis rely on the 
properties of aviation system architectures, implicit arguments of rationale, and 
contemporary types of evidence used within the aviation domain. To evaluate the 
universality of these concepts, it would be beneficial to investigate whether these 
concepts require adaptation in order to be applied to safety assurance in other domains, 
and whether these concepts could be expressed at an even more general level.   
11.2.3 Use of Meta-arguments for Expressing Rationale of Standards 
This thesis has used meta-arguments for expressing the rationale of the underlying 
concepts around which an assurance level approach has been developed. As the problem 
of implicit rationale affects standards across many domains, it would be beneficial to 
investigate whether the usage of meta-arguments for expressing rationale in standards 
provides benefits to the soundness and utility of assurance standards.  
11.2.4 Application of Re-defined Risk Paradigm to Other Domains 
The re-defined risk paradigm within Chapter 8 of this thesis provides a method of 
characterising and evaluating systematic contributions to risks. As many other domains 
also are bound by probabilistic risk methodologies, many of which suffer similar 
limitations to those historically applied in the aviation domain, there may be benefits to 
investigating if these concepts read across or require adaptation for other domains.  
11.2.5 Applicability to ALARP 
ALARP implicitly assumes that the cost of information to inform risk assessments is 
negligible when compared with the costs of treatments to risks. This thesis has shown 
that there is a minimum cost of information needed to inform risk assessments, and has 
provided a way for managing the costs and benefits of this information with regards to 
establishing confidence in the knowledge and uncertainty of risks. This thesis has also 
provided a way for evaluating contributions from systematic behaviours (e.g. software) 
in relation to risk. There would be benefits to further investigating whether clarification 
of the ALARP principle based on the cost of information needed to inform risk 
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treatment or retention decisions provides a means of resolving the long standing 
difficulties of ALARP with technologies like software.  
11.2.6 System of Systems 
This thesis was not intended to address system of systems; however there are concepts 
developed in this thesis that may be beneficial to systems of systems and warrant further 
investigation. 
Systems Analysis Informs Systems of System Analysis 
Consider how the impact of a system on other systems in any potential systems of 
systems might be assessed. Any system of systems analysis will require, as a starting 
point, knowledge of the potential risks, accidents, hazards and behaviours of the 
individual systems within the system of systems. The framework within this thesis 
provides a means of providing knowledge of product behaviours, and relating these to 
hazards, accidents and risks which are analysed in system safety analyses. Thus, this 
framework may be a starting point for system of systems analysis. 
The framework described in thesis has a focus on layers of defences (refer to Sections 
9.1 and 9.2, and Chapter 4). Knowledge of these defences is useful when taking a 
system of systems perspective for the following reasons: 
• when system of systems analysis identifies new interaction related hazards, the 
knowledge of the individual system defences permits straightforward evaluation 
of substantive treatments to these hazards; 
• existing system defences against faults may already provide treatments to systems 
of systems hazard, and thus knowing that they exist reduces need for re-
engineering systems; 
• existing system defences against faults may provide the architectural framework 
necessary to enhance a system’s defences with lesser impact on the system’s 
established design if the system already incorporates a fault prevention and fault 
tolerance defence design features; and 
• external defences (i.e. external defence, platform severity reduction defence and 
external severity reduction defences – refer Chapter 4) may be identified by an 
individual system which are suggestive of dependencies in a system of systems 
context. 
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System of Systems Impact on Individual Systems 
Consider how the impact of the other systems in the system of systems on the individual 
system might be assessed. The impact assessment on individual systems in systems of 
systems analysis will require knowledge of how the individual systems behaviours may 
be impacted by system of systems behaviours. The framework within this thesis 
provides a means of providing knowledge of an individual system’s defences against 
classes of faults. This knowledge is beneficial because it permits an assessment of how 
any system interaction hazards, and the faults they might induce, are handled by the 
individual system. Further, when they are not, it provides sufficient behavioural 
knowledge to determine if an additional defence may or may not be required.  
Application of Concepts to System of Systems 
This thesis describes the ‘layers of defence’ concept at a system architectural level to 
provide confidence that faults/events don’t prevent the system achieving safety. This 
concept offers benefits to system of systems assurance paradigms, in that it provides a 
way to measure the resilience of a system of systems against both individual and 
collective threats. Although beyond of the scope of this thesis, a valuable future 
research question is: can a system of systems assurance framework be developed that is 
based on the layers of defences against threats concept? 
This thesis also describes the ‘tolerability of limitations’ concept to provide a way of 
articulating the impact of unavoidable limitations in evidence. In the system of systems 
case, having knowledge of the behaviours of all the systems in the network is much less 
likely than having knowledge about systems that are within your control, and less 
knowledge about systems that are out of it. Thus the tolerability of limitations concept 
might also offer some benefits to system of systems assurance paradigms, in that when 
coupled with the layers of defence concept, it provides a methodology for determining 
the importance of evidence shortfalls, and correlating them to known defences. This 
may provide a means of establishing priorities in a system of systems where it is most 
valuable to seek further knowledge. 
Thus it is evident that the framework provided within this thesis could help to 
complement system of systems analysis, and warrants investigation. 
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11.3 Concluding Remarks 
A major factor identified in the effectiveness of safety assurance standards is how 
stakeholders are incentivised (or discouraged) in decision making. This thesis has 
shown the novel integrated framework, through implementation of the principles and 
guidelines, helps avoid historical project issues by helping developers to focus on 
reasoning about the risks related to behavioural properties of their products, and the 
production of evidence informing product behaviours. 
Only with practical application on real world projects can the feasibility and 
effectiveness of these concepts be fully evaluated. The approaches described in this 
thesis help to improve the demonstration and achievement of safety, and thus through 
their practical use, it is hoped, will provide greater confidence in the knowledge and 
uncertainty associated with the treatment and retention of risks. It has not been possible 
to completely demonstrate this within the timescale of a Doctoral program, but the 
aspiration is that the definition of concepts within this thesis will lead to industrial 
application, and improvements in the safety assurance of aviation systems.  
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Appendix A – Fault Prevention and Tolerance in 
Aviation Systems 
This appendix summarises the fault prevention and fault tolerance mechanisms in 
several aircraft that were examined in establishing architectural trends in safety 
assurance (refer to Chapter 4). 
Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance in Flight Control Systems 
Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-17A 
Primary 
Computers 
Three (3) Primary 
Flight Computers 
(PFC) – digital 
• process Normal, 
Secondary and 
Direct laws 
• actuation 
commands 
transmitted to 
ACE 
• execution of 
automated 
functions such as 
yaw damper 
• system 
monitoring, crew 
annunciation, and 
on-board 
maintenance 
capabilities 
Four (4) Actuator 
Control Electronics 
(ACE) – analogue 
• interface with the 
pilot control 
transducers and to 
control the 
Primary Flight 
Control System 
actuation with 
analogue servo 
loops 
• ACEs convert the 
transducer position 
into a digital value 
and then transmit 
that value to the 
PFCs 
• ACEs then convert 
PFC commands 
into analogue 
commands for 
each individual 
actuator 
• flight control 
surface servo 
loops are 
distributed among 
the four ACEs. 
Three (3) Flight Control 
Primary Computers 
(FCPC) - digital 
• process Normal, 
Alternate and Direct 
Laws 
• one FCPC is selected 
as Master: it 
processes the orders 
and outputs them to 
the other computers 
which will execute 
them on their servo 
loops 
• Master checks that its 
orders are fulfilled by 
comparing them with 
feedback received; 
self-monitoring of the 
master can detect a 
malfunction and 
cascade control to the 
next computer 
• each FCPC can 
control up to eight (8) 
servo loops and 
provide complete 
aircraft control under 
normal laws. 
Quad redundant digital 
flight control system 
incorporating two (2) 
flight control computers 
with two independent 
channels per computer 
process: 
• control stick, rudder 
pedal and trim 
commands 
• pitot static, rate gyro, 
accelerometer, AOA 
probe and fight control 
surface position 
feedback signals, and 
• send commands to 
each flight control 
surface actuator. 
 
Quadruplex set of 
digital flight control 
computers 
Four channel 
synchronous 
operation 
All output hardware, 
signals, and 
feedback are 
monitored and 
compared to ensure 
failure detection and 
channel output 
voting. 
Dedicated cross-
channel data link 
used between 
channels 
Input signal voting 
Actuator loop 
voting 
 
Secondary 
Computers 
Two (2) Flight Control 
Secondary Computers 
(FCSC) - digital 
• Are able to process 
direct laws 
• Either secondary can 
be the master in the 
case of loss of all 
FCPC 
• Each FCSC can 
control up to 10 servo 
loops and can provide 
complete aircraft 
control 
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Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-17A 
Additional Control 
Computers 
Other systems: 
• Flap Slat 
Electronics Unit 
(FSEU) 
• Proximity Switch 
Electronics Unit 
(PSEU) 
• Engine Data 
Interface Unit 
(EDIU) 
Airplane Information 
Management System 
(AIMS) Data 
Conversion Gateway 
(DCG) maintains 
separation between 
the critical flight 
controls busses and 
the essential systems 
busses. 
High life devices are 
commanded by two 
Slat/Flap Control 
Computers 
Two (2) Flight Control 
Data Concentrators 
(FCDC) acquire the 
outputs from the various 
computers to be sent to 
the ECAM and Flight 
Data Interface Unit to 
provide isolation of the 
flight control computers 
from other systems. 
No additional flight 
computers 
Two dual digital 
Spoiler 
Control/Electronic 
Flap Computers 
Computer 
Architecture 
Each PFC has three 
identical computing 
‘‘lanes”  
• a voting plane 
scheme is used by 
the PFCs on 
themselves,  
• single computing 
lane within a PFC 
channel is declared 
as the ‘‘master” 
lane, 
• all three lanes 
simultaneously 
computing the 
same control laws, 
• the outputs of all 
three lanes are 
compared against 
each other,  
• any failure of a 
lane that will 
cause an erroneous 
output from that 
lane will cause 
that lane to be 
‘‘failed” by the 
other two lanes, 
and 
• Command Lane, 
Standby Lane, 
Monitor Lane. 
Command/ Monitor 
computer architecture for 
both the FCPC and 
FCSC. 
• Monitor channel 
monitors for health of 
the command channel 
and control surface 
runaway 
• Specific variables are 
permanently 
compared in the two 
channels.  
• sensor inaccuracy, 
rigging tolerances, 
computer 
asynchronisation are 
taken into account 
• errors which are not 
detectable (within the 
signal and timing 
thresholds) are 
assessed in respect to 
their handling quality 
and structural loads 
effect 
• in the event of a 
divergence between 
command and 
monitor solutions, the 
affected computer is 
disengaged and the 
next highest priority 
computer takes over 
Two independent 
channels per computer 
processor 
FCC and SCEFC 
each use 3 MIL-
STD-1750A CPUs.  
• In the FCC one 
processor serves 
as an I/O 
processor, and 
the other two 
perform control 
law 
computations. 
• In the SFEFC 
one processor 
serves as an I/O 
processor and 
the other two 
are configured 
as a self-
checking pair. 
The AFCS control 
panel is 
implemented with 
four MIL-STD-
1760A CPU 
configured as two 
self-checking pairs. 
 
Dissimilarity Dissimilarity between 
the PFC and ACE. 
• PFCs are identical 
digital computers 
• ACE are identical 
analogue devices 
 Dissimilarity between 
the Air Data and 
Inertial Reference 
Unit (ADIRU) and 
Standby Attitude and 
Air Data Reference 
Unit (SAARU) 
Dissimilarity between 
FCPC and FCSC digital 
computer designs 
• different processor 
architectures and 
manufacturers 
• different software 
between FCPC and 
FCSC and between 
command and 
monitor channels in 
each FCPC and 
FCSC 
No dissimilarity between 
Air Data and Inertial 
Reference Units 
(ADIRUs) 
No dissimilarity between 
flight control computers. 
 
No dissimilarity 
between flight 
control computers. 
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Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-17A 
Latent Failure 
Detection 
Built in Test Self-test and peripheral 
tests 
Built in Test Built in Test 
Reconfiguration The outputs from all 
three PFC channels 
are compared.  
• Each PFC 
compares its 
output for each 
particular actuator, 
and with the same 
command that was 
calculated by the 
other two PFC 
channels. 
• Each PFC channel 
does a mid-value 
select on the three 
commands, and 
that value is output 
to the ACEs. 
When the active computer 
interrupts its operation, 
one of the standby 
computers almost 
instantly changes to 
active mode with no or 
limited jerk on the control 
surfaces. 
Three (3) modes of 
operation 
• Control Augmentation 
System (CAS) – full 
digital capability 
including adaptive 
flight controls and 
stability augmentation. 
• Direct Electrical Link 
(DEL) – provided in 
the event of primary 
CAS failure, no longer 
process input from 
failed rate gyros and/or 
accelerometers. 
• Mechanical (MECH) – 
three or more channel 
failures, pitch roll 
sensor failures, failure 
of both servo-valves in 
one actuator, hydraulic 
starvation 
All FCS critical 
inputs, processing 
and outputs are quad 
redundant (fail op, 
fail op, fail passive). 
The FCCs and 
SCEFCs operate as 
a frame 
synchronous set. In 
the event of loss of 
synchronisation, the 
computers will 
attempt to re-
synchronise. 
A sensor selection 
algorithm derives a 
selected value for 
each signal as a 
function of the 
sensor failure states. 
• Average of middle 
two values (four 
valid signals) 
• Mid-value of three 
signals 
• Average of two 
signals 
Servos Actuators 
arrangements are as 
follows: 
• Elevators, 
ailerons, and 
flaperons are 
controlled by two 
actuators per 
surface; the rudder 
is controlled by 
three.  
• Each spoiler panel 
is powered by a 
single actuator. 
• The horizontal 
stabilizer is 
positioned by two 
parallel hydraulic 
motors driving the 
stabilizer 
jackscrew. 
The actuation 
powering the 
elevators, ailerons, 
flaperons, and rudder 
have several 
operational modes: 
Active, Bypassed, 
Damped, or Blocked. 
Actuators arrangements 
are as follows: 
• Elevators, ailerons 
are controlled by two 
actuators per surface; 
the rudder is 
controlled by three. 
• Each spoiler panel is 
powered by a single 
actuator. 
• The horizontal 
stabiliser is 
positioned by two 
actuators. 
Servo-jacks can operate 
in one of three control 
modes depending upon 
computer status and type 
of control surface: active, 
damping, centring. 
Normally one servo is 
active and one is damped 
on each control surface 
Dual servo values in each 
actuator fed by both flight 
control computers and 
two independent 
hydraulic sources. 
Aileron and twin rudders 
are differentially 
scheduled. 
Trailing Edge Flaps, 
Leading Edge Flaps and 
Stabs are scheduled both 
differentially and 
collectively. 
All four FCCs are 
connected to each 
actuator. Outputs 
from each FCC are 
summed at the 
Electro hydraulic 
Servo Values 
providing a voting 
node. 
Output signal 
management 
software function in 
each FCC compares 
local channel 
actuator data with 
cross channel data 
to detect, identify 
and remove local 
faults 
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Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-17A 
Envelope 
protection / 
limiting 
Computers provide 
the following 
protections: 
• Bank angle 
protection 
• Turn 
compensation 
• Stall and over-
speed protection 
• Pitch control and 
stability 
augmentation 
• Thrust asymmetry 
compensation 
Computers will prevent 
excessive manoeuvres 
and exceedance of the 
safe flight envelope. 
• Excessive load 
factors 
• Over-speed 
• Stall 
• Extreme pitch angle 
• Extreme bank angle 
Conventional envelope 
protections not provided 
in a fighter jet 
The following 
protections are 
provided: 
• Angel of attack 
limiting system 
• Deep stall 
avoidance 
• All engine out 
control 
• Safe go-around 
 
Sensors Dual redundant air 
data and inertial 
systems: 
• Air Data and 
Inertial Reference 
Unit (ADIRU) 
• Standby Attitude 
and Air Data 
Reference Unit 
(SAARU)  
• Autopilot Flight 
Director 
Computers 
(AFDC)  
All critical interfaces 
into the Primary 
Flight Control System 
use multiple inputs 
which are compared 
by a voting plane. 
Triple redundant air data 
and inertial: 
• Three air data and 
inertial reference 
units (ADIRUs) 
• Accelerometers and 
rate gyros 
The following sensors are 
used by the Flight Control 
Computers: 
• Pitot Static 
• Rate Gyro 
• Accelerometer, 
• AOA probe 
• And flight control 
surface position 
transducers 
 
 
 
 
Quadruplex sensors 
including: 
• Stick and Pedal 
Force Sensors 
• Stick Position 
• Surface Position 
• Air data and 
stabiliser 
sensors 
• Air Data 
Computers 
• Inertial 
Reference Unit 
Six (6) AOA 
sensors 
Remaining sensors 
are dual. 
Inputs are voted, 
monitored, selected 
and sent to each 
processing channel 
before use in output 
signal processing. 
Digital inputs have 
validity bits 
Mechanical 
Backup 
Two spoiler panels 
and alternate stabiliser 
pitch trim are 
mechanically 
controlled 
Mechanical backup: 
rudder and trimmable 
horizontal stabiliser – no 
artificial stabilisation 
required 
Mechanical 
backup/linkage to the 
horizontal stabilators. 
Backup mechanical 
system provides 
control of the 
ailerons, elevators, 
rudders and 
stabilizer surfaces. 
Table 34: Summary of Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance in Flight Control Systems 
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Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance in Flight Management Systems 
Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-130J 
Flight 
Management 
Computers 
Dual integrated cabinets 
which provide the 
processing and the I/O 
hardware and software 
required to perform the 
following functions: 
• Flight Management 
• Display 
• Central Maintenance 
• Airplane Condition 
Monitoring 
• Communication 
Management (including 
flight deck 
communication) 
• Data Conversion 
Gateway (ARINC 
429/629 Conversion) 
The applications hosted on 
AIMS are listed below, 
along with the number of 
redundant copies of each 
application per ship-set in 
parentheses: 
• Displays (4) 
• Flight 
Management/Thrust 
Management (2) 
• Central Maintenance (2) 
• Data Communication 
Management (2) 
• Flight Deck 
Communication (2) 
• Airplane Condition 
Monitoring (1) 
• Digital Flight Data 
Acquisition (2) 
• Data Conversion 
Gateway (4) 
Two computers Flight 
Management Guidance Computer 
(FMGC) 
• Flight management for 
navigation, performance 
prediction and optimisation, 
navigation radio tuning and 
information display 
management 
• Flight guidance for autopilot 
commands, flight director and 
thrust commands – two types 
of guidance 
o Managed – lateral and 
vertical flight plan data 
o Selected – guidance targets 
selected on the glare-shield 
Flight Control Unit 
• Flight envelope and speed 
computation 
 
Two AYK-14 
Mission 
Computers (MC) 
One MC will be 
the active Bus 
Controller on 
AVMUX 1 – 6 
and the other MC 
will be the an RT. 
Communication / 
Navigation / 
Identification – 
Management System 
(CNI-MS) consists of 
• 2 Mission 
Computers (MC) – 
control the 
information 
exchanged between 
airplane systems 
via MIL-STD-1553 
data-buses. One 
MC will be the 
active Bus 
Controller on 
nominated data-
buses and the other 
will be the Backup 
Bus Controller for 
those same data-
buses 
• 2 Bus Interface 
Units (BIU) – if 
both MCs fail the 
BIU assume the 
bus controller 
functions for the 
applicable data-
buses 
• 2 CNI System 
Processors (CNI-
SP) – contain the 
operational logic 
that permit crew 
control and 
functioning of the 
communication, 
navigation and 
identification 
equipment.  
Control The other flight deck 
hardware elements that 
make up the AIMS system 
are 
• Six flat panel display 
units 
• Three control and 
display units (left, 
centre and right) 
• Two EFIS display 
control panels 
• Display select panel 
• Cursor control devices 
• Display remote light 
sensors 
Three Multipurpose Control and 
Display Units (MCDU) (only two 
at a time) provide: 
• flight plan definition and 
display 
• data insertion (speeds, weights, 
cruise level, etc.) 
• selection of specific functions 
One Flight Control Unit on the 
glare-shield provides manual 
entry of: 
• speed 
• heading 
• altitude 
• vertical speed 
Two thrust levers linked to the 
FMGCs and FADECs provide 
auto-thrust or manual thrust 
control 
Left and Right 
Digital Display 
Indicators (DDIs) 
Up Front 
Controller (UFC) 
Digital Map 
Computer (DMC) 
• 3 CNI Management 
Units (CNI-MU) – 
primary crew 
interface to the 
CNI-MS. 
• 1 Communications 
/ Navigation / 
Breaker Panel 
(CNBP) 
• 2 Avionics 
Management Units 
(AMU) 
• 2 Heads Up 
Display (HUD) 
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Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-130J 
Display Two Primary Flight Displays 
(PFD) and two Navigation 
Displays (NDs) provide visual 
interface with flight management 
and guidance related data. 
PFD: 
• FMGC guidance targets 
• Armed and active modes 
• System engagement targets 
ND: 
• Flight plan presentation 
• Aircraft position and flight 
path 
• Navigation items including 
radio aids and wind) 
Left and Right 
DDIs 
UFC 
DMC 
Heads Up 
Display (HUD) 
Computer 
Architecture 
Dual cabinets each contain 
four core processor 
modules (CPMs) and four 
input / output modules 
(IOMs), with space 
reserved in the cabinet to 
add one CPM and two 
IOMs to accommodate 
future growth. The shared 
platform resources 
provided by AIMS are 
• Common processor and 
mechanical housing, 
• Common input/output 
ports, power supply, and 
mechanical housing, 
• Common backplane bus 
(SAFEbus™) to move 
data between CPMs and 
between CPMs and 
IOMs, 
• Common operating 
system and built-in test 
(BIT) and utility 
software. 
Applications are 
integrated on common 
CPMs. The IOMs transmit 
data from the CPMs to 
other systems on the 
airplane, and receive data 
from these other systems 
for use by the CPM 
applications. A high-speed 
backplane bus, called 
SAFEbus™, provides a 
60-Mbit/s data pipe 
between any of the CPMs 
and IOMs in a cabinet. 
Communication between 
AIMS cabinets is through 
four ARINC 629 serial 
buses. 
Two computers Flight 
Management Guidance Computer 
(FMGC) 
FMGC are identical single 
channel computers 
MCDU are identical single 
channel computers 
Two AYK-14 
Mission 
Computers 
AYK-14 MCs are 
identical single 
channel 
computers. 
Other AYK-14 
modules include a 
core memory and 
MIL-STD - 
1553A/B, 
Tactical Data 
System, RS-232, 
and discrete Input 
/ Output (I/O). 
 
MC are identical 
single channel 
computers 
CNI-SP are identical 
single channel 
computers 
BIU are identical 
single channel 
computers 
MC, CNI-SP and BIU 
are all different 
computer architectures 
Dissimilarity No dissimilarity between 
AIMS cabinets 
No dissimilarity between FGMCs 
No dissimilarity between 
MCDUs 
No dissimilarity 
between MCs 
No dissimilarity 
between MCs 
No dissimilarity 
between CNI-SPs 
No dissimilarity 
between BIUs 
Latent Failure 
Detection 
Built in Test Built in Test Built in Test MC BIT 
CNI-SP PBIT and 
IBIT 
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Feature Boeing 777 A330 / KC-30A F/A-18A/B C-130J 
Reconfiguration Hardware fault detection 
and isolation is achieved 
via a lock-step design of 
the CPMs, IOMs, and the 
SAFEbus™. Each 
machine cycle on the 
CPMs and IOMs is 
performed in lock-step by 
two separate processing 
channels, and comparison 
hardware ensures that 
each channel is 
performing identically. If 
a miss-compare occurs, 
the system will attempt 
retries where possible 
before invoking the fault 
handling and logging 
software in the operation 
system. The SAFEbus™ 
has four redundant data 
channels that are 
compared in real time to 
detect and isolate bus 
faults. 
Selected guidance has priority 
over managed guidance mode. 
Normal mode, dual mode, single 
mode 
One MC will be 
the active Bus 
Controller on 
AVMUX 1 – 6 
and the other MC 
will be the RT. 
If the MC BC 
fails, the other 
MC assumed 
control of all 
buses. 
One MC is capable of 
performing the 
functions of both MCs 
with no reduction in 
capability 
If one MC fails, the 
other MC assumes 
control of all seven 
buses with no loss of 
system integration 
performance. 
BIU provides backup 
in the event of dual 
MC failures. 
Each CNI-SP 
calculates its own 
solutions 
independently, and 
compares the results 
with the other CNI-SP. 
Either CNI-SP can 
perform all the 
functions alone, should 
the other CNI-SP fail. 
The CNI-SP operates 
in one of three modes: 
dual, single 
active/inactive and 
independent. 
Sensors Redundant Inertial 
Navigation Systems / 
Global Positioning 
Systems 
Radio Navigation (VOR, 
ILS, ADF, DME) 
Each FMGC tunes its own side 
except when in single operation 
• One VOR 
• One ILS 
• One ADF 
• 5 DMEs 
3 Inertial Reference Systems 
FMGC position is a blend of IRS 
and radio position 
Uses GPIRS position in priority 
mode 
Comm #1 and 
Comm #2 (UHF, 
VHF, HF) 
EGI – INS / GPS 
VOR, ILS, 
TACAN , DME, 
ADF 
Combined 
Interrogator 
Transponder 
(CIT) 
 
The CNI-MS controls 
the following 
equipment: 
• 2 UHF radios 
• 2 VHF radios 
• 2 HF radios 
• 2 Embedded 
GPS/INS (EGI) 
• 2 VOR/ILS/MB 
radios 
• 2 TACAN radios 
• 2 ADF radios 
• 2 IFF transponders 
Backup Stand-by navigation 
instruments 
Communications can be 
independently tuned 
Stand-by navigation instruments 
Communications can be 
independently tuned 
Stand-by 
navigation 
instruments 
Communications 
can be 
independently 
tuned 
Stand-by navigation 
instruments 
CNBP can 
independently tune 
radios 
Bus Interface Unit 
(BIU) provides backup 
in the event of MC 
failures 
Table 35: Summary of Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance in Flight Management Systems 
 
 
  
 340  
Appendix B – Attributes of Lifecycle Products 
This appendix lists in full the attributes of each respective lifecycle products defined by 
the CSAL framework (refer Chapter 5). Greyed-out attributes are not applicable the 
specific lifecycle product. 
Attributes of Specified Constraint Level Requirements 
(specified at the level of the architectural constraint, and at the level at which 
requirements are allocated to hardware and software) 
Attributes Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Existence 
Group 
     
Defined / 
Developed / 
Produced / 
Integrated 
Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements for constraint 
{constraint} do not exist – therefore 
there is no basis for the relevant 
behaviour existing. 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable 
Specification 
Group 
     
Accurate /  
Consistent / 
Complete 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements isn’t accurate / 
consistent / complete – therefore, 
there is potential for other lifecycle 
products or translations to refine or 
implement the behaviour erroneously. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Unambiguous 
/ Precise 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements is ambiguous and/or 
imprecise – therefore, there is 
potential for other lifecycle products 
or translations to misinterpret the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Verifiable The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements cannot be verified 
(analytically or empirically) – 
therefore verification evidence for the 
constraint may not exist or may be 
irrelevant. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Validatable The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements cannot be validated 
(analytically or empirically) – 
therefore validation evidence for the 
constraint may not exist or may be 
irrelevant. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Higher 
     
Traceable to 
Lower 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements has no traceability to a 
lower level refinement of the 
behaviour – therefore, there is no 
traceable basis for the refinement of 
the relevant Specified Constraint 
Level Requirements existing in the 
design 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
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Attributes Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Compatible 
with Target  
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements isn’t compatible with 
the target implementation – therefore, 
the specification of the constraint is 
unverifiable and additional 
behaviours that violate the constraint 
may be exhibited by the target. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Verification 
Group 
     
Coverage of 
Self 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement hasn’t been covered by 
verification – therefore the 
specification of the constraint hasn’t 
been verified. 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Higher 
     
Robust with 
Higher 
     
Coverage of 
Higher 
     
Validation 
Group 
     
Consistent 
with Safety 
Objective 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement isn’t consistent with 
safety objectives – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Consistent 
with Other 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement isn’t consistent with 
other constraints – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Non-
Interference 
with Other 
The Specified Constraint Level 
Requirement infers with other 
constraints – therefore the constraint 
may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Resolution of 
Inadequacies 
     
Inadequacies 
in Specified 
Constraint 
Level 
Requirements 
are identified 
and resolved 
Compliance, robustness, traceability, 
verification and validation may 
identify inadequacies in Specified 
Constraint Level Requirements – 
therefore the behaviours implemented 
may not be consistent with the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Table 36: Attributes of Specified Constraint Level Requirements 
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Attributes of Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
(optional, and refined from Specified Constraint Level Requirements, while still being 
abstract from Low Level Requirements, and used to provide a means making claims 
from evidence that cannot be produced directly against Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements or Low Level Requirements) 
Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Existence 
Group 
     
Defined / 
Developed / 
Produced / 
Integrated 
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for constraint {constraint} do not 
exist – therefore there is no basis for 
the relevant behaviour existing. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Specification 
Group 
     
Accurate /   
Consistent / 
Complete 
Refined Abstract Level Requirement 
for constraint {constraint} isn’t 
accurate / consistent / complete – 
therefore, there is potential for other 
lifecycle products to refine or 
implement the behaviour erroneously. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Unambiguous 
/ Precise 
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for constraint {constraint} are 
ambiguous and/or imprecise – 
therefore, there is potential for other 
lifecycle products or translations to 
misinterpret the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Verifiable Refined Abstract Level Requirement 
for constraint {constraint} cannot be 
verified (analytically or empirically) – 
therefore verification evidence for the 
constraint will not exist or be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Validatable Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for constraint {constraint} cannot be 
validated (analytically or empirically) 
– therefore validation evidence for the 
constraint may not exist for me 
irrelevant. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Higher  
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for constraint {constraint} aren’t 
traceability to the higher level 
Requirements associated with the 
constraint {constraint} – therefore, 
the behaviours specified by this 
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
may not be consistent with the 
constraint 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Lower  
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for the constraint {constraint} aren’t 
traceability to a lower level 
refinement of the behaviour – 
therefore, there is no basis for the 
refinement of the relevant Abstract 
Level Requirement existing in the 
design 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Compatible 
with Target  
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
for the constraint {constraint} aren’t 
compatible with the target 
implementation – therefore, the 
specification of the constraint is 
unverifiable and additional 
behaviours that violate the constraint 
may be exhibited by the target. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Verification 
Group 
     
Coverage of 
Self 
Refined Abstract Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} haven’t been 
covered by verification – therefore 
the requirement hasn’t been verified. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Higher  
Refined Abstract Requirement for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
compliant with the Higher Level 
Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours specified by the Refined 
Abstract Level Requirements are not 
consistent with the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Higher  
Refined Abstract Requirement for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t robust 
with the Higher Level Requirements 
– therefore, the behaviours specified 
by the Refined Abstract Level 
Requirements may not be resilient to 
faults that might violate the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Higher 
Refined Abstract Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t verified 
against all related Specified 
Constraint Level Requirements – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented may not be consistent 
with the constraint 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Validation 
Group 
     
Consistent 
with Safety 
Objective 
Refined Abstract Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
consistent with safety objectives – 
therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Consistent 
with Other 
Refined Abstract Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
consistent with other constraints – 
therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Non-
Interference 
with Other 
Refined Abstract Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} interferes with 
other constraints – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Inadequacies 
Resolved 
     
Inadequacies 
in Refined 
Abstract 
Level 
Requirements 
are identified 
and resolved 
Compliance, robustness, traceability, 
verification, and validation may 
identify inadequacies in Refined 
Abstract Level Requirements – 
therefore the behaviours implemented 
may not be consistent with the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Table 37: Attributes of Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
 344  
Attributes of Low Level / Detailed Design Requirements 
(specified such that no additional refinement is required for logical implementation and 
all behaviours of the implementation are described by requirements) 
Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Existence 
Group 
     
Defined / 
Developed / 
Produced / 
Integrated 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} do not exist – 
therefore there is no basis for relevant 
behaviour existing in software 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Specification 
Group 
     
Accurate /  
Consistent / 
Complete 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t accurate 
/ consistent / complete – therefore, 
there is potential for other lifecycle 
products to refine or implement the 
behaviour erroneously 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Unambiguous 
/ Precise 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} are ambiguous 
or imprecise – therefore, there is 
potential for other lifecycle products 
to misinterpret the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Verifiable Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} cannot be 
verified (analytically or empirically) – 
therefore verification evidence for the 
refinement of the constraint will not 
exist or be invalid 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Validatable Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} cannot be 
validated (analytically or empirically) 
– therefore validation evidence for the 
refinement of the constraint will not 
exist or be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Higher  
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
traceability to higher level 
requirements – therefore, behaviours 
specified by Low Level Requirements 
may not be consistent with the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Lower 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
traceability to an implementation 
level refinement of the behaviour – 
therefore, there is no basis for the 
refinement of the Low Level 
Requirements existing in the 
implementation. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compatible 
with Target  
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
compatible with the target computer – 
therefore specification of the 
constraint is unverifiable and 
behaviours that violate the constraint 
may be exhibited by the target. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying 
Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Verification 
Group 
     
Coverage of 
Self 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} haven’t been 
covered by verification – therefore 
the requirements haven’t been 
verified. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Higher  
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t 
compliant with the higher level 
requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours specified by the Low 
Level Requirements are not consistent 
with the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Higher  
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t robust 
with the higher level requirements – 
therefore, the behaviours specified by 
the Low Level Requirements may not 
be resilient to sources of faults that 
might violate the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Higher 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} aren’t verified 
against all related higher level 
requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Validation 
Group 
     
Consistent 
with Safety 
Objective 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} isn’t 
consistent with safety objectives – 
therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Consistent 
with Other 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} isn’t 
consistent with other constraints – 
therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Non-
Interference 
with Other 
Low Level Requirements for 
constraint {constraint} interferes with 
other constraints – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Inadequacies 
Resolved 
     
Inadequacies 
in Low Level 
Requirements 
are identified 
and resolved 
Compliance, robustness, traceability, 
verification and validation may 
identify inadequacies in Low Level 
Requirements – therefore the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Table 38: Attributes of Low Level Requirements 
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Attributes of Logical Implementation (‘Human Readable’) 
(parser, compiler, assembler or translation tool readable code) 
Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Existence 
Group 
     
Defined / 
Developed / 
Produced / 
Integrated 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} does not exist – therefore 
no basis for the relevant behaviour 
existing. 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable 
Specification 
Group 
     
Accurate /  
Consistent / 
Complete 
Logical Implementation for the 
constraint {constraint} is incorrect – 
therefore, the implementation will 
contain an erroneous behaviour. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Unambiguous 
/ Precise 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} is ambiguous or 
imprecise – therefore, there is 
potential for implementation of other 
components or translations to 
misinterpret the constraint and 
introduce vulnerabilities that violate 
the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Verifiable Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} cannot be verified 
(analytically or empirically) – 
therefore verification evidence for the 
implementation of the constraint may 
not exist or may be invalid. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Validatable Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} cannot be validated 
(analytically or empirically) – 
therefore validation evidence for the 
implementation of the constraint may 
not exist or be invalid. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Higher  
{Low Level 
Require-
ments} 
Logical Implementation isn’t 
traceability to the Low Level 
Requirements associated with the 
constraint {constraint} – therefore, 
the behaviours implemented may not 
be consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Lower 
{Logical 
Implement-
ation – 
Machine 
Readable / 
Physical} 
Logical Implementation for the 
constraint {constraint} isn’t 
traceability to the Machine Readable 
Logical Implementation or Physical 
Implementation – therefore, there is 
no basis for the complete refinement 
existing in the implementation. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compatible 
with Target  
Logical Implementation for the 
constraint {constraint} isn’t 
compatible with the target – therefore, 
the implementation of the constraint 
is invalid and additional behaviours 
that violate the constraint may be 
exhibited by the target 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Verification 
Group 
     
Coverage of 
Self 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} hasn’t been covered by 
verification – therefore the 
implementation hasn’t been verified. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Low 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} isn’t compliant with the 
Low Level Requirements – therefore, 
the behaviours implemented are not 
consistent with the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Low Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} isn’t robust with the Low 
Level Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
resilient to sources of faults that 
might violate the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Low Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} isn’t verified against 
related requirements – therefore, the 
behaviour implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Validation 
Group 
     
Consistent 
with Safety 
Objective 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} isn’t consistent with 
safety objectives – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Consistent 
with Other 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} isn’t consistent with 
other constraints – therefore the 
constraint may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Non-
Interference 
with Other 
Logical Implementation for constraint 
{constraint} interferes with other 
constraints – therefore the constraint 
may be invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Inadequacies 
Resolved 
     
Inadequacies 
in Logical 
Implement-
ation are 
identified and 
resolved 
Compliance, robustness, traceability 
verification, and validation may 
identify inadequacies in 
implementation – therefore the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Table 39: Attributes of Logical Implementation (‘Human Readable’) 
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Attributes of Logical Implementation (‘Machine Readable’)  
(executable object code, binary implementation, physical devices) 
Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Existence 
Group 
     
Defined / 
Developed / 
Produced / 
Integrated 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for the constraint 
{constraint} has not been produced or 
integrated – therefore no basis for the 
refinement of the relevant behaviours 
of the constraint existing in the 
implementation 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable 
Specification 
Group 
     
Accurate /  
Consistent / 
Complete 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for the constraint 
{constraint} is incorrect – therefore, 
the implementation will contain an 
erroneous behaviour. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Unambiguous 
/ Precise 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
is ambiguous or imprecise – 
therefore, there is potential for 
implementation of other components 
or translations to misinterpret the 
constraint and introduce 
vulnerabilities that violate the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Verifiable Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
cannot be verified (analytically or 
empirically) – therefore verification 
evidence for the implementation of 
the constraint may not exist or may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Validatable Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
cannot be validated (analytically or 
empirically) – therefore validation 
evidence for the implementation of 
the constraint may not exist or be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Higher 
{Logical 
Implement-
ation – 
Human 
Readable} 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t traceability to the Logical 
Implementation Human Readable 
associated with the constraint 
{constraint} – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Traceable to 
Lower  
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Compatible 
with Target  
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for the constraint 
{constraint} isn’t compatible with the 
target – therefore, the implementation 
of the constraint is invalid and 
additional behaviours that violate the 
constraint may be exhibited by the 
target 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Verification 
Group 
     
Coverage of 
Self 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
hasn’t been covered by verification – 
therefore the implementation hasn’t 
been verified. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Specified 
Constraint 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
compliant with the Specified 
Constraint Level Requirements – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented are not consistent with 
the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Robust with 
Specified 
Constraint 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t robust with the Specified 
Constraint Level Requirements – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented may not be resilient to 
sources of faults that might violate the 
constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Constrained Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Specified 
Constraint 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t verified against all applicable 
Specified Constraint Level 
Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Refined 
Abstract 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t compliant with the Refined 
Abstract Level Requirements – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented are not consistent with 
the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Refined 
Abstract 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t robust with the Refined Abstract 
Level Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
resilient to sources of faults that may 
violate the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Refined 
Abstract 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t verified against all applicable 
Refined Abstract Level Requirements 
– therefore, the behaviours 
implemented may not be consistent 
with the constraint. 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Compliant 
with Low 
Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t compliant with the Low Level 
Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented are not 
consistent with the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Low Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t robust with the Low Level 
Requirements – therefore, the 
behaviours implemented may not be 
resilient to sources of faults that may 
violate the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Low Level 
Requirements 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint}  
isn’t verified against all applicable 
Low Level Requirements – therefore, 
the behaviours implemented by the 
software may not be consistent with 
the constraint 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Compliant 
with Logical 
Implement-
ation Human 
Readable 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t compliant with the Logical 
Implementation Human Readable – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented are not consistent with 
the constraint. 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Robust with 
Logical 
Implement-
ation Human 
Readable 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint}  
isn’t robust with the Logical 
Implementation Human Readable – 
therefore, the behaviours 
implemented by the software may not 
be resilient to sources of faults that 
may violate the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Coverage of 
Logical 
Implement-
ation Human 
Readable 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint}  
hasn’t exercised all behaviours of the 
Logical Implementation Human 
Readable relevant to the constraint – 
therefore, there may be additional 
behaviours of the source code which 
violate the constraint 
Intolerable Intolerable Tolerable Tolerable 
Validation 
Group 
     
Consistent 
with Safety 
Objective 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t consistent with safety objectives 
– therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Consistent 
with Other 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
isn’t consistent with other constraints 
– therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
Non-
Interference 
with Other 
Logical Implementation Machine 
Readable for constraint {constraint} 
interferes with other constraints – 
therefore the constraint may be 
invalid. 
Intolerable Constrained Constrained Tolerable 
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Attribute Impact of NOT Satisfying Tolerability of Limitations in Satisfying 
CSAL3 CSAL2 CSAL1 CSAL0 
Inadequacies 
Resolved 
     
Inadequacies 
in Executable 
Object Code 
are identified 
and resolved 
Compliance, robustness, traceability 
and verification may identify 
inadequacies in Logical 
Implementation Machine Readable – 
therefore the behaviours implemented 
by the software may not be consistent 
or complete with the constraint 
Intolerable Constrained Tolerable Tolerable 
Table 40: Attributes of Logical Implementation (‘Machine Readable’) 
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Appendix C – Tender/Contract DRL and DIDs 
This appendix provides the Data Requirements List (DRL) and Data Items Descriptions 
(DID)s for Tender and Contract documentation (refer to Chapter 7). 
Tender DRL 
TDRL
#
 Title 
ENG-120 Safety Assurance Plan 
ENG-121 Development Plan 
ENG-511 Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document 
ENG-521 Exemplar Safety Assurance Case 
Key 
#: TDRL numbers integrated to (Defence Materiel Organisation , 2012) numbering sequence. 
Table 41: Tender Data Requirements List (TDRL) 
Contract DRL 
CDRL
#
 Title Delivery Schedule 
Drafts Final 
ENG-120 Safety Assurance Plan Refer 
Tender 
ED+20 
ENG-121 Development Plan Refer 
Tender 
ED+20 
ENG-511 Architectural Assurance Document SRR-20 
SDR-20 
PDR-20 
CDR-20 
TRR-20 
FCR-40 
ENG-521 Safety Assurance Case SRR-20 
SDR-20 
PDR-20 
CDR-20 
TRR-20 
FCR-40 
ENG-522 Safety Assurance Summary SRR-20 
SDR-20 
PDR-20 
CDR-20 
TRR-20 
FCR-40 
CM-120 Configuration Index TRR-20 FCR-20 
Key 
#: TDRL numbers integrated to (Defence Materiel Organisation , 2012) numbering sequence. 
ED = Effective Date, SRR = Systems Requirements Review, SDR = Systems Design Review, PDR = 
Preliminary Design Review, CDR = Critical Design Review, TRR = Test Readiness Review, FCR = Final 
Certification Review 
Note that the lead and lag timeframes specified above are notional for illustration purposes and may be 
adjusted pre-contract signature by the contract preparer to suit specific project lifecycle requirements. 
Table 42: Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) 
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DIDs 
DID NUMBER: ENG-120 
TITLE: SAFETY ASSURANCE PLAN (TENDER / CONTRACT) 
DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE 
The purpose of the Safety Assurance Plan is to describe the [Tenderer/Contractor] 
proposed approach to assurance of constraints, claims assurance and evidence 
assurance. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] uses the Safety Assurance Plan to describe how they will 
demonstrate tolerability of limitations in evidence for constraints. 
The [Acquirer] uses the Safety Assurance Plan to evaluate if the limitations in evidence 
are tolerable for constraints. 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
The Safety Assurance Plan is subordinate to the following data items, where these data 
items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Tenderer/Contractor Engineering Management Plan 
• System Safety Program Plan 
The Safety Assurance Plan inter-relates with the following data items, where these data 
items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Development Plan 
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents form a part of this DID to the extent specified herein: 
• [List any [Acquirer] or [Tenderer/Contractor] specific documents that are required 
to form part of this DID – tender/contract specific] 
PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Generic Format and Content 
The data item shall comply with the general format, content and preparation instructions 
contained in the section entitled “General Requirements for Data Items”. 
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Specific Content 
System Overview. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide a descriptive overview of 
the system and architecture to which this plan relates. 
Assurance of Constraints 
Proposal of CSAL. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the Claims Safety 
Assurance Level (CSAL) proposed for each constraint described by the [Conceptual 
Architectural Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance Document] as per [Table 
19]. 
Assurance of Evidence 
Proposal of ESAL. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the Evidence Safety 
Assurance Level (ESAL) proposed for each attribute for each constraint described by 
the [Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance 
Document] as per [Table 19]. 
Assessing the Evidence. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe how the evidence 
produced from the application of the [Tenderer/Contractor] proposed methods and 
techniques (as described by the [Tenderer/Contractor] proposed [Development Plan] are 
proposed to achieve the Evidence Safety Assurance Level (ESAL) requirements for 
tolerability of limitations as defined in [Table 24]; for each attribute of each lifecycle 
product [per Appendix B], at the CSAL [defined per Table 19] and as described in the 
[Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance Document] 
for each proposed constraint type. Where the strategy for attributes is common across 
groups of constraint types, then the information need not be duplicated, provided there 
is traceability for each proposed constraint type. 
Support for Certification Evaluation. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the 
means, either via provision of evidence or via access provisions to tenderer facilities and 
data, for the [Acquirer] to inspect or review all evidence, both new and existing, from 
the application of [Tenderer/Contractor] proposed methods and techniques for the 
purposes of certification evaluation by the [Acquirer]. 
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DID NUMBER: ENG-121 
TITLE: DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE 
The purpose of the Development Plan is to describe the [Tenderer/Contractor] proposed 
development strategy and execution. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] uses the Development Plan to describe the methods and 
techniques proposed and their relationship to the development lifecycle. 
The [Acquirer] uses the Development Plan to evaluate the suitability of development 
lifecycle, methods and techniques, and the suitability of sources of evidence. 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
The Development Plan is subordinate to the following data items, where these data 
items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Tenderer/Contractor Engineering Management Plan 
The Development Plan inter-relates with the following data items, where these data 
items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Safety Assurance Plan 
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents form a part of this DID to the extent specified herein: 
• [List any [Acquirer] or [Tenderer/Contractor] specific documents that are required 
to form part of this DID – tender/contract specific] 
PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Generic Format and Content 
The data item shall comply with the general format, content and preparation instructions 
contained in the section entitled “General Requirements for Data Items”. 
Specific Content 
System Overview. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide a descriptive overview of 
the system and architecture to which this plan relates. 
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Overview of Required Work. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide an overview of 
required work, including product, processes and data. 
General Plans 
Development Process. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the lifecycle, and the 
applicable lifecycle products and their hierarchy. 
Standards. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the standards to be applied for 
certification liaison, planning, reviews and audits, configuration management, quality 
assurance, requirements analysis, safety and security, design development, verification 
and validation, corrective actions, release to service, and documentation. 
Detailed Plans 
Processes and Procedures. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe process and 
procedures to be used for certification liaison, planning, reviews and audits, 
configuration management, quality assurance, requirements analysis, safety and 
security, design development, verification and validation, corrective actions, release to 
service, and documentation. 
Methods. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the methods and techniques 
proposed to be used throughout the development lifecycle, including description of 
techniques or methods used prior to this development but for which evidence is 
relevant. The [Tenderer] shall describe how all evidence, both new and existing, or 
produced from the application of [Tenderer] proposed methods and techniques will be 
documented, stored, and retrievable. 
CDRL Delivery. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe how [CDRLs] will be 
produced throughout the development lifecycle, per the delivery timeframes specified at 
the [CDRL]. 
Schedule of Activities. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe schedule including 
lifecycle processes, activities, milestones and deliverables; any dependencies between 
schedule elements are also to be described. 
Project Organisation and Resources. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe the 
organisational structure, including the organisations involved, their relationships, and 
authority and responsibilities of each organisation. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall 
describe the personnel resources and facilities; as well as any acquirer-furnished 
equipment, services, data and facilities.  
 357  
DID NUMBER: ENG-511 
TITLE: CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURAL SUITABILITY DOCUMENT 
(TENDER) / ARCHITECTURAL ASSURANCE DOCUMENT (CONTRACT) 
DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE 
The purpose of the [Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document/Architectural 
Assurance Document] is to describe and justify the suitability of the architecture, 
defences, and constraints with respect the architectural assurance criteria. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] uses the document to describe and justify the suitability of 
the architecture, defences, and constraints with respect the architectural assurance 
criteria. 
The [Acquirer] uses the document to evaluate the suitability of architecture, defences, 
and constraints with respect to architectural assurance criteria. 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
The [Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document/Architectural Assurance 
Document] is subordinate to the following data items, where these data items are 
required under the tender/contract: 
• Tenderer/Contractor Engineering Management Plan 
• Development Plan 
• System Safety Program Plan 
The [Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document/Architectural Assurance 
Document] inter-relates with the following data items, where these data items are 
required under the tender/contract: 
• Requirements Data 
• Design Data 
• Safety Lifecycle Data 
• Hazard Log 
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents form a part of this DID to the extent specified herein: 
• [List any [Acquirer] or [Tenderer/Contractor] specific documents that are required 
to form part of this DID – tender/contract specific] 
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PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Generic Format and Content 
The data item shall comply with the general format, content and preparation instructions 
contained in the section entitled “General Requirements for Data Items”. 
Specific Content 
System Overview. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide a descriptive overview of 
the system and architecture to which this plan relates. 
Architectural Description. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe architecture of the 
system including: 
• architectural structure including sub-systems, equipment, hardware and software; 
• interfaces and communications between sub-systems, equipment, hardware and 
software; 
• references to hazards, consequences and severities; 
• sources of faults/events; 
• error, fault/event, and failure mode propagation paths and transformations; and 
• defences including fault/error prevention and fault tolerance including direct 
defences, intra-system defences, extra-system defences, external defences, 
severity reduction defences and external severity reduction defences. 
Layers of Defence. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe how the architecture and 
mechanisms for achieving fault prevention and fault tolerance meets the Architectural 
Safety Assurance Level (ASAL) requirements defined in [Table 15]. The 
[Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide safety risk based justification of any deviations 
from ASAL criteria. 
Adequate Constraints. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe how each constraint 
(i.e. absence assertion or detection and handling mechanism) is proposed to achieve the 
ASAL Architecturally Layered Fault Prevention and Fault Tolerance Requirements as 
defined in [Table 16]; or be shown to provide an equivalent level of fault prevention and 
fault tolerance by alternative means. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide safety risk 
based justification of any deviations from ASAL criteria. 
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DID NUMBER: ENG-521 
TITLE: EXEMPLAR SAFETY ASSURANCE CASE (TENDER) / SAFETY 
ASSURANCE CASE (CONTRACT) 
DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE 
The purpose of the [Exemplar Safety Assurance Case / Safety Assurance Case] is to 
describe the [Tenderer/Contractor] approach to justification of safety assurance. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] uses the [Exemplar Safety Assurance Case / Safety 
Assurance Case] to describe how they will justify confidence in knowledge and 
treatment of risks taking into account architectural, claims and evidence assurance. 
The [Acquirer] uses the [Exemplar Safety Assurance Case / Safety Assurance Case] to 
evaluate [if the strategy for safety assurance is likely to meet / safety assurance has met] 
acquirer requirements for confidence in knowledge and treatment of risks. 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
The [Exemplar Safety Assurance Case / Safety Assurance Case] is subordinate to the 
following data items, where these data items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Tenderer/Contractor Engineering Management Plan 
• System Safety Program Plan 
The Safety Assurance Plan [Exemplar Safety Assurance Case / Safety Assurance Case] 
inter-relates with the following data items, where these data items are required under the 
tender/contract: 
• Development Plan 
• Safety Assurance Plan 
• [Conceptual Architectural Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance 
Document] 
• [Safety Assurance Summary] 
• Safety Lifecycle Data, Hazard Log, Safety Case 
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents form a part of this DID to the extent specified herein: 
• [List any [Acquirer] or [Tenderer/Contractor] specific documents that are required 
to form part of this DID – tender/contract specific] 
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PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Generic Format and Content 
The data item shall comply with the general format, content and preparation instructions 
contained in the section entitled “General Requirements for Data Items”. 
Specific Content 
System Overview. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide a descriptive overview of 
the system and architecture to which this plan relates. 
System Operation. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe: 
• operational, testing and maintenance activities which may be hazardous to system 
or personnel; 
• essential safety features for operations, test and maintenance; 
• anticipated operational environment from conception to disposal; 
• dependencies on support facilities. 
System Safety Engineering. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall describe: 
• criteria/methodologies used to classify and evaluate hazards; 
• how hazards were analysed from architectural, hardware, software and human 
factors perspectives, including consideration of the design, operational and 
disposal lifecycles; 
• describe and summarise the analyses, development, verification and validation 
performed to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat and retain risks; 
• [Tender Only] The [Tenderer] shall describe the implementation of the ASAL, 
CSAL and ESAL framework for at least one constraint in each generalised 
category, type or class of constraint proposed. The [Tenderer] shall describe the 
set of categories, types or classes by which they have categorised the proposed 
constraints.  
• [Contract Only] The [Contractor] shall describe how the safety objectives, and 
safety assurance requirements of the contract SOR have been achieved, and to 
provide the arguments and evidence to show the satisfaction of 
ASAL/CSAL/ESAL criteria for each defence/constraint. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] is free to propose how the information is presented (tabular 
or using an argument notation such as goal structuring notation), the emphasis on 
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understanding how constraints will be assured and the evidence presented to 
demonstrate that.  
Conclusions and Recommendations. The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall: 
• assess the results of the safety assurance program and establish how confidence on 
identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment and retention of risks has been 
established to acquirer satisfaction; and 
• provide recommendations for treatments of risks where the confidence in 
knowledge of risks has not been established. 
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DID NUMBER: ENG-522 
TITLE: SAFETY ASSURANCE SUMMARY 
DESCRIPTION AND INTENDED USE 
The purpose of the Safety Assurance Summary is to describe and justify the tolerability 
of limitations of evidence with respect the claims and evidence assurance criteria. 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] uses the document to describe and justify the tolerability of 
limitations of evidence with respect the claims and evidence assurance criteria. 
The [Acquirer] uses the document to evaluate the tolerability of limitations of evidence 
with respect the claims and evidence assurance criteria. 
INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
The Safety Assurance Summary is subordinate to the following data items, where these 
data items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Tenderer/Contractor Engineering Management Plan 
• Development Plan 
• System Safety Program Plan 
The Safety Assurance Summary inter-relates with the following data items, where these 
data items are required under the tender/contract: 
• Requirements Data 
• Design Data 
• Safety Lifecycle Data 
• Hazard Log 
PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
Generic Format and Content 
The data item shall comply with the general format, content and preparation instructions 
contained in the section entitled “General Requirements for Data Items”. 
Specific Content 
System Overview 
The [Tenderer/Contractor] shall provide a descriptive overview of the system and 
architecture to which this plan relates. 
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Achievement of Claims and Attributes of Software Lifecycle Products 
The [Contractor] shall describe the attributes that have been assured, for each software 
lifecycle product, for each constraint described in the [Conceptual Architectural 
Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance Document]. The [Contractor] shall 
describe the Claims Safety Assurance Level (CSAL) established for each constraint as 
per [Table 20]. 
Assessing the Evidence 
The [Contractor] shall describe how the evidence produced from the application of the 
[Contractor] proposed methods and techniques has assured the tolerability of limitations 
in evidence with respect to relevance, trustworthiness and results, for each attribute of 
each software lifecycle product, for each constraint described in the [Conceptual 
Architectural Suitability Document / Architectural Assurance Document].  
The [Contractor] shall describe how the evidence produced from the application of the 
[Contractor] proposed methods and techniques achieves the Evidence Safety Assurance 
Level (ESAL) requirements for tolerability of limitations as defined in [Table 24]; for 
each attribute of each lifecycle product [per Appendix B], at the CSAL [Table 19] for 
each constraint. 
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Appendix D – Survey Evaluation Form and Results 
Due to constraints on the size of this document, the survey evaluation form and raw 
results analysed in Chapter 10 have not been included within this thesis. Instead, this 
appendix lists the survey evaluation information provided on the enclosed CD. 
• Survey Evaluation Pack 
• Survey Evaluation Form 
• Consolidated Survey Evaluation and Workshop Results 
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Appendix E – Review of Historical Projects 
The following table summarises a review of numerous Australian Defence Force projects (avionics and software aspects) with respect to safety and 
software assurance. The review examined the project files at the Defence Materiel Organisation project offices and/or at the Directorate General 
Technical Airworthiness. The results are summarised to adhere to security classification and commercial restrictions. 
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41 This column describes if evidence was found of these measures being employed. It does not indicate the overall adequacy of the measures. Where limitations are identified, this 
was based on there being project office documentation pertaining to the issue. 
42 ADF Design Acceptance Strategy involves recognition of prior certification by another civil or military airworthiness authority. 
43 For a commercial contract, refers to the standard identified by the SOR and SOW. For FMS, refers to the contract between the US Government and the prime US contractor. 
44 Refer to prior footnote.  
45 Refers to risk retention by an official instrument such as an Issue Paper. 
46 FAA oversight of baseline type and modifications to civil equipment. 
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AIR 5216 
(C-130J) 
Acq Yes CC USAF USM No - - Yes No Lim Yes Lim Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes No 
AIR 5276 
(AP-3C) 
Mod - CC - USM No - - Yes No Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
AIR 5349 
(F/A-18F) 
Acq Yes FMS USN USM No - - No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Lim
50 
Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR 5367 
(LIF 
HAWK 
127) 
Acq Yes CC RAF UKM No UKM Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
AIR 5376 
(F/A-18 
HUG) 
Mod - FMS USN USM No - - No Yes Lim Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Lim
51 
Lim 
 
Yes Lim 
 
No Yes Yes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
47 ARP4754 for baseline type and modifications to civil certified equipment, MIL-STD-882C for military modifications. 
48 RTCA/DO-178B for baseline type and modification to civil certified equipment, no software assurance standard for military modifications 
49 Limitations are with respect to military capability systems, and this applies to requirements, design, implementation and verification evidence columns also. 
50 ITAR restrictions prevented ADF review of requirements, design, implementation and verification evidence. 
51 ITAR restrictions prevented ADF review of requirements, design, implementation and verification evidence. 
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(F-111 
Interim 
EWSP) 
Mod - CC - USM No - - Yes Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR 5398 
(F-111 
AGM-
142) 
Mod - CC/ 
FMS 
USAF
52 
USM No - - Yes Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR 5402 
(KC-30A) 
Acq Yes CC EASA53 / 
CASA
54 
CiSS No CiS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/
Lim
55 
Yes/
Lim 
Yes/
Lim 
Yes/
Lim 
No Yes Yes 
AIR 5418 
(F/A-18 
FOSOW) 
Mod - CC/ 
FMS 
USAF
56 
USM No - - Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Yes Yes Yes 
                                                 
52 Weapon acquisition only. 
53 EASA certification of the baseline aircraft type. 
54 CASA (Spanish) oversight of the military modifications. 
55 Limitations are with respect to on and off-board mission/flight planning system, and this applies to requirements, design, implementation and verification evidence. 
56 Weapon acquisition only. 
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AIR5440 
(C-130J 
Block 5.4) 
Mod - CC USAF USM No - - Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR5440 
(C-130J 
Block 6.1) 
Mod - CC USAF 
/ RAF 
USM No - - Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR5440 
(C-130J 
Block 7.0) 
Mod - FMS USAF 
/ RAF 
USM No - - Yes
57 
Yes
58 
Lim Yes Lim Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
AIR 8000 
(C-17) 
Acq No FMS USAF USM No - - No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
AIR 87 
(ARH 
Tiger) 
Acq Yes CC DGA CiSS No CiS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AIR 9000 
(MRH-90) 
Acq Yes CC DGA CiSS No CiS Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
                                                 
57 Program not completed at time of thesis, but risk retention is likely. 
58 Program not completed at time of thesis, but risk retention is likely. 
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AIR 9000 
(CH-47D 
T55 
Engine) 
Mod - FMS US 
Army 
USM No - - Yes Yes No Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
JP129 (I-
VIEW 
TUAV) 
Acq Yes CC - USM No - - Yes
59 
Yes
60 
Yes Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Yes Yes Yes 
MIS910 
(PC-9/A 
EFIS-GPS 
Upgrade) 
Mod - CC FOCA CiSS No CiS Yes Yes No Yes Yes Lim Yes Lim Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SEA 1405 
(S-70B-2 
FLIR and 
ESM) 
Mod - CC - USM Yes - - Yes Yes No Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
SEA 1411 
(SH-2G 
(A)) 
Acq Yes CC - - No - - Yes
61 
Yes
62 
No Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Yes Yes Yes 
                                                 
59 Program never released to service.  
60 Program never released to service. 
61 Program never released to service. 
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S-70A-9 
and CH-
47D GPS  
Mod - SPO - - No - - Yes Yes No Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim Lim No Yes Yes 
Key to annotations: 
Acq – New Aircraft Acquisition 
Mod – Modification to existing ADF Type 
CC – Commercial Contract 
FMS – Foreign Military Sales 
 
SPO – System Program Office conducts integration 
 
CASA – Spanish Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. 
CiSS – Civil Paradigm Safety Assurance Standards – ARP 4754 and ARP 4761 
CiS – Civil Paradigm Software Assurance Standards – RTCA/DO-178A/B 
DGA – French General Directorate for Armament 
EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration 
FOCA – Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation 
RAF – Royal Air Force 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USM – United States Military Safety Assurance Standards – MIL-STD-882C/D 
UKM – United Kingdom Safety Assurance and /or Software Assurance Standard – DefStan 00-56 
Iss 2 or DefStan 00-55 Iss 2 
USN – United States Navy 
 
Lim – Limitations of achievement thereof. Note to be a limitation, the issue must feature in project 
office documentation and have been subject to decision on treatment or otherwise. 
 
Table 43: Review of Historical Projects
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
62 Program never released to service. 
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Glossary 
AA Airworthiness Authority 
AC Advisory Circular (FAA) 
ACE Actuator Control Electronics 
ACP Assurance Claim Point 
ACQ Acquisition 
ADF Australian Defence Force 
ADF Automatic Direction Finding 
ADIRU Air Data and Inertial Reference Unit 
AEL Assurance Evidence Level 
AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control 
AFCS Automatic Flight Control System 
AFDC Autopilot Flight Director Computers 
AGM Air to Ground Missile 
AIMS Airplane Information Management System 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance (EASA) 
AMU Avionics Management Unit 
AOA Angle of Attack 
ARH Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter 
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated 
ARM Argumentation Meta-model 
ASAL Architectural Safety Assurance Level 
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
AVMUX Avionic Multiplex Bus 
BBN Bayesian Belief Network 
BIT Built In Test 
372 
BITAR Buying Information To Avoid Risk 
BIU Bus Interface Unit 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority (United Kingdom) 
CAE Claims-Argument-Evidence (Adelard)   
CAS Control Augmentation System 
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia) 
CASA Spanish Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. 
CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 
CC Commercial Contract 
CD Compact Disc 
CDRL Contract Data Requirements List 
CIT Combined Interrogator Transponder 
CSAL Claims Safety Assurance Level 
CM Configuration Management 
CNBP Communication Navigation Breaker Panel 
CNI-MS Communication Navigation Identification – Management System 
CNI-SP Communication Navigation Identification – System Processor 
CPM Core Processor Modules 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CS Certification Specification 
DAL Design Assurance Level 
DCG Data Conversion Gateway 
DDI Digital Display Indicator 
DEFSTAN Defence Standard (United Kingdom) 
DEL Direct Electrical Link 
DGA General Directorate for Armament (French) 
DID Data Item Description 
373 
DoD Department of Defense (United States of America) 
DMC Digital Map Computer 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment 
DMO Defence Materiel Organisation (Australian Department of Defence) 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ECAM Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor 
EDIU Engine Data Interface Unit 
EEPE Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic 
EGI Embedded GPS / INS 
ENG Engineering (in relation to Data Item Descriptions) 
EOI Expression of Interest 
ESAL Evidence Safety Assurance Level 
ESM Electronic Surveillance Measures 
EWSP Electronic Warfare Self Protection 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (United States of America) 
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Controller 
FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrators 
FCPC Flight Control Primary Computers 
FHA Functional Hazard Assessment 
FLIR Forward Looking Infra-Red 
FM Formal Methods 
FMGC Flight Management Guidance Computer 
FMS Flight Management System 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
FOCA Federal Office of Civil Aviation (Switzerland) 
FOSOW Follow-On Stand-Off Weapon 
374 
FPTA Fault Propagation and Transformation Analysis 
FPTN Fault Propagation and Transformation Notation 
FSEU Flap Slat Electronics Unit 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GPS Global Position System 
GSN Goal Structuring Notation 
HF High Frequency 
HUD Heads-Up Display 
HUG Hornet Upgrade Program 
IBIT Initiated Built In Test 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IFF Identify Friend or Foe 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IO Input Output 
IOM Input Output Module 
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation 
IT Information Technology 
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
JSSSC Joint Software System Safety Committee 
LIM Limitations 
MAA Military Airworthiness Authority 
MC Mission Computer 
MCDU Multipurpose Control and Display Units 
MECH Mechanical 
375 
MIL-STD Military Standard (United States) 
MOD Modification 
MoD Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom) 
MRH Multi-Role Helicopter 
MSO Military Standard Order 
NAA National Airworthiness Authority 
ND Navigation Display 
OMG Object Management Group 
OO Object Oriented 
PBIT Periodic Bit 
PDF Probability Distribution Function 
PFC Primary Flight Computers 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PSEU Proximity Switch Electronics Unit 
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RPEQ Registered Professional Engineer of Queensland 
RT Remote Terminal 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SAARU Standby Attribute and Air Data Reference Unit 
SACM Structured Assurance Case Meta-model 
SAEM Software Assurance Evidence Meta-model 
SAL Safety Assurance Level 
SCEFC Spoiler Control / Electronic Flap Computers 
SEAL Safety Evidence Assurance Level 
SHRI Software Hazard Risk Index 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
376 
SPO Systems Program Office 
SPR System/Software Problem Report 
SSA System Safety Assessment 
SSEI Software Systems Engineering Initiative 
SSSH Software System Safety Handbook 
TACAN Tactical Air Navigation 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
TSO Technical Standard Order 
TUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UFC Up Front Controller 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UK United Kingdom 
USAF United States Air Force 
USN United States Navy 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VOR Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Ranging 
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